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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the agency of minority groups and their international allies in 
reshaping the international protection regime for national, ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities to include new group-specific norms. The practices of “norm 
entrepreneurship” by two groups, Dalits and Afro-descendants, are considered in detail 
and contrasted with the experiences of similar norm entrepreneurship by indigenous 
peoples and Roma. Dalit and Affo-descendant activists have pursued norm emergence 
to establish group-specific recognition, standards and mechanisms at the international 
level. This thesis examines three key factors that have been instrumental to this group- 
specific norm emergence: the establishment of strategic frames and stronger forms of 
transnational mobilisation by each group; the supportive engagement of international 
actors; and the emergence of new political opportunity structures at the international 
level, in particular the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR).
The findings of the thesis provide insight into macro-level changes to international 
minority protection. By concentrating on the agency of minority groups, the thesis adds 
to the largely state-centred literature on minority protection. By critically assessing the 
role of international actors in aiding this norm entrepreneurship, the thesis helps to 
uncover their limitations, interests and ideational commitments. The findings contribute 
to norm entrepreneurship studies by considering a unique kind of transnational non-state 
actor, one that possesses the latent capacity for statehood. The capacity of weak non­
state actors to achieve norm emergence even without state support is demonstrated but 
the deep challenges they face in securing group-specific norms are exposed. On a 
normative level, the findings give a glimpse of how emerging norms for transnational 
minority groups could alter conventions of representation in international society, 
creating post-Westphalian forms of political community. On a policy level, the findings 
provide some useful inputs on how to strengthen these new forms of political 
community and how to enable adherence to emerging group-specific norms.
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A b b r e v ia t io n s  an d  A c r o n y m s
ACJP - Ambedkar Centre for Justice and Peace
ADEPHCA - Asociacion de Desarrollo y Promotion Humana de la Costa Atlantica
ADRM - Asian Dalit Rights Movement
AECI - Spanish Agency for International Cooperation
AFRODES - Asociacion de Afrocolombianos Desplazados
AI - Amnesty International
Alianza - La Alianza Estrategica de Afro-Latinamericanos 
BLL - Buraku Liberation League 
CBC - US Congressional Black Caucus
CEDEHCA - El Centro de Derechos Humanos, Ciudadanos y Autonomicos 
CEDET - Centro de Desarrollo Etnico
CEJUDHCAN - Centro por la Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Costa Atlantica de 
Nicaragua
CEE -  Central and Eastern Europe
CEMIRIDE - Centre for Minority Rights Development
CERD -  UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CESCR -  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CCFD - Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development
CIMARRON - Afro-Colombian National Movement CIMARRON
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
COCEN - Council Working Group on Enlargement
CoE -  Council of Europe
Commission -  UN Commission on Human Rights; European Commission
CONAPA - National Commission of Andean, Amazon and Afroperuvian Peoples
CRC - Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSCE -  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DANIDA - Danish International Development Agency
DDPA - Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
DFID - UK Department for International Development
DG - Directorate General
DLET - Dalit Liberation Education Trust
DNF - Dalit NGO Federation Nepal
DoCip -  Indigenous Peoples’ Centre for Documentation, Research, and Information 
DRC - Durban Review Conference
DRIPS - UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
DSN-UK - Dalit Solidarity Network UK
ECHR - European Convention on Human Rights
ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC -  UN Economic and Social Council
ECRI - European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
EIDHR - European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
ERIO - European Roma Information Office
ERRC - European Roma Rights Centre
ERTF - European Roma and Travellers Forum
EU -  European Union
FEDO - Feminist Dalit Organisation
FCNM - Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
FNB -  Frente Negra Brasileira
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G8 -  Group of 8 states 
GA -  General Assembly
GALCI - Global Afro Latino and Caribbean Initiative 
GONGO - governmental NGOs
GRULAC - Group of Latin American and Caribbean states 
HCNM - High Commissioner on National Minorities 
HRC -  UN Human Rights Committee 
HRW -  Human Rights Watch
IAC - Inter-Agency Consultation on Race in the Americas 
IAF - Inter-American Foundation
LASG - Inter-Agency Support Group on Indigenous Peoples Issues
ICCPR -  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR -  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
ICERD - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
IDB - Inter-American Development Bank 
EDSN -  International Dalit Solidarity Network 
IEM — UN Independent Expert on minority issues 
IIDH - Inter-American Institute of Human Rights 
DDS -  Indian Institute of Dalit Studies 
IITC -  International Indian Treaty Council 
ILO -  International Labour Organization 
ILP - Independent Labour Party
IMADR -  International Movement Against all forms of Discrimination and Racism 
IMF -  International Monetary Fund
INDEPA - National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazonian and Afro- 
Peruvian Peoples
INGO - international non-governmental organisation
IOs -  International organisations
EPCN - Instituto de Pesquisas das Culturas Negras
IR -  International Relations
IRU - International Romani Union
IWGIA -  International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
LWF - Lutheran World Federation
MDGs -  Millennium Development Goals
MG-S-ROM - Committee of Experts on Roma and Travellers
MEP -  Member of European Parliament
MNU - Moviemento Negro Unificado
MP -  Member of Parliament
MRG -  Minority Rights Group International
NAACP - National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NACDOR - National Conference of Dalit Organisations
NCDHR - National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights
NGO -  non-governmental organisation
NORAD - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OAS -  Organization of American States
ODECO - Organizacion de Desarrollo Etnico Comunitario
ODIHR - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OED - Oxford English Dictionary
OFRANEH - Organization Fraternal Negra Hondurena
OHCHR -  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
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OIC -  Organization of the Islamic Conference
ONECA - Central American Black Organisation
OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI - Open Society Institute
POA -  Durban Programme of Action
PER - Project on Ethnic Relations
Prepcom - preparatory conference
PFII -  UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
RNC - Roma National Congress
SAARC - South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
SEE -  Southeast Europe
SEPPIR - Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality 
SIDA -  Swedish International Development Agency
SKOKRA - Council of the Organizations and Kumpania Roma of the Americas 
Sub-Commission — UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights (formerly the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities)
TAN - transnational advocacy network
TC - Thematic Commissions
TEN - Teatro Experimental do Negro
UDHR -  Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK -  United Kingdom
UN -  United Nations
UNDM - UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities
UNDP -  UN Development Programme
UNESCO -  UN Education, Social and Cultural Organization
UNHCR -  UN High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF -  UN Children’s Fund
UNPO - Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
US -  United States of America
USAID - US Agency for International Development
VISION - Volunteers in Service to India’s Oppressed and Neglected
WB World Bank
WCAR -  UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, 
and Related Intolerance
WGIP -  UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations
WGPAD - UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent
WGM - UN Working Group on Minorities
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C h a pter  1: In tr o d u c tio n
Beginning in the 1970s and witnessing more intensity in the recent decade, the 
international protection regime for ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities has 
exhibited a shift away from generalised measures for all minority groups to the 
delineation of more group-specific standards and mechanisms. This thesis intends to 
investigate this shift. In particular, the thesis seeks to understand the agency of minority 
groups in stimulating this shift through a process of “norm entrepreneurship”. In an in- 
depth study of two groups, Dalits and Afro-descendants, recent normative innovations 
in the international protection regime for minorities will be explored. Dalit and Afro- 
descendant activists both have pursued norm emergence to establish group-specific 
recognition, standards and mechanisms at the international level. These efforts have 
helped to build group esteem and increase group leverage vis-a-vis states. This thesis 
examines three key factors that have been instrumental to this group-specific norm 
emergence: the establishment of strategic frames and stronger forms of transnational 
mobilisation; the supportive engagement of international actors; and the emergence of 
new political opportunity structures at the international level, in particular the 2001 UN 
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance (WCAR). Although there is evidence to suggest that these changes are 
impacting on domestic policy, this thesis will focus primarily on understanding the 
processes of norm emergence within the international sphere. By concentrating on the 
agency of minority groups, the thesis also aims to challenge the state-centred orientation 
of much of the literature on minority protection.
The existing international protection regime for minorities consists of a set of standards 
and mechanisms created to balance the legitimate interests of minorities and states. 
Most of these standards and mechanisms have been elaborated with little participation 
of minorities. The regime lumps together very disparate groups -  be they distinct 
ethnically, religiously, linguistically or culturally, territorially concentrated or dispersed, 
resident for centuries or newly arrived -  with only limited regard for the many factors 
that distinguish their needs and interests. The protection regime emerges from the 
historical experiences of minority treaties in Europe, which focused primarily on
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national and religious minorities; groups outside this experience often have found it 
difficult to fit the scope and purpose of the standards to their own context. The 
international protection regime is, in short, a one-size-fits-all approach to managing 
diversity that takes little account of diversity itself. While having a universal minimum 
standard of protection for minorities is important, the compromise necessary to achieve 
this standard has produced a weak and highly generalised regime that is poorly 
monitored, frequently ignored and sometimes blatantly transgressed.
Not all minorities are satisfied with the normative landscape constructed by states. They 
are rejecting the one-size-fits-all approach of the regime and are seeking to maximise 
attention to their particular interests through the creation of group-specific norms. 
Group-specific norms are packages of norms (especially rights) that are delineated for -  
but not necessarily exclusive to -  named groups. These new group-specific norms are a 
response to ill-fitting and/or failed implementation of existing (domestic) norms. They 
can increase attention to their communities, both from international actors and states, 
boost the (internal and external) esteem of groups, help to mobilise members, provide 
increased opportunities for participation and can give priority access to resources for 
realising their rights.
The process of non-state actors creating new norms has been termed “norm 
entrepreneurship” in International Relations (IR) scholarship (Florini 1996, 375 and ft 
12; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The study of norm entrepreneurship can be divided 
broadly into two stages: norm emergence and norm adherence. This thesis will be 
concerned primarily with norm emergence, drawing especially from a framework 
elaborated in Finnemore and Sikkink’s article, “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change” (1998). Successful norm emergence relies, inter alia, on strategies of 
‘framing’, the development of organisational platforms and the effective use of political 
opportunity structures. Frames enable actors to present issues and objectives in a way 
that gives them particular meaning, often embedding them in an existing institutional or 
normative framework. Minority groups can frame their identities as distinct from 
general ‘minority’ categories and can construct transnational identity frames to unite 
disparate groups under a common agenda. This common identity and agenda is 
institutionalised through the creation of organisational platforms. These may be new 
organisations or coalitions of existing organisations and other actors at the domestic and
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international levels that engage in transnational social mobilisation. The frames used by 
these organisational platforms can also give access to existing political opportunity 
structures or justify the creation of new ones. In the international sphere, these 
structures come in various forms, including international organisations, world 
conferences and treaty negotiations. These structures offer minorities formal 
recognition, strategic support, space for collective action and leverage to influence their 
governments.
Very few minority groups have sought group-specific norms linked to a transnational 
identity. Most groups focus on domestic political opportunities to advance their claims, 
lacking either the interest or capacity to use international fora. Those that are aware of 
international standards and mechanisms tend to use them only sporadically. They do 
not seek group-specific norms, regarding the existing norms and mechanisms as 
satisfactory, or because the motivation, ability and likely success of constructing 
transnational identities matched by group-specific international standards is low.
There is, nevertheless, a small but interesting trend towards group-specific norms. 
Indigenous peoples were the first and most successful group to make this move, 
managing to forge a distinct transnational identity on the basis of being ‘indigenous’, 
i.e. original (read pre-colonial) inhabitants, and being ‘peoples’ entitled to the right to 
self-determination. Roma have followed suit, uniting several distinct communities 
under a shared transnational Romani identity. Both groups have accessed a wide array 
of political opportunity structures, many created exclusively for their group. They have 
engaged in an important dialogue with states over the meaning of ‘peoples’ and 
‘national minorities’, respectively, in international law, leading to the adoption of 
group-specific standards and/or policies. There is now a separate international 
protection regime for indigenous peoples, whose resources outweigh those allocated for 
the international protection regime for minorities within the UN, and a plethora of 
mechanisms at the regional level in Europe that privilege Roma apart from other 
minority groups.
There are strong parallels between the discourse, framing strategies, organisational 
platforms and institutions utilised by indigenous peoples and Roma. Two other groups 
have pursued similar group-specific norm entrepreneurship: the Dalits and Afro-
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descendants. Both have mobilised around constructed transnational identities to target 
international institutions and the states in which they live. They have been successful in 
achieving recognition, new standards, and/or new mechanisms for group-specific 
protection at the international, regional and domestic levels.
Dalits have mobilised as a distinct community in India since the 1920s but in the 1990s 
began a more systematic process of internationalizing their advocacy. The Dalit 
identity was reconstructed to fit into a transnational group of communities discriminated 
against on the basis of caste. Key international institutions, such as the UN Sub- 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), have been instrumental in keeping 
a focus on caste-based discrimination within the international sphere. Normatively, 
Dalit advocacy has concentrated on a reinterpretation of the grounds of discrimination 
in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), specifically that concerning the meaning of ‘descent’ in 
Article 1.1 defining discrimination. CERD endorsed this view with the adoption in 2002 
of a General Recommendation on ‘Descent’. An important catalyst for Dalit and caste- 
based mobilisation was the 2001 World Conference Against Racism. The conference 
stimulated the development of new partnerships between caste-affected communities 
across Asia and Africa and with international NGOs, institutionalised by the 
establishment of the International Dalit Solidarity Network in 2000. The conference 
also provided a space for Dalits and caste-affected groups to bring global attention to 
their case and put the spotlight on the Government of India’s denial that caste should be 
discussed at the WCAR.
People of African descent (living outside of Africa) find their transnational mobilisation
tli #roots in the Pan-African movement begun at the start of the 20 century. This 
movement had a principal concern with emancipation of Africans from colonialism as 
well as a strong civil rights component for Africans living elsewhere. The American 
civil rights movement had long overshadowed the smaller and more elite focused 
mobilisation of people of African descent in Latin America, but from the late 1990s, the 
regional activism in Latin America become more prominent. The increased profile can 
be linked to the preparatory processes of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism. 
The political opportunities afforded by the Santiago regional preparatory conference
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(prepcom) of the WCAR stimulated a surge in advocacy and united activists under the 
newly articulated identity of “Afro-descendants”. Significant new concessions were 
recognized for this group, echoing concessions made previously to indigenous peoples 
in Latin America. The WCAR prompted the creation of new mechanisms at the global 
and regional levels, such as the UN Working Group of Experts on People of African 
Descent and increased cooperation with key international organisations, such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
This short summation shows the many commonalities between these groups. They each 
have deep historical roots in group-specific advocacy, both domestically and 
internationally and have gradually constructed a transnational identity out of shared 
experiences. This identity has been asserted not as an ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority identity but as a distinct group identity. The groups have all managed to 
undertake sustained transnational social mobilisation and international organisations 
have served as important political opportunity structures. The WCAR was instrumental 
in shaping their mobilisation over the last decade. Their advocacy has been oriented to 
norm emergence - seeking international recognition, standards and mechanisms that are 
group-specific.
The impact of group-specific norm emergence on the international protection regime for 
minorities has not been considered frilly (Kymlicka 2007, 5). The effect is a 
fragmentation of the protection regime, initiated first by the transnational mobilisation 
of indigenous peoples. On a positive note, such fragmentation has been empowering for 
the groups, propelling international actors and governments to give unprecedented 
support to the long-neglected needs of indigenous peoples, Dalits, Roma and Afro- 
descendants. The groups are reconfiguring their relationship with the state, seizing their 
citizenship and stimulating esteem for identities that have been degraded. Activists have 
constructed new sets of group-specific rights and mechanisms that are directly relevant 
to the stated interests and needs of their communities. This has helped make an arguably 
state-focused protection system more responsive to the views of minorities, especially 
those not from Europe.
This fragmentation also raises some concerns. Some would argue that group-specific 
norms ‘essentialise difference’, particularly by institutionalising difference in standards
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and mechanisms. Rather than focusing on general human rights protection, this norm 
entrepreneurship further marginalises groups from social and political integration. It 
reinforces structures of inequality by perpetuating and reifying identities used for 
discrimination. The construction of universal group-specific norms restricts local 
communities from negotiating particular forms of inclusion. Another concern is that 
the core minority protection mechanisms could be weakened by the diversion of 
resources to group-specific mechanisms. Minorities might be compelled to reframe 
their identities in an attempt to access these resources; for example, evidence shows that 
some groups are already making dubious claims to being indigenous peoples to gain 
advantageous rights (Kymlicka 2007; Lennox 2006). The result is a de facto hierarchy 
of groups with some better able to command attention than others based less on need 
and more on mobilisation capacity. The transnational mobilisation of these groups also 
raises questions about representation and accountability, where an elite cadre of 
activists is influencing a normative and policy discourse of which their fellow 
minorities are largely unaware. These activists have not always agreed a common 
understanding of norm emergence, nor do their international allies necessarily share this 
understanding. This normative discourse has real implications for government action 
domestically but because mobilisation has been concentrated in the international sphere 
minorities and government actors at the local level have had little input. As a 
consequence, they often have less will and/or capacity to meet the expectations set for 
them within international fora, leaving the efforts at norm emergence without a strong 
basis for norm adherence.
These are some of the points that will be explored in subsequent chapters. This chapter 
will set out the analysis and provide some useful background information. The 
analytical framework of norm entrepreneurship will be introduced, with a particular 
focus on framing, organisational platforms and political opportunity structures. How 
these concepts apply to the case of minorities will be considered, beginning with a 
discussion of probable state motivations for accepting normative standards on minority 
rights. The concept of ‘minority’ as a frame and its meaning, in particular as perceived 
by so-called minorities themselves, will be discussed to help understand motivations for 
establishing alternative group-specific frames. The evidence of transnational social 
mobilisation by minority groups will be presented and placed in the context of the 
general literature on transnational social mobilisation by non-state actors. This will be
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followed by a discussion of the relationship between minorities and political 
opportunity structures, especially those offered within international organisations. The 
key political opportunity structure in this analysis, the WCAR, will be introduced to 
provide the necessary background information on the conference and its significance for 
civil society and states. For comparative purposes, the chapter will then provide a 
summary analysis of the case of indigenous peoples and Roma, reviewing their norm 
entrepreneurship successes and challenges. This will inform the case study chapters 
that follow and offer points for identifying similarities across the cases and the common 
problems faced in norm entrepreneurship by minority groups. To begin, the 
methodological approach of the thesis will be outlined.
Learning from the experiences of Dalits and Afro-descendants: Methods and thesis 
structure
This thesis will draw upon norm entrepreneurship theory, the experiences of indigenous 
peoples and Roma, and the WCAR as a pivotal political opportunity structure to guide 
the examination of two group case studies. Dalits and Afro-descendants were selected 
for analysis because, after indigenous peoples and Roma, they have been the most 
active and successful norm entrepreneurs within the international protection regime for 
minorities. An in-depth analysis of the processes of norm emergence in each of the 
cases can uncover some conclusions about the challenges of establishing transnational 
mobilisation and group-specific norms for minority groups. The WCAR had a profound 
impact on the groups in different ways and it offers a unique opportunity to examine 
how they were able to exercise norm entrepreneurship within the same time and space. 
That the cases are strongly rooted in particular regions offers another important spatial 
comparison and the possibility to evaluate the role of regional systems in supporting 
norm emergence.
The case study chapters will offer a long view of each group in order to demonstrate the 
historical and contemporary manifestations of their transnational mobilisation and its 
changes over time. The time period of analysis runs to late-2008, although some key 
points that emerged during the WCAR Durban Review Conference (DRC) in April 
2009 have been included as needed. Given that a principal claim of this thesis concerns 
the important role of international actors in aiding norm emergence, particular attention
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will be given to reviewing the interaction between the groups and international 
institutions. The aim is to highlight which international actors have been most 
influential for norm emergence and in what ways they have been influential. Effort will 
be made to pinpoint agency in the processes considered here, including where possible 
to name the individual actors responsible for change. The end result is a thick 
description of norm emergence guided by the analytical framework of norm 
entrepreneurship.
The empirical analysis is compiled from primary and secondary sources. Internet-based 
materials of IOs, INGOs, NGOs, and documents issued during the WCAR processes 
form most of the corpus of primary texts. This was complimented by a series of 28 
semi-structured interviews conducted in New York, Washington, D.C., Geneva, 
London, Kathmandu and Brussels or via telephone and by email communications, and 
by other personal communications with relevant actors. I also attended the Durban 
Review Conference, Geneva, 22-23 April 2009, for participant observation. Given the 
vast geographic and linguistic scope of the case studies, I have selected interviewees on 
the basis of their deep knowledge of the norm emergence processes in question and 
their role as an actor in these processes. I have not interviewed government 
representatives because the main focus of analysis is on the agency of minority groups 
and international actors in norm emergence. Secondary resources discussing the case 
study groups have also been used, with much compiled from country-specific analyses. 
In addition, I have drawn on my work as an Advocacy Officer for Minority Rights 
Group International for the period 2001-2006, which includes also my participation at 
the WCAR in Durban. I have verified (and challenged) my own perceptions of events 
with the record of primary resources and interview responses. My marginal role as an 
actor in the processes studied here has afforded me exceptional access to information, 
helped to build confidence with interviewees and offered a first-hand view of norm 
development during a critical period.
Some connections between the cases will be drawn as appropriate within the case study 
chapters; however, the bulk of cross-case analysis will be offered in the concluding 
chapter. There, the common successes and challenges experienced by the four groups 
will be reviewed. The main challenges to be discussed are: the obstacles in moving 
from norm emergence to norm adherence; the debates about minority representation and
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accountability; the difficulties is constructing viable frames for mobilisation; the role of 
critical states and other actors; and the ongoing need for increased resources and 
capacity for norm entrepreneurship. Based on this analysis, I will discuss the policy 
implications for international actors and governments interested to support the 
normative claims of Dalits and Afro-descendants. Among the implications are the need 
to: increase political participation of these groups domestically; invest in long-term 
sustainable capacity building of all relevant actors; establish stronger accountability 
mechanisms for norm elaboration and implementation; and maintain and expand 
international space for groups to advance their normative claims.
Norm entrepreneurship by non-state actors: key concepts and strategies
The concept of “norm entrepreneurship” aims to capture both a process and an outcome: 
the process is the emergence of new norms for appropriate state behaviour and the 
outcome is norm adherence. How and why certain norms emerge and others recede is 
of great interest to those IR scholars that believe norms matter in international society 
(e.g. Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Several scholars 
assert that it is not only state actors (especially hegemonic state actors) that contribute to 
changes in norms; non-state actors similarly can shape norms, in particular transnational 
non-state actors (Chamovitz 2006; Risse-Kappen 1995; Boli and Thomas 1999; 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). International 
organisations (IOs), international NGOs (INGOs), and transnational corporations are 
among those non-state actors that have attempted to influence understandings of 
appropriate state behaviour. They do this by persuading states to adhere to existing 
norms and by promoting acceptance of new normative tools like treaties, IOs, and 
monitoring systems that create new norms or reinterpret existing ones.
Much of the literature on norm entrepreneurship focuses on non-state actors that want to 
strengthen or create norms pertaining to social justice (Klotz 1995; Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Ropp, Risse-Kappen, and Sikkink 1999; Friedman, Hochstetler, and Clark 2005). 
Researchers emphasise the principled, non-self-interested nature of these claims, in 
contrast with the self-interested norm creation practised typically by states, corporations 
or other civil society. For example, Keck and Sikkink’s major study, Activists Beyond 
Borders (1998), finds that processes of transnational social mobilisation “often involve
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individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist 
understanding of their ‘interests’” (8).
Norm entrepreneurs rely on three key tools: framing, organisational platforms and 
political opportunity structures. Each of these concepts draws heavily on social 
movement theory, which recently has given greater attention to these processes at the 
transnational level (e.g. Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Della Porta and Tarrow 
2004; Tarrow 2005; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Smith and Johnston 2002). 
Using these tools, norm entrepreneurs pursue strategies for norm emergence.
Framing:
Frames are an essential tool for constructing collective action across diverse social, 
cultural and political spaces. They can help actors to “transform other actors’ 
understandings of their identities and interests” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 17). Frames 
can change perceptions of existing structures of power and inequality in order “to 
further undermine the legitimacy of the [political/social/cultural] system or its perceived 
mutability” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 8). Framing stimulates greater or 
different attention to claims by placing issues and objectives within a particular 
discourse with which the frame is associated. For example, frames can give domestic 
issues a new international relevance or meaning. In order to move from the domestic to 
the international sphere, activists must either link domestic issues to broader global 
frames or diffuse domestic frames across borders. Tarrow (2005) terms the former 
“global framing” and the latter “diffusion”. He cites the anti-globalisation movement as 
a highly successful “global frame” by being open enough that a diverse range of actors 
can translate their local concerns into ‘globalisation’ issues. The human rights frame 
has served a similar function (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 11-12).
Creating a universal frame is never easy and there are particular challenges of framing 
in the international sphere. Although global framing can “dignify and generalise claims 
that might otherwise remain narrow Mid parochial”, it is difficult to achieve because 
“activists must work within the power structures and political cultures of their own 
countries” (Tarrow 2005, 75). Agreeing on a shared frame can be a long negotiation 
process for actors involved. Passy’s (1999) analysis of indigenous peoples’ mobilisation
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identified this as a “communicative interaction” process, drawing from the work of 
Habermas (1987), whereby groups “try to frame their protest in global terms through a 
series of discursive acts with the aim of finding compromises or even consensus that 
allow them to speak with a common voice” (160-161).
Political opportunity structures:
Frames can give access to a wide range of actors, institutions and processes that are 
otherwise termed political opportunity structures. Political opportunity structures can 
enable social discontent to become collective social action. In the international sphere, 
these structures come in various forms, including IOs, world conferences and treaty 
negotiations. These structures increasingly have formalised mechanisms for 
participation of non-state actors. They give non-state actors opportunities to engage in 
dialogue on normative issues, both formally, e.g. through NGO participation in UN 
meetings, and informally, e.g. via the ‘corridor advocacy’ of international spaces. They 
give legitimacy or “certification” (Tarrow 2005, 194) to non-state actors by raising their 
profile within the international sphere and recognizing their right to participate. They 
provide opportunities to learn about policy issues and to share relevant domestic 
information. These structures increase the leverage and visibility of norm entrepreneurs 
by serving as “a fulcrum for the formation of alliances of different state and non-state 
actors” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2004, 236). Actors within IOs working towards the 
purpose for which they are mandated can be important allies for groups that seek to 
influence state practice. Sikkink and Smith (2002) show that non-state actors working 
on social issues have increased their engagement with IOs: for example, “the proportion 
of groups reporting having ties with more than three [IOs] more than doubled from 17 
percent in 1953 to 37 percent in 1993 (Smith and Sikkink 2002,41).
Political opportunities in the international sphere do not always translate into change in 
the domestic sphere: domestic political opportunities also must be favourable. Domestic 
political opportunities are fewer where state interests are threatened by the goals of 
norm entrepreneurs, where state-civil society relations are fraught, where the channels 
for political contention are blocked, or where there is an absence of domestic political 
allies. Even if domestic political opportunities are open, Sikkink’s (2004) work shows 
that activists may still use simultaneously international political opportunities in an
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“insider-outsider coalition” (165) for strategic purposes. Access to political 
opportunities in the international sphere adds to the leverage of norm entrepreneurs to 
achieve their goals domestically.
Not all themes or all regions have equal access to political opportunities (Tarrow 2005, 
27). Regional institutions are deepest in Europe and some thematic issues are more 
institutionalized than others, such as human rights. This institutionalisation presents 
non-state actors with more opportunity structures in the form of invitations for policy 
input, international meetings, or individual employees of IOs with whom to engage. 
The space available for norm entrepreneurship at the international level also can expand 
or contract, usually according to the needs of the states that created the political 
opportunity structures in the first place.
Norm entrepreneurs, however, are not passive actors reacting to political opportunities -  
they also seek to transform or create opportunity structures (Sikkink 2004, 154). To 
paraphrase Wendt (1992), political opportunities are what actors make of them: 
“opportunities and threats are not objective structural factors but are perceived by 
activists” (Sikkink 2004, 158 citing McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). This is 
evidenced in the establishment of parallel NGO fora alongside world conferences, 
which create a formal space to make ‘declarations’, or the lobbying for creation of new 
mechanisms at the international level such as the establishment of new thematic or 
country UN Special Rapporteurs, whose reports can simultaneously elaborate and 
institutionalize norms.
Organisational platforms:
Political opportunity structures provide physical spaces for the emergence of new 
institutions, coalitions and networks that serve as “organisational platforms” for norm 
entrepreneurship (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 899). These organisational platforms 
enable transnational social mobilisation and may develop from within existing 
institutions (such as NGOs) or be spawned for the specific purpose of norm 
entrepreneurship. One of the most common structures for organisational platforms are 
so-called transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). TANs are 
described as “sets of actors linked across country boundaries bound together by shared
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values, dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses” 
(Khagram, et al 2002, 7). These actors can include NGOs, INGOs, epistemic 
communities, church groups, trade unions, political parties or individuals with a 
personal commitment to the ideas and values espoused by the TAN. TANs are not 
social movements per se, the former constituting a wider and deeper form of social 
mobilisation, although social movements might use TAN structures. The mechanical 
function of TANs is primarily to exchange and use information for advocacy purposes 
but they may also enable the distribution of, inter alia, funds and training opportunities, 
particularly from Northern to Southern members.
TANs serve an important function when domestic political opportunities are blocked. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) denote this advocacy cooperation as a “boomerang” model, 
which occurs where “domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out 
international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside” (12). Domestic 
NGOs use TANs to relay information on practice and policy in the domestic sphere and 
INGOs use this information to influence state behaviour in the international sphere. The 
TAN structure is also central to “insider-outsider coalitions” where international 
political opportunities are used in conjunction with open domestic opportunities. 
Working with political opportunity structures requires a certain set of skills, knowledge 
and resources. In this regard INGOs play an intermediary role, gathering information 
on 10 activity for redistribution through their networks and sometimes facilitating the 
physical access to these institutions of other actors through financial or other support 
(e.g. allowing domestic NGOs without UN ECOSOC consultative status to speak under 
the recognised INGO’s name).
This cooperation is not always smooth. Cultural barriers, institutional variations and 
differential access to resources undermine efforts to establish global cooperation. 
INGOs are sometimes accused of profiting from domestic NGO information and 
partnership to bolster their own credibility and access to resources. North-South 
structural divisions can be problematic: highly institutionalised movements of the 
North, operating in similar domestic structures (i.e. Western liberal democracies) have 
privileged access to financial resources, media and communications facilities; Southern 
NGOs, usually more linked to grassroots movements, struggle to access these same 
resources and facilities. There may also be real tension between the modus operandi of
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North and South actors, with some preferring direct-action, disruptive strategies and 
others focusing on policy development, lobbying and media campaigns. There may be 
ideological differences, from Marxist-based analyses of goals and targets to more liberal 
democratic views. North-South divisions can thus impede genuine coalition building 
across time and space, both for operational and ideological reasons.
Pre-existing mobilising structures and access to resources also can affect the emergence 
of organisational platforms. Mobilising structures are “those collective vehicles, 
informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective 
action” (McAdam, et al 1996, 3). These may include interpersonal networks, formal 
organisational structures or even a shared discourse as evidenced by epistemic 
communities. For example, in the civil rights movement in the United States, the church 
functioned as a key mobilizing structure (McAdam 1999). In transnational 
mobilisation, mobilisation structures can be harder to source, given that cross-border 
cooperation may be entirely novel and pre-existing connections weak. Transnational 
social mobilisation is aided greatly also by external funding. Funding organisations 
give support to enable domestic civil society to participate in the international sphere 
and to cooperate across borders. These kinds of funds are limited, however, and subject 
to shifting priorities of donors. Norm entrepreneurs therefore find it difficult to attract 
vital external funding to sustain long-term transnational mobilisation that is needed to 
achieve their norm-changing goals.
Processes o f norm emergence:
The norm emergence process can be disaggregated into various components of action 
and outcome (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 25 and 201; Price 2003, 584; Reinalda and 
Verbeek 2001). In the earliest stages, scholars identify agenda-setting actions, when 
actors manage to get their issues recognised as a topic for international attention. This 
might be evidenced by international meetings held on an issue-area, interventions made 
on a topic in international fora or a new research programme. Another action is what 
this thesis terms, ‘norm elaboration’, when actors outline the content and scope of 
proposed norms. This can be an empowering process for norm entrepreneurs, enabling 
them to define the norms according to their own perceptions and interests. Once 
elaborated, norms can be “institutionalised” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 900), for
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example, in the form of legal standards, policy recommendations or IO-endorsed 
documents (such as review reports, interventions or mandates). This helps to set the 
parameters of the norm and gives guidance on how it should be observed. Another 
outcome of norm elaboration can be the creation of new procedures or bodies to review 
the implementation of the emerging norm. This can come in the form of international 
monitoring mechanisms, a new 10, or new domestic institutions charged with 
monitoring and/or implementing the norm. It is important to note that none of these 
early stages of norm emergence necessarily require active state consent. Issues can be 
put on the agenda of international fora wherein states do not determine the agenda; 
norms can be elaborated in civil society meetings or by independent legal bodies (e.g. 
international courts); IOs can institutionalise norms without state approval (for example, 
General Recommendations of UN treaty bodies); and new bodies can be established by 
IOs with only the tacit consent of states (e.g. UN Special Rapporteurs) or independently 
by civil society (e.g. new monitoring INGOs).
The desired outcome of norm emergence is norm compliance by target actors, usually 
states. This is pursued through actions of persuasion and socialisation. The goal of 
persuasion is to socialise states to comply with the new norms of behaviour, to 
encourage socialised states to persuade other states to adopt the norm and ultimately to 
achieve norm “internalisation1’ where norm adherence is no longer questioned 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). At the earliest stages this can be evidenced by 
changes in the “discursive positions” of states (or IOs) (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 25). 
Norm entrepreneurs aim for a “tipping point” when a critical mass of states follow a 
norm, stimulating a “norm cascade” when norm entrepreneurship from below is no 
longer required for states to adhere to the norm -  they will do so without mobilised 
pressure from civil society, the burden of socialisation then shifting to other states or 
IOs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902). The process of norm emergence is not 
necessarily linear -  norms may advance or recede -  and not all norms will reach a 
“tipping point” nor be institutionalised before the cascade.
This raises the question of why some norms emerge and others do not. Keck and 
Sikkink (1998), for example, point both to issue characteristics and actor characteristics 
in determining norm emergence success. They find that for social justice concerns, 
actors are most effective where they can frame their issues as constituting a “legal
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inequality of opportunity” or “bodily harm to vulnerable individuals” (27). They cite in 
evidence examples like the international campaign on violence against women and the 
anti-slavery movement. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) further pinpoint what March 
and Olsen call the “logic of appropriateness” (cited at 912, March and Olsen 1998, 951) 
in determining how targets will respond to proposed norms. Where norm entrepreneurs 
can frame their issues “within the standards of appropriateness defined by prior norms” 
they will be more successful (Ibid, 897). To achieve this, a strategy of “adjacency” is 
used, whereby “activists work hard to frame their issues in ways that make persuasive 
connections between existing norms and emergent norms” (Ibid, 908).
Actor characteristics are also crucial to norm emergence success. Researchers find that 
norm entrepreneurs are more successful where they can increase their influence by 
asserting authority. Price (2003) summarises three key sources of authority: “expertise, 
moral influence and claim to political legitimacy” (587). Expertise is based on 
knowledge of the issue, typically exhibited by epistemic communities. Their normative 
and policy recommendations hold influence because they are perceived to be informed 
by (independent) expertise. Moral influence derives from perceptions that norm 
entrepreneurs are acting for principled values not tied to their own self-interest (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998). Norm entrepreneurs are thought to hold political legitimacy because 
they claim to represent constituencies affected by the proposed norms. The mechanics 
of this representation, e.g. through transparent processes of election and accountability, 
is sometimes critiqued and norm entrepreneurs are vulnerable to accusations that their 
‘representativeness’ is dubious (Price 2003, 590).
The characteristics of states and their consequent motivation to accept norms also are 
considered in the literature. Ideational and rational motivations are debated, often 
concluding in many cases that both affect norm emergence. Beyond material 
considerations, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) posit that states will be more readily 
socialised to norms on the basis of legitimacy, conformity and esteem (903). 
Legitimation pertains to state identities -  where states are concerned about their 
reputation internationally or domestically they may be more willing to adhere to certain 
norms, particularly where the norm is seen to be adopted by successful and desirable 
models of statehood. Conforming to the norm buys the state into this club of successful 
and desirable states. Esteem speaks to the level of the individual, such that individual
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state actors may want to act according to norms that make them feel good or be thought 
well of by others. This effect may be particularly strong where principled issue norms 
are concerned and the “logic of appropriateness” compels state actors to see these norms 
as desirable, positive and appropriate behaviour. These factors are difficult to test 
empirically; constmctivists rely on methodologies such as process tracing (Checkel 
2005), which can uncover perceptions and motivations by individual actors.
Rational factors need also be considered, even when ideational concerns appear to rise 
above them. The configuration of power among states can have a significant impact on 
what norms emerge and when. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) acknowledge that certain 
“critical states” can have a positive or negative effect on norm emergence. Critical 
states are “those without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is 
compromised” or those that “have a certain moral stature” that may impact strongly on 
norm adoption by other states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 901). In a similar way, the 
influence and interests of global or regional hegemons, former colonial powers or 
powerful neighbouring states can impact on the extent to which norms will be accepted 
by critical states or others. The position of the state in international society also affects 
socialisation possibilities. For example, ‘pariah’ states may have little engagement 
within the international sphere, may restrict access to outside information, and may 
prevent international travel of civil society activists. At an operational level, many 
international institutions are composed of states’ membership on a rotating basis: thus 
the possibilities for successful norm emergence alters according to which states have a 
seat at the table (or are chairing) and the interests and identities they represent. This is 
evidenced in policy issues made a priority by states holding EU Presidencies, or in 
which states are members of the UN Human Rights Council. Where the interests and 
priorities of leading or participating states coincide with those of norm entrepreneurs, 
the possibility for successful norm emergence expands.
Norm entrepreneurs have various tools at their disposal to persuade states and IOs 
despite their weak position in international society. Social movement theorists identify 
a set of processes or forms of action that all movements draw upon for exerting their 
contention. Charles Tilly (2004) calls these “the social movement repertoire” (3). In 
the domestic sphere, this most commonly includes such forms as marches, public 
meetings, petitions and demonstrations. Keck and Sikkink (1998) identify a repertoire
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used successfully by TANs in the boomerang process consisting of: information 
politics; symbolic politics; leverage politics; and accountability politics. Information 
politics involves the transfer of information (including not only facts but also especially 
personal “testimonies”) from the domestic sphere to the international sphere in order to 
bring pressure on governments {Ibid, 19). Symbolic politics uses powerful symbolic 
events, symbols or stories to stimulate action and/or to reffame issues {Ibid, 22). 
Leverage politics sees TANs using material and moral leverage to bring pressure to bear 
on targets. Material leverage is most common in the form of economic and security 
sanctions or restrictions on access to international loans. Activists work with key states 
or IOs to harm target states through restrictions on material goods they value. Moral 
leverage comes from shaming states publicly, assuming that a state’s concern over its 
international reputation may prompt a change in behaviour {Ibid, 23-24). Accountability 
politics brings attention to states’ failed voluntary commitments evidenced in hard and 
soft international law, domestic legislation or other policy documents and public 
statements made by state actors {Ibid, 24). Tarrow (2005) builds on Keck and Sikkink’s 
emphasis on information to consider also “institutional access” (147). Institutional 
access refers to social movement actors’ use of international institutions to assert their 
claims, such as bringing cases to international courts or participating in public meetings 
of international institutions {Ibid, 152-154).
There are many processes and variables that contribute to successful norm 
entrepreneurship, including the capacity of actors, external opportunities and state 
interests. The next section will consider these points as they apply in the case of 
minority groups.
Norm entrepreneurship by minorities: (re)-constructing the international 
protection regime for  minorities
Norm entrepreneurship by minorities reflects many of the above characteristics but 
offers a different perspective on the study of norm emergence. Norms on minority rights 
stem from a complex mixture of rational and ideational concerns of state actors, 
including interests in security, the management of diversity and resource implications. 
The ‘minority’ frame is problematic for many groups but also necessary for accessing
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certain rights and political opportunities. The organisational platforms of minorities are 
also distinct because of the difficult issue of representation. How and why groups come 
to diverge from the minority frame, create new organisational platforms and use 
political opportunity structures will be introduced here and detailed in the case study 
chapters.
Specific challenges to norm entrepreneurship by minorities:
Minorities face some particular challenges that distinguish them from other non-state 
actors following principled issue norm entrepreneurship. First, it cannot be said that 
they act without consideration to their own interests; indeed, the motivation to change 
the minority protection regime stems in part from a belief that the current regime does 
not reflect their interests enough. This raises questions about their ‘expertise’ and 
‘moral influence’. Minorities are deeply and personally aware of the norm violations 
that affect them but their self-interest in those norms may give the impression they are 
ill disposed to serve as objective authorities on norm development in the manner of 
epistemic communities. Discriminatory attitudes can also impact on their perceived 
capacity. Although their actions might include principled aims (such as universal 
recognition of minority rights), they will often be perceived to be advocating not for 
universal values but for benefits to their own group. Even when embedding their claims 
in the universal human rights framework, society might not see accommodation of 
minority claims as a problem of the common good nor see how they too would benefit 
from the remedies.
The relationship between norm entrepreneurs and the constituents that will benefit from 
norm entrepreneurship is also specific, creating problems for ‘claims to political 
legitimacy’. Minorities are seeking norms for a distinct kind of community, a 
community that could form a new sovereignty entity. This leads to an assumption that 
minority norm entrepreneurs must somehow be ‘representatives’ o f  their communities, 
rather than merely advocates from  these communities. The burden of democratic 
accountability is arguably higher than for other norm entrepreneurs. Advocates on 
landmines or the environment are not required to demonstrate their authority within any 
community they intend to support; even women’s rights activists are not held to the 
same accountability expectations as minorities (women face critiques on class-based or
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North-South representation). Within the international sphere, minorities are typically 
represented by NGOs but the concept of ‘representation’ in the case of minority-specific 
NGOs can be problematic: is the NGO specifically mandated by the community to 
represent them?; in what way are the NGOs accountable to the community?; are there 
other decision-making structures within the community which the NGO does not take 
into consideration (e.g. elder groups)? Moreover, minorities who are elected 
government officials would be more inclined to focus their attention on domestic 
political opportunities than on international (advocacy) fora. Many groups that are 
territorially concentrated may possess the nascent structures of statehood that far 
surpass NGO organisational limitations yet for the most part they are not able to 
represent themselves supranationally through forms of so-called “paradiplomacy” 
(Aldecoa and Keating 1999). The ‘leaders’ that participate in international meetings are 
usually self-appointed advocates and therefore may or may not be viewed as legitimate 
representatives by their own communities. There can be tension when those who are 
effective international advocates are not those who hold authority at the grassroots level. 
These issues have come to the fore in the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(PFII) and also the European Roma and Travellers Forum, both institutions established 
for a more structured interface between IOs and the respective groups but each 
challenged by issues of legitimacy, transparency and accountability.
Even if the minority actors do have legitimacy they may be operating without the 
necessary resources and infrastructure to properly consult or disseminate information on 
actions being taken in the international sphere in the name of the community. Because 
of the general conditions of marginalisation experienced by many minority groups in 
society, minority NGOs typically have limited advocacy capacity and minimal 
institutionalisation. Getting funding for minority advocacy can be difficult -  many 
donors do not want to allocate funds to specific ethnic, religious or linguistic identity 
groups for fear it will be viewed as political interference in the state. Norm 
entrepreneurs for more generic groups like women or persons with disabilities or even 
‘vulnerable groups’ are more palatable partners for cooperation. Private donors like the 
Ford Foundation and the Open Society Institute (OSI), or international NGOs like 
Minority Rights Group International (MRG), Human Rights Watch or Global Rights, 
have provided much of the seed funding to norm entrepreneurship for the groups 
studied here before bilateral and multilateral donors came on board.
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Regarding issue characteristics, states can be less open to persuasion by minority groups 
than other civil society actors because the issues they raise touch on fundamental ‘logics 
of appropriateness’ concerning state identity, legitimacy and territorial integrity. 
Minority demands may be regarded as politically destabilising, challenging the myths of 
national homogeneity and the right of self-determination of the state. Kin states that 
could be natural allies might be reticent for fear of facing accusations of irredentism. 
Conversely, kin state support can be seen only as self-interested rather than as 
principled support to global norms. Norm entrepreneurship by minority groups that are 
territorially concentrated might be perceived as the first steps towards secession.
Asserting minority rights is often viewed as an affront to national unity and a (harmful) 
process of ‘othering’ the group from society at large and ‘essentialising difference’. 
Minorities who might benefit from new group-specific norms can consider them 
divisive and favour strategies of inclusion based on equality not difference. The group- 
specific goals of norm emergence may be thought to go well beyond rectification of 
‘legal inequality’ and even appear superfluous given that legal equality provisions that 
prohibit racial discrimination are nearly universally entrenched.
Finally, minority identities often have negative connotations, pushing members of the 
group to not wish to so identify. Norm entrepreneurs face the prospect that the norms 
they help to create will be unclaimed because the intended beneficiaries reject the 
identity to which the norms are attached.
Accepting norms for the protection o f minorities: rational and ideational motivations
Under the auspices of the UN and various regional organisations, several standards and 
mechanisms concerned with ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have been 
adopted by states. These standards are elaborated as rights of persons belonging to 
minorities within the broader international human rights framework. They are structured 
around four key norms: the right to exist; the right to non-discrimination; the right to 
protection of identity; and the right to participation. The rights are contained in a 
number of international standards adopted in the post-World War II era, some legally 
binding and others constituting political declarations. The first pillar, the right to exist,
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is embodied in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948) (Thomberry 1991). Although the Convention is not limited to 
protection of minorities, the dynamics of genocide are such that it is ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities that are targeted most frequently in this way. The same applies to 
discrimination against minorities: the right to non-discrimination is recognised by the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965) (ICERD), adopted as a universal protection mechanism but from which 
minorities can benefit significantly. The right to protection o f identity is at the heart of 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR), 
which reads:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language.
The meaning and purpose of Article 27 (expressed similarly in Article 30 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (CRC)) was elaborated further in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities (UNDM), adopted by the General Assembly in 1992. The 
Declaration provides an extended list of rights around each of the four pillars in addition 
to details on appropriate measures by states to give effect to these rights. Herein the 
fourth pillar on the right to participate is given attention, calling upon states to 
recognise the right of persons belonging to minorities “to participate effectively in 
cultural, religious, social, economic and public life” (Article 2.2) and “to participate 
effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level 
concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live” (Article 
2.3). To these universal standards on minority rights we can add several regional 
standards. The Council of Europe has a Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM) (1995), and a European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (1992); the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
has minority-specific standards in its political declarations, principally evidenced in the 
1990 Copenhagen Document. Various monitoring mechanisms review and advise on 
the implementation of these standards, including treaties bodies, the UN Forum on 
Minorities (and former Working Group on Minorities (WGM)) and the UN Independent 
Expert on minority issues (IEM).
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The motivations of states in accepting these norms have both rational and ideational 
elements, rooted also in the complex history of international debates on the nation-state 
and racism. Security interests have been a major factor, evidenced not least in the fact 
that key standards have emerged in the context of heightened security concerns 
pertaining to conflict with minorities: for example, the UNDM and FCNM were 
adopted in the uncertain post-1989 climate predicting ethnic fragmentation of states 
(Jackson Preece 1998). Security motivations are less obvious in the two case studies. 
Affo-descendants and Dalits have in their history some incidents of violent agitation 
against the state, and even some claims to territorial sovereignty, but these have been 
more symbolic than decisive and, with the possible exception of Maoist movements in 
South Asia, these factors are not evident in the contemporary period. State motivations 
in accepting (or rejecting) their demands are not explained well either by economic 
interests. These groups are among the poorest in the world. It could even be argued 
that states benefit by pushing minorities to fill low-waged positions and by limiting 
their title to lands ripe for exploitation. Poverty alleviation, affirmative action and 
increased access to education, housing and health feature strongly in emerging norms 
for these groups, all of which require a significant redistribution of resources that may 
not be in elite interests.
Legitimacy has been a motivation: for example, the proposals for an article on 
minorities in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (subsequently 
rejected) and later in the ICCPR, were championed especially by the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, both with particular interests to portray to domestic constituencies their 
concerns for the protection of (minority) nations and nationalities. Legitimacy appears 
also to be an important factor in the case studies examined here. For example, the 
adoption of international commitments to address the concerns of Affo-descendants has 
coincided with domestic processes of democratisation beginning in the 1990s. In the 
case of the Dalits, domestic attention to their rights in India and Nepal has emerged in 
the context of decolonisation and internal conflict.
The impact of conformity on acceptance of minority rights norms is less clear. For 
example, in the context of the EU accession process the adoption of standards like the 
FCNM was considered an essential step in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria requiring,
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inter alia, “respect for and protection of minorities”. To be a successful EU member 
state was to protect minority rights (even if several prominent EU members like France 
and Belgium have not ratified the FCNM) (Hughes and Sasse 2003). The Copenhagen 
criteria are widely regarded as measures to prevent ethnic conflict, however, and cannot 
be seen independently of this security motivation. States joining the Council of Europe 
often ratify the FCNM, suggesting that adopting minority rights standards represents a 
commitment to European values. In the case studies for Dalits and Affo-descendants, 
the identities of critical states are important. Brazil used the WCAR and reforms vis-a- 
vis Affo-Brazilians as a way of bolstering domestic legitimacy but also to signal its 
moral leadership in the region. The Government of India exerted great pressure to keep 
caste-based discrimination out of the WCAR and off the international agenda fearful in 
part that the debates might damage its preferred reputation as a liberal democratic state. 
In Multicultural Odysseys (2007), Will Kymlicka explores the issue of conformity by 
examining the global spread of liberal multiculturalism (of which the protection of 
minorities is a key component). He is not conclusive as to whether conformity with 
these norms is a necessary condition for being accepted as a liberal democratic state, 
given divergent practices on accommodating diversity even within Western states. He 
does argue convincingly that at a minimum this is the view being espoused by IOs, 
whose own (mis)perceptions of liberal multiculturalism guide their censure or praise of 
state behaviour and institutions.
The role of esteem and moral convictions cannot be ignored either. This was at play in 
the proclamation of the UN to remain committed to “the fate of minorities”, as 
evidenced by the General Assembly resolution of the same name adopted on 10 
December 1948.1 It is true that the attention given to individual human rights over 
protection of minority rights (as under the League of Nations minority treaties system) 
was in part motivated by a security interest in preventing irredentism like that pursued 
under the Nazi regime. At the same time, the pogroms and Holocaust “shocked the 
conscience of mankind”, prompting the founding member states of the UN to make 
attention to minorities a priority issue for the Commission on Human Rights with the 
creation of its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. This ideational commitment was also evidenced in the swift adoption (if not 
universal ratification) of the Genocide Convention. The preamble states, “to liberate
1 UN Doc. General Assembly Resolution 217c (IE) (10 December 1948).
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mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required”, and 
genocide was thereby legally recognized as an international crime punishable under 
universal jurisdiction, challenging norms of sovereign authority and immunity.
The crime of genocide is one of a short list of so-called obligations erga omnes, those 
acts so egregious their prohibition is considered part of customary international law. 
The crimes of, inter alia, apartheid, slavery, and racial discrimination are also on this 
list. This is important to note in the context of this analysis because they represent an 
interesting conversion of norms pertaining to the treatment of minorities. Genocide, 
slavery, apartheid and racial discrimination are not committed exclusively against 
minorities but more often then not it is minorities that are the victims. From the 
perspective of assessing esteem in norm acceptance by state actors, these are also 
among the most heinous crimes for which an individual can be accused, all of which 
resurface in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (see Article 7.1). 
Minorities can benefit from this in their efforts at norm emergence. These norms have 
influenced the “logic of appropriateness” in the adoption of subsequent standards for the 
protection of minorities -  indeed, both genocide and racial discrimination are explicitly 
mentioned in the preamble of the UNDM. The minority groups detailed in the case 
studies have been victims of most or all of these crimes. Their appeals to the esteem of 
state actors tap into feelings of moral responsibility to provide restitution for crimes of 
the past and to prevent these crimes in the present. Affo-descendants have made strong 
calls for reparations for the slave trade, Dalits have described their experiences as 
contemporary forms of apartheid, and both have attributed their situation to the 
consequences of racial discrimination.
The norms against these practices are so strong that no state actor would openly admit 
to committing them. Nevertheless, these practices persist. This is particularly true of 
racial discrimination. Rather than admitting that racial discrimination is a problem 
domestically, many state actors have simply denied they are racist at all, often 
explaining blatant inequalities experienced by minority groups as a consequence of 
social or economic underdevelopment. At a rhetorical level, states can thereby maintain
2 On obligations erga omnes see, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case (Belgium v. Spain), 
International Court of Justice Reports 1970, 3.
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the illusion of norm adherence while at a practical level attribute the effects of 
discrimination to other causes. In the end, the esteem of state actors remains intact.
This denial of racial discrimination has proven to be a barrier to norm entrepreneurship 
by minorities. It has made otherwise open domestic political opportunities more closed 
to groups who seek to raise these issues. Where states are not willing to accept there is a 
problem it is difficult to persuade them to create new norms to address it. Racial 
discrimination has long been a subject of international discourse but that discourse has 
focused primarily on inter-state relations rather than domestic obligations to individuals 
and groups (Banton 2002a; Lauren 1988; Jackson Preece 2005). The discourse on anti­
racism in the UN quickly became a fault line between Northern and Southern states and 
a proxy for anti-colonial rhetoric. As newly independent former colonial states joined 
the UN as members, their agenda for reform concentrated in part on the elaboration of 
measures for combating racial discrimination. This is evidenced in the adoption of 
ICERD in 1965. The treaty was designed to protect the individual from discrimination 
but the language of the preamble hints at other motivations: the preamble makes 
specific mention of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (1960) and reaffirms that discrimination “is an obstacle to 
friendly and peaceful relations among nations and is capable of disturbing peace and 
security among peoples” (cited by Banton 1996, 54). In the debate over the content of 
the convention, the summary record reports “certain members...felt that the convention 
should recognize the intimate relationship between manifestations of colonialism, which 
continue to affect millions of people, and racial discrimination” {Ibid, 56).3 Among the 
members supporting this position was the Soviet Union, which aligned itself 
strategically with the newly independent post-colonial states in opposition to the 
Western group, largely comprised of former colonial powers. Thus, debates on the 
international legal prohibition of racism were never far removed from the inter-state 
politics of the age. Racial discrimination in many states was more prominent as a 
foreign policy issue than a domestic policy issue. The only cases of consistent naming 
and shaming of states were South Africa for apartheid and Israel’s occupation of 
Palestine. For many state actors, to admit to practicing racism was to equate their 
actions with those of these ‘pariah’ states.
3 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/873, para. 29.
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This attitude continues to impact on state perceptions of legitimacy, conformity and 
esteem. The Government of India refused to accept they were racist by denying that 
caste-based discrimination had anything to do with race per se. In Latin America, states 
have relied heavily on the myth of ‘racial democracy’ to ignore the stark inequalities 
that persist along racial lines. To persuade state actors, especially those at the local 
level, that they are racist or complicit in racism continues to undermine the success of 
norm emergence and adherence. It is for this reason that the 2001 WCAR was so 
crucial -  it pushed states into an open dialogue on race with civil society in an 
unprecedented way.
The gap between acceptance of emerging norms at the international level and adherence 
to norms for minority protection domestically revealed in the case studies, however, 
points to a two-level process of norm cascade. The rational and ideational motivations 
for norm adherence seem to differ in the international and domestic spheres, and even at 
different levels domestically. The cost of norm adherence in the international level can 
be low when compared to the costs domestically. For example, whereas actors in 
ministries of foreign affairs may be compelled by legitimacy and esteem internationally 
to admit to failures at home and thus promote emerging norms in international fora, the 
material implications of implementing those norms domestically may be high and 
burden ministries not privy to international commitments that affect them. 
Governments have endorsed norms at the regional and global levels, even creating 
domestic institutions to implement these norms but have not taken next steps towards 
norm adherence. These next steps require resources and might have implications for the 
ideational motivations of state actors. For example, it may be less costly to the 
individual esteem of a foreign office minister to acknowledge racial discrimination than 
to the esteem of a local government actor directly responsible for combating racism, 
who may be implicated personally as ‘racist’. For this local actor, esteem is preserved 
best by ignoring the realities of racial discrimination and by attributing failures to the 
minority groups themselves and/or a non-group-specific cause such as 
underdevelopment.
This point requires further development but will not be a key focus of the thesis. It is 
noted here because it accounts for the evidence that norm emergence is not translating 
well into norm adherence in the case studies. To be understood more thoroughly, it
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requires extensive analysis of domestic dynamics of norm adherence as well as in-depth 
interviews with state actors working in the international sphere; both of these issues are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, which aims to concentrate on minority agency in norm 
emergence at the international level.
The standards and mechanisms that already exist constitute an important normative 
framework to guide the relationship between minorities and states. This normative 
framework matters to minority groups. Minorities are often lacking the power to 
influence decision-making in the state. Even in democratic polities, the legitimate 
processes of majority voting can overrule the interests of minorities. Norms can provide 
leverage in a domestic system that is structurally unfavourable to minorities. Through 
processes of “accountability politics” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) minorities can use 
international law as a universal standard baseline for state practice in order to highlight 
gaps in adherence and push for change.
The international protection regime for minorities is not without controversy, however. 
The regime is structured on the basis of individual rights, not collective rights, thus 
limiting the ability of minority groups to make claims qua groups, including to the right 
to self-determination (of peoples).4 The only legally binding provision specifically for 
minorities at the international level is contained in Article 27 of the ICCPR (and Article 
30 of the CRC). Where minority rights are elaborated more fully in the UNDM the 
language used suggests recommendation rather than obligation on the part of states: 
states ‘shall’ and ‘should’ take measures to protect minorities, rather than minorities 
have ‘rights to’ those measures being taken. The WGM was replaced in 2008 by a 
smaller and arguably weaker UN Forum on Minorities. The newly appointed 
Independent Expert on minority issues is an expert to the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, rather than reporting directly to the General Assembly or Secretary- 
General (as is the case for other similar mechanisms) thus conferring lower status to the 
position. The regime also lumps together very disparate groups -  the needs of linguistic 
minorities are distinct from those of religious minorities, while national minorities may 
have stronger claims to, inter alia, territorial autonomy, a factor not considered directly 
in any of the minority rights provisions. The possibility of groups to claim the rights is 
determined in large part by whether states accept them to be minorities; this safeguard is
4 See common Article 1.1. of the ICCPR and ICESCR on the right to self-determination of peoples.
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built into Article 27, which is said to apply “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist” (emphasis added). International mechanisms have been 
challenged by state willingness to acknowledge even this basic starting point.5
Who is a ‘minority ’? Strategic framing o f minority identities
The former OSCE Higher Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der 
Stoel, once famously said “I know a minority when I see one” in response to a question 
regarding how one might legitimately identify a minority group. His response touches 
on one of the most challenging aspects of the international protection regime for 
minorities, namely, determining who are minorities. The answer is important because it 
dictates which groups have rights as minorities, rights that pertain to material interests. 
Minority status is socially constructed, as is the meaning of the term itself. The identity 
label has an intersubjective quality, requiring both group and state acceptance before the 
rights claims can be made successfully. This dynamic creates real tension between 
minority groups and states, while IOs often take up the role of mediating the contending 
views through expert observations and providing space for the debate to happen.
There is no universally accepted definition of “minority” either in law or in practice.6 
What has evolved is a balance between objective and subjective criteria that define 
groups as minorities. Objectively, groups must share a common ethnic, religious or 
linguistic identity; they must be ‘non-dominant’ in the political, economic and/or social 
spheres; and they may or may not be citizens of the state in which they live. 
Subjectively, they must have a desire to continue their collective identity and a wish to 
self-identify as members of a ‘minority’ group. This last criterion encapsulates the 
‘principle of self-identification’, an important caveat. The principal serves as a 
safeguard against states that would deny the existence of persons belonging to 
minorities within their territory. It also recognises the freedom of groups to reject the 
minority identity label on an individual or communal basis.
5 The interpretation of the article by the UN Human Rights Committee has tried to establish that the 
existence of a minority group must be determined by fact and not merely by a decision of the state. See 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23 on the Rights o f Minorities (Article 27), (UN doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.5, 1994): para 5.2.
6 See the proposed but rejected definitions of Francesco Capotorti (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l 
(1979)) and Jules Deschenes (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31 (14 May 1985)). See also the summary 
document on proposed definitions, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/WG.5/WP.1 (14 November 1986).
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The category of minority has fragmented significantly over time, now encompassing a 
host of sub-groups. The WGM has said that the UNDM can apply to national 
minorities; ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities; indigenous peoples; migrant 
workers; refugees; immigrants; and non-citizens.7 With the exception of ‘indigenous 
peoples’, these identity categories have been elaborated from above; that is, the groups 
themselves did not collectively organise to assert a new identity label. Rather, the 
labels have emerged from inter-state discourse (usually resulting in standards pertaining 
to groups) or from expert discourse, such as in the UN Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights. Consequently, many groups so-labelled have had little input into how their 
identity is framed or the limitations of that frame.
The minority frame can be both empowering and disempowering for groups. When 
groups claim they are a minority they can access an existing set of rights, institutions 
and meanings associated with the term. Outwardly, as a frame for social mobilisation it 
can therefore be highly instrumental. Inwardly, it is not a value-neutral term, however, 
and this can affect the desire of a group to so-identify. In English, for example, the 
meaning of the term ‘minority’ can have negative connotations (such as weakness,
Q
smallness, marginal) depending on etymology and/or social and political usage. When 
groups say they are minorities, as opposed to, for example, nations or peoples, they 
tacitly acknowledge that they are in a position of less power. The frame imposes 
limitations on their rights established by the confines of the international protection 
regime for minorities, limitations created in the interests of states.
Some groups are rejecting the term minority and opting instead for the construction of 
new identity frames and/or the adoption of other identity frames, such as ‘indigenous
7 Commentary o f the Working Group on Minorities to the UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, (4 April 2005).
8 The origins of the term ‘minority’ in English are illustrative. The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford 
University Press 2000) indicates that minority in its present usage can refer to “any identifiable subgroup 
within a society, esp. one perceived as suffering from discrimination or from relative lack of status or 
power”. The word minority in English was first used in the 14th century to denote “[t]he period of a 
person's life prior to attaining full age; the state or fact of being a minor”. It was subsequently used to 
denote “[t]he condition or fact of being smaller, inferior, or subordinate in relation to something else”. 
The word was then often used from the early 18th century to describe a political group not holding power, 
“whose views or actions distinguish it from the main body of people”. From the mid- 19th century the 
word ‘minority’ took on the meaning o f “[a] small group of people differing from the rest o f the 
community in ethnic origin, religion, language, etc.”.
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peoples’. Some seek empowerment in a new identity frame that is unique to their 
experiences, regardless of whether this impedes their access to the rights and 
opportunities of the minority frame. The new frame can reflect better their cultural and 
historical identity as they see it. This can build group esteem, by distancing members 
from the negative connotations of ‘minority’ and constructing positive connotations in 
the new identity frame. From a rational perspective, a group may also find that an 
alternative identity frame affords greater rights and opportunities. Identity frames such 
as ‘peoples’ or ‘national minorities’ are attached to legally binding rights in 
international law and to various kinds of state practice. A group may wish to re-frame 
its identity from ‘minority’, with a limited set of rights, to ‘peoples’ with a different set 
of rights as part of an interest maximising process. For example, Kurds in Turkey could 
legitimately claim status as national minorities but the discourse of Kurdish political 
activism often uses instead the identity frame of peoples, implying their ‘stateless- 
nation’ status. External actors cannot easily dissect ideational interests from rational 
interests in identity framing and often both motivations exist. The case is illustrated 
well in the words of one Afro-descendant leader from Colombia:
‘Pueblo/s affodescendiente/s’ is definitely more effective [than ‘minority’] in 
political terms. Why? Because not only the leaders but also the communities see 
the word ‘minorities’ (“minorias”) as a word that minimizes their socio­
economic problems. For instance, it is common to hear in Latin America 
sentences like “Affo-descendants have many problems, but they are just a 
minority, and we need to solve the problems of all people in the country or 
region”. It is important to add that the word ‘minorities’ is also (mainly) seen as 
a measure of comparison (only in demographic terms), and many leaders don’t 
like it because of that.9
It is clear that the minority identity frame is not sufficient in many cases to accurately 
reflect either the character, the needs or the objectives of the group.
A shared ethnic, religious or linguistic identity serves as a powerful mobilising frame 
but these identities contain much internal variation that can undermine attempts to 
establish a unified outward identity, particularly on a transnational level. The frame can 
be challenged by insiders and outsiders; indeed, the principle of self-identification 
embedded in the minority rights discourse recognises the right of communities to name 
themselves and assert their distinctiveness against the forces of homogenisation. The
9 Personal communication with Leonardo Reales. March 2006.
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Roma in Europe, for example, self-identify into several groups such as the Sinti, 
Manush, Kale, Rudari and have associated groups such as the Ashkalija, Egyupti and 
Travellers (Klimova-Alexander 2005, 30-31); some groups are even reclaiming the 
‘gypsy’ identity label, in part to distinguish themselves from ethnic Roma. The 
indigenous peoples’ identity frame has fit less well in the regions of Africa and Asia 
where indigeneity is not so distinct and where post-colonial states are less willing to 
countenance group claims to be colonised ‘peoples’.
The main purpose of forging these new transnational identity frames is empowerment, 
particularly to increase the leverage of the group vis-a-vis the state. By distinguishing 
themselves from minorities in the main, the groups begin to have a justification for 
separate standards, mechanisms and policies. These can give privileged access to 
resources, representation and participation. By making the identity frame as 
transnational as possible, they also justify attention by IOs to their concerns. When 
small and marginalised minority groups associate with a particular transnational identity 
frame, they are accessing an international network that can build esteem and alter 
relations with the state(s). No longer are they a unique and isolated group; they are part 
of that transnational community of indigenous peoples, Roma, Affo-descendants or 
caste-affected groups. They are less confined by domestic power structures and 
empowered by a diaspora, one of individually weak actors but with a strong collective 
voice. In sum, framing their identities as a minority can bring certain advantages; 
framing as part of a distinct transnational minority can bring even greater advantages.
Transnational social mobilisation by minorities:
Transnational social mobilisation of minorities occurs where minorities with a shared 
identity normally residing in separate states jointly take action in the international 
sphere. This mobilisation is social mobilisation to distinguish it from other kinds of 
mobilisation that may have distinctly cultural, economic or combative purposes and to 
distinguish those minorities who are non-state actors. A vast literature on ethnic 
conflict, power-sharing, irredentism and secession exists already to examine the nature 
and scope of mobilisation by minority groups to engage in conflict or governance. This 
is an important body of work but it has ignored other forms of mobilisation by minority
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groups that are not only more peaceful but arguably more constructive than combative 
or narrowly political strategies.
Transnational mobilisation for social justice is not a new phenomenon. Social 
movements, INGOs and transnational coalitions of actors have long been active beyond 
the domestic sphere in their efforts to achieve change on global and/or local issues 
(Seary 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Chatfield 1997). Among the earliest social foci of 
international NGOs have been anti-slavery, women’s suffrage, labour rights and 
humanitarian assistance. The transnational mobilisation of non-state actors has been 
aided greatly over time by innovations in transportation and communication technology 
that have made time and space less of a barrier to collective social action across borders.
No transnational social mobilisation has occurred on the basis of the overarching 
identity frame of ‘minority’. Despite the shared experiences of marginalisation and 
identity, the divergent social, cultural, historical and political experiences of minority 
groups have never been united in a global alliance. Groups in different regions are 
embedded in different historical constructions of diversity and state formation, from the 
idea of national minorities in ethnic-nation states (e.g. the Hungarians in Romania), to 
immigrant groups in civic states (e.g. north Africans in France), to highly fragmented 
ethno-linguistic communities in post-colonial states (e.g. India, Nigeria). This produces 
a wide spectrum in terms of how governments are disposed to minority rights advocacy. 
In Africa, for example, even the concept of ‘minority’ is contested, not least because the 
term is associated with colonial governance. There are also very practical divisions 
between categories of minority groups: for example, territorially concentrated ethnic 
minorities will be more likely to focus on land rights and autonomy issues than 
geographically dispersed religious minorities facing restrictions to the expression of 
their religious identity. The common ground, i.e. discrimination on the basis of identity, 
may be hard to find amid the particularities of each case. There are very legitimate 
reasons also why different minority groups should have greater entitlements than others, 
given the size of the group, the degree and nature of marginalisation faced and/or the 
historical place in society. In addition, many minorities are marginalised, poor and/or 
politically impotent. To mobilise resources, access information, create organisational 
structures and make international alliances is already a struggle for civil society actors 
who do not have to overcome these additional barriers.
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Similarly, there has not been a common issue, such as access to mother tongue 
education, which has stimulated minorities from diverse experiences to form 
transnational alliances. North-South differences, regional differences and cultural 
barriers play a part in this. Groups in the North, for example, particularly in Europe, 
may have an easier claim to mother tongue education where resources are less stretched 
and several precedents for this kind of education exist, including as recognised in the 
regional standards on minority rights. In Asia or Africa, minority groups may prioritise 
equal access to education, considering mother-tongue provision of this education as a 
much longer-term goal (or unnecessary). Regardless of these caveats, minority groups 
may understand that they can better maximise their interests without creating a global 
alliance. The women’s movement, for example, has faced many of the same barriers to 
mobilisation as minorities but has nevertheless forged transnational movements, 
including along issue areas (Friedman 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The evidence 
suggests that minority groups have pursued more group-specific paths instead of global 
alliances because they see these as more beneficial and more feasible.
Generalisations on transnational mobilisation by minorities are difficult to make 
because minority groups will have different motivations for acting (or not acting) 
beyond the boundaries of the state. So-called ‘homeland minorities’ (national minorities 
historically resident) may find no gains can be made from international advocacy. In 
Europe, for example, many homeland minorities have found domestic political 
opportunities to be open as a result of strong domestic mobilisation, kin-state support 
and/or concessions following conflict. Individuals may connect with a diaspora as a 
means of preserving their culture or establishing social capital when far away from their 
homeland. Religious minorities may use their international brethren for political support 
in the face of persecution from the state or more commonly as part of proselytising or 
worship. While cultural associations, diasporas and religious universalism all have a 
clear transnational element, they often lack the “contentious politics” (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) that the present analysis intends to explore. These may 
nevertheless serve as useful mobilising structures: for example, some Dalits have used 
religious institutions to mobilise and Afro-descendants have found links through 
cultural channels like music.
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Some insights can be gained by examining the landscape of minority-focused 
international NGOs active in international fora. Jackie Smith (e.g. Smith 2004b, 1997, 
2004a) categorises nearly 80 percent of social-interest INGOs under seven headings: 
human rights; peace; women’s rights; environment; world order/international law; 
development/empowerment; and self-determination/ethnic unity.














Human Rights 33 38 41 79 190 247
30.0% 27.0% 22.4% 22.7% 27.7% 26%
Environment 2 5 10 26 123 167
1.8% 3.5% 5.5% 7.5% 18% 17%
Women’s 10 14 16 25 62 94
Rights 9.1% 9.9% 8.7% 7.2% 9.1% 9%
Peace 11 20 14 22 81 98
10% 14.2% 7.7% 6.3% 11.8% 19%
World order/ 22 23 37 57 80 109*
international
law
20% 16.3% 20.2% 16.4% 11.7% 11%
Development** 3 3 7 13 47 95
2.7% 2.2% 3.8% 3.7% 7% 10%
Self- 10 12 18 37 29 20
determination/ 
ethnic unity
9.1% 8.5% 9.8% 10.6% 4.2% 2%
Source: Figures drawn from the Yearbook o f International Organizations (1953, 1963, 1973, 1983, 1993, 
2000). Table adapted from Keck and Sikkink (1998, 11), Sikkink and Smith (2005, 30), and Smith 
(2004a, 268).
*This figure is taken from Smith (2004a) under the heading “Global Justice/Peace/Envir.”, which most 
closely corresponds to the “World order/intemational law” heading used in the other sources.
** This heading is sometimes presented as “Development/empowerment” in the sources used.
INGOs focusing on “self-determination/ethnic unity” is the smallest of Smith’s 
categories and also reportedly the only one that has declined over time (Smith 1997, 
48). She hypothesises that the decrease may be accounted for either by a shift of such 
INGOs to more violent forms of organisation (which would exclude them from her 
primary data source, the Yearbook o f International Organizations), particularly over the 
1990s as ethnic militarism increased; or to a reframing of their issues under another 
theme, most probably as human rights issues (1997,48-49; 2004a, 270). She finds that:
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About half of the groups working to promote indigenous peoples’ rights 
were formed during the 1980s. Another organizing frame that may be 
displacing the ethnic unity/liberation one is the anti-racism/minority 
rights frame. Half of the groups listing this as a key goal were formed 
after 1980, and one quarter were formed during the 1990s. (Smith 
2004a, 270).
It is not clear how Smith’s figures on ‘self-determination/ethnic unity’ relate to the 
current categories of the Yearbook o f  International Organizations.10 The Yearbook 
reports that for 2004, 302 international organisations (i.e. INGOs and IOs) were 
categorised under the heading “Racial, Ethnic Groups” and 265 under “Minority, 
Indigenous Groups”.11 These two categories have generally showed steady growth over 
time, with the “Minority, Indigenous Groups” increasing at a higher rate, in particular in 
the period between 1986 and 1995. From 2001 to 2002, the number of INGOs in each
17category nearly doubled. The two growth periods may coincide with the growth of 
indigenous peoples’ organisations around the WGIP (created in 1982) and the 
international campaign around the 500th Anniversary of Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of the 
Americas (1992) and with the 2001 WCAR. One of the Yearbook's earliest records, 
from 1924, shows 7 organisations registered under the category of “Nationalities and 
races”, suggesting that the institutionalisation of transnational social mobilisation by 
ethnic non-state actors has a long history.13 This is in evidence in the case studies: 
Affo-descendants pursued forms of transnational mobilisation from the beginning of the 
20th century, while domestically Dalits were beginning to mobilise in the period.
The institutions categorised by the Yearbook include a wide range of bodies, such as 
funds, research institutes, foundations, and moribund organisations, in addition to 
international legal standards and IOs. The “Minority, Indigenous Groups” category, for 
example, begins with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, a now 
defunct body of the Government of Australia, and ends with Young Women from 
Minorities, a small European INGO; in between are many organisations predominately
10 Smith indicates that her code on self-determination/ethnic unity was used for groups that were 
organised around an ethnic identity to promote solidarity within an ethnic group. Ethnic unity groups 
were not necessarily coded as ‘Minority Rights’ groups. This only occurred when the organisational 
description mentioned rights explicitly, as in minority rights or rights for marginalised peoples.
Personal communication with the author, 23 February 2007.
11 Union of International Associations, “Figure 4.1.2 Subjects. Number of International Organisations by 
Subject Groups: 2004”, Yearbook o f International Organizations, 2005. The Yearbook also includes 
related categories such as “Peoples”, “Migrants”, “Refugees”, and “Class, Caste, Elites”.
12 Ibid, “Figure 4.2.2(b) Trends in Selected Subjects, 1985-2004”, 2005.
13 Ibid, “Figure 4.3.1 Classification of International Organisations: 1924”, 2005.
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working on indigenous peoples rights (e.g. International Indian Treaty Council -  an 
advocacy INGO), some working on religious minorities (e.g. Institute of Muslim 
Minority Affairs -  a UK-based research institute) and some for whom only a strand of 
their work indirectly impacts on minorities (e.g. International Alert -  a conflict 
INGO).14
A better picture of minority INGOs is provided in Table 1.2, which gives an overview 
of the most active advocacy-focused INGOs, including those working primarily at the 
regional level. The INGOs listed here are those whose exclusive focus is on the 
situation of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and/or indigenous peoples. This list 
does not include INGOs that may give attention to minorities/indigenous peoples as one 
of several issues in their repertoire. The minority ENGOs combine roles in information 
sharing, advocacy vis-a-vis international institutions, research, training/capacity 
building, and funding or running small to medium-sized projects, usually at the local 
level.
Significantly, most of the INGOs have a primary or exclusive focus on indigenous 
peoples; the extensive duration of their transnational mobilisation has led to strong 
organisational platforms that have been institutionalised as INGO structures. Only one 
of the 18 global INGOs focuses on a particular minority/indigenous group, namely the 
International Romani Union directed towards the interests of the Roma.15 This suggests 
two points: first, that most minority groups are localised identities that are not easily 
framed with a global reach; and second, that transnational mobilisation by specific 
minorities is not extensive enough to warrant the creation of INGOs. At the regional 
level, the only non-indigenous group to have a dedicated INGO is the Roma; the 
indigenous Saami and the Amazigh also have specially dedicated INGOs. Many of the 
INGOs have been established by external actors and only about one third of the global 
organisations are directed by individuals belonging to minority groups. Although most 
of the INGOs are based in the North, many do straddle the North-South divide, working 
in close cooperation with organisations in the South and/or North. For example,
14 It is not clear how the Yearbook decides where to categorise the organisations; several bodies also 
appear under both the “Minority, Indigenous Groups” heading and the “Racial, Ethnic Groups” heading.
5 The International Dalit Solidarity Network does work principally with Dalit issues but seeks to 
represent the interests of a wide range of caste-affected groups.
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Minority Rights Group International reports that it has over 130 partner NGOs/INGOs 
in nearly 60 countries worldwide.
While Smith (2004a) finds that INGOs are increasingly working with regional 
organisations, the spread of minority INGOs in Table 1.2 suggests that many continue 
to use the UN as a key focus of their activity. All of the INGOs in Table 1.2 have 
engaged at some point with the UN fora and about half of these have formal 
consultative status with the UN, including seven of the mostly regionally focused 
INGOs. INGOs are often work very closely with and within international institutions, 
The expertise of 10 actors can validate minority claims on norm development; IOs 
possess moral influence based on their perceived neutrality; and the political legitimacy 
of IOs is rooted in their state-sanctioned mandates. As discussed below, these are just a 
few of the ways that IOs have supported minority norm entrepreneurs.
Table 1.2 INGOs focusing on minorities and/or indigenous peoples.
The country in which the headquarters or secretariat of these organisations is located appears in 
parentheses.
Global Cultural Survival (US)
Centre de Documentation, de Recherche et d'Information des Peulpes 
Autochtones (DoCip) (Switzerland)
Forest Peoples Programme (UK)
First Peoples Worldwide (US)
International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical 
Forests (Thailand)
International Dalit Solidarity Network (Denmark)
International Indian Treaty Council (US)
International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism 
(Japan)
International Romani Union (Poland)
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (Denmark)
Minority Rights Group International (UK)
Netherlands Centre for Indigenous Peoples (Netherlands)
Rainforest Foundation (UK/US/Norway)
Society for Threatened Peoples (Germany)
Survival International (UK)
Tebtebba Foundation - Indigenous Peoples' International Centre for Policy 
Research and Education (the Philippines)
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (Netherlands)
World Alliance of Mobile Indigenous Peoples (Iran)
Europe/North
America
Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat (Denmark) 
Association for Democratic Initiatives (Macedonia) 
European Roma and Travellers Forum (France)
European Roma Rights Centre (Hungary)
Federal Union of European Nationalities (Germany) 
Indian Law Resource Centre (US)
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Inuit Circumpolar Conference (Canada/US/Russia/Greenland) 
Roma National Congress (Germany/Czech Republic)
Saami Council (Finland)
Africa African Indigenous Women’s Organisation (Burkino Faso)
Commission Amazigh Internationale pur le Developpement et les Droits de 
L'Homme (Algeria)
Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordination Committee (South Africa) 
Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (Namibia)
Asia/Pacific Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact Foundation (Thailand) 
Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network (India)
Middle East N/A
Latin America Abya Yala Fund for Indigenous Self-Development in South and Meso 
America (US)
Amazon Alliance (US)
Coordinator of the Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) 
(Ecuador)
Indian Council of South America (Peru)
Indigenous Information Network (Mexico)
South and Meso American Indian Rights Center (US)
Using political opportunity structures: the supporting role o f international 
organisations
International organisations provide a space in which norm emergence can occur. They 
provide a focal point for collective action and actors within these institutions frequently 
assist in achieving the goals of minority norm entrepreneurs. Minorities need to take on 
particular modus operandi, however, to be successful in these international fora.
The interaction of minorities with international organisations has a long history. From 
the League of Nations’ minority treaties to the minority NGOs such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American 
Jewish League participating at the San Francisco conference to found the UN (Seary 
1996, 25-26), and the specialised minority-focused bodies under the OSCE, minorities 
have played a role in shaping the mandates and structure of many IOs.
Minorities in turn have frequently looked to IOs as allies in their struggles. At one 
extreme, IOs (mandated by states) have intervened to physically protect minorities, as in 
cases of genocide: UN peacekeeping missions in Iraq protecting the Kurds, in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to protect the Bosniacs, and eventually in Rwanda to protect the Tutsi 
are examples in point. Several IOs have also established specialised mechanisms aimed 
at supporting minorities to engage peacefully with states on issues of legitimate interest.
49
Treaties with minority provisions are overseen by treaty bodies that review periodic 
state reports and provide recommendations for improved implementation. The soft law 
standards also have review bodies. The UNDM had the Working Group on Minorities 
(WGM), established under the auspices of the UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights.16 Operating from 1995-2007, the WGM provided 
space for minorities to raise concerns, engage in dialogue with states, and for all 
participants to examine important general issues pertaining to minorities. This was 
replaced from 2008 with a UN Forum on Minorities meeting 2 days per year to focus on 
a specific theme. Finally, some ad hoc mechanisms have been established, charged with 
reviewing thematic and country-specific concerns, the latter principally upon invitation 
of states. At the UN, the position of the Independent Expert on minority issues was 
created in 2005 to focus on promoting the implementation of the UNDM and
17documenting best practices vis-a-vis minorities. Related mechanisms, such as the 
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia 
and related intolerance, also have a focus that includes attention to minority protection 
issues. Other IOs may take up the issue of minorities as it pertains to the objective of the 
organisation: for example, the HCNM was created in 1992 by the OSCE to seek 
preventative solutions to inter-ethnic tension; and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) has been active in organising a series of conferences on Muslim 
minorities.18 All of these mechanisms are supported by a cadre of international staff that 
regularly organise meetings and consultations with a view to stimulating dialogue and 
information sharing relevant to the mandates. For example, within the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) there is an Indigenous Peoples and 
Minorities Unit and an Anti-Discrimination Unit.
These mechanisms provide important spaces for minorities outside of the domestic 
sphere. The international political opportunity structures enable minorities to make 
public statements about country-specific or thematic concerns, statements that might be 
blocked or weak in the domestic sphere for security reasons or lack of general public
16 ECOSOC Resolution 1995/31 (25 July 1995).
17 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/79 (21 April 2005).
18 The first conference of Muslim Minorities in Africa was held in Accra, Republic of Ghana from 20-22 
January 2003. See Resolution No. 1/10-MM (IS) On Safeguarding the Rights o f Muslim Communities 
and Minorities in non-OIC Member States. Tenth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, held in 
Putrajaya, Malaysia, from 20-21 Shaaban 1424H (16-17 October 2003). A second African conference 
was planned for Tanzania in 2006 and for Asia in 2007. See http://www.oic-oci.org/index.asp, ‘Calendar 
of Events’.
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interest. Within these international spaces minorities may be better able to engage in 
dialogue with representatives of their state, finding that their government officials are 
more accessible (and less discriminatory) in the corridors of UN buildings than in the 
offices of ministries at home. Recognition by the IO of the NGO’s right to participate in 
the proceedings of the IO’s institutions can be an important “certification” (Tarrow 
2005, 194) of not only the organisation but also of the people they seek to represent. 
Where the state itself does not represent the interests of a minority, participation in 
inter-state dialogue is afforded by the space in IOs. Minority groups can suddenly find 
their kin have a seat at the international table and a voice to challenge the actions of 
their state from outside. Through statements to international fora, minorities can begin 
to formulate a shared agenda around country or thematic issues, a first step in norm 
elaboration. The more often groups come together at international meetings the greater 
the possibility that they can form supra-national alliances, including with INGOs and 
IOs. Several training and fellowship programmes have been established by INGOs and 
IOs to support these ends. The OHCHR hosts two fellowship programmes, one for 
indigenous peoples and one for minorities.19 MRG and Global Rights similarly conduct 
trainings at the UN level and regionally on how to use minority rights standards in 
advocacy work. Slowly this is building a pool of minority actors that know how to take 
advantage of the political opportunities afforded by IOs.
Where IOs have a specific mandate to work on minority issues, for example through the 
legal standards elaborated under its auspices, actors within that IO will have a keen 
interest in engaging with minority representatives. This cooperation can assist IO actors 
to push for greater state compliance with standards. International mechanisms enable 
groups to input into the evolving normative framework of minority rights by sharing 
their own perspectives on these norms in theory and practice. For example, the 
submission of shadow reports or individual complaints to treaty bodies can help 
advance norm emergence and adherence by states via treaty body recommendations. 
Minority actors can also influence agenda-setting by persuading IOs to include new 
minority issues in their work. This can precipitate institutionalisation of emerging 
norms in IOs and the creation of mechanisms for observing them: for example, the UN 
Sub-Commission on Human Rights has played a key role in institutionalising emerging
19 Individuals are nominated by minority or indigenous NGOs to participate in the 1 -4 month programmes 
in Geneva, where participants are introduced to the UN machinery available for protection of their rights.
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norms on indigenous peoples’ rights and has appointed Special Rapporteurs to 
investigate these issues.
In interviews conducted for this thesis, minority NGO representatives repeatedly cited 
the UN or similar IOs (such as the EU) as important allies to their cause. As noted in 
Table 1.2, however, there are a limited number of minority NGOs that have regular 
contact with IOs, often lacking the resources to sustain any serious international 
cooperation. NGOs with little experience on the international stage will find it difficult 
to understand where best to invest their efforts for maximum effect. There are also 
some minority groups for whom the domestic political opportunities are open and 
effective; this is particularly the case where groups have secured political representation 
in governance and/or autonomy. For them, international political opportunities offer 
little added-value.
Participation in any IO comes with certain parameters. IO actors can be cautious where 
minority groups are not officially recognised by the state, members of the minority 
group are engaged in some sort of conflict with the state, or sensitive political questions, 
such as forms of autonomy, are at issue. States can veto NGO participation (e.g. under 
ECOSOC procedures). Minority NGOs that seek to engage in these fora therefore must 
adopt a particular modus operandi to be admitted and succeed. NGOs that advocate or 
use violence in their efforts to achieve their goals will find it difficult to gain entry into 
IO proceedings. For those who believe that minority power lies in grassroots mass 
mobilisation or armed opposition, the IO offers little attraction. Even to engage with 
IOs, minorities must make certain concessions: “once NGOs have become recognised 
by international organisations, their room to manoeuvre will be limited with regard to 
the scope of their activities and their official positions” (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001, 
155). The principal concession is to state sovereignty: groups would be unlikely to 
solicit state support for claims that challenge directly the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the state in which they reside. This is evident in the discourse of indigenous 
peoples’ rights where advocacy on self-determination in the main focuses on internal 
self-determination. As much as the IO affords to minorities in terms of political 
opportunities and leverage against the state, the IO is first and foremost an institution 
formed for the interests of states and minorities must operate within these limitations. 
This may be more challenging for minorities than for other civil society groups since
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many of the issues for which minorities seek remedy touch upon the authority and
90structure of the state. Access to IOs, however, can facilitate “voices of moderation” 
within aggrieved minority communities, particularly where domestic political 
opportunities are blocked and violence appears the quickest path to soliciting state 
attention. The rules of engagement for civil society participation within IOs are law- 
abiding, orderly, adhering to certain repertoires and procedures that enable discursive 
pathways to normative change. Offering space for minority NGOs/INGOs within 
international fora can stimulate moderate and peaceful forms of mobilisation by 
minority groups, provided (and this is a key caveat) that minorities see that change is 
possible in using these fora.
Durban or bust: the 2001 World Conference Against Racism
In light of the many challenges discussed above for minority norm entrepreneurship, 
there are several reasons why the WCAR was such an important political opportunity 
structure for minority groups. It reduced some of the constraints on their norm 
entrepreneurship and promised the possibility of new normative commitments. The 
WCAR opened up doors for dialogue and gave minorities more esteem for their 
identities. They had opportunities to make arguments for change without being accused 
of upsetting the status quo because external actors created the opportunities. The topic 
of discrimination was not taboo; governments were obliged by way of the WCAR 
preparatory processes to discuss it. National and regional consultative meetings 
conferred greater authority to minority advocates and the increased media and 
legislative attention gave a better sense of accountability for the commitments made. 
Several donors created funding streams for civil society participation. This section will 
provide an overview of these dynamics, which will be treated in greater detail in the 
case study chapters.
The UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance was held in Durban, South Africa, 31 August - 8 September 2001. 
For the victims of racial discrimination and related intolerance that travelled from far 
and wide to be present it was a deeply moving experience; for South Africans and the
20 This point on NGOs attending the UN being “voices of moderation” was made by Mr. Karim Abdian 
of the Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation at the 2005 session of the WGM.
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rest of the world it was a highly symbolic event, another signpost in the triumph over 
apartheid.
This was the third world conference on this topic, predated by the first held in Geneva 
in 1978 and the second, also in Geneva, in 1983. The decision to hold a third world 
conference on racism was not inevitable: by many accounts the first two world 
conferences had been largely ineffective. These conferences were used as a political 
forum to criticise South Africa’s apartheid regime and Israel’s occupation of Palestine 
but failed to give adequate attention to the persistence of discrimination across states. 
The third conference, coming at the start of a new century, following a decade of 
increased confidence in multilateral processes, and with a large pool of interest from 
civil society, was supposed to herald a new wave of commitment to equality, justice and 
non-discrimination. Three days after the conference ended, following a surge of 
diplomacy to secure a text amidst the controversial departure of the US and Israeli 
delegations, the September 11 attacks in the US occurred. The convergence of these 
events has impacted significantly on the post-WCAR follow-up, shifting world focus to 
anti-terrorism measures and related security concerns.
The proposal to hold a third world conference on racism originated in the UN Sub- 
Commission on Human Rights with Resolution 1994/2. It came at an important 
juncture, following the Presidential election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 and the UN 
abolition of the epithet that “Zionism is racism” in all o f its subsequent documents as of 
1 9 9 1  21 These two issues were important because both apartheid and Israel’s 
occupation of Palestine had all but consumed the UN dialogue on ‘racism and racial 
discrimination’ to that date. As Sub-Commission member Gay McDougall recalls, in 
this period “there was some searching going on for what to do with the racism 
agenda”.22 The Sub-Commission was keen to draw states’ attention to a myriad of 
contemporary problems linked to racism and racial discrimination (Lindgren Alves 
2003). They were also encouraged by the success of the World Conference on Human 
Rights held in Vienna in 1993. The General Assembly took up the call for a third world 
conference in Resolution 52/111 in 1997, proposing that such a conference be held not 
later than 2001.
21 See UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86 (16 December 1991).
22 Interview with Gay McDougall, April 2008.
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The core objectives of the WCAR offered to minorities an important political 
opportunity structure in which to push the normative boundaries governing their rights 
and recognition in a way that was not in evidence at the 1978 and 1983 meetings. So- 
called “victim groups” were to be a primary focus of attention. A series of preparatory 
meetings at the regional and global level offered space to meet and develop 
organistional platforms and a common agenda. The WCAR outcome document, the 
Durban Declaration and Programme o f  Action (DDPA), presented an opportunity to 
embed their claims into an international soft law instrument. States that might 
otherwise give little attention to minority concerns were pushed into dialogue by the 
demands of WCAR engagement.
A wide array of UN official preparatory processes led up to the final conference in 
September 2001. During 1999 and 2000 five regional Expert Seminars were held in 
Geneva, Warsaw, Bangkok, Addis Ababa and Santiago de Chile. These proved useful 
opportunities for norm-related issues to gain a profile early on in the process. Of 
particular significance was the so-called Bellagio Consultation, hosted in January 2000 
by Global Rights under its then Executive Director Gay McDougall. The Bellagio 
Consultation was a high-level civil society meeting that produced recommendations for 
the first draft text of the DDPA prepared by OHCHR. Among the short list of invited 
participants were key leaders in the cases considered here: Paul Divakar, Convener of 
the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR); Claire Nelson, the lead 
within the IDB on Afro-descendant issues; and Dimitrina Petrova, Executive Director of 
the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC). The consultation suggested themes for the 
WCAR, including ‘Victims Groups’, under which sub-themes were recommended for:
Indigenous peoples; Ethnic, national, religious and linguistic minorities; 
"Excluded majorities" (such as Afro-Brazilians or Black South Africans under 
apartheid); Migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons; Groups 
subject to discrimination on the basis of descent (such as the Dalits and the 
Burakumin); People o f colour in the Americas P
The list signals an interest, conceptually and politically, to consider Afro-descendants 
and Dalits as a distinct category from minorities at the WCAR.
23 UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC. 1/10 (8 March 2000): para 50 (emphasis added).
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Regional intergovernmental preparatory meetings were also held: European countries 
met in Strasbourg, 11-13 October 2000; in the Americas a meeting was held in Santiago 
de Chile, 5-7 December 2000; the African regional preparatory meeting took place in 
Dakar, 22-24 January 2001; and the meeting of the Asian group was held in Tehran, 19- 
21 February 2001. Each of these prepcoms produced a draft Declaration and 
Programme (or Plan) of Action to feed into the global common draft DDPA. The 
global common draft was shaped by several intergovernmental prepcoms held in 
Geneva.24
Parallel to these UN sanctioned processes were NGO-led initiatives. NGOs were able 
to participate in virtually all of the preparatory processes as observers, offering them 
important political opportunities to encourage states to include civil society 
recommendations in the draft texts. NGOs typically organised parallel sessions to the 
regional inter-governmental prepcoms and tried to influence the outcome of these 
processes at the same time as networking amongst themselves. These parallel NGO 
prepcoms would issue their own declarations in which they could express views on 
normative and substantive issues related to the WCAR.25 At the WCAR itself an NGO 
Forum was held 28 August -  1 September 2001 just a short walk from the official site 
of the UN conference. The NGO Forum issued its own Declaration and Programme o f  
Action, which became embroiled in controversy regarding certain paragraphs relating 
to the situation of Israel and Palestine, prompting several NGOs to publicly distance 
themselves from the document. In many countries national consultation processes also 
fed into both government and civil society positions at the WCAR. In the US, for 
example, an Interagency Task Force was created by the Department of State to conduct 
consultations with NGOs and other stakeholders in the lead up to Durban 27 This gave 
national platforms/networks an opportunity to coalesce and enabled input from local 
NGOs and individuals that lacked the means to participate in the international 
preparatory meetings or Durban.
24 The key Geneva-based preparatory meetings were as follows: a special session of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights during the period 19 March - 27 April 2001; two Inter-sessional Open-Ended Working 
Group Meetings of the Preparatory Committee, 5 - 9  March 2001 and 7- 11  May 2001; two preparatory 
intergovernmental meetings held 1-5 May 2000, and 21 May -1 June 2001; and further meetings of the 
Preparatory Committee, 30 July to 10 August 2001.
25 For access to NGO Fora outcome documents, see http ://www. icare. to/docs-wcar.html (accessed 5 May 
2009).
26 http://www.icare.to/wcar/finalngodeclarationandpoa.html (accessed 5 May 2009).
27 http://www.state.gov/p/io/uncnf/wcar/c1577.htm (accessed 24 April 2007).
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An estimated 18800 people were in Durban to follow all of the events held in 
connection with the WCAR (OHCHR 2001, 2). The NGO Forum saw the attendance of 
some 7000 representatives (in contrast, the 1978 and 1983 conference had 33 and 50 
NGOs respectively) (OHCHR 2001, 6).28 At the intergovernmental conference, 163 
governments were present, including 16 heads of state and 58 foreign ministers (Banton 
2002b, 359). The scene was set for a remarkable event, significant not only in its 
historic location but in the optimism that a third world conference would mark a 
genuine step forward.
After the firm international attention to the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights 
in 1993 and the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995, there was a sense among 
civil society actors that such conferences were (at worst) good spaces for networking 
and (at best) could offer an opportunity for normative change and renewing political 
will to implement existing standards. The WCAR was no exception in this regard. For 
victim groups, this was not just another conference, however; it was a deeply personal 
journey, an assertion of their right to equality and a challenge to the discrimination, 
marginalization, violence and injustice that was part o f daily life for many who 
participated in the Durban processes.
The WCAR was a good political opportunity structure for several reasons. The focus on 
not only racial discrimination but also ‘xenophobia and related intolerance’ gave a 
broad frame under which many groups could legitimately classify their interests. It was 
a densely concentrated process, spanning some 18-24 months of organised preparatory 
events, a useful time frame in which to launch a campaign and mobilise interest. World 
conferences are also very media friendly events, providing groups a chance to gain 
media attention in the domestic arena and internationally. The UN and other 
international donors (such as the Ford Foundation, Inter-American Foundation, and 
bilateral or multilateral development agencies) were willing to provide resources for 
NGOs to attend international meetings, organise local, national and international 
consultation processes and undertake related educational and campaigning projects. 
These kinds of funds would have been a lifeline to small and large NGOs alike 
representing groups who do not always figure prominently in funding agendas; the
28 See also UN Docs A/CONF.92/INF.2 (5 October 1978): p. 34 and A/CONF.l 19/INF.4 (1 December 
1983): p. 36.
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WCAR gave a legitimate motivation for targeting funds to NGOs with a mandate to 
promote the interests of specific ethnic groups.
New forms of transnational mobilisation were a key feature of the WCAR processes. 
Civil society formed some 35+ caucuses for the preparatory processes, which became
90the basis of 25 Thematic Commissions (TCs) created at Durban for the purposes of 
negotiating the NGO Declaration and Programme o f  Action. Those outside the TCs 
were less likely to have their recommendations included. Many NGOs were only able to 
attend Durban itself, by which time lobbying to introduce new ideas or text was all but 
useless, leaving them to focus principally on networking. The TCs on African 
Descendants, Indigenous Peoples, Roma/Sinti/Travellers, and Dalits and caste-based 
discrimination were among the largest and most active.
The original General Assembly resolution 52/111 authorizing the WCAR named only 
two groups specifically: migrants and indigenous peoples. It is significant, therefore, 
that the final DDPA makes mention of not less than 21 different groups as victims of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia or related intolerance, namely:
• Africans and people of African descent
• Arab communities
• Asians and people of Asian descent
• ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities
• indigenous peoples
• people infected or affected by HIV/AIDS
• Jewish communities
• migrants
• Mestizo populations of mixed ethnic and racial origins
• Muslim communities
• Palestinian people
• refugees and asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons
• certain religious communities
• Roma/Gypsies/Sinti/Travellers
• victims of trafficking
• women and girls
29 The Thematic Commissions were as follows: Administration o f Justice and Criminal Justice; African 
Descendants; Anti-Semitism; Asians and Asian Descendants; Colonialism/Foreign occupation; Dalits and 
caste discrimination; Disabled; Displaced Persons/Migrants/Refugees/Asylum Seeks; Education, 
Information, Communication ad Media; Ethnic Minorities; Gender; Globalisation, Poverty Social 
exclusion and environmental racism; Hate crimes/Ethnic cleansing/Conflict/Genocide; Health and 
HIV/AIDS; Indigenous Peoples; Labour; Legal measures, policies and practices; Palestinians/New forms 
of Apartheid; Religious intolerance; Reparation and Compensation; Roma/Sinti/Travellers; Sexual 
orientation; Slavery and Slave trade; Trafficking; Youth and children.
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Not all groups were successful in their bids to secure recognition of their concerns; 
indeed many more groups are distinctly mentioned in the NGO Forum outcome 
documents. Several factors contributed to the ability of groups to be recognized by the 
inter-governmental forum, including the size of the group lobbying (both in terms of the 
population size of the group as a whole and the number of delegates directly engaged in 
the WCAR processes); the presence of the group’s representatives in WCAR fora and 
their skill as advocates in the international sphere; the willingness of states to take up 
the issues of concern to the groups; and the preexistence of agreed normative standards 
and other multilateral commitments vis-a-vis the group.
Arguably, state willingness trumped all other issues since it was states that made 
decisions on whether to adopt language for the final outcome documents. NGOs could 
make recommendations and lobby for certain paragraphs but without strong state 
support (or least, in the absence of strong state objections) these recommendations 
would remain on the cutting room floor. Groups that represented large constituents 
living in many different states were in a better position to use domestic media and other 
advocacy tools (e.g. parliamentary allies) to leverage support for their 
recommendations. They could also target multiple states to encourage adoption of their 
relevant paragraphs. A large team of advocates would enable this logistically and 
would also give their group a visible presence in the field of ‘victim groups’ at the 
meetings. Quantity does not always mean quality, however, and regardless of the 
number of delegates, victim groups’ representatives needed to be savvy persuaders with 
an understanding of multilateral negotiating processes. Presence and hard lobbying in 
the regional intergovernmental prepcoms and the Geneva global prepcoms were key to 
success at Durban. Where past lobbying had established precedents and socialised 
states to certain language and provisions, victim group advocates had a better chance of 
securing state endorsement for their recommendations in Durban.
This is evidenced in part by the final outcome documents where certain victim groups 
are privileged over others in the text. The DDPA dedicates distinct ‘chapters’ to four 
groups: Africans and People of African Descent; Indigenous Peoples; Migrants; and 
Refugees. The latter two issues have obvious cross-border implications and would be 
the source of important economic concerns for states as well. Indigenous peoples have
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over the past three decades been a visible presence in multilateral fora, repeatedly 
securing attention to their concerns in outcome documents; this socialisation was carried 
through at Durban. Africans and People of African descent were aided by state interests 
from both Latin America and Africa in seeing these paragraphs figure prominently in 
the final documents. Several other groups are addressed under the chapter ‘other 
victims’ (women; Roma/Gypsies/Sinti/Travellers; trafficked persons; people of Asian 
descent; national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; and children). It is not 
clear why these groups are lumped under the ‘other groups’ general heading, rather than 
separate paragraphs. Given the preoccupation of states with the controversial inter­
state debates that dominated the WCAR processes, the success of victim groups in 
bringing any attention to their issues should be lauded.
Ideational and rational interests of states were both in evidence at the WCAR. The inter­
state discourse on racism within the UN historically has been a proxy for criticisms of 
colonialism, specifically, and the dominance of the West, more generally. The discourse 
has been dominated by an underlying political agenda that claims racism, manifest 
through colonialism, perpetuates the structural inequalities faced by many (post­
colonial) states in the international system. While there is a valid ideational critique in 
these assertions -  the idea of racial hierarchy was used to justify colonialism -  this point
is often overplayed while the persistence of racism in all countries is ignored (Banton 
11
2002a). From a rationalist perspective, many Southern states sought to use the WCAR 
as an arena for gaining financial concessions for the negative legacies of colonialism 
and slavery.32 From an ideational perspective, Northern states were ill-placed to oppose 
a world conference without appearing ipso facto to oppose combating racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. At the WCAR concerns with racism 
between states were still overshadowing attention to racism within states.
Norm entrepreneurship was constrained for many groups in the WCAR because states 
were most concerned with the big debates on slavery reparations, colonialism and
30 Women, in particular, are often privileged in such texts and states are socialised to women’s concerns 
in these kind of fora. The interest of mainstream women’s NGOs in the WCAR was weaker, however, 
and with a weaker presence can come weaker outcomes.
31 See also Banton’s (1996) work analysing state submissions to CERD.
32 GRULAC (Group of Latin American and Caribbean) states were caught somewhere in between: 
aligned with Southern states over concerns of global financial inequalities but likely cognisant, 
particularly in the context of the WCAR, of the lingering structures of European colonialism in many 
states of the region.
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Israel’s occupation of Palestine. Some minority groups were able to profit from this: for 
example, Afro-descendants gained the support of the Africa group by highlighting 
common interests pertaining to the transatlantic slave trade. Dalits, in contrast, 
struggled to secure state support on caste-based discrimination because India was a 
broker for the Western Group of states in their efforts to avoid reparations for 
colonialism and slavery.
Several new bodies were created as formal WCAR follow-up mechanisms. The first 
such mechanism was a Group of Independent Eminent Experts, comprised of one 
individual nominated by the UN Secretary-General from each of the five regions. The 
Commission on Human Rights created a second follow-up mechanism, the 
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the Durban 
Declaration and Programme of Action. The Commission also created a Working Group 
of Experts on People of African Descent (WGPAD),33 as requested by the DDPA. There 
has been very little rehashing of tense Durban debates within these mechanisms and so 
far the Intergovernmental Working Group and the WGPAD have been choosing 
important but innocuous thematic foci for each session (e.g. for the 2007 session the 
foci were national actions plans to combat racism and a discussion of racial profiling, 
respectively). A new Anti-Discrimination Unit was established at the OHCHR with a 
mandate to support the Durban follow-up mechanisms.
These instruments have been poorly attended by civil society. NGOs deeply engaged in 
the Durban processes took an early interest but were soon disappointed with the results. 
The 2006 session of the Intergovernmental Working Group was attended by 18 NGOs; 
in the 2005 session, the WGPAD was attended by 15 NGOs.34 The low presence is the 
result of lack of funding by NGOs to participate in the (Geneva-based) meetings; a lack 
of awareness of the meetings; and a belief that attendance at the meetings is not useful 
for their advocacy objectives. Some NGO activists have lamented that (bar a few 
exceptions) there is a dearth of firmly committed individuals sitting in these 
mechanisms.
The set of institutions nevertheless continues to expand. In December 2006, the General
33 See Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/68 (25 April 2002).
34 See UN Docs. E/CN.4/2006/18 (20 March 2006) and E/CN.4/2006/19 (6 December 2005), 
respectively.
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Assembly adopted a resolution to convene in 2009 a Durban Review Conference 
(DRC).35 The proposal was tabled by South Africa, with strong support from the Africa 
Group and the OIC member states.36 The United States and Israel voted against the 
resolution and Canada signaled early on its intention not to participate in the process. 
The EU member states predicated their participation on no reopening of the DDPA. In 
the opinion of one key INGO representative in Geneva, the meeting “is simply a waste 
of money, energy and everything!” given the permanent mechanisms that already
10
exist. Civil society has not expressly lobbied for the DRC and NGO participation in 
the prepcoms was low.39 In the DRC outcome document,40 very little had shifted in 
terms of state positions on Dalits and Afro-descendants: the latter are mentioned 
specifically once again but ‘work and descent-based discrimination’ is omitted. With 
little funding tabled for civil society participation and no official NGO Forum held, the 
DRC did not match the important civil society mobilisation witnessed at Durban.
The impact of the WCAR on the international protection regime for minorities is mixed. 
The status of the outcome documents as soft law does matter, evident not least in the 
firm fighting between states over their content. The change exhibited therein has been 
used as the basis for subsequent construction of norms and institutions. The WCAR 
also was an important moral and political rallying point for groups who usually feel that 
their issues are not a priority. New forms of transnational mobilisation emerged for 
Durban and many WCAR actors remain active on the international stage. Many “victim 
groups” made symbolic gains, securing recognition in the media and/or the WCAR 
outcome documents. The Durban conference pushed the spotlight on state practice 
internally to combat racism, a spotlight that in 1978 and 1983 only shone brightly on 
South Africa and Israel.
Racial discrimination may still be more of a foreign policy issue than a domestic policy 
issue for some states but non-state actors are now much more active agents in this 
discourse. In the WCAR, Dalits and Afro-descendants had ambitious goals for 
expanding the normative framework of their rights and benefited greatly from the
35 UN Doc. A/RES/61/149 (7 February 2007): para. 33.
36 UN Doc. A/C.3/61/L.53/Rev.l (17 November 2006).
37 An additional four states abstained on the resolution: Australia, Canada, Marshall Islands and Palau.
38 Atsuko Tanaka, personal communication, February 2007.
39 The meeting report of the first substantive session of the DRC Preparatory Committee shows only 26 
NGOs registered to attend. UN Doc. A/63/112 (9 July 2008): p. 21.
40 UN Doc. A/CONF.211/L.l, 24 April 2009.
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funding and political opportunities afforded by that process. They have had greater 
success since Durban in getting their issues on the international agenda and have 
witnessed important strides in norm emergence. Their goals have not always aligned 
with state interests, however, and the path to normative change has not been easy. The 
case studies will review these developments in greater detail. The next section will 
provide an overview of norm entrepreneurship by indigenous peoples and Roma, whose 
experiences at the WCAR and beyond are instructive for understanding norm 
emergence on group-specific rights.
Norm entrepreneurship by indigenous peoples and Roma: a model for other 
minorities?
This thesis aims to identify trends across groups that have diverted from the mainstream 
minority protection regime to forge group-specific norms. Indigenous peoples and 
Roma have both had successes in this regard. They have used framing and political 
opportunity structures to build strong transnational organisational platforms that have 
helped to secure the emergence of new normative standards and mechanisms 
specifically for them. International institutions have played a significant role in 
supporting these emerging norms. They have also both struggled with issues of 
leadership, accountability, and self-identification. These points have been documented 
in a handful of important studies by IR scholars on the indigenous peoples’ global 
movement (e.g. Brysk 2000; Wilmer 1993; Keal 2003; Niezen 2003) and on 
transnational mobilisation of Roma in European and UN institutions (e.g. Vermeersch 
2006 and Klimova-Alexander 2005). In order to establish a frame of reference for the 
case studies on Dalits and Afro-descendants, some key points from the experiences of 
indigenous peoples and Roma will be summarized here. This will inform the analysis of 
broader trends on group-specific norm entrepreneurship that is offered in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis.
Indigenous peoples: leading the way for group-specific norms
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Although the opposition that indigenous peoples have faced in norm entrepreneurship 
often is rooted in material interests of states, their success in norm emergence cannot be 
explained easily by rationalist theories. The efforts of indigenous peoples to secure 
recognition of their special status and rights within the state and transnationally have 
opened up space for other minorities whose demands can seem less radical in 
comparison.
Transnational networks of indigenous peoples’ organisations emerged in the 1970s, 
guided by their own initiative and the support of international actors. The early 
gatherings brought together individuals from the Americas, Nordic states, Australia and 
New Zealand. In Latin America, for example, Brysk (2000) finds that the international 
and local mobilisation of indigenous actors happened more or less simultaneously, with 
less success in forging a strong presence at the national level in between. This is partly 
attributed to the lack of allies among national political parties, including on the left, who 
tended to regard indigenous peoples with the same discriminatory attitudes as society at 
large and/or who favoured class-based agitations (Brysk 2000; Warren and Jackson 
2003). Discrimination also impacted on the willingness of individuals to self-identify 
as indigenous peoples and thus to associate themselves with national movements (Brysk 
2000, 86). Moreover, while traditional structures of organisation and authority 
remained intact within many indigenous communities, indigenous mobilisation was 
constrained by the political climate of authoritarianism, as in Latin America, and/or 
government prohibition of political organisation by indigenous communities that was 
common across states.41
The international dimension was important to their mobilisation from the beginning. 
States had invested some authority in international organisations to help regulate the 
status of indigenous communities. The ILO was charged from the 1920s with 
investigating the situation of indigenous labourers, culminating in the adoption in 1957 
of ELO Convention 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and 
other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (Thomberry 2002). 
The Inter-American Indian Institute was created in 1940 under the Convention 
Intemacional de Patzcuaro, eventually becoming a specialized agency of the OAS to
41 For example, in Canada the 1927 Indian Act outlawed the organisation o f political groups by 
indigenous peoples (http://www.afn.ca/article.asp?id=59 (accessed 1 June 2009)).
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coordinate national policy and research on indigenous populations (Brysk 2000, 125). 
Many of the grievances made by the communities pertained to encroachment on their 
lands by resource extraction policies supported by governments often in cooperation 
with international donors and corporations. Many communities were also penetrated by 
international actors aiming to help them, in particular the church, development 
practitioners and anthropologists, whose sympathy to the plight of indigenous groups 
prompted them to encourage mobilisation within the communities.
These latter international actors were instrumental in forging early organisational 
platforms. Three northern-based INGOs with mandates to support indigenous peoples 
were founded in the late 1960s and early 1970s: the International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (1968); Survival International (1969) and Cultural Survival (1972); 
Anti-Slavery International was also focusing on indigenous communities in this period. 
The World Council of Churches co-sponsored the first international meeting on 
indigenous issues (attended primarily by anthropologists) in 1971 in Barbados (Brysk 
2000, 64). INGOs were funding indigenous mobilisation activities: Oxfam and the 
Inter-American Foundation were among the early contributors (Brysk 2000, 97 and 
201).
There were also important efforts by indigenous leaders directly to organise themselves 
across borders. The Saami Council was created in 1956 as a regional network across 
several Nordic states. The National Indian Brotherhood, established in Canada in 1968, 
extended existing contacts within the Americas to forge links with indigenous leaders in 
New Zealand and the Nordic states on visits in the early 1970s. From 1974-1975 they 
held a series of international meetings at which the term and shared definition of 
‘indigenous peoples’ was elaborated (Sanders 1980). The delegates also founded the 
World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the first transnational organisational platform of 
indigenous peoples, which earned UN ECOSOC consultative status in 1975.
The UN quickly became a key political opportunity structure for facilitating 
transnational contact of indigenous peoples and for establishing attention to indigenous 
peoples as a discreet normative discourse (from minorities). The decision in 1970 by the 
UN Sub-Commission to appoint a Special Rapporteur to prepare a study of the problem 
of discrimination against indigenous populations was among the earliest initiatives
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(three years previous a similar study was recommended on minorities).42 In 1977, an 
International NGO Meeting on Indigenous Peoples of the Americas was organised in 
connection with the UN Decade to Combat Racial Discrimination; a second global 
meeting on indigenous peoples and land was held in 1981. Commentators cite these 
meetings as a major turning point for indigenous participation in international society 
(Tennant 1994, 52). The following year a UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations (WGIP) was established under theTJN Sub-Commission, meeting annually 
in Geneva with a specific mandate to, inter alia, “give special attention to the evolution 
of standards concerning the rights of indigenous populations”.43 The interface with the 
UN for indigenous peoples has continued to grow with the addition of the Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII), which held its first session in 2002. The PFII 
creates a unique space within the UN system (reporting directly to ECOSOC), where 
eight indigenous-nominated and eight state-nominated experts are approved by 
ECOSOC to sit on its governing body. The UN world conferences on the environment 
(1992 and 2002), human rights (1993) and racism (1978, 1983 and 2001) have all 
witnessed successful mobilisation by indigenous peoples, evidenced in special 
provisions for them in the outcome documents. The UN declared 1993 the International 
Year of the World’s Indigenous People and two subsequent UN Decades of the World’s 
Indigenous People, 1995-2004 and 2005-2014 have been proclaimed. From 1995 - 
2007, a UN open-ended inter-sessional Working Group on the draft declaration on the 
rights of indigenous peoples brought together states and indigenous representatives to 
negotiate the terms of the declaration. In 2001, the UN created the Special Rapporteur 
on the human rights of indigenous people, who has conducted some 12 country visits 
(as of end 2008) and hosted numerous seminars on thematic issues. At the regional 
level, the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights adopted its first 
resolution on action to combat racial discrimination against indigenous populations in 
1972 and has had a Special Rapporteur mechanism on the rights of indigenous peoples 
since 1990. The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights created a Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in 2001. The Artie Council recognises 
a special participatory and consultation status for representative indigenous
42 See UN Sub-Commission Resolution 4B (XXIII) (26 August 1970). Jose Martinez Cobo was appointed 
as Special Rapporteur in 1971; his final report is found at UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add. 1-4. 
The Sub-Commission passed a resolution calling for a study on the application o f Article 27 of the 
ICCPR in 1967 (Resolution 9 (XX)) and appointed the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Francesco Capotorti in 
1971. His final report is found at UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384 (20 June 1977) and Add. 1-7.
43 ECOSOC Resolution 1982/34 (7 May 1982): para 2.
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organisations. The list of international seminars, country reports and policy documents 
on indigenous peoples is too long to be detailed here but spans nearly four decades of 
international attention to their specific concerns as a distinct identity group.
These successes have been possible largely because of sustained and extensive 
mobilisation of indigenous peoples at the international level. In 1985, the UN created a 
Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations that has financed travel to international 
meetings; specific budget lines to support the advocacy of indigenous organisations 
have also been created by international donors and through private funding. Attendance 
at the WGIP has grown from 14 NGOs in 1982 to the accreditation of some of 583 
participants in 2006.44 At the 2008 session of the PFII, around 3000 participants 
attended.45 Several indigenous international NGOs have formed, such as the 
International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Tebtebba, the Saami Council 
and the International Indian Treaty Council.
Indigenous actors have pursued a strategy for embedding their normative claims in 
international standards. One of the earliest successes came at the first World Conference 
Against Racism in 1978. The final outcome document reads:
The conference endorses the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their 
traditional structure of economy and culture, including their own language, and 
also recognizes the special relationship of indigenous peoples to their land, and 
stresses that their land, land rights and natural resources should not be taken 
from them (1978 Declaration, para 21).46
From 1985, indigenous actors worked with the WGIP to elaborate a draft UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. They lobbied for ILO Convention 
107 to be replaced by ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries in 1989 (Barsh 1990). The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (DRIPS) was adopted in 2007. At the regional level, a draft OAS 
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is still under review by 
states. A number of international agencies, including the World Bank, UNDP and
44 Thomberry (2002, 23) and Report o f the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its twenty- 
fourth session (Geneva, 31 July-4 August 2006), UN Doc. A/HRC/Sub. 1/58/22, (14 August 2006).
45 UN Press Release, UN’s Indigenous Forum issues recommendations on climate change and other 
challenges as two-week meeting concludes (2 May 2008).
46 UN Doc. A/33/262 (9 October 1978): p. 17.
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European Union, have adopted formal policies on cooperation with indigenous 
peoples.47
This long list of achievements belies the struggle and controversy that has characterised 
much of the norm entrepreneurship by indigenous peoples (Barsh 1994). Although 
from an early stage many states have been willing to countenance distinct recognition 
and protection for these groups, not all states have been readily socialised to then- 
proposed norms nor accepted that those norms apply to their territories. At issue are 
self-determination and land rights, the cornerstones of the normative claims made by 
indigenous peoples. They have predicated access to these rights on their status as 
‘peoples’, using this frame to strategically align their claims with those of other 
colonised peoples. This was a way of tapping into the “logic of appropriateness” in 
norm recognition, highlighting the “adjacency” of their claims to the decolonisation 
process. International law holds that “All peoples have the right to self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
A Q
economic, social and cultural development”. States have long resisted the recognition 
of indigenous groups as peoples fearing that it would lead to territorial and natural 
resources claims and by extension, to challenges against the sovereignty of the state. 
They have managed the claim by circumscribing the rights of indigenous peoples qua 
peoples with legal provisos: for example, the principal legally binding international 
treaty on indigenous rights, the ILO Convention 169, states in Article 1.3 “The use of 
the term “peoples” in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications 
as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.” States have 
also blocked efforts to see the term indigenous peoples used in international standards, 
opting instead for people, populations, or communities.
This was a major point of contention at the 2001 WCAR where indigenous activists 
staged a walkout of the conference when states insisted on a proviso on ‘peoples’ in the 
DDPA similar to that in ILO Convention 169.49 The experiences at the WCAR
47 The World Bank first adopted an institutional policy on indigenous peoples in 1982, subsequently 
strengthened in 1991 and revised in 2005: the Revised Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on 
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10) (July 2005). See also the UNDP and Indigenous Peoples: A Policy o f 
Engagement (August 2001); and European Council Resolution, Indigenous peoples within the framework 
of the development cooperation o f the community and the member states (30 November 1998).
48 See common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR.
49 See para 24, Durban Declaration: “We declare that the use of the term “indigenous peoples” in the 
Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
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illustrate well the precarious position of indigenous gains at the start of the 21st century. 
While it is clear that the majority of the GRULAC states were willing to support 
indigenous peoples’ claims after decades of socialisation to the issues50 (Postero and 
Zamosc 2004; Brysk 2000), indigenous peoples did not have universal support among 
states. Most post-colonial states of Africa and Asia did not buy into the indigenous 
peoples’ frame as colonised peoples whilst many Western states were trying to avoid 
any commitments that might impact on the protracted negotiation of the draft DRIPS. 
Indigenous groups as ever were highly organised in the preparatory processes and at 
Durban but they were competing with other voices for space and recognition. They 
struggled to maintain gains won previously, especially in the area of land rights.51
Progress in shaping the normative discourse on indigenous rights is still constrained by 
lack of consensus on these norms -  in particular the ‘indigenous peoples' identity frame 
- among states and also across the global indigenous community. As the indigenous 
peoples movement has grown, the cracks in the logic of choosing the ‘colonised 
peoples’ frame have begun to show. Framing indigenous groups in the Americas and 
Australia/New Zealand as ‘peoples’ like other colonised peoples worked well in the 
initial stages of the transnational advocacy. The emphasis on the similar relationship 
with the state made the cultural and spatial differences less important (Niezen 2003, 87). 
However, as groups wishing to claim indigenous identity began to mobilise in Africa, 
Asia and elsewhere, the decolonisation argument began to lose coherence. Groups were 
claiming to be indigenous peoples in countries long since liberated from colonisation 
and led by peoples also indigenous to the territory. The frame of colonised peoples has 
therefore been less successful for many groups in Asia and Africa who wish to self- 
identify as indigenous peoples (Kingsbury 1998).52 This was a factor in the adoption of
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance is in the context of, and without prejudice to the outcome of, 
ongoing international negotiations on texts that specifically deal with this issue, and cannot be construed 
as having any implications as to rights under international law”.
50 This is evidenced by the high number of ratifications of ILO Convention 169 in the region: 13 of the 
20 ratifications to date are from states in Latin America.
51 On land, the WCAR Declaration reads: “We also recognize the special relationship that indigenous 
peoples have with the land as the basis for their spiritual, physical and cultural existence and encourage 
States, wherever possible, to ensure that indigenous peoples are able to retain ownership of their lands 
and natural resources to which they are entitled under domestic law” (Declaration, para 43). The text 
omits the term ‘rights’ and adopts the soft language of ‘wherever possible’ in invoking state 
responsibility.
52 See also the objections to the use of the concept ‘indigenous’ by African and Asian indigenous peoples 
by UN Sub-Commissioner Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Study on treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements between States and indigenous populations, Final Report. UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20, (22 June 1999): para 88.
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the DRIPS. After being passed to the General Assembly, the Group of African states 
blocked the process, having participated only marginally in the negotiation to that point. 
Their fears over the legal meaning of the text were allayed by the insertion of additional 
provisions to safeguard territorial integrity. Key Western states voted against the 
DRIPS; the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand declined to adopt the declaration 
ostensibly on grounds that the provisions were unclear and also might compromise 
domestic standards for indigenous rights. Their comments at the adoption suggest they 
were especially concerned about: the principle of ‘free, prior and informed consent’, 
which they considered as a veto over the state; the issue of land and resources; and the 
meaning of self-determination, which several states recalled only applied to internal 
forms of self-government and not to sovereign independence.53
The organisational platform is also possibly weakening. The great success of the 
indigenous movement has been its ability to unite disparate peoples and interests under 
a common set of demands. This was facilitated in large part by the creation of an 
indigenous caucus, a gathering of indigenous representatives prior to international 
meetings that concerned them. Often the same people dominate these caucus meetings 
because only a handful of individuals are able to attend international events on a regular 
basis. The actors driving the agenda tend to be from the Anglophone countries; 
Francophone groups often feel excluded, whilst the support of the Latin Americans is 
usually necessary to get issues agreed. It is a discussion by and for indigenous peoples, 
with non-indigenous actors accepted usually only by invitation. This caucus had its first 
great success in the 1992 World Conference on the Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro, where a unified set of demands from indigenous peoples was critical to 
securing specific measures for “indigenous people and their communities”, contained 
principally in Chapter 26 of the outcome document Agenda 21.54 The most recent gains 
made in the form of the DRIPS, however, marked a fissure in the movement. While a 
core cadre of indigenous actors refused to accept any changes to the text, others 
understood that only through some compromise on their part would states agree to an 
amended draft. The caucus could not agree a unified platform. Further agitation was in 
evidence at the May 2008 session of the PFII. The theme of carbon trading was under
53 UN Doc. GA 10612, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights o f Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major 
Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, says President, 61st General Assembly, Plenary, 107 & 
108th Meetings (13 September 2007)
54 Interview with Julian Burger, May 2008.
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discussion and while draft recommendations by the PFII supported World Bank 
initiatives like the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility as “good practices”, a large 
constituent of indigenous actors (principally from Latin America) did not, demanding 
that the relevant paragraphs be removed;55 they made their objections known by 
banging their fists on the table and yelling in unison at the (indigenous) Chair Vicky 
Tauli-Corpuz of the Philippines, who eventually capitulated and allowed them to 
present their concerns but not before UN security officers had to be called in.56
As interests are diverging, the strength of the movement is threatened. New arrivals at 
the indigenous caucus are reportedly skeptical of the legitimacy of those actors 
dominating therein. There have long been accusations of favouritism in how the 
resources of the Voluntary Fund on Indigenous Populations have been used, with
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certain indigenous communities receiving a disproportionate share. The isolationism 
of the indigenous movement is also a concern. Since the mid-1980s, indigenous actors 
made a point of silencing NGOs that would speak for them, preferring to speak for their 
own communities in international fora. While this was important for empowerment it 
also prevented strong alliances from developing with other civil society actors. The 
environmentalist movement, an early ally of indigenous peoples, has more recently 
acted sometimes against indigenous interests, with many favouring environmental 
conservation over the rights of indigenous communities (Brysk 2000, 228-229). Efforts 
to reach out to other social movements, such as those focused on globalization and 
human rights, have been made by some of the key leaders in the movement.
The power of the indigenous movement has not entirely waned, however. Because of 
their strong platform they were able to demand that the WGIP not be lost in the 
reorganisation under the Human Rights Council; there is a new Expert Mechanism on
c o
Indigenous Peoples to replace the WGIP with a strong mandate. The new Special
55 The protesters requested that paragraphs 5 and 37 be removed from Recommendations on the special 
theme, “Climate change, biocultural diversity and livelihoods: the stewardship role o f indigenous 
peoples and new challenges”. UN Doc. E/C.19/2008/L.2 (24 April 2008).
56 For a short documentary film on the events, see PROTEST-Indigenous Peoples "2nd May Revolt" at the 
UNPFII, SommerFilms, 2008. http://uk.voutube.com/watch?v=UtORVi7GvbY&feature=related 
(accessed 30 May 2008).
57 Primarily indigenous activists are elected to the 5-person Board of Trustees that oversees the Voluntary 
Fund. See htto://www2.ohcbr.org/english/about/funds/indigenous/ (accessed 31 May 2008). Interview 
with Sarnia Slimane (commenting specifically on the UN Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade on 
Indigenous People), May 2005.
58 UN Doc. A/HRC/6/L.42 (12 December 2007).
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Rapporteur on Indigenous People, James Anaya, is an indigenous person. The DRIPS 
might have been lost if not for the advocacy prowess of indigenous peoples’ 
organisations.
What is to be learned from the indigenous peoples experience for other would-be norm 
entrepreneurs? The indigenous experience validates many of the assertions of scholars 
on norm entrepreneurship. Framing is important for distinguishing concerns from those 
of other identity groups. Framing can afford important gains but frames also impose 
limitations and may have to be changed over time. In the indigenous case, the use of 
‘peoples’ and its association with decolonization provided opportunities in the 
beginning but some constraints as the claims and regions expanded. Nevertheless, the 
identity frame of peoples did alter the power relationship with the state, at least 
symbolically, and opened up the opportunity to discuss collective land and natural 
resource rights in a way that a minority frame would not. Framing themselves as 
guardians of the environment was also key for success at Rio and providing access to 
other political opportunity structures but has sometimes conveyed an impression of 
‘primitiveness’ that does not fit well with the reality and self-perception of new 
generations of indigenous peoples, including those whose goals clash with those of the 
environmental movement.
Transnational mobilisation of indigenous peoples has not happened spontaneously but is 
partly the result of interventions by international actors, both positive and negative, that 
stimulated awareness of and engagement with the international sphere. Epistemic 
communities, faith and environmental groups and INGOs have provided important top- 
down support for mobilisation. Opportunities for indigenous activists to meet at the 
international level have grown over time and helped to solidify an organisational 
platform. The development of the caucus was key to norm entrepreneurship, enabling 
the platform to issue clear, unified messages to states and other actors. This 
development of the platform also required a large investment of resources from donors 
willing to sustain funding over time; without the Voluntary Fund or INGO resources, 
for example, it is doubtful that indigenous peoples would have maintained such a 
presence in international fora.
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Embedding norms institutionally can be successful but may take decades to win. 
Support from key states and regional blocs within IOs is vital for norm emergence. 
Indigenous peoples were fortunate to have the backing of many Latin American and 
Nordic states; the normative force of the ILO Convention 169, for example, would be 
extremely low if states from these regions had not ratified it. These states were also 
important to the negotiation of the DRIPS. The UN open-ended inter-sessional 
Working Group on the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples was a vital 
space for shaping a new dynamic between indigenous peoples and states since its 
creation in 1995. In the beginning, the meetings were confrontational, with little space 
for indigenous input, prompting them often to stage walk-outs. Thanks to more 
amenable Chairpersons the sessions were opened with traditional prayers and 
indigenous leaders were eventually given a de facto equal right to speak with states 
(Feldman 2002, 40). This afforded them a status distinct from and arguably higher than 
that reserved for other NGOs. Indigenous actors learned that by pushing a hard line they 
could win concessions on points that were symbolically important. The space also 
enabled indigenous activists to socialise delegations to their proposals over time, 
through intellectual argument, personal testimonies and a refined understanding of their 
normative claims.59
Political opportunity structures are essential spaces for advancing norm 
entrepreneurship. The WGIP, PFII and Special Rapporteur have played an important 
role in discussing and developing normative understandings of indigenous rights on a 
range of issues. Indigenous peoples can rely on these opportunities every year and are 
not dependent on ad hoc conferences or treaty body reviews to present their 
recommendations for change. The UN International Decade on Indigenous People has 
given cause for continued resource allocation to indigenous issues by the UN and 
stimulated engagement by UN agencies. Individual actors within international 
institutions have also been important to their efforts: for example, Erica Irene-Daes and 
Asbjom Eide, both Chairs of the WGIP and members of the UN Sub-Commission, 
were very sympathetic to the norm entrepreneurship of indigenous peoples and played a 
key role in shaping their normative claims. Shelton Davis, anthropologist turned World 
Bank social development advisor, founded an early indigenous information centre in the 
1970s and worked with the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights before
59 Interview with Julian Burger (former Secretary of the Working Group on the draft declaration), May 
2008 .
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moving to the Bank where he was central to the elaboration of the first World Bank 
policy on indigenous peoples at the end of the 1980s.60 Julian Burger, OHCHR lead on 
indigenous peoples, has pushed for UN engagement on these issues and forged strong 
links with indigenous leaders, extending a commitment he developed since representing 
Anti-Slavery International at the first WGIP in 1982.
Maintaining a unified voice is consistently challenging and legitimacy of representation 
will be questioned. Many of the indigenous organisations were, as Brysk puts it, “bom 
transnational” and consequently have weak connections with the grassroots level (Brysk 
2000, 277). While traditional leaders of indigenous communities have often been able 
to participate in international fora, many of the leading figures are activists, not elders. 
Both governments and IOs tend to prefer engagement with these (international) activists 
rather than local communities, the latter regarded as “culturally alien, sometimes 
intransigent” (Brysk 2000, 286). In contrast, actors operating in international fora adopt 
modes of operation that are alien to grassroots activists, resulting in “a cadre of 
professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN 
system then to their own communities” (Comtassel 2007, 161). The poor 
communication between international indigenous actors and local communities has been 
criticised often. The fissure of the indigenous caucus and the protests at the 2008 PFII 
demonstrate that consensus is not always possible even at the international level and a 
transnational identity group will have much internal contention that can impede 
successful norm entrepreneurship. While the PFII does have procedures for electing the 
indigenous representatives (under ECOSOC’s approval), the selection is made by 
indigenous organisations with connections to the PFII and not directly by vote of 
indigenous communities.
The motivation of states in accepting new norms for indigenous peoples cannot be 
explained by rational interests alone. The indigenous population is usually small and 
marginalized both politically and economically, thus posing no tangible threat to elite 
interests or government stability. Security has typically not been a factor, with few 
indigenous communities using any violent tactics to push for state action (among the 
exceptions are Mexico’s Zapatistas; Brysk 2000, 72). Indigenous actors have also 
played up the ‘guardians of the environment’ frame and used symbols of their
60 Interview with Shelton Davis, April 2008.
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traditional culture -  such as dress or ceremonies -  to disarm state actors by portraying 
an exoticised and vulnerable identity that should be preserved and protected (Niezen 
2003, 179-180). The presence of domestic constituencies of organised indigenous actors 
has influenced the level of engagement of states in international discourse on norm 
emergence. For example, the states of North and South America, the Nordic region, 
Australia and New Zealand have strong domestic indigenous NGOs/communities and 
these governments have maintained a serious commitment to negotiating the DRIPS 
(albeit not always sharing the goals of indigenous peoples). Denmark was pushing for 
the creation of the PFII and agreed to finance it. Participating in and promoting these 
institutions is one way of conveying to domestic indigenous actors that the state is 
committed to their issues, even if concessions on hardline issues at home or away 
remain difficult to secure. Thus, an important distinction can be made between state 
support to norm emergence and state support to norm adherence. At the international 
level, states have low material motivations to adopt emerging norms on indigenous 
rights and low material costs for adopting those norms, particularly where emerging 
norms are not legally binding. Conversely, they have high ideational motivations 
thanks to strong mobilisation and the effective framing by indigenous activists of their 
communities as colonized peoples denied their right to self-determination. 
Domestically, in contrast, when norm adherence comes into play, the material costs of 
adherence are high, and although ideational motivations remain, they often are trumped 
by material concerns, leading to low norm adherence.
In achieving norm emergence, indigenous leaders have had to allay states’ rational 
concerns. The main point of contention has been land and resources, attached to 
acceptance of norms on self-determination for indigenous peoples. Indigenous activists 
have had to work hard to clarify the application of the right to self-determination, in 
particular to make states believe their intentions extend only so far as internal self- 
determination that would not impact on territorial integrity of the state. Rights to land 
and natural resources nevertheless can have significant economic implications and most 
states have not been willing to accept any legally binding provisions that might 
constrain their rights to use these for the public good rather than for the exclusive use of 
indigenous peoples.
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Indigenous peoples are forging a new “logic of appropriateness”, asserting a might in 
international society that extends far beyond their status as largely poor and 
marginalized communities. They are no longer just equal citizens of the state -  their 
special status in international law has afforded them a special status also in domestic 
society. But the gains made in the international sphere belie the failures that persist in 
the domestic sphere. As much as the indigenous peoples’ organisational platform holds 
considerable force in international spaces, most have not been able to match this at the 
national level. The challenges of overcoming long-standing discrimination and poverty 
are resource intensive and indigenous peoples typically lack the leverage to extract 
those resources from government budgets. At the international level they are part of a 
strong mobilisation of advocates whose measured norm entrepreneurship has been 
effective in persuasion and socialisation. Locally, they are smaller and more isolated, 
lacking the numerical, material or political influence that is often needed to influence 
change in the domestic sphere. This is an essential paradox of transnational social 
mobilisation by minorities: using peaceful measures, their potential to influence states 
under the prevailing conditions in the international sphere is often far greater than their 
potential to influence within the dynamics of domestic politics. This may be useful for 
norm emergence but it makes norm adherence more difficult.
Roma: A European minority?
Specific norms and mechanisms for Roma were emerging from as early as the 1970s 
but have grown significantly since the 1990s. Hundreds of Romani NGOs have been 
created to help articulate and implement these norms and policies. The discursive 
position of states has changed significantly over this time, with many acknowledging 
now that the situation of Roma is caused by discrimination and not ‘social 
backwardness’ as previously articulated. Specific references to Roma appear in 
standards and policies agreed by the OSCE, the Council of Europe (CoE), the EU 
institutions and the UN. Among the most prominent examples are the OSCE Action 
Plan for Improving the Situation o f Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area adopted by 
the Permanent Council (2003); the CoE Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 
1203 “On Gypsies in Europe” (1993); the European Commission Against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI)’s General Policy Recommendation No. 3: Combating racism and
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intolerance against Roma/Gypsies (1998); the COCEN “Guiding Principles for 
improving the situation of the Roma”, adopted by the EU Tampere summit (1999); and 
the CERD General Recommendation 27 on Discrimination against Roma (2000). The 
Durban and Santiago outcome documents reinforced and expanded the existing soft law 
recognition at the European level. Many states have become socialised to the inclusion 
of Roma as a national minority within the terms of the FCNM.61 Several monitoring 
mechanisms on Roma have been created including the CoE’s Committee of Experts on 
Roma and Travellers (MG-S-ROM), the European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF), 
the OSCE Contact Point on Roma and Sinti, and the institutions of the Decade for 
Roma Inclusion.62 This process is still advancing, with Romani activists focused now 
on building new EU institutions such as a new Commissioner portfolio on Roma, a 
European Roma Strategy and even a binding EU Directive on Roma.
The emergence of norms and mechanisms on Roma has been both a top-down and 
bottom-up process. Romani groups have come onto the international agenda initially in 
the late 1960s and 1970s in response to the issues of nomadism and of discrimination 
against them (Guy 2001, 133 fts 3-4). It was not until the 1990s that IOs engaged in 
sustained efforts to respond to a growing crisis in the treatment of Roma. The egregious 
violence experienced by Roma for centuries was in evidence once again in the 1990s 
and 2000s in ethnic cleansing policies in the Western Balkans and racially motivated 
attacks on Roma across Europe. As economic conditions worsened, especially in post- 
Communist states, Roma communities became marginalized further. These factors 
prompted an increase in Roma asylum seekers over the same period: from 1990 to 1999, 
some 7000 Roma were granted refugee status in EU states; thousands more were 
required to return home.64 The perception of mass Romani economic and asylum 
migration to richer states brought pressure on home states to decrease the push factors.
61 The Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine and the United Kingdom have 
all accepted (de jure or de facto) that the FCNM applies also to Roma. See the Second Cycle Comments 
by States for further information and Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of 
National Minorities (DH-MIN), Results o f the exchange of information on the question to which groups 
the Framework Convention will be applied, Strasbourg, DH-MIN (98) 4 (15 January 1999): Addendum I
62 The Decade for Roma Inclusion (2005-2015) is a transnational initiative to secure for Roma 
improvements in education, employment, health and housing; 12 states participate in the Decade 
activities and it is funded in part by IOs like the World Bank and UNDP. See 
http://www.romadecade.org/ (accessed 10 June 2009).
63 See, for example, the European Parliament’s Resolution on a European Strategy on the Roma (P6_TA- 
PROV(2008)0035) (31 January 2008); and EU Roma Policy Coalition (2008).
64 http://www.irr.org.uk/2003/april/ak000004.html (accessed 17 March 2008). On returns see Cahn and 
Guild (2008).
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States put the issue of Roma on the agenda of IOs to help expedite and coordinate these 
actions. By safeguarding Romani rights, EU member states prior to accession could 
more easily reject Romani claims for asylum and, post-accession, can decrease the 
migratory flow. Accession states have championed Romani rights in order to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria and hasten their membership in the EU.
These state interests have been matched by the interests of Romani leaders to use 
international fora as a space for addressing Romani concerns in the face of state failures 
to do so. They have used norm entrepreneurship to privilege Roma as distinct from 
other minorities at the same time as seeking similar forms of protection. This process 
has not been without challenges and controversy, however, and the Romani experience 
is helpful in identifying many of the difficulties in norm entrepreneurship for minority 
groups. Chief among these for Roma have been the creation of unifying identity 
frames, the strengthening of organisational platforms and finding consensus on norm 
elaboration. Political opportunity structures created by international actors have tried to 
mitigate some of these difficulties but the results have been mixed.
Building a viable transnational identity frame was an early challenge for Romani norm 
entrepreneurs. The population of Roma in greater Europe is estimated at 10-12 
million.65 The name ‘Roma’ obscures the great diversity of identities captured by this 
term. In fact, Roma per se constitute only one particular type of Romani group that is 
concentrated primarily in CEE. Other identities include the Sinti, Kale, Manush and 
associated groups like the Travellers, Egyupti and Ashkalija; Romani communities are 
found also in the Americas, the Middle East, North Africa, India and Australia 
(Klimova-Alexander 2005, 30-31). This diversity has impacted on unity in the Romani 
transnational mobilisation, including in contemporary discourses of Romani 
nationhood, which in some guises attempts to reunite the Roma as one community 
based on a myth of common origin from India (Fraser 1993; Hancock 1987, 2008; 
Vermeersch 2006, 14-17).
As for many subaltern groups, appropriation of their own identity frames is an exercise 
in empowerment and esteem building. For Romani leaders, it is a project that has helped
65 This figure is given by the Council of Europe for the population of Roma in its member states. See: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/documentation/strategies/statistiques_en.asp (accessed 11 May 
2009).
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to re-frame an identity from socially undesirable to politically significant and useful for 
ethno-nationalist goals. The social stigma of belonging to a Romani community is still 
very strong, conferring real social and economic disadvantage to those who might self- 
identify as such. Many Roma have also assimilated much of their identity (often 
involuntarily) to the dominant culture in which they live; in Hungary, for example, 70 
percent of Roma do not speak Romanes and have little in the way of distinct cultural 
practices (Pogany 2006, 15).
This reality does not sit well with the ambitions of some Romani actors. They have an 
avowedly nationalistic agenda, to forge for Roma a strong, transnational nationhood. 
As Hancock (1991) explains, “A sentiment common among many Romani nationalists 
is that ‘we were one people when we came into Europe, and that we must be one people 
again’” (256). This is a classic nationalist fiction, not least because there is no firm 
agreement if Roma ever constituted ‘one people’ or arrived in Europe during the same 
period. Nevertheless, leaders have created many of the trappings of nationalism, 
including a flag, a written language, an anthem and a mythical homeland of Romanestan 
(Hancock 1991,258; Liegeois 1994,258).
One difficulty that leaders have faced is that dominant groups within the Romani 
“archipelago” (Acton and Gheorghe 2001, 55) compete to assert their independence 
within and from a Roma nation. As Acton and Gheorghe (2001) point out:
Not all those politically defined as Roma call themselves by this name; and 
some of those who do not, such as the German Sinte, outraged by what they 
perceive as claims of superior authenticity by Vlach Roma, even repudiate the 
appellation Roma (58).
Some groups also seek to reclaim the previously pejorative ‘gypsy’ term, arguing that it 
better reflects their identity than ethno terms like ‘Roma’. Thus, even within the 
“imagined community” (Anderson 1991) of Roma there is disagreement over in and out 
groups, hierarchies and the very terminology to be applied.
There are some points on which these diverse groups can agree in terms of their identity 
construction. The first is the distinction between Roma/Gypsy society and non- 
Roma/Gypsy society. The Roma/gypsy populations ‘othered’ the majority groups by 
labeling them ‘Gadje’ (singular, ‘Gadjo’). This has established a dichotomy that
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Romani leaders can use to give their communities a feeling of unity. The other 
common experience is that of discrimination. Even where individuals may not feel 
deeply a Romani identity, society at large may perceive them as Romani and use this as 
the basis for discrimination. Severe economic marginalization and persecution has also 
caused Roma to migrate, bringing together Roma from diverse backgrounds in new 
states. It is this feeling of grievance that is perhaps the best glue Romani leaders have 
to bind together a patchwork ‘nation’.
The process of making claims to be a nation is one linked both to empowerment and 
also to rights claims (Petrova 2003). There is an obvious ‘adjacency’ strategy at play. 
Romani “ethnogenesis” is portrayed as an extension of earlier processes of nation- 
building in Europe, a nation whose late-awakening is a consequence of earlier 
oppression (Gheorghe 1997, 158-159). At a conference of the International Romani 
Union (IRU) in 2000, the IRU Declaration of Nation (sic) was proclaimed: “we are a 
Nation, we share the same tradition, the culture, the same origin, the same language; we 
are a Nation. We have never looked for creating a Roma State” (reproduced in Acton 
and Klimova 2001, 216). The declaration rejects the appropriateness of a state for Roma 
because it is not suited to their history and culture and because the form of a territorial 
state is perceived as old thinking in the new age of global governance (Klimova- 
Alexander 2005, 22-23). On the other hand, Romani leaders (like indigenous peoples) 
recognize that the likelihood of achieving a state of Romanestan is slim and asserting 
such claims will make governments less sympathetic to their cause.
Achieving consensus on norm elaboration has been problematic because there is tension 
between those who see Romani concerns through the prism of ethno-cultural rights and 
those that see it as socio-economic rights, or human rights writ large. The difficulty lies 
in how different actors wish to represent Roma. Some regard Roma as citizens to be 
treated equally with others on the basis of non-discrimination, afforded no particular 
privileges other than full implementation of their human rights. They fear that the 
assertion of a national minority identity or transnational nationhood will further 
marginalize Roma from the wider society within which they seek integration. Others 
see Roma as national minorities, with particular rights stemming from their ethno­
cultural identity and non-dominant status within the state. They want Roma to have the 
same minority rights as similar groups within the state and have less interest in cross­
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border issues.66 Still others see Roma as a transnational people or nation, with 
entitlement to a sui generis set of rights on the basis of their unique status as a non­
territorial transnational nation.
The claims for Roma to be recognized as a transnational nation or people are the most 
controversial, and the only proposal that really includes new Romani-specific rights. 
Some Romani leaders do not believe that Roma are minorities because they lack a kin 
state and “do not conform to the traditional profile of a territorially concentrated 
national minority” (Gheorghe and Mirga 1997). These actors see the “Romani minority 
as an ‘exception’, which renders the situation unique in comparison with other cultural 
and ethnic minorities” {Ibid.). Some espousing this view have asserted the need for a 
European Charter on Romani Rights, the implication being that their unique status 
requires recognition of new group-specific forms of international protection. The idea 
for a European Charter on Romani Rights has been around since the early 1990s and 
was resurrected most recently at the ERTF annual assembly in late November 2008. 
The Charter is to include provisions for: combating Anti-Gypsyism; representation with 
voting rights in the UN, CoE and European Parliament; participation in decision­
making at the national/local level with a right to veto over decisions affecting Roma; 
political recognition of the Roma as a national minority; freedom of movement across 
borders; freedom of cultural and political organisation; and rights pertaining to 
education for Roma.67 These provisions go beyond existing international standards for 
the protection of minorities by including collective rights structures for supranational 
representation, veto rights, and by the focus on Anti-Gypsyism as a unique form of 
discrimination.
There are some important practical arguments for and against a European Charter on 
Romani Rights. Romani identity spreads throughout Europe and is a common minority 
to nearly every European state. Although the same claim might be made by a handful 
of other minorities (e.g. certain religious minorities), none can claim to suffer the same 
extent of marginalization as Roma. A treaty for them alone therefore seems justified. 
Others have made the point that many Roma that have migrated out of their country of 
origin for various reasons often have less access to rights than Roma who are
66 Gheorghe and Mirga (1997) give the example of the Zentralrat of German Sinti and Roma which 
opposed German laws that did not recognise their status as a national minority.
67 See http://www.romnews.eom/a/RKreport.htm# Toc496896328 (accessed 20 June 2009).
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considered as ‘national minorities’ in the countries where they hold citizenship 
(Gheorghe and Mirga 1997). This presents a two-tiered system of rights protection 
even between Romani groups living in the same country. A European Charter would 
give some uniformity of status to Roma regardless of their citizenship or country of 
residence. There is also no collective rights dimension to any European-level provisions 
for minorities, which frames the rights as those of ‘persons belonging to minorities’. 
Those against the idea of a European Charter on Romani Rights believe that such an 
instrument is ill suited to the existing realities of the Romani population and 
international law. The emphasis on Europe in this case is seen as problematic given that 
the Romani population extends far beyond the borders of Europe. This is why at the 
WCAR the NGO Forum Programme o f Action amends the title to call for an 
International Charter on Roma Rights (Article 435, emphasis added). There also is 
concern that recognition of legal rights for a transnational Romani community may 
undermine the state-citizen relationship and possibly the utility of the state itself. In its 
most radical form, the proposal for a collective rights-holding transnational Romani 
identity makes Roma subjects of international law separate from and in many ways on 
par with states in the space of international institutions (Kawczynski 1997). Acton and 
Gheorghe (2001) go so far as the claim “the unfolding agenda of Gypsy activism may 
be nothing less than the abolition of the nation-state” (69). Most Romani leaders, 
however, prefer a combination of the citizenship approach with recognition of minority 
status and rights that is rooted firmly within the nation-state system (PER 2001; 2006). 
They do not look beyond the horizon for a post-national, post-territorial international 
order.
Like indigenous peoples, the ambitions of Romani norm entrepreneurship have not 
always been accepted universally by states. For example, while several have recognized 
the application of the FCNM to Roma, others have not and only a handful of states
ro
confer constitutional recognition to Roma as minorities. There was no acceptance of 
the proposal to recognize Roma as a ‘non-territorial nation’ in the government 
documents of the WCAR indicating that Roma have not successfully socialised states to 
this rights frame. At the same time, some have argued that states have been keen to
68 Specifically, see the Finnish Constitution, section 14, subsection 2-3; Slovenian Constitution Article 
65; Macedonia Constitution Articles 48 and 78, Hungarian Act on the Rights of National and Ethnic 
Minorities (1993) and the Austrian Ethnic Act (1993, amendment to the Act of 1976) (Gheorghe and 
Mirga 1997). Denmark and Ireland (for Travellers) are among the states that do not accept application of 
the FCNM to Roma. See also supra note 61.
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effect the “Europeanisation of the Romani problem” as a means of evading their 
responsibilities towards these communities (Klimova-Alexander 2005, 139). From a 
rational perspective, recognizing Roma as a transnational non-territorial nation may 
confer some material benefits for states. Funding and policy support from IOs has to 
some extent alleviated state responsibilities. From an ideational perspective, making 
discrimination against Roma a collective European problem diffuses accusations against 
individual state failures and safeguards esteem of state actors.
With this divergence of views on Romani rights framing, what is emerging in practice is 
a compromise approach in international fora that constitutes a group-specific rights 
approach. This approach goes beyond mere non-discrimination by focusing also on the 
cultural aspects of Romani identity, privileging Roma as a specific kind of national 
minority, but does not go so far as to endorse the more controversial collective rights 
possibilities. This approach ensures a distinct place on the international agenda for 
Roma without creating any sui generis rights for them. This group-specific approach is 
evident, for example, in proposals for a European Strategy on Roma but rejections of a 
(legally-binding) EU Directive on Roma, which might confer distinct rights.
A third challenge for Romani leaders has been in creating a sound organisational 
platform to pursue these norm entrepreneurship objectives. There are strong divisions 
across Romani NGOs, between the old guard and younger generations and between 
those who favour domestic political representation over civil society and 10 routes 
(Gheorghe 2001; PER 2001, 18-19; Trehan 2001, 139). Leaders have not stimulated a 
mass mobilisation of Roma and the civil society organisations of or for Roma have been 
labeled pejoratively as the ‘gypsy industry’.
Like indigenous peoples, Roma have a long history of transnational social mobilisation, 
beginning possibly as early as the late 19th century, and some forms of traditional 
leadership (Puxon 1973; Mayall 2004, 215, ft. 60; Liegeois 1994, 17-18). These 
structures were concretised in the mid-1960s when the World Gypsy Community was 
formed. This was followed by the first World Romani Congress held in 1971 in 
London and the second World Romani Congress convened in Geneva in 1978, from 
where emerged the International Romani Union (IRU). This meeting marked a sharp 
increase in size and breadth of participation, with 120 delegates from 26 countries
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(Liegeois 1994, 258). Participation has continued to grow at subsequent World Romani 
Congresses held in Gottingen, Germany (1981), Warsaw (1990), Prague (2001), 
Lanciano, Italy (2004), and Zagreb (2008). The Congresses lack firm institutional 
structures, however, and tend to be organised in an ad hoc manner.
The IRU remains one of the most prominent Romani INGOs. It has over time 
attempted to create formal structures of representation and decision-making with a view 
to serving in its most ambitious form as a world Romani government (Acton and 
Klimova 2001, 208). By 2004, it had 33 member states and 19 candidate states in its 
membership, including states such as Australia, India and Israel (Klimova-Alexander 
2005, 18; Acton and Klimova 2001, 199-200). The IRU has struggled to meet its own 
expectations, lacking funding, accountability of its leadership and even a website 
(Klimova-Alexander 2005, 18; Barany 2002, 258-259). Because of what are seen as the 
failures of the IRU there have been a small number of organisations aiming to compete 
for space on the transnational level. The most visible is the Roma National Congress 
(RNC) founded in 1990 under the leadership of Rudko Kawczynski (Gheorghe 2006; 
Klimova-Alexander 2005, 100-101). In 2003, the International Roma Women’s 
Network was created, in part a reaction to male dominated leadership on Romani 
affairs; it is directed by Soraya Post. The European Roma Information Office (ERIO) 
was established in 2003 to serve as an interface between Romani networks and 
European institutions; its director in Ivan Ivanov.
All of these organisations must now share space with the European Roma and 
Travellers Forum (ERTF). The ERTF was bom in 2004 following a process of 
negotiation with the Governments of Finland and France (co-sponsors of the proposal) 
and the CoE. It has the status of an NGO but is affiliated with and largely funded by the 
CoE, serving as an interface with the organisation. The ERTF consists of 75 elected 
Romani representatives meeting once a year in plenary and, inter alia, an Executive 
Committee. The Statutes of the ERTF attempt to ensure a breadth of representation by 
specifying, “The composition of the [country] delegation should reflect the principles of 
representativeness, transparency, geographical specificity, gender equality and 
generation balance” (ERTF Statutes Article 6.3). The delegates are selected by Romani
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INGOs or by national platform Romani NGOs in 38 countries in Europe.69
The structural changes made by the IRU and the emergence of the ERTF have 
precipitated greater discussion in recent years on the issue of Romani leadership and 
representation. By most accounts, Romani mobilisation is an elite affair that is 
dominated by a handful of individuals who move between key positions in NGOs and 
IOs working on Romani issues. For example, Nicolae Gheorghe, a scholar and activist 
from Romania, founded the NGO Romani Criss, was Vice President of the IRU and was 
the first to hold the position of Senior Advisor to the Office of the OSCE Contact Point 
on Roma and Sinti. The space for new actors is opening up, following investment in 
Romani leadership programmes, and an expanding cadre of Romani professionals with 
experience of working in and with, INGOs, IOs and governments.
This elite activism, however, has not been able to break easily into mainstream politics 
nor to build up mass Romani mobilisation from below. Discrimination still abounds in 
mainstream parties that can be loath to field a Romani candidate. Romani political 
parties tend to be dominated by older Romani men, which has left less space for women 
or younger actors.70 Most Roma are more concerned with local day-to-day realities than 
national or international mobilisation (Gheorghe 2006). Many communities express a 
mistrust of government institutions and actors (Mihalache 2009). There is also little in 
the way of transnational or even intra-Romani group solidarity among local populations 
(Pogany2006, 18).
While in the early days the short-cut to representation taken by a self-selected Romani 
intelligentsia and activist elite seemed necessary (given capacity gaps) and important 
(given the situation of Roma) they must now consider whether those short-cuts have 
harmed their longer-term goals. The norms have emerged but Roma have low capacity 
to ensure norm adherence. According to Gheorghe (2006):
Roma are still taking a rather comfortable approach to politics [...]. International 
organisations [...] invite Roma to their meetings [...] where we frequently 
behave in a ‘take-it-easy’ way and do not use these occasions for political
69 The INGOs represented are the International Romani Union; the Roma National Congress; East Meets 
West — Roma Youth Network; Forum of European Roma Young People; and the International Roma 
Women Network. The national delegates can be found at http://www.ertf.org/en/membemgos.html 
(accessed 10 February 2008).
70 Personal communication with Isabela Mihalache, OSI, May 2009.
85
debates and confrontation. We still tend to believe that rights are granted 
somehow mechanically by laws and policy documents. After 15-20 years of 
such “resolution-driven” Romani activism, we could learn that the adoption of 
such documents, while useful, is far from being enough; neither is the “small 
project driven” approach successful enough.
This is one reason why expectations of the ERTF have been so high. The ERTF has the 
potential to provide international representation for Roma as a subject of international 
law and some Romani leaders envisage that states would consult the ERTF before 
implementing any actions aimed at Roma (PER 2006). This would make Roma a sui 
generis non-state actor, with no territoriality but with some political authority over 
community members. The ERTF has the potential to move beyond the PFII, which is 
narrowly focused on the role of UN agencies and which has no consultative powers 
with states. This is far from certain, however, and the ERTF is already fielding major 
criticism, with many regarding it as little more than a mismanaged INGO. 
Institutionally, it has achieved modest gains over the IRU but has failed so far to 
establish a firm plan of action. There is little consistency in or external scrutiny of the 
decision-making processes therein (Deets 2008, 22-23). Its role as a representative body 
is dubious and the selection of delegates has been criticised for its lack of transparency 
and the dominance of an old guard of Romani actors to the exclusion of younger
71activists. National platform NGOs seated in the ERTF are perceived by some to 
prioritise their own institutional goals (e.g. funding) over the needs of local Romani 
organisations. A contract awarded to the ERTF by the CoE to host a Roma information 
network was terminated after a year of inaction and a spent budget. The interim ERTF 
President, Rudko Kawczynski, has commented that Roma are “in the process of 
establishing a truly efficient and representative Romani interest representation [...] This 
will be a painful process especially for those who have had a comfortable life as self­
acclaimed experts or Romani leaders”.72 Gheorghe’s need for “political debates and 
confrontation” may emerge within the ERTF but if the ERTF becomes too contentious 
or radical in its recommendations to IOs and states it could lose IO support. There is 
evidence to suggest this is already happening; according to one leading Romani actor, 
the ERTF delegates:
don’t have the capacity to be political representatives, they are acting like 
grassroots activists. Some of them are Rom and some aren’t Roma. The
71 Personal communication with Isabela Mihalache, OSI, May 2009.
72 http://ertf.org/en/index.html (accessed 23 March 2008).
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[European Commission] and Finnish were deeply disappointed. When you talk 
to [Romani leaders] they always speak of how hungry their children are, how 
dirty their streets, the Holocaust -  they really don’t have the language of 
European institutions.73
If neither states nor IOs find credible norm entrepreneurs to inform their decisions, the 
risk is that participation of Roma will become even more tokenistic, with states and IOs 
rendering policy prescriptions independently.
As international institutions and states have become more and more willing to 
countenance the normative demands of Roma, Romani leaders have been under 
increasing pressure to consolidate their views and provide a firm direction for future 
norm elaboration and policy vis-a-vis their communities. The difficulty they have faced 
in doing this signals the range of problems that norm emergence for transnational 
minorities can entail. Romani leaders have struggled to forge consensus between far- 
reaching norm entrepreneurship and modest norm adherence, and as a consequence 
have lacked a clear, consolidated message on Romani rights and policy priorities.
Given these many challenges faced by Romani norm entrepreneurs, the role of IOs and 
INGOs in bolstering norm emergence has been critical to the successes achieved. It is 
not possible here to provide a detailed analysis of all the institutions created by IOs for 
Roma or of all the cooperation between Roma and INGOs. Vermeersch (2006) offers 
an excellent review of European institutions and Klimova-Alexander (2005) of UN 
institutions vis-a-vis Roma; both also consider INGO engagement, with the European 
Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and Open Society Institute (OSI) figuring most 
prominently. For the purposes of this thesis, the impact of the WCAR will be noted 
briefly before turning to some broad conclusions about the impact of international 
actors on Romani norm emergence.
The WCAR gave Roma an important forum in which to raise their profile on the 
international stage, translating into several symbolic gains. Durban marked a greater 
internationalization of the Romani identity and the normative framework of Romani 
rights. They had one of the largest delegations and were widely mentioned in the 
keynote speeches (Klimova 2003, 314, ft. 164). In the NGO Forum Declaration and
73 Interview with Ivan Ivanov, May 2008.
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Programme o f Action Romani activists were successful in asserting their identity as a 
‘stateless nation’ and proposing several policy recommendations such as the 
establishment of a Permanent Roma Forum.74 While the DDPA offered Roma no 
normative innovations, it did reaffirm them as a distinct ‘victim group’ in the 
provisions.
States were not willing to countenance the ‘stateless nation’ claims of the Roma by 
incorporating this into the outcome documents. Such an acceptance has potential legal 
implications for many states with Romani populations, particularly those in Europe that 
are signatory to the FCNM. States outside this region or without Roma populations had 
weak incentives to fight for this issue. Furthermore, the norm has not been firmly 
institutionalized in IOs and thus lacks certification from international actors.
The active participation of Roma from the Americas underscored the need to consider 
Romani issues at this global level. The WCAR offered more to Latin American Roma 
than to European Roma. States in the region were newly socialised to the existence of 
Roma within their territory. Romani groups based in the Americas formed a new 
transnational organisational platform during the regional prepcom process, namely
• j c
SKOKRA (Council of the Organizations and Kumpania Roma of the Americas), 
which issued its own normatively innovative Declaration that drew heavily from the 
regional indigenous rights discourse.76 Despite being a very small presence,77 they also 
managed to secure inclusion of Roma in the Santiago NGO Forum Declaration and 
Plan o f Action as well as the inter-govemmental outcome documents. In the latter, the 
Romani delegates were aided in particular by the delegation of Colombia who 
submitted the proposed text (International Human Rights Law Group n.d., 13). In the 
Santiago Declaration and Plan o f  Action states “Recognize with concern that the Roma 
and Senti [sic] are victims in some countries of the region of stigmatization and 
discrimination, as in other parts of the world” (Santiago Declaration, para 48); and were
74 NGO Forum Programme o f Action, para 136. The body was requested under the auspices of the UN, 
CoE and OAS.
75 The Declaration was signed by the following members of SKOKRA: Asociacion Identitad Cultural 
Romani de Argentina; Asociacion Nacional del Pueblo Rome de Ecuador; Proceso Organizativo del 
Pueblo Rom de Colombia; Grupo Roma -  Kumpania Rom de Chile; SA Roma (US); American Romani 
Union; Romano Lil (Canada); Western Canadian Romani Romani Alliance.
76 The Declaration can be found at http://www.philologv.ru/liloro/romanes/declaration eng.htm (accessed 
5 April 2008). It was an output of the meeting "The Roma people: The other son of Pacha Mama - 
Mother Earth, Continental Meeting of the Roma people of Americas".
77 Only one Roma NGO (PROROM Proceso Organizativo del Pueblo Rom de Colombia) with 2 
delegates was present in Santiago (Klimova 2003,293).
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urged to “eliminate all the legal and real barriers that obstruct the full exercise of the 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Roma (Gypsy) people” 
(Santiago Plan o f Action, para 136). Romani NGOs in the region were primarily 
culturally focused prior to the WCAR and have subsequently become more cognisant of 
rights issues (Tchileva 2004). They have continued to forge alliances with IOs: for 
example, Argentinean Rom Jorge Bernal was invited to submit a Working Paper to the 
WGM,78 the OHCHR has funded a community-led training of Romani leaders in Latin 
America in 2007, and in Colombia, Romani NGO ProRom has been active politically 
under the direction of Dalila Gomez Baos (who ran for the Senate in 2006 (Stanley 
2006)). They have also featured prominently in the regional Durban follow-up 
activities. Provisions on Roma are included in the Santiago Mas Cinco and DRC
70regional prepcom outcome documents.
The comparison between the impact of the WCAR on Roma in Europe and Roma in 
Latin America shows that the process was a much stronger political opportunity for 
norm entrepreneurship in its earliest stages and in its less ambitious forms. Nascent 
norms emerged in Latin America where state socialisation to Romani rights was low, 
where transnational mobilisation was weak and where (regional) norms on Roma had 
not yet been institutionalized at the surpra-state level. Far-reaching norms on ‘stateless 
nation’ status were beyond the accepted “logic of appropriateness” for states.
Beyond the WCAR, IOs have recognized Roma as a distinct community and have 
entrenched Romani concerns as transnational concerns. Several caveats, however, are 
needed to understand the effect of IO support to norm entrepreneurship.
IOs have been less successful in their role in socializing states to emergent norms for 
Roma, especially at the local level. For example, in the EU accession Review Reports 
researchers found that the “emphasis is on acknowledging the existence of formal 
measures rather than the evaluation of implementation” (Hughes and Sasse 2003, 15). 
The establishment of structures to prevent discrimination and to work towards the lull 
inclusion of Roma has not changed deeply entrenched social practices of discrimination.
78 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2003/WP.17 (5 May 2003).
79 UN Docs. A/HRC/4/111(15 January 2007): p. 9, para 12; p. 13, para 17; A/CONF.21 l/PC.3/3 (18 June
2008): para 4.
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Norm emergence also has been undermined by the haphazard approach to normative 
frames by IOs, which have focused variously on non-discrimination rights, on minority 
rights, on nationhood and on transnational minority status (PER 2001, 7). Even within 
the same institution there have been divergent messages: in CERD, for example, 
members at the thematic session on Roma wanted to know more about whether Roma 
constituted a ‘nation’ at the same time as focusing on non-discrimination as the 
dominant rights frame for Roma.80 The CoE champions minority rights for Roma while 
the EU sticks to non-discrimination frames. The norms are being institutionalized under 
divergent frames and cannot build to a clear and consistent norm cascade.
The norms adopted have not always fit local interests of Romani communities. In the 
process of norm entrepreneurship, Romani diversity has been obscured by 
homogenizing frames. This has served the needs of IOs seeking to make transnational 
policies for Roma. Vermeersch (2006) argues that IOs “have been actively shaping a 
view on the Roma that does not always coincide with (and sometimes contradicts) the 
way in which Romani activists have framed their issues and demands” (186). Universal 
norms are created for a ‘fictional’ transnational Roma that when applied in practice do 
not always adapt well to particular experience of local communities. For example, 
Romani groups can have divergent views of education policies for their children, with 
some even preferring the ‘segregation’ of their children in distinct Romani schools 
(albeit with reforms), a practice that has been widely condemned by IOs.
Some Roma perceive that the homogenization of their individual communities into a 
transnational group puts the onus for response on 10 institutions and not individual 
states (Vermeersch 2006, 195). IOs set budgets for Romani-focused activity that is a 
fraction of the actual financing needed to overcome the social marginalisation of Roma. 
States busy themselves in international fora discussing Romani issues to detract 
attention from their failure to initiate similar discussions at home. This is compounded 
by the fact that none of the institutions created by IOs for Roma has had the power to 
intervene directly in country situations. Too much work is concentrated in Western 
capital cities; one Ukrainian Rom activist interviewed said his cooperation with the CoE 
occurred only in Strasbourg.81
80 See, for example, UN Doc. A/55/18, para 450 (a) and CERD/C/SR.1423 (11 September 2000): para 39.
81 Interview with Fedor Kondur, May 2008.
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A fifth caveat to IO support to norm entrepreneurship is the poor coordination of 10 
activities. In the words of one Romani activist: “The EU’s criticism is not really helpful 
because it’s not clear what we should ask from the government when we refer to it [...] 
there is little communication about this from the European institutions” (quoted by 
Vermeersch 2006, 199). Despite some token efforts at coordination initiatives,82 IOs 
persist in unilateral measures; for example, the absence of the CoE at the European 
Roma Summit in 2008 was criticized by Romani leaders.
The final caveat concerns the critical issue of representation. At the European level, 
building a Romani organisational platform has served the interests of IOs, keen to have 
a constituency of Romani actors to input into and endorse their policy proposals. 
Consultative bodies like the MG-S-ROM, the Decade of Roma Inclusion and the ERTF 
have been established. The ability of these institutions to ‘represent’ Roma continues to 
be questioned. There are no accountability mechanisms built into these consultative 
bodies such that Roma who object to policy recommendations of IOs can seek redress. 
Moreover, activists report that many of the participants are not Roma but government 
(or government endorsed) actors. Vermeersch (2006) finds the feeling among Romani 
activists is:
increasing involvement of Romani activists on the European level did not 
necessarily integrate them in domestic and local decision making. On the 
contrary, many of the Romani activists who became progressively more 
successful on the European level experienced more and more difficulties in 
gaining support from Romani communities at home. (195)
How Roma seated in these institutions see fit to use their position of influence is highly 
relevant to norm entrepreneurship success. Romani activists have complained that 
many of their counterparts working in IOs “have lost their independence and become 
part of ‘the establishment’” (PER 2006, 14). According to the director of ERIO, many 
Roma participating in such IO bodies come with vaguely defined recommendations for 
change that IOs pick up, translate into policy papers, and offer as Romani-endorsed 
policy without further consultation or input.83 IOs are floundering without Romani staff
82 See, for example, the International Conference on the Implementation and Harmonization o f National 
Policies on Roma, Sinti and Travellers: “Guidelines for a Common Vision", Bucharest, May 2006, 
http://www.osce.org/conferences/roma b 06.html (accessed 10 March 2008).
83 Interview with Ivan Ivanov, May 2008.
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and rely too heavily on these consultative bodies when they are neither accountable nor 
representative.
Notably, IOs have been less open about cooperating institutionally with Romani INGOs 
like the IRU or RNC. They have created parallel institutions wherein IOs are better 
able to determine the agenda. The institutional bodies established by IOs have not 
satisfied the most ambitious of Romani proposals, i.e. permanent representation in the 
UN, CoE and EU. The ERTF is a test case to determine whether permanent 
representation in IOs is viable; so far, it appears to be failing that test. IOs clearly want 
and need Romani input; Romani leaders want to have input - but the approaches of each 
side differ substantively and procedurally. They do not always understand each other 
and their interaction seems to end in mutual frustration rather than clearly articulated 
goals and shared ownership.
IOs have played a vital role despite the caveats noted above. IOs have helped states to 
change the discourse on Roma and to include rights in this discourse. IOs have also 
provided the all-important funds to enable Romani norm entrepreneurs to operate. At 
the European level all signs point to further institutionalisation of strategies to assist 
Roma and IO funding to support these efforts. Whether these strategies will lead to 
norm internationalization depends much on the future role IOs play in strengthening the 
capacities of both Roma and states to move beyond norm elaboration to norm 
adherence.
The role of INGOs in supporting Romani interests also has been important for norm 
emergence. They have created space for dialogue among Roma and between Roma, 
governments and IOs for norm elaboration and socialisation; have built Romani 
capacity to use international institutions for emergence; and have helped to put Romani 
concerns onto the international agenda through effective reporting on violations of their 
rights and through strategic litigation.
INGOs have also faced some criticisms. INGOs have had undue influence over the 
landscape of Romani norm entrepreneurship. This is one consequence of creating 
international norms ahead of domestic change. INGOs have been in a position to 
influence the emergence of standards on Roma along with a handful of Roma activists
92
but have done so without mass social mobilisation on the part of Roma (Klimova- 
Alexander 2005, 140; Vermeersch 2006, 211). Norm emergence has been influenced 
strongly by INGO perceptions of what those norms should be; for example, the 
development of the CERD General Recommendation had more to do with ERRC 
lobbying than calls from Romani leaders. INGOs speak the institutional language of IOs 
and have formulated normative proposals that fit this language. This has expedited the 
adoption of norms but it has not necessarily produced a normative landscape that 
Romani leaders or Roma at large would have chosen themselves* The gap created by a 
lack of agreement among Romani leaders on normative frames has been filled partly by 
INGOs, which appear less willing to push the envelope in the way that actors like the 
IRU aim to do in its calls for recognition of the Roma as a non-territorial ‘nation’, for a 
seat at the UN or for group-specific standards like a Romani Charter. INGOs tend to 
stick within the confines of existing standards of international human rights and 
minority rights law (ERRC is exemplary of the former; MRG’s approach, more of the 
latter). Although they strive to privilege the Roma as a distinct case among minority 
groups, there are evidently limits to which INGOs are willing to champion norm 
innovation for Roma.
This practice feeds the perception by some Romani leaders that ‘gadjo’ INGOs/NGOs 
are unjustly speaking for  Roma. The critique is summed up by the term ‘Gypsy 
industry’ denoting the community of civil society organisations and private agencies 
that have emerged to seek funding for Romani-focused initiatives. In some respects, 
INGOs are in a better position to secure these funds because donors prefer 
administratively to deal with large budget projects than small budget, localized projects 
of the type that the bulk of Romani NGOs would pursue. There also has not been a 
strong institutional relationship between INGOs and Romani INGOs. The IRU, for 
example, sees itself as a quasi-govemmental institution with constituent authority to 
represent Roma vis-a-vis IOs and states, one that does not require an intermediary 
INGO to facilitate this interface. On the other hand, the IRU’s overtly ‘political’ 
identity and comparatively weaker knowledge of IO institutional approaches, means 
that IOs appear cautious about liaising with it, opting instead to invite representatives of 
‘expert’ INGOs like the ERRC to give input on Romani issues. The effect is that the 
divergence of views on Romani norms and policy espoused by Roma is replaced by the 
normative voices of INGOs (Vermeersch 2006, 208). Moreover, INGOs do not share
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the same commitment of Romani leaders to group esteem as a political project, and 
although they share an interest to end discrimination they are not in the business of 
nation-building.
Important lessons can be learned from the Romani experience of norm 
entrepreneurship, lessons that may have implications for the transnational mobilisation 
of other minorities. Roma are firmly on the international agenda in Europe, discursive 
positions of states have changed and attention to Roma has been institutionalized across 
several IOs. The support to norm emergence is not matched, however, by efforts at 
norm adherence.
Norm emergence on group-specific rights for Roma has been aided by rational and 
ideational interests of states. In the early 1990s, the marginalization of Roma became a 
transnational concern, as violence and more open borders pushed and pulled Roma to 
migrate in greater numbers. Roma were unwanted for various economic and social 
reasons in their home countries and the countries they newly inhabited. Their poverty, 
deprivation and treatment, however, were an affront to Europe’s self-image as 
progressive, just and equal. Discrimination motivated states to be rid of the ‘gypsy’ 
problem but espoused ideational commitments to non-discrimination and minority 
rights provided the normative framework for their action. This hypocrisy is one factor 
that continues to undermine the success of norm adherence on Romani rights. Norm 
acceptance in international fora by a small number of elite state actors has demanded 
less social transformation than norm adherence by state actors in the domestic sphere, 
where material costs of norm adherence are higher. While several ideational statements 
in support of Roma have been made by states, proposals that would have real bite - like 
the EU Roma Directive - have not been accepted. No critical state exists in the case of 
Roma that could influence a norm cascade; Hungary and the Czech Republic, for 
example, have adopted a strong discursive position in favour of Roma on the 
international stage but the emerging norms are a long way from domestic 
internalization.84 Roma in all states are weak constituents with minimal material 
leverage, lacking financial power, political representation, or kin state allies.
84 See, for example, the Czech Republic’s prioritisation of Romani issues during its tenure as EU 
President, including the development o f the Integrated Platform on Roma Inclusion; Hungarian MEPs 
have taken the lead in seeking an EU Strategy on Roma within the European Parliament. In contrast, 
increased violence against Roma has been reported in 2008 and 2009 in both the Czech Republic and 
Hungary (Rorke and Nicolae 2009).
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Roma have been unable to increase their leverage in part because they have not invested 
in better mobilisation strategies. Perceptions of expertise and political legitimacy have 
been key problems. Romani activists are criticized for focusing too much on the 
reiteration of problems and on (transnational) political projects and not enough on 
detailed and concrete policy solutions. There is no common and clear normative 
platform and competing views of rights and identity undermine the impact of their 
collective voice. Roma have struggled with the issue of legitimate representation, 
precipitating IO and state interest to create institutions like the ERTF. Romani 
mobilisation remains an elite and divided affair and the calls to engage Roma at the 
grass roots level are used more rhetorically than effected in practice. No mass 
mobilisation of Roma exists. Romani engagement in legislative politics has been 
undermined for several reasons but among these is the lack of focus by Romani leaders 
to make this a priority goal. Their ‘repertoires of contention’ have been weak: 
transnational information exchange is accessible only to a limited audience; symbols of 
Romani identity exist but are not widely used nor recognized; and material leverage has 
not been harnessed - the possibilities for such during the EU accession process resulted 
only in institutional rather than ideational changes vis-a-vis Roma. Local Romani NGOs 
have focused attention on using international funds to create small-scale projects that 
have had little effect on institutional discrimination in the domestic sphere. Many 
Romani victims of rights violations are fearful of mobilizing, believing that the 
government or police are unlikely to protect them from retaliation by those who are 
accused of committing the crimes.85
Activity at the international level and at the grassroots level largely appears to have 
failed to tackle socialisation at the all-important middle level where government 
institutions -  both national and local -  are responsible for norm adherence. The 
grassroots NGOs are not always well disposed to conduct advocacy for reform (not least 
because of low levels of social mobilisation among Romani populations) and the 
Romani elite are preoccupied with the international sphere. If norms are 
institutionalised without sufficient socialisation at the level of the individual, 
discrimination is not easily countered even with national action plans and EU funds. 
There is evidence that many elite government actors have been socialised to Romani
85 This experience was expressed in interviews with Fedor Kondur and Ivan Ivanov, both with experience 
in working with litigation on behalf of Roma.
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rights, at least in terms of rhetoric at the international level: for example, when 
discussing the UN decade to combat discrimination in 1988, the delegate from 
Czechoslovakia reported, “Although the incorporation of gypsy population into the life 
of Czechoslovak society was not complete, there was no discrimination against that 
group”.86 Such a statement would rarely be uttered today by states in international fora 
when discussing Roma, but the sentiment of this statement still holds for many state 
actors working at all levels of government.
Norm emergence on Romani rights has taken place in boardrooms of capital cities 
across Europe attended by a limited cadre of Romani, IO and government actors. The 
greater challenge is building a wider constituency of norm entrepreneurs. Most Roma 
have little or no awareness of the standards and policies adopted in their name nor have 
they participated in debates on the appropriate identity and rights frames for Roma. The 
mechanisms of accountability for norm adherence rely inordinately on the goodwill of 
non-Romani actors. Increased political representation of Roma will be harder to secure 
than NGO representation (mostly due to financial and discrimination barriers) but is 
arguably more effective for norm adherence in the long term. One caveat is necessary, 
however: with low levels of trust among Roma for political actors — including Romani 
political actors -  the election of one or two Roma into parliamentary positions is 
unlikely to be more than a symbolic gesture and will not alter the balance of power for 
Romani groups. Institution-wide commitments are needed, with pressure from above 
and below to implement a firmly entrenched legal and policy framework that meets the 
needs of Roma. The desired EU Directive on Roma is one such example.
Roma have been the victims of their own success in many ways. There are many IOs 
interested to support their norm entrepreneurship but the lack of coordination between 
these IOs and among Romani actors, and the divergent interests of IOs, has had three 
negative effects: it has fragmented the organisational platform of Roma; it has enabled 
external IOs to take too much of a lead in determining the normative frames and policy 
goals of Romani norm entrepreneurs; and it has weakened the policy coherence on 
group-specific Romani rights. The intense interest of IOs in Romani concerns also has 
eliminated the need for strong social mobilisation from below and clearly articulated
86 Mrs. Broznakova, Czechoslovakia, UN Doc. A/C.3/43/SR.8 (18 October 1988): para 6.
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demands. The easy access to policy dialogue in IOs has made electoral politics less 
imperative, with the effect that leaders are removed from and less accountable to local 
realities. INGOs have championed their cause on the national and international stage 
but are less well-equipped for the tougher challenges in norm adherence. Sub-groups 
within the broader Romani identity frame have tried to assert their own identity in an 
effort to claim distinct representation - it pays to be distinct as regards access to 
resources and a say in how they are distributed. Identity frames constructed to mask 
heterogeneity are fragile and any groups seeking to forge a transnational identity must 
be aware of those sub-groups who will at some stage want to ‘go it alone’. The Romani 
experience remains too inward-looking: Romani activists have conceded “the fact that 
Roma are often thought of as a ‘special minority’, not related to any other, has 
prevented them from seeking coalitions with other interest groups or minorities in 
similar situations” (PER 2006, 15).
Thanks to norm entrepreneurship, Roma are extraordinarily privileged among 
minorities in international discourse. The engagement of international actors in the 
Romani cause has made an important impact on their status in society and pushed states 
to accept publicly their failures towards Roma. The pathway to norm emergence - elite 
centred, lacking local community engagement, largely dependant on IOs and INGOs 
and concentrated in the international sphere - has unfortunately not fostered firm roots 
for norm adherence. Romani actors and their international partners need to alter the 
course of the norm entrepreneurship to adopt new strategies that are better suited for 
norm adherence challenges.
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Ch a p t e r  II: Da lits  a n d  N orm  En tr epr en eu r sh ip  o n  C a ste-based
D isc r im in a tio n
We have begun a new life 
We have found our own temples 
Regained our lost faith 
All are equal here.
Harish Bansode
Introduction:
In a process that has spanned nearly three decades, representatives of caste-affected 
groups have worked to bring international attention to the plight of their communities as 
a means of putting pressure on caste-affected states for domestic reform. They have 
done so by building transnational social mobilisation and by using political opportunity 
structures available at the international level. The 2001 World Conference Against 
Racism (WCAR) was one such structure, serving as an important catalyst for 
accelerated mobilisation and norm emergence. Both before and after the WCAR, 
however, important developments have occurred that provide a long-view of norm 
entrepreneurship around caste-based discrimination. This chapter will show how caste- 
affected groups and their allies have secured international recognition of their identity 
and concerns and institutionalized new norms for state behaviour by using a sound 
‘adjacency’ strategy for norm emergence. The process of constructing an effective 
transnational advocacy network (TAN) to facilitate this work will also be considered. 
Their efforts at norm entrepreneurship have been met with opposition from the 
Government of India, which has objected to international attention to this issue and the 
consideration of caste under the rubric of racism. The caste TAN has responded with a 
twofold strategy: first, to expand the scope of communities being considered beyond 
India and South Asia; and second, to replace the terminology of caste with a wider 
frame focusing on discrimination based on work and descent. Most states have been 
reluctant to challenge India’s obstinacy but the caste TAN has been assisted by several 
international actors in their norm entrepreneurship. Two key allies will be given 
particular attention: the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights and CERD. Actors
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within these institutions have given certification to the new global identity frame of 
caste-affected groups and supported their claim that caste-based discrimination is 
prohibited in international law, including under the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
The main focus in this chapter will be on the experience of Dalits in India, who 
constitute nearly 170 million of the estimated 240 million Dalits across South Asia and 
the 250 million caste-affected persons around the world. Dalit leaders from India have 
figured most prominently in international advocacy on caste and it was India-based or 
focused NGOs that were the first to make caste an issue for international attention at the 
UN. India also has been a “critical state” for norm emergence on caste-based 
discrimination, positioned with the largest population of caste groups and the most 
extensive domestic legal framework for the protection of low caste groups. The 
Government of India nevertheless remains the strongest opposition force in 
international fora against the elaboration of new norms on the prohibition of caste-based 
discrimination and the recognition that caste be considered within the scope of ICERD. 
This chapter will consider some of the internal and external factors that have shaped 
India’s opposition to norm entrepreneurship.
Caste in contemporary society:
A wide range of groups are embedded in structures of caste or analogous systems. 
These groups are found in certain states of Africa and Asia and among diaspora 
communities in other parts of the world. They include the Dalits (or ‘Untouchables’) of 
South Asia, the Buraku people of Japan, the Dime of Ethiopia, the Sab of Somalia, and 
the Osu of Nigeria, to name a few.87 It is estimated that some 250 million people 
worldwide are relegated to a ‘low-caste’ or ‘out-caste’ status by the societies in which 
they live. They are united under the caste umbrella by a number of common 
experiences, including the ascription of their status by birth, their predominance in (and 
sometimes restriction to) certain low-status and ‘polluted’ occupations (e.g.
87 Some twenty states have been identified as having caste-like structures in their traditional societies (i.e. 
not among resident diaspora groups). These are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Burkino Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea 
Conakry, India, Japan, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda,
Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yemen (DDSN and DNF 2005, 3).
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blacksmiths, leather workers, sweepers, servants, entertainers), restrictions on marrying
o o
outside their group, and a general regard as being ‘impure’ peoples. The impact of 
their status as low caste peoples is typically a lower level of human development, social 
segregation, discrimination, and even violence targeted against them.
The largest caste-affected group is the Dalits, numbering approximately 240 million 
across South Asia and in the diaspora.89 Dalits are designated within the Hindu caste 
system as ‘Untouchables’. Untouchables are at the lowest level of the social hierarchy, 
considered to be outside of (and socially below) the four vamas of the Hindu caste 
system, namely the Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (farmers) and 
Shudras (labourers, servants). Each of the vamas of the caste system is heterogeneous, 
comprised of up to hundreds of jatis, specialized designations linked to labour type and 
sometimes language. The origins of the caste system are disputed but the majority holds 
the view that it was established during the Aryan invasions of the Indian sub-continent 
around 3000 B.C. The Aryans are said to have subjugated the indigenous populations of 
the region through the caste structure, legitimized further by subsequent sacred and 
legal texts of Hinduism.
Dalits are formally outside the caste hierarchy but nevertheless are constrained by the 
caste power structure. They are considered ritually impure and are relegated to 
performing the most menial work-based tasks in society such as manual scavenging, 
leather tanning and preparation of bodies for cremation. They typically live in 
segregated parts of villages and are not permitted to share access to the same water 
resources or to enter Hindu temples because of their ‘impurity’. Their status within the 
caste system is often interpreted as conferring a right upon higher castes to treat lower 
castes as they will, including with impunity. As a consequence, violence and 
discrimination against Dalits is rife in India: according to official statistics a serious 
crime is committed against a Dalit every 18 minutes, including murder, rape and 
beatings (IDSN n.d., 5). Access to justice for Dalits is poor: many do not report crimes 
against them for fear of retaliation and of those cases involving offences against Dalits
88 See E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/24 for the UN Sub-Commission’s assessment o f common features, paras 45- 
56.
89 Dalits are estimated to comprise 15-20% of the population of India; 20-30% of the population of Sri 
Lanka; between .25-1.2% in Pakistan; 3-4% in Bangladesh; and 15-20% in Nepal. There are an estimated 
50,000 Dalits in the UK (DSN-UK 2006). Source: IDSN, http://idsn.org/caste-discrimination/caste-exists- 
where/ (accessed 29 May 2009).
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that do make it to court, some 89% or more result in acquittal (Human Rights Watch 
and CHRGJ 2007, 55). Much of the violence against Dalits stems from individuals 
attempting to defy the caste system, for example, by asserting land claims rights or 
attempting to take upper caste members to court for crimes committed against Dalits. 
The economic status of Dalits is disproportionately low: in India, the poverty level in 
urban areas for Scheduled Castes (including low castes and Dalits) is 39% compared 
with a national average of 24% (Chronic Poverty Research Centre 2005, 16).
There are a wide range of responses made by governments that aim, directly or 
indirectly, to address the inequalities and discrimination faced by caste-affected groups. 
At a minimum, most caste-affected states have legislation on non-discrimination to 
which caste-groups can appeal. In some cases, the right to non-discrimination on the 
grounds of ‘caste’ is explicitly mentioned (e.g. in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, India and 
Nepal).90 The measures for implementation of these laws frequently fall short and most 
states have failed to elaborate special measures in the form of policy or targeted 
legislation to overcome the negative effects of caste.
The most proactive states in this regard are India and Nepal, which have taken concrete 
steps to eradicate caste-based discrimination. In both cases, the de facto conditions of 
Dalits belie the de jure provisions adopted with the intention of ameliorating their social 
and economic status. The Constitution o f India, for example, makes ‘Untouchability’ 
and caste-based discrimination illegal.91 Article 17 holds:
“Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The 
enforcement of any disability arising out o f “Untouchability” shall be an 
offence punishable in accordance with law.
The Constitution replaces the term ‘Untouchability’ with that of Scheduled Castes, used
09to denote low caste and Dalit populations. The Constitution also authorizes the 
government to implement special measures of affirmative action for the purposes of 
overcoming the effects of discrimination against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
90 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/31 (5 July 2004).
91 There are several articles of the constitution that give attention to untouchables and caste-based 
discrimination. See Goonesekere report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/16, (14 June 2001), p7-8.
92 The term derives from the period of British colonization, in which caste groups were ordered through 
the British census taking by creating a list or ‘Schedule’ of groups. These same lists ordered the adivasi 
(indigenous peoples) populations of India and named them as Scheduled Tribes.
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Tribes.93 Several laws94 elaborate on these provisions, principally the Untouchability 
Offenses Act 1955, later amended in 1976 and renamed as the Protection o f Civil Rights 
Act 1955; and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention o f Atrocities) Act 
1989. Both prescribe criminal responsibility for a wide variety of offences. A system of 
reserved seats in parliament for Scheduled Castes and for public sector employment is 
also in place, constitutionally entrenched in Articles 330, 332 and 335, and elaborated 
further by the Mandal Commission in 1980 (Jafffelot 2006, 183).
To monitor the implementation of these provisions a National Commission for 
Scheduled Castes was established.95 The National Commission is a statutory body, 
whose chairman and vice- chairman have a rank of Union Cabinet Minister and Union 
Minister of State respectively and the members of the Commission enjoy the rank of 
Secretary to the Government of India. The Commission can investigate individual 
complaints, advise on government policy vis-a-vis Scheduled Castes and monitor 
general trends in the implementation of relevant legislation.96 The Government of Nepal 
established a similar body in 2002, the National Dalit Commission. No other caste-
07affected state has established a caste-focused monitoring body.
Given the long-standing provisions outlawing caste-based discrimination and 
untouchability and offering affirmative action policies towards low caste groups, the 
lack of progress in realizing improvement in the lives of the targeted groups is striking. 
A small cadre of Dalit middle classes has emerged, thanks in part to their successful use 
of these measures. The majority of Dalits, however, continue to live in conditions of 
extreme poverty. Many are unable to benefit from the opportunities afforded by the 
reservation system, some because they lack the minimal educational requirements to 
take up the posts but also because the reservations provisions are not enforced fully and 
are only voluntary in the private sector (Human Rights Watch and CHRGJ 2007, 9-10 
and 43-44). Most individuals in positions of power still come from the dominant castes
93 Indian Constitution Article 15. (4).
94 See also the Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act 1976 and the Employment o f Manual Scavengers and 
Construction o f Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act 1993, both of which principally benefit Dalits who are 
concentrated in these ‘occupations’.
95 The office was initially a Commissioner under the authority of Article 338 of the Constitution and 
subsequently consolidated as a formal Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 1978. 
This Commission was divided in two in 2004 into the National Commission on Scheduled Castes and the 
National Commission on Scheduled Tribes. See http ://ncsc.nic .in/index2.asp?sid= 160 (accessed 5 May
2009).
96 See http://ncsc.nic.in/index.asp (accessed 29 May 2009).
97 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/31 (5 July 2004).
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and have not been socially persuaded against caste-based thinking. Legal enforcement 
of the Prevention o f Atrocities Act and the Protection o f Civil Rights Act remains weak 
(Keane 2007, 250). The National Commission for Scheduled Castes in India (and in 
Nepal) is under-resourced and has weak powers of enforcement.
Most political parties court the Dalit vote, offering promises that are rarely kept. One 
party has an explicit Dalit focus, the Bahujan Samaj Party, established in 1984. The 
party holds power in India’s largest state of Uttar Pradesh, where the party leader 
Kumari Mayawati is the first Dalit woman to hold the post of Chief Minister. The party 
was founded with an expressed mandate to represent Dalits but has been active in 
reaching out to other castes. The role of Dalits in influencing domestic politics has been 
studied extensively (e.g. Shah 2001; Lerche 2008; Jafffelot 2003) and it is clear that 
Dalits are important constituents who can be used to secure power in India’s pluralistic 
system. Dalits are also active at the local government level, frequently represented in 
panchayats (village councils). At all levels, however, upper castes retain the balance of 
power, affording Dalits less influence over decision-making.
Despite the obvious intentions within the Constitution to transform India into a more 
equitable and possibly ‘post-caste’ society, the caste system remains a powerful identity 
structure. For Dalits, the system is at once marginalizing and empowering. Their 
identity as ‘Untouchables’ is still pertinent for most of their social interactions, 
acquiescing them to discriminatory and derogatory treatment in the interests of a wider 
social order they have been socialised over centuries to respect. Politically, their 
collective identity as Dalits remains a potentially powerful mobilisation force, 
underscoring their shared experiences and common goals. Being ‘Dalit’ is the very 
foundation of their political power. Paradoxically, they rely on the system they seek to 
eradicate for their strength to eradicate it. This strength has manifest in various forms 
of mobilisation that have changed over time.
Dalit mobilisation: from domestic resistance to transnational advocacy
The current cooperation between Dalits and other caste-affected groups at the 
international level is predated by a long development at the domestic level of political
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awareness and self-organisation. The mobilisation of Dalits in India has the longest 
history. The roots of this mobilisation are varied, stemming from endogenous 
resistance to the hierarchical structure of Hinduism, to the influence of external actors in 
shaping social relations. What has emerged is a strong Dalit consciousness that has 
translated into a vehicle for collective representation and advocacy. The sustained 
move to the international sphere is a later development, led first by Dalit diaspora 
groups and subsequently strengthened in cooperation with INGOs and international 
institutions. This section will examine first the origins of Dalit mobilisation in the 
domestic sphere before turning to an analysis of the contemporary organisational 
platform that has made transnational advocacy by Dalits possible.
Precursors to the modern Dalit movement 
Anti-Brahminism:
Challenges to the inequalities created by the caste structure are said to have appeared 
first in the Bhakti spiritual movement in the 14th and 15th centuries (Kananaikil 1993, 
401). The movement aimed at reforming Hinduism and included among its disciples 
individuals drawn from the Untouchable caste (Kananaikil 1993, 401). This movement 
later strongly influenced anti-Brahmin movements emerging in the mid-19th century, 
lead by Jotirao Phule (1827-90) (Kumar 2000, 26). Phule, himself from a Shudra caste, 
drew inspiration from the experience of emancipated Black African slaves in the United 
States (to whom he dedicated his book Slavery (1873)), and from the thinking of 
Thomas Paine, an 18th-century political theorist on natural law and human rights 
(Jaffrelot 2005, 15). He believed that low castes were peoples indigenous to the 
territory of modem India who had been subjugated by external invaders represented by 
the Brahmin caste (Jaffrelot 2005, 16). The anti-Brahmin movements collectively 
rejected the hierarchical structure of Hinduism, advocated for worship of a single deity 
and sought to give the low castes a stronger sense of their own political power vis-a-vis 
the (unjust) dominance of the minority Brahmin class. Their ideas were both socially 
and politically radical and they made concrete efforts to put them into action: for 
example, Phule created the first ‘emancipatory’ society for lower castes, the 
Satyashodak Samaj (Society for the Search of Truth) in 1873 (Jaffrelot 2005, 17). One
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anti-Brahminical group even went so far as to advocate for the creation of a separate 
non-Brahmin state (Kumar 2000, 28).
British colonizers and missionaries:
The British colonial authorities chose to include markers of caste in census taking and 
in particular adopted the vama system of classification in their efforts to 
administratively organise the colony’s population. Several authors have debated the role 
of the colonizers in constructing the modem view of caste in India. Through their 
systematization of the population by caste (and more broadly by religion) the British are 
said to have given new meaning to identities that had previously been materially and 
politically less significant (Waldorp 2004, 283), a legacy that continues to impact on 
social and political relations in India today.
Although the British accepted the caste structure they did not adopt the caste ethos and 
formally treated all castes with equality before the law. Schools were established for 
children from the ‘Untouchables’ from 1892, contributing to a small increase in the 
nearly null literacy rate among the ‘Untouchable’ caste (Jaffrelot 2006, 174). The 
British also recmited individuals into military and administrative posts without 
discrimination on the basis of caste, thus enabling a cadre o f ‘Untouchables’ to improve 
their economic and social status (Kananaikil 1993, 403). Some affirmative action 
policies were introduced, including reserving some 8.5 percent of posts for 
‘Untouchables’ in the civil service (Jaffrelot 2006, 174). When the British introduced 
moves to autonomy and ultimately independence for India, members of the low caste 
groups, including ‘Untouchables’, were represented among those participating in the 
consultation processes for self-rule (Kananaikil 1993, 407). Many lower caste leaders 
expressed preferences for British rule over continued subordination in a ‘free’ India and 
were thus granted these concessions in large part to co-opt them to the Congress agenda, 
marking one of many failed political promises (Shah 2001, 30-31).
British Christian missionaries also focused on Dalits in their attempts to convert them to 
Christianity. Many Dalits were receptive to religious conversion, and the majority 
chose Christianity (others chose Islam or Buddhism). The number of conversions 
taking place near the end of the 19th century was so high that it became a political
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threat: as one author notes, “conversion acquired political overtones because it affected 
the communal balance of power” (Webster 1996, 200). The less integrated into the 
Hindu hierarchy, the more power Dalits had to independently negotiate their interests 
without deference to caste order.
Ambedkar and the ‘Dalits’
The early challenges to the caste status quo came to influence some of the thinking of 
the first leader of the modem Dalit movement: Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar (1891-1956). 
Dr. Ambedkar was bom an ‘Untouchable’ and was the first person to politically 
mobilise the Dalits as a distinct community. He famously rose to the level of Law 
Minister in Nehru’s Congress government and was the chief architect of the Indian 
Constitution. Ambedkar tried to seize upon a moment of intense change in Indian 
society to position the Dalits as a key political constituency. He had a good relationship 
with the British (not least for being educated in the West, including at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science!), who regarded him as the foremost leader 
of the Dalits. He used this relationship to secure Dalit representation in important 
decision-making processes around decolonization.
Ambedkar was firmly against the caste structure of Hinduism, encouraging mass 
conversion to Buddhism, and consequently was never aligned with the Hindutva 
nationalism. His beliefs regarding the liberation of Dalits and the eradication of the 
caste system also brought him into direct conflict with Karamchand Gandhi, alias 
Mahatma Gandhi (Jaffrelot 2005, 60-68). Gandhi rejected the inequalities and 
discrimination created by ‘Untouchability’ but did not reject the caste system per se, 
arguing that the ordering of groups under Hinduism into specific duties was good for 
society. Gandhi termed the ‘Untouchables’ the harijans or ‘children of god’ and 
supported grassroots organisations in an effort to uplift them socially. He felt that 
Ambedkar’s efforts to mobilise the Dalits as a distinct (non-Hindu) community were 
divisive. When Ambedkar made a proposal for separate electorates for Dalits during 
the Round Table Conferences on self-rule in 1930-1933, Gandhi went on hunger strike 
to oppose the bid until Ambedkar was forced to capitulate. In return, Gandhi and 
Ambedkar settled on a system of reserved seats in the legislative council for Dalits 
under the Poona Pact (1932).
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Ambedkar went on to attempt to establish a political party base for Dalit representation, 
beginning with the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in 1936 and followed in 1942 with 
the Scheduled Castes’ Federation (SCF), a party focused specifically on Dalits. Seeing 
the gains made by Muslims (heading towards securing their own state, Pakistan), the 
SCF made similar bids for recognition as a ‘minority’ and for separate Dalit territories 
to be designated (Jaffrelot 2005, 81). These claims were not successful and Ambedkar 
subsequently reverted to the horizontal strategy of the ILP of forging alliances with 
other ‘depressed classes’ in India in a bid to bolster electoral power. The resultant 
Republican Party of India was broader in its base but without the electoral structure he 
sought to create before the Poona Pact, he was never able to achieve a critical mass of 
support. Dalits were also courted by other parties, including the Congress party, which 
was instrumental in the creation in 1926 of the first pan-India low-caste organisation, 
the All India Depressed Classes’ Association (Jaffrelot 2005, 89).
Ambedkar’s focus was the domestic sphere but he was skilled at capitalizing on 
political opportunities outside, demonstrated by his savvy use of contacts with British 
officials and his understanding of the important political opportunity afforded by the 
self-rule processes. There is also evidence of his engagement with the early days of the 
UN and efforts to forge transnational solidarity links with African Americans. 
Correspondence exists from Ambedkar to W.E.B Dubois, an early leader of Afro- 
descendant mobilisation. Both men were interested to use the UN to put pressure on 
governments to address the situation of their constituents, Ambedkar proposing an 
appeal in 1947 (Ambedkar 2003, 358-59).98 Ambedkar also proposed the establishment 
of an “impartial international tribunal” to assess Dalit demands vis-a-vis the Congress 
government (Ambedkar 2003, 363).
Ambedkar’s legacy as a founding father for the contemporary Dalit mobilisation is 
profound. His statue figures prominently around India, his picture is found in Dalit 
homes and Dalits will often greet one another with the phrase Jai Bhim, meaning 
‘Victory to Dr. Ambedkar’ (Shah, et al 2006, 146-150). His manifesto for Dalit 
emancipation continues to impact on the Dalit leaders that have followed him, albeit 
none with the same stature as Ambedkar himself.
98 No records have been found to confirm that the appeal was issued formally to the UN.
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Dalit militancy: The Dalit Panthers
A new post-Ambedkar wave of militant activism was introduced in the 1970s with the 
creation of the Dalit Panthers. The Panthers emerged in Bombay in 1972 and drew their 
name from the Black Panthers in the US. Prominent among the movement’s leaders 
were two Dalit writers, Namdeo Dhasal and J.V. Pawar (Shah 1990, 329) and Raja 
Dhale, also a Dalit (Kananaikil 1993, 409). The Panthers aimed to respond to what was 
perceived as increased violence against Dalits and persistent impunity for those 
committing these crimes. The Panthers were prepared to respond similarly with 
violence, directed particularly against Brahmins and other high caste groups, and 
several riots took place throughout the 1970s (Shah 1990, 330). The movement receded 
due to internal disputes and failed to reach a critical mass of supporters beyond the 
urban sphere (Kananaikil 1993,409).
Dalit cultural identity:
The Dalit militancy was paralleled by the development of a Dalit cultural movement in 
the 1970s, centred principally on the fields of literature, music and sociology. The 
movement remains to this day and has two broad objectives: first, to create a 
contemporary pool of cultural resources for Dalits; and second, to link contemporary 
Dalit identity to an ancient cultural past. Much of the contemporary cultural artifacts, in 
the form of poetry, plays and music, have a strong resistance tone, with the aim of using 
art as a means of political mobilisation and/or commentary. Excerpts from the work of 
two Dalit poets illustrate well the general sentiment (Pantawane 1986, 83-85):
But I am a new sun 
Independent, self-illuminating,
Possessed of a new spirit 
I reject your culture
I reject your Parmeshwar centred tradition 
I reject your religion based literature.
V.L. Kalekar
We have begun a new life 
We have found our own temples 
Regained our lost faith 
All are equal here.
Harish Bansode
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Linking Dalit culture also to ancient roots is part of a project of distinguishing Dalit 
identity from Hindu identity writ large. This means reaching to the practices of pre- 
Hindu and pre-Aryan indigenous societies. With little hard evidence of this ancient 
culture, much of the practice has been constructed and projected on to the past. Dalit 
‘national’ heroes have also been created, such as Uda Devi, a Dalit woman who led a 
revolt against the British in 1857 and whose story has been used by various political 
parities and “reshaped [...] according to their own political agendas” (Narayan 2004, 
219).
The sum effect has been to use a glorious past to bolster the Dalit collective identity. 
Indeed, the history of Dalit mobilisation need not be ‘invented’ nor its history 
‘imagined’, featuring as it does a long line of important activists that have influenced 
the contemporary movement. The anti-Brahmins were the first to conceive of ‘rights’ 
for Dalits, drawing from the liberal enlightenment thinkers and anti-slavery movements. 
They forged early forms of social organisation built upon by Ambedkar. Ambedkar’s 
vision of Dalit emancipation and political rights, revealed in his extensive writings, 
continues to shape the goals of contemporary Dalit activists. His experimentation with 
political party mobilisation, his efforts to forge horizontal alliances with similar groups 
and his use of external powers to influence domestic political processes have been 
lessons for national Dalit NGOs. Likewise, the unsuccessful attempts at more militant 
tactics by the Dalit Panthers have likely dissuaded current civil society actors from 
using this approach. These experiences have pushed the mainstream of Dalit activism in 
a particular direction, combining grassroots civil society empowerment with 
international advocacy within a rights-based frame.
The contemporary Dalit movement:
The contemporary Dalit movement is a web of organisations at the national and 
international level joined in “insider-outsider coalitions” of advocacy, research and/or 
funding relationships. Some of these actors have forged a TAN that is constituted by 
both vertical and horizontal relationships: horizontally, between domestic Dalit/caste 
NGOs within and (to a lesser extent) across borders; and vertically, by interactions of 
domestic NGOs with international NGOs and other IOs. The network is aided greatly
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by international donors, which serve as both targets and enablers of norm 
entrepreneurship.
Domestic Dalit actors:
The Dalit movement in India is comprised of a wide spectrum of actors, from NGOs 
and community-based organisations, to political parties, religious organisations, trade 
unions, epislemic communities and grassroots social movements." Only a small 
number of these actors has had any direct engagement in norm entrepreneurship 
internationally and the principal among them will be introduced here.
The predominant Dalit NGO in India that works in the international sphere is the 
National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR). The NCDHR was created as a 
national Dalit platform in 1998 and now has branches in 14 Indian states. Since 2008, 
Vijay Parmar is the National Convenor, with four General Secretaries: Civil and 
Political Rights - Prasad Sirivella; Dalit Women - Vimal Thorat; Economic and Cultural 
Rights - Paul Divakar; and Land Rights -  Manas Jena. Although it is a national 
platform, it has a strong international focus and an interest in normative change at the 
core of its mandate. The first in its list of stated aims is “That India and the 
International Community recognise and uphold that Dalit Rights are Human Rights”.100 
The UN is a key advocacy target for the organisation, and their demands include that 
the UN:
- Recognise that Dalit Rights are Human Rights.
- Appoint a Special Rapporteur or Working Group on the practice of 
untouchability in South Asia.
- Pressurise the Indian Government to adhere to the UDHR, CERD and other 
international standards, by bringing within the purview of Human Rights any 
form of discrimination and violations against Dalits, by both the State and 
civil society
- Identify caste discrimination in Article 1 of the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.101
99 There are some Dalit organisations that have been important in using a rights frame for Dalit advocacy, 
including in India the Dalit Maha Sabha, Dalit Sangarsh Samithi, and the new Dalit Panthers.
100 http://www.dalits.org/aims.htm (accessed 27 July 2007).
101 http://www.dalits.org/demands.htm (accessed 27 July 2007).
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There is also an explicit transnational view of the organisation’s objectives, including to 
“Strengthen the unity and solidarity of Dalits and Dalit movements across the nation 
and the world”.102 Finally, the NCDHR asserts the collective identity of Dalits in 
seeking “To highlight the culture and contribution of Dalit Communities to society”.103 
The NCDHR’s early years focused on agenda-setting at the domestic and international 
level, to raise awareness of caste-based discrimination and, through norm emergence, 
bring pressure for reform on caste-affected states. In recent years, the NCDHR has 
turned its attention from norm emergence to norm adherence, and have restructured to 
concentrate their work domestically into four priority “movements”, namely on civil 
and political rights of Dalits, economic and social rights, land rights and the rights of 
Dalit women.104
Other key national Dalit NGOs include the Navsaijan Trust, established in 1989 by 
Martin Macwan, a prominent Dalit activist and former convener of the NCDHR who 
was also a leader in the WCAR. The Navsaijan Trust, now led by Manjula Pradeep, is 
based in Gujarat where it conducts most of its work on legal aid, social work and 
advocacy capacity building105 but also has an eye on international fora (albeit reverting 
mostly to domestic action since the WCAR). The National Federation of Dalit Women 
was founded in 1993 under the direction of Ruth Manorama and is based in Bangalore. 
The National Convention of Dalit Organisations (NACDOR), headed by Ashok Bharti, 
is another umbrella organisation of some 300 NGOs focusing primarily on domestic 
advocacy and capacity building.106 Other Dalit rights organisations with some 
international activism include Sakshi Human Rights Watch -  Andhra Pradesh (est. 
1999), HRFDL (Human Rights Forum for Dalit Liberation) -  Tamil Nadu (est. 1999), 
Dalit Bahujan Shramik Union, Dalit Panthers of India (not directly associated with the 
earlier Dalit Panthers) and People's Education for Action and Liberation (PEAL) -  
Tamil Nadu. People’s Watch-Tamil Nadu is a human rights organisation that includes
107attention to Dalit issues in its work. A large number of grassroots Dalit NGOs also 
exist, which occasionally participate in international fora. Epistemic communities have 
also formed important research centres: among them are the Indian Institute of Dalit
102 http://www.dalits.org/obiectives.htm (accessed 27 July 2007).
103 Ibid.
104 http://www.ncdhr.org.in/ncdhr2/aboutncdhr (accessed 7 May 2009).
105 http://navsaijan.org/navsaijan/aboutus (accessed 1 July 2009).
106 http://www.nacdor.org/ (accessed 5 May 2009).
107 http://www.pwtn.org/ (accessed 5 May 2009).
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Studies (IIDS), the Indian Social Institute and the K. R. Narayanan Centre for Dalit and
Minorities Studies at the Jamia Millia Islamia, all based in New Delhi. The University
Grants Commission in India has recently designated funds for start-up institutes on
Ambedkar studies and on social inclusion, demonstrating an increasing focus on Dalit 
10sconcerns.
A small number of Dalit/caste organisations from other countries are active in norm 
entrepreneurship. Nepal has several Dalit-focused NGOs with the most prominent being 
the Dalit NGO Federation - Nepal (DNF), established in 1996 and directed by Tirtha 
Bishwakarma. The DNF is an umbrella organisation for some 200 Dalit NGOs. They 
have been very active in the international sphere, in particular working with UN human 
rights bodies, and have had good links with government institutions (in contrast to 
Indian Dalit civil society). Their strategic goals for 2006-2009 include to “Promote pro- 
Dalit polity to ensure Dalit rights/representation in the mainstream socio-political 
processes” and to “Build national and international solidarity to strengthen Nepalese 
Dalit rights movement”.109 The Feminist Dalit Organisation (FEDO) of Nepal has also 
been visible in international fora through its President, Durga Sob. In Sri Lanka, the 
national Dalit platform is the Human Development Organisation; in Pakistan, the 
Pakistan Dalit Solidarity Network was created in April 2009,110 building on existing 
domestic advocacy; and in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Dalit and Excluded Rights 
Movement (BDERM) was created as a national platform in 2008, following an earlier 
organisation, the Bangladesh Dalit Human Rights (BDHR). Each of these latter three 
Dalit organisations is smaller in scope and capacity than either the NCDHR or the DNF 
but nevertheless maintain some presence in international meetings among Dalit 
representatives. In Japan, the Buraku Liberation League (BLL), established (under a 
different name) in 1922, now serves as a national platform.111 The BLL founded a key 
INGO working on caste issues, the International Movement Against All Forms of 
Discrimination and Racism (IMADR) in 1988. In Africa, civil society organisations of 
caste-affected groups are barely in evidence, with most international advocacy 
conducted by academics from the states in question. Among the exceptions is the 
Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) in Kenya. In October 2008, the
108 http://www.thehindu.eom/2008/l l/19/stories/2008111950450100.htm (accessed 5 May 2009).
109 http://www.dnfnepal.org/aboutus/stategic.php (accessed 10 August 2007).
110 http://www.thenews.com.pk/print 1 .asp?id=171039 (accessed 5 May 2009).
111 http://www.bll.gr.jp/eng.html (accessed 5 May 2009).
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Nigerian Humanists organised a national conference on the Osu caste system with some
119100 participants, evidence of the potential of African activism. Sometimes members 
o f African caste-affected communities will also participate in international actions 
directly, usually with the support of an INGO or the IDSN.
All of these actors face significant challenges in their mobilisation. Uniting Dalits 
across India has proven extremely difficult. Many cite the size of the country and Dalit 
population as an obstacle -  there are just too many people to coordinate a unified 
movement. There is a social hierarchy among different Dalit jatis (there are over 400 
jatis among Scheduled Castes) that impacts on solidarity (Shah 2001, 26). In addition to 
linguistic and cultural diversity, Dalits are also divided by religion and rights; in India, 
Dalits of Hindu, Buddhist or Sikh faiths are recognised as Scheduled Castes, but 
Christian and Muslim Dalits are not, with the effect they cannot access constitutionally 
entrenched guarantees for Dalits. NGOs headed, for example, by Christian Dalits may 
be perceived as Christian-based organisations impeding cooperation with other non- 
Christian groups. Organisations have different operational approaches, some focused 
on international advocacy and/or project based initiatives that rely on funding, others on 
voluntary grassroots mobilisation. Those who are politically engaged are spread across 
die spectrum of parties. Many Dalits who rise to positions of authority are co-opted by 
upper castes and fail to offer to Dalit communities the strong and informed leadership 
they need.
Engaging in advocacy on Dalit rights also can be dangerous: Human Rights Watch 
documents what it calls the “criminalization of social activism” in India by police 
authorities and also retaliation by upper caste groups against Dalits who speak out 
against them (Narula 1999, 153). Some Dalits have been persuaded to take up violence 
themselves: Dalits figure prominently in the armed Maoist movements in India (i.e. the 
Naxalites) and Nepal, afforded access to opportunities and power within these 
movements that is not readily attainable in mainstream society. Extreme poverty, weak 
access to land or to justice and the persistent unwillingness of government to take action 
has pushed some Dalits to these extreme measures, joining forces with indigenous 
peoples (tribal peoples) that dominate these movements. This has no doubt impacted on 
the way government views their constituency, made all the more palpable in India given
112 See http://www. iheu.org/node/3322 (accessed 15 December 2008). The International Humanist and 
Ethical Union, an INGO based in London works on ‘untouchability’ issues in several states.
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the success of the Maoist rebels in Nepal in overthrowing the monarchy. Prime Minister 
Singh of India proclaimed in April 2006 that the “problem of naxalism is the single 
biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country”, a problem he identified
11 -i
as “directly related to underdevelopment [of tribal areas]”. In Nepal, the democratic 
transition spurred by the conflict with Maoists has given increased space for Dalit 
political participation, evidenced not least in the new draft constitution that includes 
stronger attention to Dalit concerns (EDSN 2009b).
Although domestic political opportunity structures exist, the persistence of caste-based 
discrimination and the many factors inhibiting mobilisation of Dalits account for the 
interest of some Dalit NGOs to seek alternatives in the international sphere. Therein 
they find a space where caste prejudice is less penetrating and mobilisation is easier to 
achieve with fewer players. Activists report also that media attention for international 
advocacy is much higher than attention generated by domestic initiatives alone. The 
number of actors from the domestic Dalit movement that are engaged internationally is 
small. Many lack access to information, resources and/or have weak capacity to engage 
with international institutions. Others prefer to focus on the opportunities afforded by 
the political and legal institutions at home. As is the case with many other civil society 
actors, those Dalit activists who do engage in the international sphere or across borders 
have usually done so by forming relationships with INGOs.
International NGOs:
Dalit NGOs have developed close partnerships with INGOs to forge an exceptionally 
strong TAN. Those INGOs engaged in the caste TAN are primarily Dalit solidarity 
organisations or human rights-focused INGOs. Human rights-focused INGOs function 
both as advocacy partners and as sources of funding. They focus primarily on utilizing 
international human rights monitoring mechanisms to advance normative emergence on 
caste-based discrimination and to bring pressure to bear on governments in caste- 
affected countries. They sometimes fund Dalit representatives to travel from their home 
countries to international meetings to speak on behalf of their communities often with 
personal testimonies. They may also fund local advocacy capacity building initiatives
113 PM ’s speech at the Chief Minister’s meet on Naxalism, April 13, 2006 New Delhi 
http://www.pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp7icN311 (accessed 10 June 2008).
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targeting Dalits. These INGOs have been responsible for producing several 
publications on Dalit issues, lending the authority and credibility of the organisation’s 
name to bring the concerns to a wider audience. The key human rights INGOs active on 
Dalit issues include Human Rights Watch (HRW); the International Movement Against 
Discrimination and Racism (IMADR); MRG; the Lutheran World Federation (LWF); 
the Asian Human Rights Commission; and Anti-Slavery International. All of these 
organisations are based in the North. The most prominent individuals from these 
INGOs in the norm emergence process have been Smita Narala (HRW), Atsuko Tanaka 
(IMADR) and Peter Prove (LWF).
Several Dalit solidarity organisations have also emerged over the last decade. These 
include the: Dalit Solidarity Network United Kingdom; Dalit Solidarity Network 
Belgium; Dalit Solidarity Platform Deutschland; Dalit Solidarity Network Denmark; 
Dalit Network Netherlands; Dalit Collectif France; and Dalit Solidarity Network 
Sweden. Such organisations are usually established by concerned individuals with an 
interest in Dalit communities rather than by the Dalit diaspora (who instead form 
representative organisations for Dalit issues). They are important for keeping caste- 
based discrimination in the public eye, particularly in countries like the UK and US 
where there are sizeable Dalit diasporas. The Dalit Solidarity Network UK (DSN-UK), 
for example, was established in 1998 by Reverend David Hasiam initially with an 
exclusive focus on India but later expanded to address caste-based discrimination more 
broadly. It is housed in the offices of Anti-Slavery International. The stated aims of the 
organisation include to “Influence policy by highlighting issues of caste-based 
discrimination to relevant national and international institutions, bilateral agencies and 
government bodies”.114 The domestic presence in the UK gives them a privileged 
position for influencing the UK government and other UK-based actors like 
international corporations working in South Asia. Jeremy Corbyn, MP, is Chair of the 
DSN-UK, further opening the conduits to parliament.115 For example, in June 2007, the 
DSN-UK tabled a motion in the UK Parliament urging the government “to make 
representations to the Indian Government to urge for the effective implementation of 
laws protecting Dalits from violent attacks.”116 In March 2007, they worked with a 
delegation of Dalit representatives that came to London to brief UK officials on caste
134 http://www.dsn-uk.org/ (accessed 27 July 2007).
115 Jean Lambert MEP and Rob Marris MP are also Patron Trustees of the DSN-UK (as at May 2009).
136 The Early Day Motion 1604 was tabled on 5 June 2007.
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issues.117 More recently they have focused their attention on the private sector, 
encouraging UK companies with offices in India to address caste-based discrimination 
within their operations. DSN-UK has faced criticism from diaspora groups: for 
example, the Hindu Council in the UK has sent letters of concern regarding DSN-UK’s 
portrayal of caste-discrimination in the UK and its efforts to have it made illegal under 
domestic law.118 New Dalit solidarity networks are emerging, linked in part to 
significantly increased media attention to Dalit issues (IDSN 2007, 4). The political 
impact of these national networks is often weak, however, and they function primarily 
to express solidarity with caste-affected groups and keep their issues publicly visible. 
The DSN-UK is one of the most active networks and they have achieved issue 
recognition and some agenda-setting. While there is an evident ideational commitment 
to these emerging norms on caste by some government actors, the UK Government has 
not been persuaded to take actions on caste at a political level with the Government of 
India.
The hub of the diverse Dalit solidarity networks is the International Dalit Solidarity 
Network (IDSN) based in Copenhagen. It is coordinated by Rikke Nohrlind. The 
IDSN was established in March 2000 as a focal point for transnational advocacy on 
caste-based discrimination. It is constituted by member organisations that are 
themselves national Dalit or caste-focused NGOs (usually platform NGOs) or solidarity 
NGOs. These NGOs form a governing Council, wherein INGOs are also invited to 
participate. According to their website:
IDSN brings together organisations, institutions and individuals concerned with 
caste-based discrimination and aims to link grassroots priorities with 
international mechanisms and institutions to make an effective contribution to 
the liberation of those affected by caste discrimination.119
The IDSN is not focused only on Dalit issues and extends its remit to address analogous 
systems of discrimination based on work and descent in both Asia and Africa. The 
substance of IDSN’s work is almost exclusively international advocacy. In a division of 
labour between the national Dalit solidarity networks and the domestic Dalit/caste
117 http://www.dsn-uk.org/other/PressRelease220307.pdf (accessed 27 July 2007). A similar briefing was 
organised by the DSN-UK and MRG on the Human Rights of Dalit Women in November 2006.
118 Interview with Meena Varma, May 2008. Caste or descent are not included as prohibited grounds of 
discrimination under the UK’s Equality Act (2006).
119 http://www.idsn.org/ (accessed 28 July 2007).
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NGOs, the IDSN acts as an interface with key IOs, including the UN, European Union, 
and European Parliament. They have also begun to focus on working with the private 
sector and with international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, prompted by advocacy shifts in national Dalit movements 
interested to boost representation of Dalits in the private sector. As the central player of 
the caste TAN’s organisational platform, IDSN facilitates transnational initiatives and 
channels information on caste-related developments both horizontally and vertically. 
IDSN has also been instrumental to building up the capacity of nascent Dalit NGOs in 
caste-affected states. Among their key initiatives was a research cooperation project 
with the HDS to deepen understanding of Dalit issues across several south Asian states
1 90through country reports, generating information that is now used for advocacy.
Donors:
International donors have been funding and advocacy partners to the caste TAN and 
advocacy targets of the caste TAN. Governmental and inter-governmental donors have 
been persuaded to make Dalits a priority focus of their development work as one means 
of exerting pressure on governments of caste-affected states. The key bilateral donors 
are DANIDA (Denmark) and the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID). DANIDA has been highly active in supporting Dalits in its Nepal country 
programme and also channels funds for Dalits through DanChurchAid. DFID earmarks 
its funds for Dalits through prioritization of the socially excluded, evidenced especially 
in its work in India and Nepal. In the past it has not named Dalits explicitly in its 
country programme documents but the most recent 4-year plan for India does so 
clearly,121 providing evidence of socialisation and norm emergence. At the European 
Commission, one major funding line, the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR), indicated in one call for applications that it “pays special 
attention to the rights of minorities, the rights of indigenous peoples and the issue of 
caste discrimination”.122 The naming of caste-based discrimination for funding 
demonstrates successful agenda-setting by the caste TAN (caste is included as an issue 
distinct from  indigenous peoples or minorities) and a change in policy commitments.
120 http://idsn.org/countrv-profiles/ (accessed 6 May 2009).
121 Compare the Three Faces o f India: DFID India Country Plan 2008-2015, which discusses Dalits and 
caste-based discrimination with Partnership or Development: DFID India Country Plan 2004-2008 
which mentions neither Dalits nor caste.
122 A/59/375 (21 September 2004): para 34.
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The caste TAN must constantly exert pressure on the Commission, however, to keep 
their issues visible on the agenda: activists report that the Commission staff recently are 
more inclined to say that caste issues need no specific mention but can fall under other 
remits, including general discrimination, vulnerable groups or minorities. Among the 
private foundations, the Ford Foundation has been active in India since 1952 (Lerche 
2008, 242), responsible, inter alia, for seed funding to the highly influential 1999 HRW 
report Broken People on caste discrimination. Many of the private foundations active in 
funding development in the global South also have a Christian base, which can 
sometimes be controversial for Dalit organisations in receipt of support from such 
organisations. Among the international development NGOs active in funding Dalit 
initiatives are DanChurchAid, Cordaid, Chrisitan Aid and the Catholic Committee 
against Hunger and for Development (CCFD). At the regional level, the establishment 
in 2003 of the Dalit Foundation was significant, given that it is based in India with a
123mandate to provide grants to Dalit-focused initiatives across South Asia. The 
funding sources listed on their website are entirely endogenous and the organisation 
explicitly supports advocacy-based work by Dalits.
Bringing ‘caste-based discrimination’ to the international sphere:
There have long been international influences on Dalit action, from the abolition of 
slavery to the American civil rights movement and the Black Panther militancy, and the 
political and economic opportunities afforded by the British under colonialism and 
through missionaries. With the exception of appeals to the Britiish authorities during 
decolonization and Ambedkar’s overtures to the UN, until the 1970s the focus and 
sphere of Dalit advocacy was strictly domestic. It took another twenty years before 
Dalits were making more sustained interventions at the international level, primarily 
within UN fora. These initial efforts at international advocacy were not well 
coordinated but they did manage to concentrate attention on international human rights 
institutions of the UN. This work forged early pathways within these institutions that 
had a strong influence on subsequent norm entrepreneurship by the caste TAN and
123 http://www.dalitfoimdation.org/ (accessed 29 May 2009).
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helped to shape their normative agenda within a human rights -  and specifically non­
discrimination - frame.
The internationalization of advocacy on caste-based discrimination was enabled initially 
through the diaspora of Dalits that had migrated to Western states. A handful of 
organisations were established in the early 1970s and 1980s both inside and outside 
India that engaged in some transnational cooperation (Bob 2007, 176). Louis (2003) 
cites the Federation of Ambedkarites and Buddhist Council established in the UK in 
1970 as the first such organisation, undertaking actions to highlight the problems faced 
by Dalits in India (224). The Ambedkar Mission of Canada, located in Toronto, had a 
similar mandate. It was established by Darshan Chaudhary in the mid-1970s (Louis 
2003, 225), later refounded by Yogesh Varhade as the Ambedkar Centre for Justice and 
Peace (ACJP) (currently based in Canada, the US and India). Bob (2007) also names 
the Chennai-based Dalit Liberation Education Trust (DLET) and the Volunteers in 
Service to India’s Oppressed and Neglected (VISION) based in Washington, D.C. as 
pioneering Dalit NGOs (176).
These early organisations targeted human rights institutions and four figure prominently 
in this initial period (i.e. 1982-1998): the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights; the 
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations; the UN Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance; and the World Conference on Human Rights (1993).
The first UN space in which the Dalit identity was asserted by civil society was the UN 
Sub-Commission on Human Rights. VISION, established in 1978, first participated in 
the Sub-Commission in 1982, where its president, Dr. Laxmi Berwa, presented an 
intervention retelling the egregious issues faced by Dalits in India (Joshi 1986, 138). 
Dr. Berwa was sent on behalf of two other Dalit NGOs (the Ambedkar Mission of 
Canada and the Shri Guru Ravidas Sabha in California) and under the auspices of MRG 
(Joshi 1986, 135-139). After his intervention there is a long period of unexplained Dalit 
silence in the UN until the early 1990s. The only evidence of international action in the 
intervening period was an international meeting on ‘Minority Strategies: Comparative 
Perspectives on Racism and Untouchability’ held in New York in 1983.124 The meeting
124 The major output of the meeting was the publication of a book; see Joshi, 1986.
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was organised by MRG, which had its own Working Group on Untouchables to unite 
activists and academics from India, Britain and North America (Joshi 1986, vii). Both 
the Ambedkar Mission and VISION appear to have been engaged in the process as well 
(Joshi 1986, ix).
In 1991, Yogesh Varhade125 of the ACJP attended the WGIP. It is not clear if the 
members of the WGIP readily accepted the Dalits as an ‘indigenous people’ (although 
the ACJP website includes a photo of Varhade with the Working Group’s then Chair, 
Erica-Irene Daes!).126 Two more domestic Dalit NGOs were present at the 1993 session 
of the WGIP (Dalit Youth Movement, Dalit Solidarity Programme).127 The Working 
Group was a good entry point for Dalit NGOs because, unlike the Sub-Commission, 
participation in the WGIP did not require NGOs to have ECOSOC status with the UN. 
In 1994, many Dalit NGOs shifted from the WGIP to the WGM for their advocacy. 
The DLET made its first appearance at the WGM in 1997, the NCDHR in 1999 and
178several other Dalit NGOs have followed since. The reason for the shift is not clear: it 
may be a factor of greater understanding of the mechanisms; a difference in self- 
perception of Dalits within the various identity categories at the UN; a rejection of their 
presence at the WGIP by other indigenous activists; or greater access to funding to 
attend the WGM than the WGIP. Funding is likely a significant factor. The INGO 
MRG has been funding NGOs to attend the WGM over the past decade and has 
frequently supported the attendance of Dalit NGOs.
The DLET and the ACJP participated in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights
in Vienna.129 The conference appears also to have stimulated some transnational
cooperation. At the Asian regional prepcom in Bangkok, March 1993, NGOs adopted a
resolution that called for, inter alia, “the United Nations [to] take appropriate steps to
eradicate the practice of untouchability, which is a crime against humanity, and
1 **0discrimination on the basis of caste, religion, and other factors”.
125 The author interviewed Mr. Varhade as a guest on her student radio talk show, Rights Talk and 
organised a public lecture by Mr. Varhade at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada in 1996.
126 http://www.ambedkar.net/ACJP%20%20UN/Forms/AHItems.aspx (accessed 31 July 2007).
127 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (23 August 1993).
128 For example, also present at the 1999 session was a Dalit women’s rights branch of the NCDHR: 
Vedika. At the 2000 session, the NCHDR and the Dalit Cultural Front were present. At the 2006 session, 
the Feminist Dalit Organisation (Nepal) attended.
129 A/CONF.157/MC/1 (24 June 1993).
130 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NGO/23 (9 August 1994): para 8.
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In the mid-1990s, several Dalit NGOs and INGOs tried to secure a UN investigation 
into caste, with a particular focus on India. In 1994 and 1995, the INGO International 
Human Rights Association of American Minorities (represented by Varhade) made calls 
to the UN Sub-Commission to “send a fact-finding team to India to get firsthand 
information on [...] human rights abuses endured by the Dalits, and provide the Indian 
Government with recommendations for the establishment of a credible system for Dalit 
human rights protection”.131 In 1996, the DLET, ACJP and the World Council of 
Churches132 submitted communications regarding the situation of Dalits in India to the 
UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, urging him to conduct a country visit.133 The 
Special Rapporteur of this period, Mr. Gele-Ahanhanzo, did manage some preliminary 
examination of the issue, including consideration of the position of CERD, with a view 
to determining whether caste-based discrimination “could be regarded as racial 
discrimination”.134 India submitted a written reply to the Special Rapporteur’s queries, 
repudiating the accusations made by NGOs and asserting “the term ‘caste’ denotes a 
‘social’ and a ‘class’ distinction and is not based on race”.135 In the end, Mr. Gele- 
Ahanhanzo made no concrete assertions as to whether the issue of caste should be 
considered under his mandate, concluding only that “specific attention should be given 
to the situation of the untouchables in India” and that a country visit was needed.136 The 
country visit to India never materialised but the exchange increased international 
attention on caste.
The queries of the Special Rapporteur were compounded by those made by CERD to 
India during the review of its periodic report on ICERD in 1996. The ACJP and the 
South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) provided shadow 
reports/information to CERD for its examination of India’s periodic report urging them
131 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/NGO/14 (27 July 1995): para 7. See also E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/NGO/23 (9 August 
1994): para 10.
132 The World Council of Churches had supported since the early 1990s a call by Dalit members to give
attention to caste-based discrimination. The Dalit Solidarity Programme (later the Dalit Solidarity Peoples
-  DSP) was established in 1992 by Dalit leaders and became a platform for inter-faith cooperation, 
prompting the WCC to take up caste issues through its UN advocacy work. See 
http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/unitv-mission-evangelism-and- 
spiritualitv/iust-and-inclusive-communities/dalits.html (accessed 28 June 2009).
133 E/CN.4/1997/71 (16 January 1997): para 127.
134 E/CN.4/1999/15 (15 January 1999): para 88.
135 Ibid, para 91.
136 Ibid, para 100.
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to raise the issue of discrimination on the basis of caste.137 This is reportedly the first 
time any NGO had submitted a shadow report on caste-based discrimination to a UN 
treaty body. It was an auspicious move for subsequent norm entrepreneurship on caste 
because it pushed CERD into taking a juridical position on whether caste fell within the 
remit of the committee. CERD made clear that caste-based discrimination did fall 
within its mandate, specifically under ‘descent’ in Article 1.1. The Indian delegation 
firmly rejected this assessment138 but the dialogue positioned CERD as an early ally of 
advocates on caste and ICERD as a relevant international standard.
By the late 1990s, Dalit NGOs and INGOs were exploring new institutions and 
approaches in their continued efforts to get international attention on caste. The DLET 
focused its efforts on interventions at the WGM in May 1997 and May 1998.139 In 
1998, the World Council of Churches urged the Sub-Commission “to undertake a study 
on caste-based discrimination and its manifestations in contemporary forms of slavery 
in the south Asian region”.140 The intervention was made under the agenda item 
‘contemporary forms of slavery’ marking a shift away from earlier interventions 
emphasizing racial discrimination or under the ‘prevention of discrimination and 
protection of minorities’ agenda item in the Sub-Commission.
These early representations of Dalit issues within international institutions were 
sporadic and lacked significant impact at the time. There did not appear to be a 
sustained effort to work with any one institution within the UN but a hopeful effort to 
raise the issue in as many fora as possible. The Dalit concerns did not fit easily into any 
identity frame either -  indigenous rights, minority rights and racial discrimination were 
all attempted. Moreover, the normative agenda was only nascent -  at most, activists 
sought to hold governments to account for existing domestic commitments on caste- 
based discrimination rather than creating new normative standards. Some points were 
made, however: Dalit concerns should be considered a human rights issue and caste- 
based discrimination was within the remit of ICERD. These advocates also put the 
Government of India on the defensive, prompting the Indian delegations to forge a
137 See Therese Boyle, “Fighting India's caste system from a photo lab on Spadina”, Toronto Star, 31 
October 1996, p. Al; and http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/about.htm (accessed 28 June 2009).
138 CERD/C/304/Add. 13, (September 17, 1996).
139 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/18 (10 July 1997); E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/18 (6 July 1998).
140 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/SR. 19 (20 August 1998): para 36.
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position from the first Dalit intervention in 1982 at the Sub-Commission that caste- 
based discrimination was a matter of internal concern (Joshi 1986, 139).
Formulating a normative agenda on caste:
Norm entrepreneurship by Dalits in the international sphere only started to solidify in 
the late 1990s when they began to build stronger horizontal relationships between Dalit 
groups and vertical relationships with INGOs and experts within IOs. From this 
organisational platform a second wave of transnational Dalit activism began (1998- 
2008) and a normative agenda evolved.
The beginning of this second wave can be marked by the foundation of the NCDHR in 
October 1998 and by the First World Dalit Convention held in Kuala Lumpur the same 
month, organised primarily by Dalit NGOs from the diaspora in the US, UK and 
Canada under the name of the Dalit International Organisation.141 Both India and the 
UN human rights machinery are mentioned in their recommendations, which include a 
call for “the implementation of fundamental ‘Human Rights’ instrument for Dalits in 
India and other parts of the world” [sic]. A related follow-up event was held in London 
in September 2000, the International Dalit Human Rights Conference, also focusing on 
UN mechanisms in its recommendations.142 This was organised by the Voice of Dalits 
International, a UK-based solidarity NGO. It also concentrated on India and failed to 
mention other caste-affected communities. These initiatives were important steps in 
consolidating transnational cooperation on Dalit advocacy but the norm emergence 
agenda was mostly absent, the cooperation serving primarily to put pressure on India.
Norm entrepreneurship on caste became more evident when Dalit activists forged 
stronger alliances with key human rights INGOs. The most important early international 
actor was Human Rights Watch (HRW). Bob (2007) reports that for many years Dalit 
activists had struggled unsuccessfully to get major human rights NGOs interested in 
caste-based discrimination until 1997 when HRW appointed Smita Narula to oversee a 
major research project on the situation of Dalits in India following increasing reports of
141 http://www.ambedkar.orgAVrorldwide Dalits/first world dalit convention.htm (accessed 15 August 
2007).
142 http://www.ambedkar.Org/Worldwide Dalits/IDHRConference.htm (accessed 15 August 2007).
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violence against them (176). The report, Broken People: Caste Violence Against India's 
"Untouchables" (Narula 1999), was published in 1999 and aimed to expose the issue to 
the international community. HRW was aided in its research by several Dalit activists, 
including Paul Divakar, Aloysius Irudayam, Henri Tiphagne, Ruth Manorama and 
Martin Macwan, who came together to reflect on the emerging report. Through a trio of 
meetings in Bangalore and Delhi it was agreed that to make the HRW report effective, a 
campaign was needed. The result was the creation of the NCDHR as a focal point. It 
was the first national coalition promoting Dalit human rights issues qua human rights, 
adopting the epithet “Dalit rights are human rights” as its rallying call. They undertook 
important domestic lobbying, using the golden jubilee of India’s independence and the 
50th anniversary of the UDHR to frame a major campaign that gathered 2.5 million 
signatures against caste-based discrimination. They also undertook a major project of 
documenting violations of human rights of Dalits, including publishing in 1999 a Black 
Paper on caste.
Although the campaign was visible, their leverage against the government was still 
weak. This work was supplemented with efforts to get the UN to take action in support 
of Dalits. Activists witnessed the impact of the Beijing and Vienna world conferences 
on domestic reforms and understood that India valued its reputation within the UN. By 
framing Dalit issues as human rights issues, they strategically situated their concerns 
within the (international) human rights discourse, enabling access to related political 
opportunity structures. It was hoped that international pressure would boost national 
advocacy and catalyse domestic reforms in an “insider-outsider” coalition effort.
NCDHR began to enlist further allies in the international sphere. One of the earliest 
stimulants was a meeting on contemporary forms of racism convened by the Geneva- 
based INGO the International Council on Human Rights Policy in December 1999
(2000). The meeting was organised to feed into the WCAR processes and brought 
together a select few actors from around the world to examine key issues of relevance. 
Among these was the issue of caste-based discrimination, represented by a working 
paper by Smita Narula of HRW. Martin Macwan of the Navsaijan Trust and then co- 
convener of the NCDHR and Atsuko Tanaka of IMADR were also present at the 
discussion. (Notably, the same meeting also included a key activist on Roma, Dimitrina 
Petrova, a member of CERD, Mr. Theo Van Boven and several Afro-descendant
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experts). The meeting provided an important space to build up a nascent cooperation on 
a shared issue: HRW was engaged in India with the NCDHR and IMADR was long- 
linked to caste-issues through the Buraku Liberation League and had conducted some 
advocacy work on discrimination against Dalits.143
In March 2000, a meeting was convened in London by the NCDHR and attended by 
HRW, IMADR, other Dalit NGOs, the few existing Dalit Solidarity Networks and 
interested INGOs, including Anti-Slavery International and the LWF. Together they 
established the International Dalit Solidarity Network as a vehicle for collective action 
on caste. The initial focus was on Dalits and the WCAR was one of the political 
opportunity structures in their sights. Peter Prove of the LWF reports that he raised the 
possibility at that meeting of securing a UN Sub-Commission resolution and report on 
caste-based discrimination, using existing good relations with some key Sub- 
Commission members.144 This set the caste-TAN down a norm emergence path, one 
that would take them through the UN Sub-Commission, cooperation with CERD and 
embroiled in controversy at the WCAR.
Three important factors shaped the normative agenda of the caste TAN: the desire to 
work within the UN; the absence of “caste” or Dalits in the lexicon of international law; 
and the opposition of India. Dalit advocates had long used human rights language to 
frame their concerns. Given that South Asia lacks any regional human rights institution 
the UN was the only 10 with relevant state membership that could offer political 
opportunity structures for human rights advocacy. Members of the IDSN recognised 
there was a good chance to embed their claims institutionally within this UN human 
rights regime.
The caste TAN also had a degree of freedom regarding where in this human rights 
regime to focus their attention. There is no mention of ‘caste’ in any international 
human rights treaty (Keane 2005, 93) and the UN human rights mechanisms had only 
dealt with the issue sporadically. Dalits and their allies therefore invested in 
institutionalizing the concept of caste-based discrimination within international law.
143 In the August 1999 Sub-Commission, IMADR made its first intervention on Dalit issues, under the 
agenda item ‘Prevention of discrimination and protection o f minorities’. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/SR. 19 (9 
November 1999): para 81.
144 Interview with Peter Prove, May 2008.
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This has helped to set clear parameters on what state practice should be and establishes 
a role for human rights monitoring mechanisms to encourage and scrutinize this 
practice. Previous advocacy by Dalits had moved in and out of various mechanisms 
within the UN but two figured more prominently: the Sub-Commission and CERD. 
The Sub-Commission was an obvious ally because of its mandate to explore new 
human rights issues. CERD had been supportive in the past in considering caste-based 
discrimination to fall within the scope of ICERD. Members of the IDSN, such as Peter 
Prove and Atsuko Tanaka, had good relations with key actors in both of these 
institutions and recognised the potential for collaboration on norm emergence.
In these efforts the caste TAN faced one major opposition: the Government of India. 
India rejects any call for caste to be considered at the international level, asserting that 
its own advanced domestic measures are more than adequate and provide the 
appropriate remedies. The government is especially opposed to caste being considered 
under the rubric of racial discrimination, thus undermining attempts to use ICERD for 
norm entrepreneurship. Dalit leaders recognize that “caste may not be race” but 
maintain that in effect the practices are similar, with some going so far as to claim that 
caste is the first and/or worst form of racism (Thorat and Umakant 2004; Berg 2007; 
Macwan 2004). Their position has been disputed by some in civil society. Several 
prominent Indian academics, including Andre Beteille, Dipankar Gupta, and Soli 
Sorabjee, argue that while caste-based discrimination should be addressed, Dalits are 
politically, legally and scientifically misguided in their attempts to assert that caste is a 
form of racism, and, moreover, to use the UN as the vehicle for verifying their claims 
(Thorat and Umakant 2004). NGOs have made similar statements: for example, at the 
Sub-Commission in August 2000, a representative of the Delhi-based INGO the 
International Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, proclaiming himself a “founding 
member of the Dalit Panthers” argued that “Despite what some Western countries said 
in an effort to divert attention from their own racism, the oppression of scheduled castes 
and tribes in India arose not from racist practices but from rigid religious attitudes”.145 
The tone of the interventions suggests a protectionist attitude vis-a-vis ‘Western’ 
criticism of India and Dalit leaders feel they are being rebuked for exposing the issue to 
international attention. The government itself has argued that any attempts by the UN to 
assert normative standards for the prevention of caste-based discrimination have in fact
145 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/SR.7 (9 January 2001): para 71. See a similar statement by the Indian Council of 
Education at the 2001 Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2001/SR.15 (2 April 2001): para 23.
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been a thinly veiled attack on one state, namely India. Until recently, with the 
exception of some capitulations of Nepal to CERD, no other caste-affected state had 
openly supported the development of new norms on caste-based discrimination nor 
accepted it to be within the scope of ICERD. India’s stance was more or less 
unchallenged at the time.
To counter India’s objections and diffuse its influence as a “critical state”', the caste 
TAN has taken two tacks. The first is to expand the number of communities - and thus 
the number of states - being considered in the caste discourse, focusing not exclusively 
on Dalits or India but on groups across Asia and parts of Africa, in addition to the 
diaspora. This process was both proactive and reactive. Members of the IDSN report 
that the more they examined the issue of caste the more communities they found to be 
affected by analogous systems.146 According to one INGO actor, this expansion had the 
added positive impact of building solidarity links across affected communities, with the 
effect that “Dalits could be the leaders, supporting others rather than being 
supported”.147 The second tack is to avoid the language of caste in the normative agenda 
and to use instead ‘discrimination based on work and descent’. This process was 
reactive. The language was initially formulated within the Sub-Commission upon the 
insistence of the Sub-Commissioner from India, Soli Sorabjee. It was clear that he 
would not support Sub-Commission investigation on the issue if caste was the explicit 
focus (Prove 2004). This language also fit well with ‘descent’ as viewed by CERD and 
the two institutions have converged over time in their consideration of caste 
discrimination.
The normative agenda of the caste TAN quickly came to focus on three primary goals: 
recognition, norms and mechanisms. They wanted to secure recognition of caste- 
affected groups and of caste-based discrimination as a violation of international human 
rights law. Recognition of caste-affected groups would raise their profile in 
international society and increase the ability of these groups to gain the support of 
international actors in pushing for change at the domestic level. The acceptance that 
caste-based discrimination was a violation of international law would provide a short­
cut to norm emergence by drawing on existing standards to outline a normative profile 
for the prohibition of caste-based discrimination without having to create new standards
146 Interview with Rikke Norhlind, June 2008 and with Peter Prove, May 2008.
147 Interview with Peter Prove, May 2008.
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from scratch. The studies of the Sub-Commission could provide authoritative research 
on the groups and applicable international law; the WCAR could name caste-affected 
groups and recognize the prohibition of caste-based discrimination, serving as a soft law 
standard; and CERD could reiterate its claims that caste-based discrimination came 
under ‘descent’ in ICERD, firmly entrenching it in international law. Activists admit 
that the rubrics of racial discrimination and descent are not a perfect fit with caste-based 
identities and structures but reason that it is closely related and constitutes a sound 
“adjacency” strategy for norm emergence. The propensity for CERD to argue in this 
way further persuaded advocates to use this as the foundation of their normative claims. 
States also would need guidance on appropriate behaviour for eradicating caste-based 
discrimination and the Sub-Commission, WCAR and CERD could elaborate this in 
their respective recommendations to states. Finally, monitoring mechanisms to 
investigate state compliance with these emerging norms were also needed; the WCAR 
follow-up mechanisms and CERD could assist in this regard but the creation of a UN 
Special Rapporteur with specific responsibility to investigate caste-based discrimination 
would be even better.
The caste TAN thus used its expertise, allies and experience to launch a strong norm 
entrepreneurship process. The next sections will examine in more detail this process 
within the WCAR, the Sub-Commission and CERD.
Dalits at the World Conference Against Racism: “cast out caste!”:
Dalits and those affected by caste-based discrimination were the least successful 
‘victim’ group at Durban in terms of the outcome documents but arguably one of the 
most successful in making their voice heard within the international community. Some 
200 Dalit delegates were present in Durban, after maintaining a steady presence 
throughout the preparatory processes. Their primary goal for Durban was to ensure that 
the final outcome documents included reference to caste-based discrimination, thus 
securing recognition of a new collective identity within international standards and 
laying the ground for group-specific norms. The biggest obstacle to their success was 
the Government of India, which did not want caste-based discrimination discussed, 
arguing that to include caste in the WCAR would be “diluting focus on racism and
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1 isracial discrimination per se”. At the WCAR, Dalit activists believed they could use 
other states to put pressure on India. Moreover, the WCAR would be an intense and 
condensed process with a much higher political and media profile than the UN Sub- 
Commission or CERD, so the chance for making gains over a shorter time period and 
with global attention was high. The first two world conferences to combat racial 
discrimination made no mention of caste but this third event offered an important 
opportunity for (normative) change.
The caste-based coalition focused initially on agenda-setting in the inter-governmental 
dialogue and the parallel NGO fora. For example, Paul Divakar of the NCDHR was 
appointed to sit on the International Steering Committee of NGOs that organised the 
NGO Forum in Durban. The regional preparatory meetings in Asia were key to moving 
the issue from regional to global attention. The Asia-Pacific NGO Forum was held 17- 
18 February 2001 just prior to the Asia Regional inter-governmental prepcom, held in 
Tehran 19-21 February. While the Asia-Pacific NGO Forum Declaration makes strong 
statements on the issue of caste, it is noticeably absent from the inter-governmental 
document because of objections from India (and reticence from other states). The 
NCDHR pursued several pre-Durban campaigns and convened a satellite NGO 
preparatory meeting focused exclusively on caste-based discrimination, entitled the 
Global Conference Against Racism and Caste-based Discrimination: Occupation and 
Descent-based Discrimination Against Dalits, New Delhi, 1-4 March 2001 (Louis 2003, 
198-199). The participants were drawn from Asia, Europe and the US, and several
references are made to African countries in the outcome documents.149 It proved another
useful opportunity for norm elaboration and TAN strategising.
Strong support on caste-based discrimination came also from the WCAR preparatory 
Expert seminars and the NGO parallel fora to the regional inter-governmental 
preparatory conferences. For example, the Expert Seminars in Geneva150, Addis 
Ababa151 and Bangkok152 all noted the issue of caste-based discrimination, as did the 
NGO fora declaration from Europe. Paul Divakar was also a participant at the Bellagio 
Consultation that offered OHCHR inputs for the initial draft of the DDPA; he managed
148 UN Doc WCR/IC.2001/Misc.3, p. 37.
149 See http://wcar.alrc.net/mainfile2.php/Statements/7/ (accessed 5 April 2007).
150 UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC. 1/9 (12 March 2000), para 29.
151 UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/4 (14 March 2001): para 41 (d).
152 UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/3 (26 April 2001), paras 55,145; Conclusions paras 17, 20 (ii), 21.
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to secure a recommendation that “Groups subject to discrimination on the basis of 
descent (such as the Dalits and the Burakumin)” be considered at the WCAR.153 
Outside of the WCAR processes there was also support. At the international level, the 
European Parliament urged “the EU and its member States to voice its concern 
regarding caste discrimination and to formulate strategies to counter this widespread 
practice”.154 Domestically, some groups were able to use the WCAR to solicit media 
interest and bring greater attention to their cause; in India, for example, there was 
dramatically increased public debate on caste in the run-up to Durban. As Smita Narula
(2001) describes it:
By mid-August, Indian papers were ablaze with articles on caste versus race, 
and conferences throughout the country debated the merits of the Indian 
government’s position -  a position taken in the absence of consultation with 
Parliament, or the country’s national commissions on human rights, women, and 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
At the WCAR NGO Forum, Dalits and other caste-affected groups made a strong 
presence; Dalits alone constituted over 200 representatives. They used a number of 
symbolic tools to raise their profile, drawing on established “repertoires” of contention 
(Tilly 2004) from rallies to hunger strikes. Those in solidarity with Dalits wore head 
and armbands reading “Dalit Rights are Human Rights” and sported black vests with the 
words “Cast out caste-based discrimination”. Marches to traditional Dalit drumming 
drew additional attention and the world’s media was quick to pick up on the visible and 
highly emotive calls of the Dalit representatives.
The NGO Forum proved an important institution for highlighting the absence of 
attention to caste-based discrimination in the official WCAR documents. At the NGO 
Forum, Dalits and other caste-based groups formed a distinct caucus (the Dalits and 
Caste Discrimination Caucus) and had a Thematic Commission, giving them voting 
leverage on the final contents of the NGO Declaration and Programme o f Action. The 
caucus organised itself to participate in all thematic sessions, raising awareness of the 
Dalit position in each. There was also visible solidarity between groups like Afro- 
Descendants, Roma and Dalits; one NGO Forum event featured representatives of each 
group on the same panel, focusing on “Institutionalized Racism/Casteism”. Roma
153 See supra note 23.
154 European Parliament Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2001, adopted 5 July 2001. See 
http://uk.geocities.com/intemationaldalitsolidaritv/eu/challengefiill.html (accessed 29 May 2009).
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especially felt a connection to the Dalits, given the former’s perceived historical roots as 
low-caste groups in India. This advocacy strategy and solidarity enabled the caucus to 
secure a prominent place in the NGO Forum outcome documents: a section on “Caste 
and Discrimination Based on Work and Descent” with seven paragraphs (paras 84-90) 
is included in the Declaration and ten paragraphs under a similar heading in the 
Programme o f Action (paras 60-70). The sections make demands for, inter alia, legal 
protection of Dalits; recognition of work and descent based discrimination, including 
caste discrimination and untouchability, as crimes against humanity; prohibition of 
exploitative labour; reparations; social and economic rights; and the appointment of a 
UN Special Rapporteur. Caste is included in the list of grounds for protection against 
discrimination in several places in the document. The term “casteism” is also used, an 
innovative framing to portray caste-based discrimination as an equivalent to racism. 
The paragraphs are not limited to discussion of Dalits: a distinct paragraph on the 
situation of some 3 million Buraku people in Japan is included (NGO Declaration, para 
89) and several caste-affected groups in Africa are also named (preambular para 52); 
these references are evidence of the global reach of caste-based solidarity developed 
through the WCAR but also the continued importance for the individual communities to 
assert their own identity within the caste frame.
At the inter-governmental conference Dalits also took a prominent place. The 
prestigious Voices event during the conference lunch hours featured Dalits among eight 
focus groups and Dalits were chosen as one of three communities (in addition to Affo- 
descendants and Palestinians) to address an exclusive Heads of State roundtable, 
wherein President Castro among others firmly denounced caste-based discrimination.155 
The Dalits and Caste Discrimination Caucus also had support from state actors in India. 
The Indian National Human Rights Commission made a plenary statement to the 
WCAR arguing in favour of using the WCAR as an opportunity to discuss caste, against 
the official Government of India position.156 Dalit NGOs invited the participation of 
four Indian MPs who also spoke out against the government’s policy on excluding caste 
in the WCAR agenda and for failing to discuss the issue in parliament prior to
1 f  7Durban. Although two members of the Indian delegation were Dalit, NGO 
campaigners did not feel that they could rely on them to support their calls.
155 Interview with Paul Divakar, November 2008.
156 See http://www.dalits.Org/nhrcstatementwcar.htm#statment
157 Rahul Singh, “Indian MP shocks in support of Dalits”, Conference News Daily, 31 August 2001, p 2.
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Furthermore, a small number of Dalit NGOs at the WCAR were reportedly 
governmental NGOs (GONGOs), expressing the government line.
Until a late stage in the intergovernmental negotiations of the WCAR Declaration, one
draft paragraph (73) with language on “discrimination based on work and descent”
remained. The paragraph had a rocky road to Durban. Caste-based discrimination was
not mentioned in the initial draft DDPA prepared by the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights. At the first prepcom in March 2001, Barbados requested that language
on caste be included in the draft text, only for the proposal to disappear from the draft a
few days later; Switzerland then (re-)proposed the text at the second prep-com in May
2001. When the language was removed again, over 100 civil society representatives
1 ^ 8staged a protest march at the meeting in Geneva. Finally, Guatemala took up the 
baton at the third prepcom in August 2001, requesting in the final hours that the text be 
reinserted. These states did not take up these proposals endogenously -  they were 
accepted after intense lobbying by actors in the caste TAN.
The final draft of the paragraph in question called upon states: “To ensure that all 
necessary constitutional, legislative and administrative measures, including appropriate 
forms of affirmative action, are in place to prohibit and redress discrimination based on 
work and descent” (Prove 2004b, 322). In the first few minutes of the opening session 
of negotiations in Durban, India asked that paragraph 73 be removed as a point of order. 
Through quick lobbying, members of the Dalits and Caste Discrimination Caucus 
managed to secure diplomatic support for retaining the paragraph, convincing the 
Guatemalan delegation to object to removal of the paragraph on procedural grounds so 
that at a minimum it could be negotiated openly.159 The caucus also secured support 
from Argentina, Canada, the Holy See, Namibia, Norway and Syria. The EU member 
states had internal disagreement on whether to openly support the language (with 
Denmark and the Netherlands in favour) and made no public declarations either for or 
against (Prove 2004b, 323). Switzerland reportedly withdrew its earlier support for the 
paragraph under pressure from the US and India.160 There was a proposal for informal
158 The walk-out took place on 30 March 2001. Among the participants were representatives of 
indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants. They wore signs reading "Caste Untouchable in WCAR?". 
See http://www.hurights.or.jp/wcar/E/Frame/2ndprepcom.htm (accessed 18 April 2009).
159 Interview with Peter Prove, May 2008.
160 Atsuko Tanaka, World Conference Against Racism: Success or Failure? 
http://www.imadr.org/old/geneva/wcar2001.assessment.html (accessed 28 March 2007)
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parallel negotiations on paragraph 73 but it was clear that India would only accept 
mention of ‘descent’ and not ‘work and descent’, thus rendering the paragraph 
meaningless for caste advocacy.161 About 150 supporters of the Dalits and Caste 
Discrimination Caucus began a hunger strike on the 6 September in protest against the 
attempts to remove paragraph 73.162
India’s position on caste in the WCAR was consistent with previous statements made in 
international society that caste is not race and moreover should be considered an 
internal matter. At stake was their identity in international society. Durban was a 
highly symbolic space for India, in which the government hoped to portray India as a 
leader in the global eradication of discrimination. In his statement to the plenary, the 
representative of India noted that Durban was the city where Gandhi launched his 
Satyagraha movement and that India was the first state in 1946 to raise objections to 
apartheid in South Africa. His statement acknowledges caste-based discrimination and 
India’s efforts to tackle it but staunchly objects to its consideration by the conference, 
going so far as to say: “We are not here to engage in social engineering within member 
states. It is neither legitimate nor feasible nor practical for this World Conference or, for 
that matter, even the UN to legislate, let alone police, individual behaviour in our 
societies”.163 In addition to discrediting international attention to caste, there was also 
an effort to discredit those NGOs raising caste in the WCAR: according to Divakar, 
“there was much media debate and expert opinion which branded the activists as anti­
national, as stooges of Christian missionaries and agents of the West” (Divakar 2004, 
318, see also Macwan 2004, 32). Numerous prominent intellectuals stood with the 
government position, arguing that the representation of caste as racism was factually 
inaccurate and regressive (e.g. Dipankar Gupta, Andre Betaille and Soli Sorabjee) 
(Thorat and Umakant 2004, Ch. 3-5). The government was using as much soft power as 
possible to maintain its self-styled image as leader against colonialism, oppression and 
racism (Visvanathan 2004,251).
Under pressure from India, no state was willing to push hard for the retention of the 
paragraph (Banton 2002b, 359). The Government of India thus prevailed in its
161 Interview with Rikki Nohrlind, June 2008.
162 http://www.hri.ca/racism/dailvundates/Gmfinal.shtml (accessed 18 April 2007).
163 Statement by Mr. Omar Abdullah, Minister of State for External Affairs (2 September 2001): 
http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/200l/09/02spc01 .htm (accessed 10 July 2009).
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objective of excluding mention of caste in the final DDPA. Although this was a blow 
for the caste TAN, their impact can be measured in other ways. The issue of caste was 
by no means invisible in the Durban process. Indeed, the government’s attempts to 
push out consideration of caste arguably made it more visible. As Smita Narula noted, 
“intense Indian political lobbying ensured that the situation of Dalits stood alone as the 
only issue to have been systematically cut out of the governmental conference’s 
documents” (Narula 2001). The world’s media put the spotlight on caste and India in an 
unprecedented way. The caste TAN also managed at Durban to socialise states to the 
issue of caste-based discrimination, gaining some new allies (such as Guatemala) that 
have remained supportive in the norm entrepreneurship process post-WCAR.
This experience shows that actor characteristics do matter in norm emergence, 
particularly of “critical states”, even where ideational acceptance of emerging norms is 
strong. The Government of India had to work hard to see caste removed from the 
WCAR agenda; in that forum, it had the leverage to trade other material interests with 
states open to seeing caste recognized. The overshadowing of other contentious issues 
such as reparations and Palestine created an atmosphere of pressure in which paragraph 
73 became a lesser priority for states rushing to secure a consensus outcome in the final 
hours of the conference. Perhaps most importantly, India was a key ally of the Western 
Group in seeing down the claims of the G-77 regarding reparations for colonialism and 
the slave trade, making them less willing to speak against India on caste.
Without the impetus of Durban, it is unlikely the mobilisation on caste would have 
reached so far and so high in such a short space of time. Durban did not advance the 
normative agenda on caste in the way advocates had hoped but it did enable processes 
of norm elaboration, agenda-setting, TAN building and state socialisation. These gains 
have provided a base for launching other developments in norm emergence. Before 
turning to the important role of the UN human rights institutions in these developments, 
a brief overview of actions in other international fora follows.
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Post-Durban mobilisation: creating political opportunities for socialisation and 
persuasion
Post-Durban mobilisation by the caste TAN has aimed to socialise international actors 
and states to the concerns of caste-affected communities and to persuade them to exert 
pressure on caste-affected states. After Durban, the caste TAN focused on bringing new 
actors into a dialogue on caste. In late 2004, the IDSN co-convened the International 
Consultation on Caste-Based Discrimination: Establishing Dalit Rights in the 
Contemporary World; the Role o f Governments, the United Nations and the Private 
Sector in Kathmandu. The output was the Kathmandu Dalit Declaration, providing 
nearly 100 paragraphs of recommendations. This was an important contribution to norm 
elaboration, drafted with direct participation of caste-affected groups. Among the most 
prominent national events was the India-wide Bhopal Conference: Charting A New 
Course For Dalits For The 21st Century, held in January 2002, which issued the Bhopal 
Declaration of detailed recommendations to the Indian government and the private 
sector (the momentum of this Declaration was lost when the MP championing it, 
Digvijay Singh, was not reelected in 2003). This meeting was followed up with an 
International Dalit Conference in Vancouver in May 2003 (Lerche 2008, 249). The 
caste-based mobilisation around the 2004 World Social Forum held in India is also 
noteworthy (Smith 2007; Bob 2007). At the World Social Forum Poiycentric held in 
Karachi in 2006, the South Asian national Dalit platforms consolidated to form an 
umbrella organisation, the South Asia Dalit Rights Forum (later renamed the Asian 
Dalit Rights Movement (ADRM)). At the People’s SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in 
2007, they issued a ‘Charter of demands’ asking, inter alia, that South Asian 
governments “Declare 2007- 2017, the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation) Dalit Rights Decade with concrete Acts, Policies, Programmes and Action 
Plan”.164 The socialisation of SAARC to caste-based discrimination is an important 
innovation given that Dalit activists have previously focused almost exclusively on 
national or UN (and some EU) institutions in their advocacy. The scope for SAARC to 
include human rights in its mandate is unclear but the issue of caste could be an 
important catalyst for change in this direction and more attractive to India, diffusing 
unilateral scrutiny given the presence of Dalits in most SAARC member states.
164 See http://nepaldalitinfo.net/2007/03/31/218/ (accessed 5 May 2009).
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The caste TAN increasingly has targeted influential states, aiming to change their
discursive position on caste and to bring external pressure to bear on governments of
countries with caste-affected groups. They have focused on EU institutions and on the
governments in countries where Dalit solidarity networks are based. This work
typically is led by Dalit solidarity NGOs or INGOs with domestic Dalit NGOs
providing verifying information and representing caste-affected groups in briefings to
decision-makers in the North. The IDSN has worked with the European Parliament to
secure a number of statements and resolutions in favour of Dalits in India.165 The US
Congress has also issued several statements encouraging the government of India to do
more for Dalits.166 The UK Parliament has had debates on the issue of caste-based
discrimination, with a focus on India.167 A hearing on caste discrimination was held in
September 2008 in the Danish Parliament under the auspices of the Foreign Affairs
Committee (IDSN 2009, 27). All of these initiatives have fallen short of proposing
economic or other sanctions against India, despite calls for such action from Dalit
1activists engaged in dialogue with these institutions. They have, however, socialised 
new actors to their cause and institutionalised discursive positions in a handful of 
declaratory statements.
In April 2009, the UN convened a Durban Review Conference (DRC) to assess progress 
in implementation of the DDPA. Dalit advocates were active in the DRC processes. 
This engagement was tempered by the absence of any reference to caste or to 
‘discrimination based on work and descent’ in the WCAR documents but activists 
focused on references to ‘descent’ in lieu. India raised objections to the accreditation of 
several Dalit-focused NGOs, including the IDSN, the National Federation of Dalit 
Women and People’s Watch Tamil Nadu.169 At the preparatory sessions the delegations 
of both India and Nepal underscored their objections to consideration of caste within the 
DRC. In contrast, the interventions of the EU Member States referenced the CERD 
General Recommendation XXIX to support discussion of caste in the DRC and the 
accreditation of caste-focused NGOs. The vigorous efforts of the Indian government to
165 See, for example, the European Parliament resolutions on the human rights situation of Dalits in India 
of 19 December 2006 and 1 February 2007.
166 See, for example, the resolution of the US Congress, Resolution 139 (1 May 2007).
167 See, for example, a transcript of the debate held in May 2007:
http://www.idsn.org/Documents/eu/pdf/HouseCommonsdebate8Mav2007.pdf (accessed 10 August 
2007).
168 See the testimony of Paul Divakar, NDCHR, to the European Parliament in December 2006: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/deve/meetings hr/20061218/divakar.pdf (accessed 10 July 2009).
169 See, for example, UN Doc. A/CONF.21 l/PC.2/7 (n.d): 11-12.
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prevent accreditation of so many Dalit NGOs was a clear sign that little political will 
existed to open up space for discussion on caste. Despite this, several states referred to 
caste-based discrimination in their high-level DRC interventions, including Nepal, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mauritius and Slovenia, evidence of a change in discursive 
positions. Caste-focused advocates held a series of successful side-events and organised 
an effective media strategy, thus keeping their issues on the agenda. Given the 
preeminence of Durban in the transnational mobilisation of caste-affected groups their 
absence in the DRC outcome document was noted by several news reports and NGO
170interventions.
State and international actors may be more socialised to the realities of caste-based 
discrimination but still unwilling to persuade India into reforms. No state actively 
pushed for inclusion of discrimination based on work and descent in the DRC. Members 
of the caste TAN report that some British MEPs have been obstructive in their efforts to 
pass the European Parliament resolutions on Dalits.171 At the end of 2007, the caste 
TAN had an initial commitment from the European Commission to adopt a specific line 
of work on Dalits but witnessed a retreat by the Commission following country 
consultations (including with India) on their proposals. While individual staff members 
of the Commission remained supportive of the work, the official line was that such 
actions could be mainstreamed under work on minorities and vulnerable groups.
These meetings nevertheless have been important political opportunity structures for 
bringing together caste TAN members, for engaging international institutions in 
dialogue with representatives of caste-affected communities and for elaborating their 
normative agenda. These ‘self-created’ political opportunity structures can be 
contrasted with caste TAN use of existing UN human rights institutions. The processes 
of norm elaboration and institutionalisation, and state socialisation in these institutions 
has been vital to norm emergence and will be considered in some depth in the next 
section.
170 See, for example, UN Information Service Meeting Summary, NGOs Address Durban Review 
Conference on Issues Arising from the Objectives o f the Conference, UN Doc. RC/09/12 (24 April 2009); 
and the IDSN Newsletter May 2009 providing a summary of media coverage of Dalit issues in the DRC, 
http://www.idsn.org/index.phn?id=244 (accessed 6 May 2009).
171 Other British MEPs have been instrumental in securing the resolutions, such as Jean Lambert (Greens, 
UK) and Claude Moraes (Party of European Socialists, UK).
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Embedding claims on ‘caste’: the role of UN human rights institutions
The caste TAN targeted the WCAR because the discourse and outcome of the WCAR 
processes would have been an effective stepping-stone to future (hard law) norms for 
the prohibition of caste-based discrimination. In the end, Durban could not deliver but it 
was never the only focus of their international advocacy. Two other bodies stand out: 
the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights and the UN Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD). This section first will trace the process of norm 
institutionalization within these two bodies and then discuss briefly other actors that 
have been part of this process, including the UN Special Rapporteur on racism and the 
UN Special Rapporteurs on discrimination based on work and descent. Each has taken 
slightly different approaches to caste in their efforts to situate the discussion within 
existing norms whilst also expanding them.
The UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights: naming caste-based discrimination
The UN Sub-Commission is an important forum for norm elaboration and 
institutionalization because it is mandated to examine emerging issues in the field of 
human rights. This has given the caste TAN a receptive environment for developing a 
broader understanding of caste-based discrimination and its prohibition in international 
law.
The first goal was to secure a Sub-Commission study on the issue, echoing earlier calls 
by Dalit advocates. The caste TAN was successful where past advocates were not 
because they had expertise on how to secure a report and strong relations with Sub- 
Commissioners willing to pursue this agenda. At the August 2000 session Paul Divakar 
of the NCDHR made an intervention urging the Sub-Commission to “commission a 
study of the situation of Dalits in South Asia and similar communities in Japan, Senegal 
and Nigeria”.172 MRG, Pax Romana and the Lutheran World Federation also addressed 
caste in their interventions at the same session, the latter recommending a “study of 
discrimination based on caste or descent”.173
172 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/SR.8 E (11 August 2000): para 48.
173 Ibid, paras 43, 50 and 7 respectively.
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The Sub-Commission responded to these calls and passed Resolution 2000/4 on 
Discrimination Based on Work and Descent at the August 2000 session recommending, 
inter alia, a working paper on the subject. This was the first such resolution of the Sub- 
Commission on the issue of caste and came only after a heated debate among the Sub- 
Commission members. Notably, the language of caste is not used in the resolution, nor 
are terms such as ‘Dalit’ or ‘Untouchable’. The principal objections came from Sub- 
Commissioner Soli Sorabjee (then Attorney-General of India) who was unable to accept 
the language of ‘caste’ given its strong association with India. He (informally) 
proposed instead the formulation ‘discrimination based on occupation and descent’, 
later morphed into ‘work and descent’ to secure a sound corresponding French 
translation of Temploi et l’ascendance’ (Prove 2004, 152-3). By keeping the frame 
broad, the Sub-Commission could proceed with the study without raising the alarm 
among concerned states that might have a pretext to object if caste-based discrimination 
were the explicit focus. The formulation of the ‘work and descent’ term created a new 
category of community in the international lexicon, namely those groups affected by 
discrimination based on work and descent. This was not the terminology initially sought 
by the caste TAN or Dalits in particular but it did enable further consideration of the 
issue at a critical juncture.
In August 2001, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/4, Sub-Commission 
expert Rajendra K.W. Goonesekere, a Sri Lankan national, presented his working paper 
on discrimination based on work and descent. He provided a preliminary analysis of the 
relationship between ascribed occupation and discrimination and attempted to outline 
the legal framework for its prohibition, referring firstly to the inclusion of ‘descent’ in 
ICERD and CERD’s interpretation thereof “to mean not solely race but tribal or caste 
distinctions as well”.174 Goonesekere limited the paper's focus to India, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Japan and Pakistan but stated that further study of African countries in particular 
was warranted. Goonesekere’s decision to name countries directly in the paper and to 
structure it around state practice was lauded by advocates on caste (Prove 2004, 154). 
At the same time, it put him into direct confrontation with the named states and both 
India and Pakistan made interventions to the Sub-Commission expressing their 
objections to the report (Prove 2004,155).
174 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/16 (14 June 2001): para 4.
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Goonesekere was not re-elected to the Sub-Commission in 2002 with the effect that no 
further report on discrimination based on work and descent was presented at the August 
2002 session of the Sub-Commission. Some have speculated that his non-election was 
motivated by a desire of certain parties, in particular the Government of India, to 
undermine further attention to the issue (Prove 2004, 156). Nevertheless, the Sub- 
Commission did persevere and in June 2003, Sub-Commissioners Asbjom Eide and 
Yozo Yokota submitted an expanded working paper. They included a wider focus on 
several African countries. They also proposed an analytical framework of 
commonalities across cultures on this kind of discrimination, drawing the conclusion 
that “This form of discrimination is distinct, in its combination of causal factors and 
expressions, from other forms of discrimination examined in the history of the Sub- 
Commission”.175 This statement suggests the need to recognise a discrete category of 
inquiry within the Sub-Commission, separate from existing categories like minorities or 
racial discrimination long common to the agenda of the Sub-Commission. The authors 
also try to solicit greater engagement by other UN agencies in addressing work and 
descent-based discrimination, marking a good example of the socialisation role of the 
Sub-Commission.
Eide and Yokota submitted a second expanded working paper in July 2004. This paper 
provides an analysis of the legal provisions on work and descent-based discrimination 
in several countries along with a review of CERD and CRC comments on state periodic 
reports relevant to the issue. Further research is also provided on diaspora communities 
where descent-based discrimination exists, in particular among the South Asian and 
Somali diaspora. The speculation made in the 2003 paper that Romani communities 
might be considered also in their analysis is here dismissed, on the basis that Roma are 
“already covered by a range of international and regional instruments in the fields of 
human rights and minority rights, through provisions which are specific to them”.176 
The reference implies that work and descent should be considered separately from 
minority rights.
The paper concludes with a proposed framework for a draft set of principles and 
guidelines for the elimination of discrimination based on work and descent and a 
recommendation to appoint a Special Rapporteur to prepare a finalized version. The
175 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/24 (26 June 2003): para 58.
176 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/31 (5 July 2004): paras 68-69.
140
authors demonstrate a clear desire to see this discrimination asserted within the 
framework of international human rights law, giving a helpful endorsement to norm 
emergence on caste. The report recommends that:
The principles expounded in the [principles and guidelines] document should, at 
a minimum, include the following:
(a) Discrimination based on work and descent is a form of discrimination 
prohibited by international human rights law, including the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The 
basis of this prohibition in international human rights law could be further 
explicated.177
The suggestion for “explication” provides an important norm emergence platform for 
reinterpreting existing standards and for perhaps creating new standards specifically on 
discrimination based on work and descent.
The Government of India was not satisfied with the Sub-Commission’s persistence in 
making discrimination based on work and descent a major focus of its work. Upon 
presentation of the August 2004 expanded working paper, a representative of the 
Government of India made the following intervention:
India remain[s] fully committed to achieving a society in which all its citizens 
[a]re equal, irrespective of religion, language, caste, birthplace or gender, and its 
democratic system provide[s] effective remedies for the pursuit of that ideal. It 
would be a travesty to treat discrimination based on work and descent as a simple 
human rights issue. Therefore it would be counterproductive for the Sub- 
Commission to develop a set of principles and guidelines on the question. 
Moreover, by addressing matters already dealt with by other United Nations 
bodies, and by focusing almost entirely on one specific country, the working 
paper failed to respect the mandate of the Sub-Commission.178
The statement shows that India remained committed to keeping caste-based 
discrimination an issue for domestic concern only, even three years after Durban. It is 
therefore significant that in April 2005 when the UN Commission on Human Rights had 
before it the proposal for a Special Rapporteur to prepare a set of principles and 
guidelines on discrimination based on work and descent, India did not block the 
appointment. This was enabled by a modus vivendi between the caste TAN and India to
177 Ibid, para 76.
178 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/SR.8 (10 August 2004): para 27.
141
focus on ‘work and descent’ instead of caste explicitly. Moreover, the caste TAN made 
clear to the Indian delegation that being obstructive as India had been in Durban would 
only serve to increase attention to the issue.179
Yozo Yokota and Chin-Sung Chung were appointed as the Special Rapporteurs to 
prepare a comprehensive study and to finalise a “draft set of principles and guidelines 
for the effective elimination of discrimination based on work and descent”.180 The 
mandate was operationally weak, offering no provisions for country visits or regional 
meetings. The process of consultation and research on the report was facilitated greatly 
by the IDSN and its domestic NGO partners. They organised a series of ‘informal’ (i.e. 
not by government invitation) visits to Bangladesh, Pakistan and India to meet with 
Dalit representatives (IDSN 2007, 3). Plans to hold additional consultations in Africa 
never materialised. They engaged international institutions through a consultation 
organised by IDSN in Geneva in March 2006, attended by representatives of caste- 
affected groups, INGOs, and UN agencies including the World Bank and the ILO. A 
specific meeting on Dalit women’s rights was held in The Hague in November 2006. 
Finally, an informal consultation on the draft principles and guidelines was convened in 
Kathmandu in April 2007 by IDSN and OHCHR, attended also by two other UN 
Special Rapporteurs (on racism and on indigenous peoples).
The Special Rapporteurs submitted their proposed principles and guidelines in June 
2007 but the adoption was forestalled by institutional changes in the UN. With the 
replacement of the Commission on Human Rights by the Human Rights Council, the 
Sub-Commission was abolished and not all of its mandates were transferred over 
automatically to its replacement body (the Advisory Committee). India is still a member 
of the Council and the caste TAN struggled to get any state to expend the political 
capital necessary to push for the adoption of the principles and guidelines. According to 
one member of the caste TAN, the response from potentially supportive Western Group 
delegations has invariably been “we sympathise but India is a very respected member of 
the [Council] and is held in high esteem because they are seen to bridge the gap
ioi
between Africa and Europe”. The principles and guidelines were finally made public
179 Interview with Peter Prove, May 2008.
180 Sub-Commission Resolution 2004/17 (12 August 2004): para 4.
181 Interview with Meena Varma, May 2008.
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in May 2009, submitted only as a working paper of the HRC and therefore not formally 
endorsed.
The final report prepared by the Special Rapporteurs provides an overview of their 
activities, state submissions and the “Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Effective
officially submitted information: Japan, Colombia, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Mauritius. Many of the recommendations are drawn from 
consultations with caste-affected communities (primarily Dalits) and international 
actors, including the UN Special Rapporteurs on racism and on the human rights of 
indigenous people. The Draft Principles and Guidelines make clear that 
“Discrimination based on work and descent is a form of discrimination prohibited by 
international human rights law”. A definition of discrimination based on work and 
descent also is offered:
Discrimination based on work and descent is any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction, or preference based on inherited status such as caste, including 
present or ancestral occupation, family, community or social origin, name, birth 
place, place of residence, dialect and accent that has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, or any other field of public life. This type of discrimination is 
typically associated with the notion of purity and pollution and practices of
rooted in societies and cultures where this
The definition is notable for two reasons. First, it is modelled on Article 1.1 of ICERD, 
and the authors make note that the definition “accordingly supports and encourages 
consistency with existing international law on the subject of discrimination, and should 
be read as such.” This is important for “adjacency” in developing new norms on caste 
discrimination. Second, it does not subsume caste-based discrimination within ICERD 
per se but appears to establish this as a distinct form of discrimination. This could allay 
objections like those of India because it does not frame caste-based discrimination 
specifically as racial discrimination. This also opens up the possibility of a completely 
new international instrument, what some advocates have termed an International 
Convention Against the Elimination of all Forms of Caste-based Discrimination. The
182 UN Doc. A/HRC/11/CRP.3 (18 May 2009).
183 Ibid, p. 8, para 4.
184 Ibid, p. 8, para 2.
Elimination of Discrimination Based on Work and Descent”.182 Only five states
discrimination is practiced.154 
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report concludes by acknowledging that “the issue of discrimination based on work and 
descent is regarded as a specific and important human rights issue to be properly 
addressed by the international community” (emphasis added), one that is found not only 
in South Asia but also in “parts of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and some 
countries of Western Europe”. 185 Some 53 paragraphs of guidelines also are offered to 
states.
The achievement of securing two Special Rapporteurs on discrimination based on work 
and descent was vital for the continuation of norm emergence and marked the 
realisation of a goal articulated at Durban in the NGO Forum outcome document. The 
reports, meetings and country visits of the Special Rapporteurs have kept the issue at the 
forefront of UN human rights dialogue and pushed states to engage in thisr dialogue. It 
has reinforced caste-based discrimination as a global concern necessitating intervention 
from the (global) UN level. The principles and guidelines developed by the Special 
Rapporteurs will mark stronger institutionalisation of the norms, an important step in 
norm emergence.
The Committee on the Elimination o f Racial Discrimination: bringing caste into ICERD
The fact that descent-based discrimination has not been well explored juridically (Keane 
2007) in the past means that norm entrepreneurs have a greater scope for shaping new 
understandings of that norm and its implementation. Rather than trying to secure an 
entirely new international standard specifically on caste in the short term, the caste TAN 
has sought instead to ‘reuse’ an existing standard by expanding the normative 
interpretation of Article 1.1 of ICERD defining racial discrimination for the purposes of 
the treaty application. Article 1.1 includes ‘descent’ among the categories upon which 
racial discrimination can be based. CERD has interpreted this to cover caste-based 
discrimination, understanding caste as a system based on status at birth. Using ICERD 
also serves to frame Dalit concerns within an area of international law, i.e. racial 
discrimination, that is a deeply entrenched norm and widely considered part of the 
‘obligations erga omnes ’ of states making it a matter of international concern.
185 Ibid, p. 19, para 64.
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CERD is in a strategic position for norm emergence and socialisation, legitimated by its 
authority to review and comment on state practice and to establish jurisprudence on 
themes pertaining to the interpretation of ICERD in practice. CERD has prompted 
caste-affected states to consider their obligations towards caste-affected groups in light 
of their ICERD commitments and thereby to see the prohibition and prevention of caste- 
based discrimination as part of international human rights law. States that might not 
otherwise recognise that caste-affected groups exist within their territory may be 
publicly called to account for obligations towards these communities by CERD. In this 
regard, the Committee also relies heavily on information from civil society actors in the 
form of shadow/alternative reports. These reports help to secure recognition of caste- 
affected groups and their concerns at the international level. CERD also has the 
mandate to produce General Recommendations to help states understand better the 
scope and application of the ICERD and undertook to elaborate a General 
Recommendation on Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention (Descent). This has 
proven to be an important instrument of norm emergence and institutionalisation.
State reports:
CERD has reviewed state reports of several countries where caste-based discrimination
exists, including Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal and
Yemen (Keane 2007, 8; Thomberry 2004, 125). The earliest and the most important
interactions have been with India. India ratified ICERD in December 1968. In 1986, it
submitted its eighth and ninth periodic reports to CERD and after a gap of ten years
submitted a consolidated report of its tenth to fourteenth periodic reports in 1996. In the
1986 session, CERD asked several questions about scheduled castes and untouchability,
to which the Indian delegation responded without hesitation, making no apparent
1 86objections to the queries. By 1996, the government’s tone had changed, following a 
more pointed approach by CERD in expressing its opinion that caste came under 
‘descent’ in ICERD. The periodic report submitted in 1996 presents the following 
explanation of the government’s view:
Article 1 of the Convention includes in the definition of racial discrimination the 
term “descent”. Both castes and tribes are systems based on “descent” since
186 Report o f CERD to the General Assembly, 42nd session, Supplement 18, UN Doc. A/42/18 (1 January 
1987): paras 745-783.
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people are normally bom into a particular caste or a particular tribe. It is 
obvious, however, that the use of the term “descent” in the Convention clearly 
refers to “race”. Communities which fall under the definition of Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes are unique to Indian society and its historical 
process. As conveyed to the Committee during the presentation of India’s last 
periodic report, it is, therefore, submitted that the policies of the Indian 
Government relating to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes do not come 
under the purview of Article 1 of the Convention. As a matter of courtesy to the 
members of the Committee, the Government is, however, happy to provide any 
information that they may require on this subject.187
India submitted its next (consolidated) periodic report in 2006. The position on caste
1 QO
within ICERD is maintained. The delegates detail their objections to considering 
caste within ICERD, arguing, “Caste was an institution unique to India, and had not 
entered into the considerations o f those who drafted the Convention”.189 This includes 
India, which had originally proposed the category of ‘descent’ under Article 1.1 in the 
treaty drafting process, reportedly not to address caste but “based on concerns regarding 
discriminatory treatment against Indians in their own land while under colonial mle, and 
to persons of Indian descent in countries where they had settled in large numbers”.190 
The Indian delegation also noted with some criticism that “The Committee had first 
raised the issue of caste-based discrimination within the concept of discrimination based 
on descent over 30 years after its establishment”,191 implying that the current views of 
CERD were ex post facto  and motivated by something other than impartial juridical 
analysis.
CERD nevertheless has asserted its interpretative authority; in the Concluding 
Observations on India’s report in 2007, CERD “maintains its position expressed in 
general recommendation No. 29 “that discrimination based on ‘descent’ includes 
discrimination against members of communities based on forms of social stratification 
such as caste and analogous systems of inherited status which nullify or impair their 
equal enjoyment of human rights”.192 As a point of law, both the position of CERD and 
India are arguable. David Keane’s (2007) in-depth analysis of caste-based 
discrimination in international law sums up the dialectic well, finding “descent was
187 CERD/C/299/Add.3 (29 April 1996): para 7.
188 CERD/C/IND/19 (29 March 2006): paras 16-17.
189 CERD/C/SR. 1796 (2 March 2007): para 7.
190 Ibid: para 8. Research by David Keane (2005) into the Indian interpretation o f ‘descent’ suggests 
rather that descent was meant to address forms o f inherited privilege on “account of dynastic or family 
status”, as put forth during the elaborations of the Indian Constitution (113).
191 Ibid: para 8.
192 CERD/C/IND/CO/19 (5 May 2007): para 8.
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unrelated to caste when it was introduced into article 1(1) of the ICERD. Nevertheless, 
CERD is entitled to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a manner that allows 
the treaty to engage with all forms of racial discrimination” (237).
Despite India’s obstinacy, the February 2007 review of the state report provided an
important platform for renewed Dalit mobilisation at the international level. Dalit NGOs
cooperated with the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and HRW to produce
an extensive shadow report, Hidden Apartheid: Caste Discrimination Against India ’s
10^Untouchables (2007). This was complemented by several other NGO submissions, 
including a coalition-based submission by the NCDHR.194
The NGO actors and the CERD Country Rapporteur for India, Linos-Alexander 
Sicilianos, were keen to capitalize on what they regarded as a marginal shift in the 
Indian position: the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at a national meeting on 
minorities and Dalits in December 2006 acknowledged:
Dalits have faced a unique discrimination in our society that is fundamentally 
different from the problems of minority groups in general. The only parallel to 
the practice of untouchability was apartheid in South Africa.195
The reference to apartheid is highly significant in the context of ICERD. Article 3 of 
the convention reads:
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and 
undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in 
territories under their jurisdiction.
This article was a key legal pretext for state sanctions against the South African 
government during apartheid and in its periodic reports to CERD during this regime, the 
Government of India was keen to report on the actions it had taken.196 Indeed, India 
was at the forefront of the international critique of apartheid in South Africa (Klotz 
1995, 41-43). There may be a strong fear that international criticism could befall India 
in a similar vein, including under the auspices of ICERD Article 3, criticism that may be
193 See http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/cerds70-ngos.htm (accessed 10 August 2007) for a list 
of NGO electronic submissions.
194 http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/shadow-report.pdf (accessed 10 August 2007).
195 CERD/C/SR. 1796 (2 March 2007): para 21.
196 See, for example, UN Doc. A/42/18 (1987): para 777.
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accompanied by, inter alia, economic sanctions as in the case of South Africa. That the 
Indian Prime Minister chose to use the language of ‘apartheid’ was surprising and so far 
he is the only senior official to make such an assessment; the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) objected outright to his unilateral change to the government line (Berg 2007, 58). 
CERD Member Sicilianos declared that in light of the Prime Minister’s statement “the
1 Q*7
position of the Indian delegation seemed simply untenable”.
CERD has been active in raising the issue of descent-based discrimination with an
10Rincreasing number of countries (Thomberry 2005, 39). In this dialogue, states have 
taken a range of responses, from openly accepting that ICERD includes caste 
(Nepal),199 to adopting the Indian interpretation and rejecting that ICERD includes caste 
(Japan),200 to denying that caste-affected communities exist within their territory 
(Nigeria). CERD has also raised the issue in its review of diaspora states, such as the 
UK: in the Concluding Observations issued in 2003, CERD implies that the UK should 
consider adopting legislation for the prohibition of descent-based discrimination.202 This 
had the effect of introducing a completely new issue into the scope of the UK’s 
reporting on ICERD, which has never previously mentioned caste.
Although the interpretations by CERD hold weight in international law, it is state 
practice that ultimately determines the scope of Article 1.1. Given that India is the 
“critical state” in this issue because it has the largest caste-affected population, so long 
as the Government of India refuses to accept this interpretation of ICERD, the scope of 
Article 1.1 remains in question. It is worth noting here that other UN treaty bodies, 
including the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and
197 CERD/C/SR. 1796 (2 March 2007): para 21.
198 Compare, for example, CERD’s Concluding Observations on Pakistan’s report in 1997, which only 
notes caste in passing, with the Concluding Observations on Pakistan’s report in 2009, which includes 
substantive recommendations on caste. UN Docs. CERD/C/304/Add.25 (23 April 1997) and 
CERD/C/PAK/CC/20 (16 March 2009).
199 See, for example, CERD/C/452/Add.2 (30 July 2003). In the CERD review of Nepal’s periodic report 
in 2004, the state delegation even included a member of the National Dalit Commission.
200 See Japan’s periodic report, which fails to mention the Buraku: CERD/C/350/Add.2 (26 September 
2000); and Japan’s rejection of CERD’s view of ‘descent’ as applying to the Buraku: CERD/C/SR. 1444 
(11 June 2001): para 28.
201 In the CERD review of Nigeria’s periodic report in 2005, the Nigerian delegate reported that “The so- 
called caste system had never been institutionalized and, after generations of intermarriage, had now died 
out.” CERD/C/SR.1722 (22 August 2005): para 10.
202 “The Committee recalls its general recommendation XXIX, in which the Committee condemns 
descent-based discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of caste and analogous systems of 
inherited status, as a violation of the Convention, and recommends that a prohibition against such 
discrimination be included in domestic legislation. The Committee would welcome information on this 
issue in the next periodic report.” CERD/C/63/CO/11 (10 December 2003): para 25.
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Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, have also raised issues pertaining to
203caste-based discrimination in their dialogues with states (Keane 2007, 240-248). The 
more CERD and other treaty bodies can socialise states to their views, the greater the 
likelihood that changes in state practice will occur and a new norm could emerge 
regardless of India’s objections.
CERD General Recommendation on Descent:
CERD’s efforts to see states give more attention to the issue of caste and analogous 
systems have been facilitated by the adoption in 2002 of General Recommendation 
XXIX on Article 1.1 of ICERD (Descent). The General Recommendation was an 
important step in the institutionalization of new norms prohibiting caste-based 
discrimination. It has given CERD a concrete reference point for its critique of state 
practice and gives states a standard of achievement against which to measure their own 
implementation of ICERD vis-a-vis caste-affected communities. CERD also has 
facilitated an “adjacency claim” by situating caste in an existing normative framework 
to hasten and increase the likelihood of its acceptance.
The thematic discussion was modeled on the first thematic discussion for a CERD 
Recommendation on Roma held in 2000. The thematic discussion format brought 
together several NGOs, experts and the state delegations of India and Nepal in a quasi- 
formal dialogue. The NGOs present were primarily INGOs or domestic NGOs from 
Africa and Asia. Some 23 NGOs made statements to the thematic discussion, including 
one joint statement undersigned by 26 NGOs204 such as the NCDHR and other South 
Asian national Dalit platforms, IDSN, IMADR, Lutheran World Federation and five 
African NGOs from Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Niger and Somalia (Louis 2003, 244, ft 
65; Tanaka 2004, 115; Thomberry 2004, ft 35). The precise selection of participating 
NGOs was largely engineered by members of the IDSN with a specific intent to ensure 
representation from beyond Asia (Tanaka 2004, 106). The emphasis on NGO and 
especially personal testimony (Tanaka 2004, 115) in the thematic discussion format has 
provided a direct interface between caste-affected groups and CERD.
203 For CESCR, see the Concluding Observations on India’s report, from 2008: UN Doc. 
E/C.12/IND/C0.5 (5 August 2008).
204 There are no summary records for this part of the discussion with NGOs.
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The proposal for a thematic discussion on ‘descent’ came in August 2001, following 
recommendations from members of the IDSN for such a session. According to Paul 
Divakar, a visit of CERD member Patrick Thomberry to India earlier in 2001 as part of 
an MRG workshop on advocacy training for Dalits was also an important catalyst. The 
timing was crucial, picking up the ball from the Sub-Commission after Goonesekere’s 
absence threatened to derail the momentum on examining caste (Tanaka 2004, 106- 
107). Four members of the Sub-Commission also participated (Thomberry 2004, 126), 
providing a direct link between their discourse on discrimination based on work and 
descent with that of CERD.
The substantive scope of the thematic discussion was the source of some controversy. 
Not all CERD members were convinced that discrimination based on work and descent 
should be the main focus and were more inclined to using the rubric of ‘descent’ for a 
discussion on people of African descent, particularly post-WCAR where the group 
figured so prominently (Tanaka 2004, 105). Given the absence of ‘work and descent’ in 
the WCAR outcome documents, however, the focus on caste came to be privileged, 
evidence of the drive of some members of CERD to ensure caste would get an 
international hearing post-Durban. The Recommendation is not limited to caste-based 
discrimination; indeed it explicitly notes “discrimination based on ‘descent’ includes 
discrimination [...] based on forms of social stratification such as caste and analogous 
systems of inherited status” and gives reference to “persons of Asian and African 
descent and indigenous and other forms of descent in the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action” (preamble). Furthermore, several CERD members, and in 
particular Raghavan Pillai from India, took pains to stress that caste-based 
discrimination should not be the only focus of discussion. Thomberry emphasises in 
his account that the broad approach “is politically and conceptually important lest the 
Committee be seen to be picking on a particular State or States, or demonizing a single 
social system” (Thomberry 2004, 127). His caution was prudent, given that the Indian 
delegate, Rajesh Prasad, stated his concern that “the thematic discussion has been 
transformed into a debate of the situation allegedly (pertaining) to a particular country” 
(cited by Louis 2003, 242). In this regard, the EDSN’s efforts to bring non-Indian and 
non-Asian NGOs to the discussion was equally prudent.
205 For Mr. Pillai’s testimony, see CERD/C/SR.1531(16 August 2002): paras 4-10.
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The Committee decided not to attempt a definition of ‘descent’ (Thomberry 2005, 38). 
This has kept the self-identification of groups affected by descent-based discrimination 
more open. The content of the Recommendation is broad, focusing on practical 
measures in several areas such as education, women’s rights, the media and civil, 
economic, political and social rights. One of the first suggestions is that states 
“Consider the incorporation of an explicit prohibition of descent-based discrimination in 
the national constitution” (para 2). Securing such a measure would be another key step 
for achieving norm emergence, designating a distinct category for this kind of 
discrimination and necessitating new action on the part of states.
In both its review of state reports and its elaboration of General Recommendations, 
CERD has proven to be a key elaborator and socialisation agent for new norms on the 
prohibition of caste-based discrimination. It has established a broad-based 
understanding of ‘descent’ in order to address the experiences of a wide range of 
affected groups. In so doing it has also avoided accusations of targeting individual 
states. As CERD increases the number of states to whom it addresses its concerns on 
‘descent’-based discrimination, it is directly contributing to norm emergence. As 
Thomberry points out, “Not all governments have objected to CERD activity [on caste], 
and even where objections have been lodged, the objecting governments have striven to 
emphasise the positive and ongoing nature of their efforts to combat this form of 
discrimination” (Thomberry 2004, 131). This presents a dilemma for the caste TAN: in 
the short-term, use of CERD is helpful for norm entrepreneurship in the absence of 
other mechanisms but in the long-term, creation of a distinct mechanism might 
overcome the objections of states to the ‘race’ frame that CERD conveys. CERD can 
influence the discursive position of states, enable the norms to strengthen and to 
stimulate new “logics of appropriateness” either within ICERD or (ultimately) adjacent 
to it.
The UN Special Rapporteur on racism:
Although the first Special Rapporteur on racism made some preliminary investigations 
into caste, the second Special Rapporteur, Doudou Diene, has made caste a key theme 
in his work. Activists credit Diene for making a personal commitment to this issue but
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the shift can be attributed also to the work of members of the IDSN in raising the profile 
of the issue within the UN, evidenced in part by an increasing number of 
communications on caste issues to the Special Rapporteur, including from African 
countries.206 In his 2003 report to the UN General Assembly Diene recommended “The 
question of castes [...] should be given priority in the follow-up to the Durban 
Conference, the fight against all forms of discrimination and the promotion of human 
rights worldwide”.207 Furthermore, in a 2007 report, he noted the relevance of caste- 
based discrimination to his mandate and announced his intention to focus on this issue 
in several activities in 2007.208 A country visit by the Special Rapporteur to Japan in 
2005 was important for bringing attention to the Buraku community, an effort facilitated 
in large part by IMADR. Diene has also reiterated his interest to visit India as part of a 
regional visit including also Pakistan and Nepal to examine, inter alia, caste-based 
discrimination.209
The Government of India has maintained its view that caste should not be seen within 
the purview of ‘racial discrimination’, criticizing Diene for undertaking this in his 
mandate 210 Diene for his part emphasizes the ‘related forms of intolerance’ aspect of 
his mandate to accommodate attention to caste without entering directly into debates on 
the normative aspects of this issue. His impact is nonetheless normative, because 
through his work caste-based discrimination is being kept on the international agenda, 
A small number of other Special Rapporteurs, like that on adequate housing and on 
violence against women, have also mentioned Dalits or other caste-affected groups in 
their regular reports and country visits. The cumulative effect is that attention to caste- 
affected groups becomes more and more a ‘mainstreamed’ consideration of Special 
Rapporteurs’ thematic reports and country visits, thereby contributing to the norm 
emergence and socialisation processes.
Assessing the impact o f UN institutional allies:
206 See, for example, A/HRC/4/19/Add.l (5 June 2007) and E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.l (27 March 2006).
207 A/58/313 (22 August 2003): para 42.
208 A/HRC/4/19 (12 January 2007): para 28.
209 A/HRC/4/19/Add. 1 (5 June 2007): para 100.
210 A/HRC/5/SR.2 (5 July 2007): para 12.
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The three human rights institutions given attention in this section, the Sub-Commission 
on Human Rights, CERD and the Special Rapporteurs on racism and on discrimination 
based on work and descent, have each been important for enabling the emergence of a 
new set of norms pertaining to caste-based discrimination. They have been both leaders 
and followers in this process, at once dependent on NGO input and pressure whilst also 
taking the lead in asserting their own interpretations.
The (quasi-) permanent status of these institutions has meant that the issue of caste 
could be considered in a longer-term process than that afforded by the WCAR. Indeed, 
each of these institutions was considering caste well before and after the WCAR. 
Moreover, given that the WCAR outcome documents failed to mention caste-based 
discrimination, the caste TAN has been excluded from benefiting from the WCAR 
follow-up mechanisms. These human rights bodies have therefore served as an 
important alternative space. The regularised meetings of the Sub-Commission and 
CERD have given caste-advocates stable and predictable fora against which to plan 
long-term joint advocacy strategies. The fact that states are engaged directly in 
dialogue with each of these institutions has also made them important socialisation 
agents for states; CERD and the Special Rapporteur on racism in particular are able to 
engage in detailed country-specific recommendations on adhering to emergent norms on 
the prohibition of caste-based discrimination. Both have demonstrated their willingness 
to raise these issues even in the face of state opposition.
Certain members of CERD, the Sub-Commission and the Special Rapporteur on racism 
have also become socialised themselves to the issue of caste and have taken personal 
initiatives to see that the issue is considered further within their operational mandates. 
CERD proved the most dynamic of the UN Treaty Bodies in the early 2000s, prompting 
IDSN members to target their cooperation with key CERD members like Patrick
711Thomberry and Morten Kjaerum. The epistemic community of human rights experts 
has proven a good pool from which to draw allies. These actors, conscious of the 
vagaries of international diplomacy from years of experience, have also successfully 
manoeuvred the discussions on caste through the rocky waters of state obstruction. 
Despite their insistence they are not acting according to a political agenda in their
211 Interview with Peter Prove, May 2008.
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investigations of caste (e.g. Thomberry 2004, 126), the actors understood the sensitivity 
of the issue to many states.
The collective outputs of the Sub-Commission in its working papers on work and 
descent, CERD in its General Recommendation and Concluding Observations, and the 
Special Rapporteur in his annual/country reports have begun to shape norms on caste- 
based discrimination. States now have a body of recommendations that spell out clearly 
their responsibilities vis-a-vis caste-affected communities. The principles and 
guidelines prepared by the Special Rapporteurs on work and descent will solidify this 
further. The more the norms are institutionalised, the less free will states be to deny 
knowledge and application of them.
These actors have been aware of the factors that can enable new norms to emerge. The 
adjacency principle is well understood by international lawyers and the experts have 
been careful to link their understanding of caste-based discrimination to the existing 
framework of international human rights law. This is most obvious in the case of 
CERD that has used a widely ratified treaty, ICERD, and a vague concept, ‘descent’, in 
which to embed the caste issue. By framing the protection of caste-affected groups 
under an existing norm — i.e. non-discrimination based on descent -  the caste TAN has 
taken a short-cut to norm emergence, accessing an existing legally-binding standard and 
review structure. The trade-off has been the reluctance of states -  particularly India -  to 
accept the ‘racial’ rubric conferred by ICERD. The long-term development of a distinct 
standard and mechanism not associated with race per se may alleviate some of these 
state objections.
The frames used to construct this normative discourse have not come solely from the 
caste TAN but have been shaped in tandem with (and certified by) these international 
actors: the Sub-Commission created the frame o f ‘work and descent’; CERD has placed 
the emphasis on ‘descent’; and the Special Rapporteur on racism has asserted that caste- 
based discrimination is a ‘form of intolerance’ within his mandate. Activists and IOs 
have used alternatives to ‘caste-based discrimination’ strategically to advance the 
normative agenda despite state opposition. In doing so they have not made recognition 
of the Dalit identity per se a priority, substituting this identity for more generic 
formulations.
154
This expansion of the identity frame is one way in which the outputs of CERD, the Sub- 
Commission and the Special Rapporteurs have helped to frame the issue as global. 
Being UN actors, their attention to the issue already suggests a global, as opposed to 
regional, relevance of this issue. In their commentaries they have consistently 
maintained that the issue of discrimination based on work and descent extends far 
beyond South Asia, not only to other Asian and African states but to diaspora countries 
as well. The next section will look further at the construction of the global identity 
frame and consider how it has both enabled and constrained transnational advocacy on 
caste.
Constructing transnational identity: Dalits, caste, and ‘work and descent’
‘Framing’ of issues and identities is a crucial part of norm entrepreneurship. Through 
effective framing, Dalits have forged transnational links with other caste-affected 
groups, found useful allies in human rights institutions, challenged the assumptions of 
caste hierarchy and justified the need for caste-specific mechanisms in international 
law. This section will examine the framing process, starting with framing in the 
domestic sphere and then moving to the international discourse. Given that Dalits and 
other caste-affected groups have been pushed to the margins on the basis of socially 
constructed notions of privilege and ‘pollution’, it seems only fitting that these groups 
should use new social constructions of their own design for emancipation.
Challenging terms: creating new identity frames
Dalits have had to contend with many identity frames imposed on them from above. 
The British introduced ‘depressed classes’ and ‘scheduled castes’, Gandhi termed them 
harijans (children of God), upper castes termed them ‘Untouchables’ and even the term 
‘caste’ is said to be a European import, derived from the Portuguese ‘casta’ (or Latin 
castus, meaning ‘purity of breed’). The term ‘Dalit’ is not endogenous to the Hindu
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caste system but was created as a tool for mobilisation and empowerment. The term 
originally means ‘broken people’ in the Indie language Marathi. It was introduced by 
Ambedkar into the anti-caste discourse and has been used to denote the status of Dalits 
as a people rather than a social category, supporting as well their claims to be the 
original inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent. Ambedkar, and his predecessor Phule, 
shared the view that ‘Untouchables’ were the pre-Aryan inhabitants of India, subjugated 
by the invaders into positions of low status. Ambedkar went further to argue that Dalits 
were originally Buddhist peoples and the Hindu religion was imposed upon them, a 
view designed to unite Dalits across India that were embedded in highly fragmented 
sub-castes and regional cultures (Jaffrelot 2005, 41). The Dalit identity frame has over 
time taken on cultural markers as well, to unify and to build esteem for the identity. The 
manipulation of the identity frame in this way has aimed to consolidate the social and 
political mobilisation of Dalits at the same time as emancipating Dalits from the caste 
structure of Hinduism. This frame also potentially positions the Dalits for ethnogenesis. 
Many Dalit leaders no longer regard Dalits as mere ‘outgroups’ but as distinct 
communities with a shared social and cultural history portrayed as indigenous to the 
territory of modem India. The contemporary Dravidian movement in southern India has 
predicated its bids for secession on similar grounds, staking its claim in the liberation of 
a ‘people’ classified as backward classes by the Aryan invaders from the North (Gupta 
2004, 71). The construction of the Dalit identity frame has important parallels with the 
construction of the ‘indigenous peoples’ identity frame: in both cases, the frame 
contends they are original inhabitants who retain certain (moral and material) 
entitlements having been unjustly denied equality by external ‘colonising’ forces. Dalits 
are unlikely candidates for secession but the Dravidian movement sets an interesting 
precedence and at least one Dalit leader admits that the armed mobilisation tactics of the 
Naxalites (or Nepalese Maoists) have benefited all Dalits by pushing actors to take their 
claims more seriously.
The term ‘Dalit’ did not take on political significance in India until the early 1970s 
when the Dalit Panthers used it in their discourse (Louis 2003, 145), gaining currency 
from the Dalit cultural movement’s use of the term in the 1960s (Shah 2001, 22). The 
frame is clearly seen as empowering for domestic actors, building esteem of community 
members. This continues to be the preferred term of Dalits in India, on the international 
stage, and in other states where ‘Untouchables’ exist.
156
The Dalit frame has not been transposed to other caste-systems, however, and the 
transnational coalition of caste-affected groups assert a number of different identity 
frames locally. In Japan, ‘buraku’ refers to a village where ‘outcastes’ live and Buraku 
people are the (outcaste) people from that village. Such communities were originally
919designated as Eta (extreme filth) and Hinin (non-human) classes. The government 
now uses instead the term ‘Dowa’ to describe these ‘buraku’. In other caste-systems, 
the names given to caste-affected group usually translate as ‘slaves and slave 
descendants’ or ‘caste peoples’ in local languages (see, for example, Stevens 2004). It 
is easy to understand why leaders within these communities would wish to articulate 
new identity frames that provide constituents with a greater sense of empowerment and 
which can become a vehicle for mobilisation.
Creating a global identity frame:
Bringing these diverse communities into the common ‘caste’ frame is a recent 
innovation. Ambedkar himself said, “Untouchability among the Hindus is a unique 
phenomenon, unknown to humanity in other parts of the world” (cited by Louis 2003, 
44). By finding a frame broad enough in which to situate very diverse experiences, 
however, advocates on caste have been able to swell their numbers and thus their 
leverage. The leverage is further enhanced by the fact that the groups using the caste 
frame extend well beyond one sub-region (i.e. South Asia) and across continents. This 
means that more states are implicated in the issue, increasing the justification for caste 
to be considered at the international level and in international law.
The global ‘work and descent-based discrimination’ frame is primarily a construction of 
INGOs, international experts and a small cadre of Dalit activists rather than of domestic 
caste-advocates writ large. Advocates were savvy to the constraints of the international 
system regarding norm elaboration, understanding that targeting a new norm at a single 
state or sub-region would be difficult. They accepted the need to steer the discussion 
away from spotlighting India and the Hindu caste system and towards the elaboration of 
broad-based concepts applicable to multiple (even all) states. The use of the ‘work and
212 http://blhrri.org/blhrri e/blhrri/buraku.htm (accessed 30 August 2007).
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descent’ and ‘descent’ frames are evidence in point -  neither use the language of ‘caste’ 
directly - and the alternative possible frame of ‘casteism’ has not been widely 
incorporated in the international discourse. The expanded ‘work and descent’ identity 
frame enabled a greater focus on non-Dalit groups. For example, while the first report 
of HRW on caste {Broken People) examined only Dalits in India, its second report on 
caste was transnational, Caste-Discrimination: A Global Concern (2001). The report 
was issued in conjunction with the WCAR and included discussion of caste-analogous 
systems in Japan, Africa and in diaspora communities. By expanding the community of 
caste-affected groups, they could better use the WCAR as a political opportunity 
structure for their norm entrepreneurship goals.
Because of this broader frame, however, the pressure on India/Hinduism has diffused 
with the effect that Dalits have to share the spotlight with other groups. Given that 
Dalits are the overwhelming majority of the caste-affected populations (some 240 
million of the estimated 250 million so-affected), they have made a calculated trade off 
of direct attention to Dalit identities for the chance to establish a new (global) norm on 
caste-based discrimination. There is a tension between transnational advocacy targeting 
individual state practice and transnational advocacy for norm elaboration. In the short­
term, a conventional ‘campaigning’ approach to pressuring individual states can offer 
important gains, while in the long-term the prospect of norm emergence and 
internalization can mark an arguably more permanent and thus stable change in state 
practice. The former wouldn’t necessitate a new transnational identity frame, but the 
latter has.
The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, however, and work in tandem to affect 
normative change. The transnational identity frame offers greater leverage to the 
individual groups sharing the frame and is a tool to open space for dialogue on 
individual groups’ concerns within the blocked domestic sphere. All of the caste TAN 
actors interviewed for this thesis reported that they felt both the country focus and the 
normative focus were important. The timing of the WCAR propelled the normative 
agenda, prompting both the Sub-Commission and CERD also to respond. The caste 
TAN has secured a recognition within the UN that work and descent-based 
discrimination exists, that it is prohibited in international law and they have developed a 
set of draft UN principles and guidelines on this discrimination. This would not have
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materialised if the only focus had been country-specific campaigning. In recent years 
there has been a shift back to country-focused advocacy: for example, India’s 
submission of its periodic report to CERD in 2007 prompted a surge of domestic and 
INGO activity (e.g. in the form of preparing shadow reports). Members of the IDSN 
report that the major current of activity within UN fora now is to submit shadow reports 
to UN Treaty Bodies and also to the new Universal Periodic Review (UPR) system of 
the Human Rights Council. In both cases the efforts are state specific, although the 
focus on groups across Asia and Africa remains. Creating the global identity frame 
facilitated the norm emergence process, now providing a wide variety of caste-affected 
groups with new international standards to press for country specific change.
Using frames strategically: indigenous, minority or racism?
It is important to ask whether Dalits could have framed their identities within existing 
normative frames for marginalized groups rather than pursuing a distinct normative 
agenda. Three relevant frames come to mind: that for indigenous peoples, that for 
minorities and that for racial discrimination. Each comes with a ready set of institutions 
and standards that could have assisted Dalits in achieving their goals domestically. At 
various stages of their transnational advocacy activities, Dalits have worked within each 
of these frames but none has fit perfectly. The limitations of these alternative frames 
highlights the protection gaps that many marginalized identity groups face when trying 
to adapt global norms to local realities.
Early Dalit advocates were attracted to the WGIP. Before the WGM was established in 
1994, Dalits did have an alternative in the form of the Working Group on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery, first convened in 1975. Given that the ‘work and descent’ frame has 
emphasized this labour/bondage aspect of caste systems, it is surprising that Dalit 
NGOs did not direct themselves to this Working Group. It appears instead that the self­
perception of Dalits as an ‘indigenous people’ fit well with the identity construction of 
Ambedkar and his followers. The difficulty they face in using this frame stems from 
competing domestic identities. In India and Nepal, for example, there are significant 
domestic constituencies who self-identify as indigenous peoples. In India the Scheduled 
Tribes or adivasis (original inhabitants) have constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
privileges similar to those recognized for Scheduled Castes. In Nepal, over 60 janajatis
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or ‘indigenous nationalities’ are also officially recognized. For Dalit NGOs from these 
countries to declare themselves as indigenous peoples on the world stage would create 
tension with domestic groups with whom they might otherwise forge useful alliances 
given their overlapping interests. This has not prevented Dalit leaders from 
constructing an identity frame based in part on claims of cultural distinctiveness and 
historical antecedence, two key pillars of the global indigenous identity frame. The
213interest of Dalit leaders in securing better implementation of land rights -  a third key 
pillar of the indigenous frame -  may prompt them in future to emphasise more this 
‘indigenous’ aspect of their identity. The language o f ‘peoples’ is already quite firmly 
entrenched in their discourse and the Black Paper on ‘Land/Labour’ issued by the 
NCDHR cites among other things an historical agreement from 1892 with the British 
(regarding so-called Panchami Lands) as a legal backing for land reform for Dalits.214 
This approach has strong parallels with the use of treaties negotiated by indigenous 
peoples with the British in other colonies to make claims against current governments.
Several Dalit NGOs have attended the WGM, often funded by MRG. The Government 
of India has been cautious about accepting the WGM as an appropriate forum for 
examining Dalit issues, arguing at the 2000 session, “The caste system is not strictly an 
issue of minorities”.215 The WGM was created with a mandate to review 
implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. Arguably, the Dalits do not fit well into 
any of these categories, displaying among them wide diversity in terms of ethnic, 
religious and linguistic characteristics. Moreover, the general international category of 
minority has proved difficult to meld with domestic interpretations. In India, for 
example, the state recognizes only religious minorities officially as minorities. 
Historically, Ambedkar and the Scheduled Castes Federation aimed for similar 
privileges to those foreseen for the Muslim minority population, i.e. separate electorates 
and separate territories. Ambedkar reportedly drew from the examples of the minority 
treaty system in Europe as well (Shah 2001, 32). He wanted to territorially concentrate
213 See, for example, point 1 of the “21 Point Action Agenda” of the Bhopal Declaration (agreed in 2002 
as part of a national meeting on Dalits): “Ensure that each Dalit family will own enough cultivable land 
for socio-economic well-being”. http://www.ambedkar.org/News/TheBhopalDeclaration.htm (accessed 
30 June 2009).
214 See “Dalit Right to Land and Labour: Fact Sheet III”, in the Black Paper, NCDHR. See also “Call to 
retrieve Panchami lands for Dalits”, The Hindu — Online edition, 13 December 2005, 
http://www.hindu.com/2005/12/13/stories/20Q5121319860300.htm (accessed 30 June 2009).
215 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/27 (30 June 2000): para 54.
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Dalits, removing them from villages where they were a marginal minority into spaces 
where they could make a majority (Jaffrelot 2005, 81). These kind of goals would best 
fit into the modem international standards for national minorities, wherein territorially 
concentrated groups are often afforded rights to autonomy and representation. In India, 
however, the concept of national minority is not used, thus limiting the effectiveness of 
such a frame. The use of a minority frame is complicated further by the fact that many 
religious minority groups include converted Dalits, who seek recognition both as 
religious minorities and as Scheduled Castes given that the social discrimination of 
caste continues to affect them.216 Apart from the official status conferred by the term 
minority, the political attraction of constituting a ‘majority’ is evidenced in the BSP, the 
Bahujan Samaj Party that unites Dalits, tribals and other low caste groups: the term 
bahujan means majority (Waldorp 2004, 289). The party name has an important 
rhetorical resonance, highlighting the concentration of power in the hands of the 
numerical minority elite and the significant voting power of the marginalized majority. 
Dalit activists from Nepal similarly reject the minority label, arguing that “20% [of the 
population] are Dalits -  this is not a minority. [...] the Chetris and Brahmins they are 
31% - we are 20% so why [would] we call ourselves minorities?”.217 The minority label 
seems only to be invoked domestically in those contexts where Dalits also belong to 
(Hindu or Christian) religious minorities, for example, in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. These practices suggest an understanding of the label ‘minority’ principally in 
numerical terms. In contrast, at the international level, Dalit leaders have sometimes 
found an instrumental value in self-identifying as a minority, principally to have access 
to political opportunities and funding targeted for minority groups.
The third frame of ‘racial discrimination’ is perhaps the most contentious. The caste 
advocates have long used ICERD as a pillar of their advocacy and were drawn to the 
WCAR as a strong political opportunity structure. The Government of India insists that 
caste is not race and that caste-based discrimination does not constitute racial 
discrimination, including under ICERD. Ambedkar had a similar understanding and was 
adamant to represent the caste system as social, not genetic or ‘racial’, often comparing 
it to class rather than ethnicity (Waldorp 2004, 287). This suggests that the efforts of
216 The Government has been reluctant to accept them as Scheduled Castes because this would mean that 
non-Hindu minorities would have equal access to the Scheduled Caste reservation policies (Jenkins 2003, 
Chapter 6).
217 Interview with Tirtha Bishwakarma, June 2006.
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the contemporary Dalit movement to embed caste in the UN discourse on racial 
discrimination is at odds with how Ambedkar sought to represent the community. From 
a sociological perspective, caste and race constructs have much in common: in addition 
to the hierarchical and purity elements, the Hindu caste system is constructed into 
vamas, literally meaning colour; in contemporary Indian society, fair skin is valued 
socially more than dark skin and Dalits are typically perceived as darker. Many 
scholars and activists have elaborated on these parallels, both in terms of the social 
construction of racial and caste divisive systems and on the effect of discrimination on 
these bases in practice (Robb 1995; Thorat and Umakant 2004). What such studies 
often miss are the underlying political dimensions of race and racism, which help to 
explain the Indian position. These political dimensions of race are embodied principally 
in the colonial doctrines and post-colonial global divides. Part of the difficulty Dalits 
have faced in using a racism frame at the international level is that the post-colonial 
international discourse on racism makes racism exclusively an act of the West against 
the peoples of its former colonial territories (Banton 2002). By extension this means 
that decolonised states like India cannot themselves be internally racist. As another case 
in point, Paul Divakar reports that during his first intervention on caste-discrimination 
at the Sub-Commission, the delegate from Nigeria approached him to refute his 
concerns about the Osu community, claiming that such practices (of discrimination) did 
not exist in his country.218 In response to such assertions, Dalits have tried to create an 
associated but distinct frame of ‘casteism’, the turn of phrase making obvious parallels 
to racism. The language of ‘casteism’ was prominent in the WCAR advocacy by Dalits 
but has never been taken up in the international normative discourse because of the 
restrictions on making an explicit link to caste (and to India by extension). Dalit 
appeals to the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, and the 
Rapporteur’s own view of caste in this aspect of his mandate, demonstrate how the caste 
TAN has sought to reconstruct ideas of racism in post-colonial societies.
The frames o f ‘indigenous’, ‘minority’, and ‘racism’ have all proven to be inappropriate 
in some way for the Dalit experience, but this has not prevented Dalit leaders from 
using these frames to gain access to political opportunity structures. The willingness of 
Dalit leaders to accept the banal ‘work and descent’ terminology and to accept funding 
to attend fora such as the WGM suggests that they have been practically-oriented on the
218 Interview with Paul Divakar, June 2009.
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international stage, taking a flexible approach to identity frames. This is reflected in the 
words of one Dalit activist, “some Dalits are represented as an indigenous community 
because we have our own culture, tradition, background. We are trying to fit wherever
910treaties talk about disadvantage based on birth and race”. This has given them a 
platform for articulating a new identity frame around caste-based discrimination, for 
socializing states and other international actors to this identity and for beginning the 
process of embedding this identity into the international lexicon and standards. The 
overarching goal of Dalit leaders nevertheless is the establishment of a unique global 
identity frame based on caste-like identities with an accompaniment of normative 
provisions directed exclusively towards their constituents. The fact that they have used a 
variety of frames to move them towards this goal has not diverted attention from the end 
game. According to Paul Divakar, “We are not satisfied with any of the terms... but 
using the basic principle of advocacy is to not rule anything out just because you don’t 
have your language -  work towards packaging your substance into that window which
Assessing the norm entrepreneurship of the caste TAN:
The global advocacy strategy of the caste TAN has been to use international institutions 
to emphasise norms that would spotlight state failures and set a minimum basic standard 
of achievement for the eradication of caste-based discrimination. They reasoned that 
external actors would be better equipped to recognise the need for reform than states 
bound internally by caste-based discrimination norms. The initial stages of their norm 
entrepreneurship focused on three primary goals: recognition of their identities and 
concerns; norm elaboration; and the creation of new mechanisms on caste. In each they 
have achieved some success thanks to the creation of an effective organisational 
platform, strategic framing of their identities and rights, good use of political 
opportunity structures and constructive cooperation with IOs. These gains have been 
made in spite of the continuous opposition of the Government of India and weak 
support from other states.
219 Interview with Sujatha Surepally, May 2005.
220 Interview with Paul Divakar, November 2008.
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Their success was aided by the establishment of strong forms of transnational social 
mobilisation. While earlier cooperation between domestic and international NGOs on 
caste had raised some awareness of the issues at the international level, it failed to build 
any organisational platform. The establishment of the IDSN was a crucial development 
that helped to bind nascent national platforms on caste and existing INGOs. Other 
caste-affected communities were soon incorporated into the mobilisation, creating a 
transcontinental network that increased the leverage of all participating identity groups. 
The caste TAN was bom: caste-focused NGOs benefited from the expertise, 
information and resources of each other and INGOs to build a norm emergence 
campaign; and INGOs increased their credibility on caste issues through partnerships 
with caste-focused NGOs.
This campaign profited from one timely political opportunity structure: the WCAR. 
The caste TAN did not achieve their main goal at Durban but caste became a cause 
celebre, affording a newfound recognition for caste-affected communities on the 
international stage. This expedited norm elaboration: although international human 
rights institutions had tentatively addressed caste prior to Durban, the failure to secure 
specific mention of caste within the WCAR appears to have galvanised interest in 
advancing the normative agenda. Individuals like Patrick Thomberry of CERD and 
Asbjom Eide and Yozo Yokota of the Sub-Commission took a personal interest in 
keeping the issue alive. They helped produce interpretive texts detailing the normative 
scope and content of the prohibition of caste-based discrimination and secured a 
specific mechanism on work and descent in the form of the two Special Rapporteurs.
This normative discourse has been facilitated by strategic use of identity frames. Dalits 
and other caste-affected groups have asserted a distinct identity based on the common 
experience of caste and analogous structures. They argued successfully that this 
identity warranted a particular focus in international society, aided by the “certification” 
of this identity by IOs. When it became clear that India would not accept overt 
references to caste, the identity frame was adapted to ‘work and descent’. This had the 
dual effect of side-stepping India’s objections whilst also embedding caste in an 
existing normative frame of ‘descent’ under ICERD. CERD was prepared to endorse 
this interpretation regardless of state objections and the caste TAN gained a legally 
binding norm without protracted inter-state negotiations. The Sub-Commission further
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legitimated the frame by elaborating on discrimination based on ‘work and descent’, 
which they confirmed is prohibited in international law. The caste TAN experience also 
supports Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) assertion that emergent norms pertaining to ‘bodily 
harm’ or ‘legal inequality’ are more likely to be accepted. By emphasizing the structural 
inequality element of caste-based discrimination and the terrible effects on individual 
community members (such as extensive murder, rape, manual scavenging and the 
practices of ‘untouchability’) in the various reports and communications, the caste TAN 
has utilised these frames successfully.
Even with these successes, the caste TAN faces several obstacles in its ongoing efforts 
to achieve norm adherence. The first is its own fractured mobilisation in the domestic 
sphere. Dalit activists in India, for example, are split by region, religion, political 
allegiance, class and language. Those participating in the international sphere are few 
and can have divergent views on advocacy priorities and strategies to the majority of 
domestic activists who may not share their norm entrepreneurship goals (Berg 2007). 
Leaders also express deep frustration with the so-called ‘victim narrative’ used by
991Dalits to justify their lamentable position in society (Macwan 2004, 33). As ‘victims’ 
they are not empowered for mobilisation and fail to seek justice reasoning that their 
status is preordained (and dissuaded by the failures of the state justice system for 
Dalits). Even where they are mobilised, they have weak social capital to influence 
decision-makers. They face a still deeply-entrenched “caste culture” that makes 
internally driven social reform a poor prospect. Many domestic commentators in India 
view the actions of caste leaders as a betrayal of national loyalty, either sharing 
Gandhi’s view that these actions are divisive or regarding solicitation of external 
interest as a return to colonialism (e.g. Thorat and Umakant 2004, Ch. 5 and 6). 
Activists struggle with the fine line between the benefits of mobilisation as a distinct 
Dalit community and the ultimate goal of eradication of the structure that created their 
distinction.
There is no strong evidence of a norm cascade among states on the international stage. 
Only five countries had replied to the requests for information on caste as part of the 
Special Rapporteurs’ study on work and descent. India is still reluctant to make caste an 
issue of international concern and continues to decline requests by Special Rapporteurs
221 Interview with Paul Divakar, November 2008.
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(on work and descent and on racial discrimination) to conduct country visits. Japan has 
not changed its principled stance on caste issues (in line with India’s) but did capitulate 
to invite the Special Rapporteur on racism to visit, giving domestic Buraku-focused 
NGOs a vital opportunity for advocacy. Nepal is an important exception and has been 
the most open of the caste-affected states to domestic reforms vis-a-vis Dalits. This 
appears to be a consequence both of emerging norms and of domestic factors. The 
elaboration of norms in the international sphere has socialised state and resident 10 
actors to these concerns and strengthened the leverage of domestic Dalit actors to press 
for change. The post-conflict transition has created space for emergent norms to take 
root. Nepal has a smaller civil society of Dalit activists than India but a much more open 
dialogue with government. Although Dalits remain a weak constituency, the 
championing of Dalit rights in the Maoist movement’s manifesto has given rationalist 
motivations for the new government to respond in earnest. At the international level, 
Nepal has accepted CERD’s view that caste is within the scope of the ICERD but it has 
not been highly vocal on its views given India’s position. Other caste-affected states 
similarly have been reticent on the issue, in part because domestic caste-NGOs are 
relatively weak in all but India, Nepal and Japan. A notable change was in evidence at 
the DRC, however: for example, both Pakistan and Nepal in their interventions noted 
the need for the outcome document to focus on caste-based discrimination, suggesting 
that India’s neighbours are increasingly socialised to international attention to the issue. 
They did not openly criticise India but their statements represent an important 
discursive shift that could be utilized for future norm emergence. Diaspora states are 
only beginning to understand the implications of caste-based discrimination within their 
populations (thanks in part to CERD questions) and Dalit solidarity networks have 
usually focused their attention on countries of origin rather than locally affected 
individuals.
In achieving a norm cascade, the position of India as a “critical state” was always clear. 
India has the largest population of caste-affected groups and its acceptance of the norm 
would be instrumental to broader norm internalisation. Its persistent criticisms of the 
Sub-Commission, CERD and the Special Rapporteurs have attempted to undermine the 
process of norm emergence. India’s obstinacy is influenced by both internal and 
external factors. Internally, caste-affected groups are an important constituency, one 
that is courted by all political parties. The expressed interest in Dalit issues, however, is
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often motivated by vote seeking: for example, the Bhopal meeting in 2002 was 
convened by the state of Madhya Pradesh, where the Congress government relies on 
low caste support (Lerche 2008, 247). The government across India has been able to 
placate Dalits with promises of a better future and a reservation system that is elusive to 
many. The balance of power in government institutions belongs to upper caste groups. 
They have limited motivation to relinquish this power and enforce laws that would 
protect the lower castes. Those parties focused on Hindu nationalism particularly (like 
the BJP in power during the WCAR) would be loath to denigrate Hinduism by 
emphasising its structural injustices. The association of some Dalits with armed 
movements like the Naxalites, however, suggests that the government cannot rely on 
social hierarchy for stability. Dalit NGO leaders may not represent a security threat but 
with the support of the international community, they can bring pressure to bear on the 
government.
It is this external pressure that India has strived to avoid, pressure that threatens to 
undermine India’s preferred identity in international society. Successive Indian 
governments have rejected the framing of caste as a racial discrimination issue at the 
same time as proclaiming firm commitment to the eradication of caste-based 
discrimination. It is the racism aspect that is offensive to them. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, racial discrimination as a norm in international society holds great weight. It 
also has played an important role in post-colonial inter-state discourse. India’s desire to 
present itself as a racism-free society is consistent with similar claims made by other 
post-colonial states. It cannot deny that caste discrimination persists but it can insist 
that the practice is not racist. This helps to portray India as a modem liberal and 
democratic state, projecting an image that intends to be more estimable than Western 
democracies that historically and currently grapple with racism. Moreover, by 
presenting caste-based discrimination as a particular phenomenon and a domestic 
concern, India sidesteps calls for international scrutiny of the issue.
India has been able to use its position in international society to dissuade other states 
from actively supporting the caste TAN. The caste TAN members report they have the 
moral sympathy of many states, but none are willing to expend the political capital 
necessary to meet their ideational concerns. India is among the most economically 
powerful post-colonial states and a regional hegemon, holding important positions in
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the UN Security Council, as a trade partner and also on the UN Human Rights Council. 
It has made itself a bridge between the North and the South. Britain probably has the 
largest number of Dalits in the diaspora but is reluctant to take a hard line on caste no 
doubt because of its status as former coloniser and its desire to maintain a privileged 
position with the Government of India. The EU at large is dependent on India as a trade 
partner, making it similarly reluctant to harm relations. The discussion of caste at the 
DRC by Pakistan and Nepal can be interpreted from a rationalist perspective, these 
states aiming to undermine India’s regional and international status by elevating caste as 
a focus of international attention. The EU support to Dalit NGO accreditation at the 
DRC, Slovenia’s intervention at the DRC, Denmark’s interventions on caste in the UPR 
(see footnote 222) and Guatemala’s support during and after the WCAR, are evidence 
of shifting discursive positions that are not so easily tied to rational interests and could 
signal an increasing willingness to act in accordance with ideational commitments on 
caste-based discrimination.
Despite the weak support of states, the caste TAN has managed to institutionalise new 
norms for caste-affected groups but the important processes of state socialisation and 
persuasion have taken a back seat. Typically in norm entrepreneurship, socialisation 
and persuasion precede norm emergence. The caste TAN has done things in the reverse 
order for three key reasons. The first is the availability of political opportunity 
structures conducive to norm elaboration, such as the WCAR and the UN Sub- 
Commission. The second is the willingness of international actors to draft normative 
standards even in the face of state opposition. They have put the norms to paper and 
added the UN stamp of authority. States have been largely unable to stop these 
processes because they have taken place within independent expert (rather than inter­
state) mechanisms like CERD and the Sub-Commission. The third factor has been the 
power of India to persuade states against openly accepting new norms focused on caste- 
based discrimination. Had the caste TAN relied solely on state persuasion, the norm 
elaboration was unlikely to occur, as was the case in Durban.
The availability and support of political opportunity structures for norm emergence has 
meant the caste-TAN has juggled both norm-focused and country-specific advocacy. 
These two objectives can be mutually beneficial but also compete for the time and 
resources of activists. It is not always clear whether this balance has fit the will,
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objectives or interests of caste-affected communities themselves. For example, the 
efforts to draw in other Asian and African communities under the rubric of 
‘discrimination based on work and decent’, may have benefited Dalits much less than 
other groups. For Dalit leaders, specific attention to the experience of Dalits and states 
in which Dalits reside might have conferred greater immediate gains than focusing 
energy and resources on norm development. The problem is that constructive dialogue 
on norm adherence has been blocked in most states and the political opportunities 
offered by norm entrepreneurship have been more effective than domestic advocacy in 
generating media and government attention. Moreover, the geographical, religious and 
cultural divides among Dalits undermines efforts to forge an effective horizontal 
alliance for country-specific (or Dalit-specific) advocacy. Cooperation with each other 
in norm entrepreneurship has in some ways been more productive than domestic 
mobilisation. The success in norm emergence has helped to open space domestically for 
better adherence to existing and/or emerging norms on caste-based discrimination.
With the norm elaboration well advanced, the caste TAN is focusing more attention 
now on socialisation, country specific work and use of new international fora with 
stronger sanctioning power. Greater efforts are being made to strengthen domestic Dalit 
platforms in other parts of Asia to exert pressure from below. Bilateral advocacy by die 
caste TAN targeting Western states and institutions (such as the EU) continues to bring 
pressure from above on caste-affected countries and keeps caste-affected groups a 
funding priority for donors (at least in South Asia). Treaty bodies are being supplied 
with relevant information on caste. The caste TAN is working more with the private 
sector and labour rights issues and beginning engagement with the ILO’s monitoring 
mechanisms. The UPR of the Human Rights Council has also proved a useful forum in 
which states have been willing to raise the issue of caste-based discrimination.222 The 
elaboration of norms has not been altogether abandoned and members of the caste TAN 
maintain a long-term vision of a legally binding instrument focused specifically on 
caste, such as an International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Caste- 
based Discrimination. The Special Rapporteur Chung has expressed her commitment to 
Dalit leaders to taking forward this proposal within the new UN Advisory Committee. 
In March 2009, on her first official visit to India and Nepal, the UN High Commissioner
222 States have raised the issue of caste-based discrimination during the UPR of Pakistan, India and Sri 
Lanka. Denmark is the only state to raise the question in all three UPRs. See, respectively, UN Docs. 
A/HRC/8/42 (4 June 2008); A/HRC/8/26 (23 May 2008); A/HRC/8/46 (5 June 2008).
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on Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, made strong statements condemning caste-based 
discrimination and encouraged the Indian Government “to show leadership in
99^combating caste-based discrimination globally”. Whether they heed this call remains 
to be seen; the Government of India no doubt will consider the comparative material 
and identity costs of being an international crusader on caste versus maintaining its 
moral authority as a racism-free society contra the Western (colonial) experience.
Conclusions:
The mobilisation of Dalits has a long history that reached a crescendo with the WCAR 
but has not fallen silent since. The momentum created by the WCAR has had a positive 
impact in the domestic sphere; activists cite Prime Minister Singh’s recognition of 
caste-based discrimination as akin to apartheid as a major victory. Nepal’s new 
government is making efforts to include Dalits in the transition process. The deeply 
entrenched social structure of caste remains forceful, however, regardless of the 
constitutional and other statutory measures that outlaw it. Dalits have struggled to create 
a mass mobilisation to combat caste, undermined by internal division and the “victim 
narrative”.
Nevertheless, the caste TAN has pursued a highly successful norm entrepreneurship 
process. They have united previously disparate groups across borders, raised the 
international consciousness of their existence and secured recognition from international 
institutions. They have created and used political opportunities to the fullest effect. 
They identified useful adjacency strategies for pursuing norm emergence. They have 
bypassed India’s objections to consideration of caste in the international sphere by 
making alliances with IOs. The CERD General Recommendation, CERD questions on 
State party reports, and the outputs of the Sub-Commission and its Special Rapporteurs 
have institutionalised a normative discourse on caste at the international level.
The caste TAN is using this normative framework to socialise states and other actors 
towards norm adherence. In an “insider-outsider coalition” advocacy strategy, emergent 
norms have benefited advocates working in the domestic sphere by helping to open up
223 Statement by Navanethem Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights at the National Human Rights 
Commission, Delhi (23 March 2009): p. 5.
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space for engagement with state actors. Dalit leaders remain hopeful that more Dalits 
themselves will demand their rights assertively. CERD and other treaty bodies will 
continue to press the issue with states through reporting dialogues. The guidelines and 
recommendations of the Special Rapporteurs on work and descent are readied for the 
implementation stage. National Dalit platforms are continuing their efforts at the 
domestic and regional level, socialising not only states and development actors but also 
IOs like SAARC. The civil society of caste-affected communities continues to benefit 
financially from increased donor awareness of their existence. Dalit solidarity networks 
continue to expand as international consciousness of the plight of Dalits grows bringing 
third states into the dialogue. As more actors become socialised to the concerns of caste- 
affected groups, they may well adhere to the norms domestically regardless of India’s 
opposition to consideration of caste in the international sphere. This, coupled with 
India’s domestic practice, may effect a norm cascade and internalization through the 
back door.
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C h a pt e r  III: A fr o -d escendant  m o bilisa tio n  in  L atin  A m e r ic a
Candil en la calle, oscuridad en la casa.
(Candlelight in the street, darkness at home.)
Introduction:
There are an estimated 150 million people of African descent in Latin America. Their 
experiences across the region are diverse. They constitute a large numerical majority in 
several states and a small numerical minority in others. They have different experiences 
of slavery and colonialism that influence their position in modem society. Some 
communities are urban and others are rural, many living in particular coastal regions or 
other territories they have settled in since their ancestors escaped slavery. There are 
variations in language, religion and tradition and they descend from different ethnic 
groups across Africa (Hall 2005, 363). They are rarely represented in government and 
typically have lower levels of human development. Some states have responded to their 
interests, in others, their interests remain largely ignored.
Overall the visibility of Afro-descendants has increased significantly in the past decade 
or so, marked by the pan-Latin American mobilisation of Afro-descendant leaders to 
push for greater inclusion of their communities and recognition of their rights. There is 
now a corpus of international standards designated specifically for people of African 
descent. The 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) and its preparatory 
events played a major role in this process but several other factors have contributed. 
This chapter will uncover these factors by examining Afro-descendant transnational 
mobilisation and the emergence of new international norms pertaining to people of 
African descent. Afro-descendant leaders have merged discourses on non­
discrimination with the assertion of collective rights and ethno-cultural identity to create 
a new group-specific set of norms. They have created an ‘Afro-descendant’ identity 
frame to unite and empower a diverse group of communities. The international actors 
that have contributed to mobilisation and norm emergence will be reviewed, in
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particular those focusing on development cooperation, international human rights 
monitoring and NGO capacity building. The chapter will also discuss many of the 
challenges faced by Affo-descendants in building transnational mobilisation. These 
include the constraints of ‘racial’ versus ‘ethnic’ identity formation in Latin America, 
the history of nationalism and ‘racial democracy’ in the region, and the forces of 
mestizaje (mixing) and blanqueamiento (whitening) that impede individual and 
collective self-identification as Afro-descendant. The Afro-descendant dialectic with 
the indigenous peoples’ movement will be examined to reveal how the socialisation of 
states to the indigenous peoples rights discourse has both helped and hindered Afro- 
descendants’ own claims. The post-WCAR outcomes also will be assessed, focusing on 
the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent (WGPAD) and practice in 
the “critical state” of Brazil, to consider how norm emergence has progressed since 
Durban.
The geographical scope of this chapter will be limited primarily to Central and South 
America, termed here as Latin America. While the relationship between Afro- 
descendant activists in North America and Latin America has been significant, the 
movement as concentrated in Latin America is commonly considered a distinct entity 
and its experiences are more relevant to the focus of this thesis. The experiences of 
Affo-descendants in the Caribbean are also distinct, not least because Affo-descendants 
often constitute a majority o f the population in many Caribbean states. The links 
between Latin American, Caribbean and North American Afro-descendant activists will 
be discussed where appropriate.
Who are Afro-descendants?
Affo-descendants are present in every state in Latin America and the Caribbean.224 The 
largest population of people of African descent in Latin America is found in Brazil; 
indeed, Brazil has the second highest population of people of African descent in the 
world after Nigeria, estimated at around 73 million or 47 percent of the total
224 Unless otherwise specified, population figures here are taken from Inter-American Dialogue (2003) 
and Minority Rights Group (1995, xii-xiii).
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population.225 Several other states in South America also have significant Afro- 
descendant populations, including Colombia (26 percent), Guyana (45 percent), 
Suriname (41 percent), French Guiana (66 percent), Venezuela (10 percent), Ecuador 
(10 percent) and Peru (5 percent). Smaller populations of Afro-descendants of between 
1 and 4 percent live in Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay. Most Caribbean states have a 
large majority population that is Affo-descendant. In Central America, Belize (47 
percent), Panama (14 percent), Puerto Rico (23 percent), Costa Rica (2-3 percent), 
Nicaragua (9 percent) and Honduras (2 percent) have the largest populations of Afro- 
descendants. In North America, Mexico has an estimated 1 million Afro-descendants (1 
percent),226 the US has 34.7 million (12 percent)227 and Canada has 662,000 (2 
percent).228 The population figures are often contested due to tendencies of self- 
identification in Latin America, leading to an under-estimation of actual population 
sizes.
Many Afro-descendants live in urban areas although in some countries there are specific 
geographical regions with a high concentration of Afro-descendants. These include the 
Bahia region of Brazil, the Atlantic-Caribbean coast of Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica, the Pacific region in Colombia, Esmeraldas in Ecuador and Barlovento in 
Venezuela (Conniff and Davis 1994, 271). Many of the areas historically were 
settlement communities of former or self-liberated (escaped) slaves (the latter called 
maroons or cimarrones). Their territories are termed quilombos in Brazil and palenques 
elsewhere. These territories were de facto sovereign and independent, many being 
continuously settled since as early as the 16th century and vigorously defended against 
invasion.
Nearly all of the Affo-descendant population in Latin America are descendants of 
slaves. Slave labour was used primarily in Spanish and Portuguese colonies from the 
16th century, later expanding into British, Dutch and French colonies from the 17th 
century. Some 40 percent of all African slaves were located in Brazil. Whereas the 
slavery of the region’s indigenous populations was outlawed as early as 1542 in the
225 This figure is drawn by combining the official census categories o f ‘black’ (preto) and ‘brown’ 
(pardo).
226 Precise figures for Mexico were difficult to find; see Nasong’o (2008,37-38) and Cevallos (2005).
227 Figures are from the 2000 US Census (Grieco and Cassidy 2001,3).
228 Individuals under the category ‘Black’ in the 2001 Canadian census. See 
http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/demo50a.htm (accessed 26 November 2007)
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Spanish colonies (1570 in Brazil) (Wade 1997, 27) slavery among the African 
populations was only first legally abolished under a series of independence movements 
beginning with Haiti in the late 18th century and was ended lastly in 1888 in Brazil 
(Conniff and Davis 1994, 180).
The socio-economic status of Afro-descendants is low and inequalities along racial lines 
persist across Latin America, with indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants 
concentrated in the bottom strata. Afro-descendants constitute one third of the region’s 
population but fifty percent of those living in poverty (Zoninsein 2001). On a range of 
social and economic rights indicators, Afro-descendants do less well than whites and 
mestizos, although the publication of indicators disaggregated by ethnic or racial group 
was not common until recently. Discrimination is a major factor: for example, job 
advertisements may stipulate “neat appearance” widely understood to mean ‘light 
skinned’. The available indicators demonstrate the persistence of high inequalities that 
have remained even when social welfare overall has improved throughout the region 
(Oakley 2001; Sutherland 2002, 9; Zoninsein 2001; Lebon 2007, 54). Affo-descendant 
women face intersecting discrimination based on gender and race and tend to score even 
lower levels of economic and social rights attainment (Lebon 2007; Safa 2005).
Many Latin American states have adopted legal and institutional measures to combat 
racial discrimination, including some that are specifically targeted for Afro-descendants. 
Access to justice for Afro-descendants in the region generally is poor and Afro- 
descendants often report they are targeted for police brutality (Adomo 1999; Guimaraes 
1999). ICERD is widely ratified in the region and general provisions on non­
discrimination are common in national legislation. Some states have taken further steps 
to entrench anti-racial discrimination measures: for example, the 1988 Constitution of
99QBrazil criminalises acts of racism with high penalties of imprisonment. The 
legislation was complemented by a new institutional structure created also in 1988, the 
Palmares Cultural Foundation (Fundagao Cultural Palmares), administered under the 
Ministry of Culture and the first federal agency with responsibility to address the social 
and cultural needs of Afro-Brazilians. Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Peru also have strong anti-discrimination laws, including some special provisions 
aimed at Afro-descendants (Inter-American Dialogue 2004, 5). At least seven countries
229 See Law 7716 of 1989 and Law 9459 of 1997. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3 (28 February 2006): 
para 7.
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(Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) have 
formally recognised land entitlements for people of African descent (Inter-American 
Dialogue 2004). Provisions for Afro-descendants are often introduced in the context of 
new national policies on multiculturalism. Federal Law 70 adopted in 1993 in 
Colombia (following the adoption of a new constitution in 1991) is widely cited as the 
strongest example, establishing for Afro-Colombians a number of special provisions 
including two reserved seats in Congress, land rights (for some communities) and 
teaching of Afro-Colombian history and culture in schools, albeit with mixed success in 
implementation.230 Many measures have come post-WCAR, with governments either 
introducing or strengthening legal and institutional policies for Afro-descendants. 
Brazil established in 2003 the Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality 
(SEPPIR) and introduced its first affirmative action policies in the spheres of state 
tertiary education and public sector employment. In Honduras, an Anti-Discrimination 
Commission was created in April 2004, on the 270th Anniversary of the arrival of the 
Garifunas in Honduras.231 In April 2005, Peru established the National Institute for the 
Development of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA), a body 
with ministerial status. In Colombia, the Directorate of Black Community Affairs 
was replaced by the new Office of Ethnic Affairs within the Ministry of the Interior, 
where a presidential adviser now coordinates the formulation of ethnic policies.233
In spite of some positive steps in the public sphere, political representation remains 
weak. There are reportedly less than 100 Affo-descendant legislators in Latin America 
(excluding Caribbean states); in Brazil, only 17 of 594 congress representatives self­
identified in 2007 as Affo-Brazilian (Mani 2006; Ribando Seelke 2008, 9). Although 
many Afro-descendants have overcome the obstacles (such as discrimination, funding, 
weak social capital) to run for political office they have often found it difficult to secure 
an electoral base, in large part because individuals tend not to vote along racial lines. 
Attempts have been made to bolster support for political representation of Afro- 
descendants both through reserved seats and through support networks among 
legislators. In November 2003, the first meeting of the Afro-Descendant Legislators of 
the Americas and the Caribbean was held, intending to establish a Black Parliament of
230 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/18/Add.3 (24 February 2004): p 6; and Arocha (1998).
231 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.5 (22 March 2005): p 8.
232 INDEPA replaced an earlier body established in late 2001, the National Commission of Andean, 
Amazon and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA).
233 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/18/Add.3 (24 February 2004): p 7.
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the Americas (realised in August 2005 in San Jose, Costa Rica). The legislators 
continue to hold regular meetings, forging important links between Latin American 
legislators and the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in the US.234 President Lula da 
Silva has also been praised for appointing four Affo-Brazilians to ministerial posts in 
his government in 2003, including three for Affo-Brazilian women. These efforts 
suggest that national political representation is increasing but only at a slow pace and in 
a select number of countries. Activists report that political participation at the 
municipal level, in particular where there are large populations of Afro-descendants, 
tends to be stronger.
One of the main obstacles to increased political representation of Afro-descendants is 
weak social consciousness and mobilisation along racial lines. There is very little social 
or material gain for individuals who self-identify as black/Affo-descendant, and while 
many will acknowledge a ‘mixed’ ancestry, few will claim to be wholly of African 
descent. The project of strengthening the Affo-descendant identity has long been 
regarded a prerequisite for other progress.
Forging an Afro-descendant identity frame: challenges and opportunities
Affo-descendant leaders have faced a significant challenge in creating an identity frame 
for mobilisation that would resonate among the Afro-descendant community and be 
recognised by wider society. Two key factors have undermined their efforts: the 
dominant ideology of ‘racial democracy’ and the privileging of indigenous peoples’ 
identities. The former denies that racism exists and the latter has limited the gains by 
Afro-descendants in the transition to multiculturalism. Afro-descendant leaders have 
worked to imbue ‘blackness’ with a newfound (political) value in societies that 
generally devalue this identity and dissuade self-identification along racial lines. They 
have also learned from (and sometimes clashed with) indigenous peoples in their 
attempt to create space domestically and internationally for recognition and making 
rights claims.
234 The first meeting was held 21-23 November 2003 in Brasilia; the second on 19-21 May 2004 in 
Bogota; the third on 28-31 August 2005 in San Jose. They formulated two declarations through these 
meetings: the Carta de Brasilia and the Carta de Bogota (Johnson 2007, 66).
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From racial democracy to multiculturalism?
The notion of racial democracy espoused in Latin America for most of the 20th century 
asserted that because of racial miscegenation, rigid racial distinctions did not exist in the 
region. It was a popular ideology that gave the illusion of equality, helped to quell 
debate about hierarchies and contributed to a nationalism myth. Proponents maintained 
that due to different approaches to slavery and manumission, and a high degree of 
intermarriage and mixing (mestizaje), Latin American states were stratified less by race 
than by class when compared with the US, where blacks were socially and legally 
segregated (Wade 1997; Telles 2004). As a nationalist discourse, mestizaje of white, 
black and indigenous appeared outwardly as progressive but always maintained an 
implicit bias towards blanqueamiento (whitening) (Romo 2007; Wade 1997, 32). 
Instead of rigid racial lines, social hierarchy in Latin America was (and continues to be) 
constructed along a spectrum of colour with black on the bottom and white on the top. 
Individuals attempt to make social gains in ‘whitening* themselves. In colonial times 
this colour diversity was known as ‘las castas’ (castes, or ‘breeds’) (Whitten 2007, 358), 
which privileged those who looked more European regardless of their actual parentage. 
Historically, this hierarchy was politically motivated: the white elite believed they could 
better secure power by reducing the large black population. The experience of slave 
rebellions, liberation and independence in the region (especially of Haiti in 1804) 
witnessed forcefully how collective Afro-descendant mobilisation could challenge 
political authority and military might of Europeans (see Naro 2003). The racial 
democracy myth and its enabling forces of mestizaje and blanqueamiento were 
powerful weapons against social unrest.
One of the early challenges to the racial democracy myth was a series of studies in the 
1950s conducted by UNESCO in Brazil as part of a global project investigating racism; 
they revealed very little evidence of a ‘racial democracy’ (Winant 1999, 99; Wade 
1997, 53). The dominant academic discourse in the region remained firmly Marxist, 
however, making race subsidiary to class in social analysis and obscuring the evidence 
of racial stratification. The political climate of authoritarianism that dominated Latin 
America for much of the 20th century further circumscribed investigation of Afro-
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descendant identity. Most scholars focused their attention on the cultural and historical 
aspects of African identity or slavery rather than addressing contemporary inequalities 
along racial lines. At least one Afro-Brazilian scholar and activist, Abdias do 
Nascimento, was exiled in 1968 for his political efforts to bring attention to Afro- 
descendant marginalisation.
In the 1980s and 1990s, many Latin American states adopted a new strategy of 
multiculturalism in an effort to gain legitimacy after decades of authoritarian rule (Van 
Cott 2000, 3). The multiculturalism frame was effective in accommodating many o f the 
claims made by indigenous peoples but afforded fewer gains to Afro-descendants. The 
vestiges of racial democracy and public perceptions of race and ethnicity have made it 
difficult for most to accept any (race-based) privileging of Afro-descendant identities. 
There is a two-level process of normative change. While some high-level, central 
government actors have adopted a more multicultural discourse and recognition of 
racism in recent years, at the local level, within the justice system, and among the public 
at large, the racial democracy myth persists. This is evidenced in the country reports of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on racism. In his visit to Honduras in 2005, the Special 
Rapporteur found:
Several government representatives considered that Honduras was not fertile 
ground for racial discrimination because of the extent of interbreeding in the 
population. Some State officials, including some from the judicial sector, have 
tried to argue that the limited number, if not absence, of complaints of racial 
discrimination indicates that there is no racism.235
Similarly, in his 2005 visit to Brazil:
The Special Rapporteur... welcomes the recognition of the existence and depth of 
racism by the federal authorities at the highest level, and the adoption of a number 
of laws and institutions to combat racism. He however notes die resistance to 
these policies at different levels of the society in general, and from some federal 
and local authorities, and the persistence of the ideology of racial democracy 
among the population and in certain institutions.236
Many are suspicious of any attempts to focus on race, with the effect that “the 
recognition of the idea of race and the promotion of any anti-racist action based on this
235 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.5 (22 March 2005): p 11.
236 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3 (28 February 2006): p 2.
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idea is interpreted as racism” (Guimaraes 2001, 39). A class view of society continues 
to dominate, with social inequalities attributed to class rather than race. The racial 
democracy ideal still clearly resonates to many. It has long been part of Latin America’s 
image, lending a sense of regional identity and pride. For some the construct facilitates 
their personal ambitions, using blanqueamiento to advance in the social hierarchy. For 
those at the top, where power is contained almost exclusively in the hands of a white 
elite, it projects an image of equality; for those at the bottom, where racial mixing is 
more common, it reflects the sense of community many readily feel. The introduction 
of multiculturalism is perceived by some to create harmful divisions, by pushing people 
to self-identify with a particular group rather than a shared identity. In the face of 
affirmative action proposals, for example, many prefer class-based to race-based 
policies (Telles 2007), not least because the class line is more obvious than divisions 
based on race alone (Sansone 2004, 30). Indeed, as Guimaraes (2001) summaries, “it is 
not surprising, then, that a considerable part of the black population feels more attracted 
to leftist political parties than to black solidarity movements” (39).
Into this class and race mixture comes a third category: ethnicity. Indigenous peoples 
have been able to sidestep many of the barriers to mobilisation raised by racial 
democracy because they are viewed as ethno-cultural nations rather than in racialised 
terms. Distinction on the basis of ethno-cultural identity is more palatable to Latin 
Americans than distinction linked to race. This difference and the experiences of 
indigenous peoples have influenced norm entrepreneurship by Afro-descendants.
Learning from Indigenous Peoples: the impact on Afro-descendant mobilisation
Indigenous mobilisation has shaped the framing of Afro-descendant identities, the rights 
claims they have made and the political opportunity structures available. Indigenous 
peoples and Afro-descendants experience similar forms of marginalisation and this has 
stimulated some solidarity between them. Indigenous peoples, however, have had 
greater advocacy success and have long dominated national and regional discourses on 
multicultural accommodation. This privileging of indigenous peoples is linked to both 
domestic and transnational discourses on indigenous identity, a discourse that has 
distinguished ethnicity from race, tied culture to land, and venerated pre-colonial
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identities (Hooker 2005; Ng'weno 2007; Greene 2007). Afro-descendants have 
struggled to make gains under multiculturalism because in the main they are not 
perceived to have a distinct culture or to constitute a distinct collective identity. The 
exception proves the rule: the small margin of Afro-descendant groups with affinities to 
indigenous groups have been able to obtain a specialised status and collective land 
rights. Three aspects of the indigenous-Afro-descendant dialectic will be explored here: 
the constraints of national ideas of ethnicity and race; the barriers in access to land 
rights; and the influence of international discourses and actors.
The shift to multiculturalism occurred at the same time that domestic and international 
mobilisation of indigenous peoples in the region was strong. Successive governments 
have been socialised to the indigenous rights discourse thanks to long processes of 
mobilisation and campaigning, strong transnational advocacy networks and good 
cooperation with international institutions (Brysk 2000; Postero and Zamosc 2004; 
Niezen 2003; Wilmer 1993). Indigenous leaders’ claims to the right to self- 
determination have led to recognition of collective rights for indigenous peoples in 
statutory or constitutional law across the region (Hooker 2005, 285; Van Cott 2000). At 
the international level, Latin American states have widely ratified ILO Convention 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, firmly supported the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and are negotiating an OAS American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The propensity of Latin American state actors to be socialised to indigenous peoples’ 
rights claims is helped by experiences of colonialism and nation building in the region, 
which at once favour indigenous peoples and undermine Afro-descendants (Wade 
1997). During colonialism, indigenous peoples were privileged over Afro-descendants, 
the former regarded variously by Europeans as noble/ignoble savages, independent 
nations or conquered peoples (Keal 2003), the latter merely as slaves and property. The 
difference in how indigenous and Afro-descendant groups were perceived was 
important when ideas of nationhood were being formulated across Latin America. The 
indigenous populations became revered in this mythical nationalist discourse, helping to 
root the contemporary state both historically and spatially to the newly defined borders. 
Indigenous peoples’ ancestral lands (and to a lesser extent culture) contributed to the 
legitimacy of modem Latin American states and their territorial integrity. The majority
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of the population were also seen as ethnically mestizo (‘mixed’) -  descendants of 
Spanish men and indigenous women. Indigenous cultures were thus an important part 
of the new mestizaje national identity, even while governments simultaneously pursued 
assimilationist policies towards indigenous communities. In contrast, Afro-descendants 
were largely invisible in the story of the nation (Anderson 2007, 391) although arguably 
were more integrated economically and socially than many indigenous peoples because 
of their labour.
The different ways in which indigenous and Afro-descendant identities have been 
included in the national imagination has impacted on their ability to make rights claims. 
Researchers comparatively studying indigenous and Afro-descendant identities in Latin 
America argue that they have been essentialised as ethnic and as racial respectively, 
with problematic effect in the current wave of multicultural reforms (Anderson 2007; 
Wade 1997; Hooker 2005; Thome 2004; Greene 2007). As Wade summarises, in Latin 
America “the study of blacks is one of racism and race relations, while the study of 
indians [sic] is that of ethnicity and ethnic groups” (Wade 1993, 37). When viewed 
through a rights lens, indigenous peoples’ rights have been understood broadly as the 
(collective) right to autonomy while Afro-descendants’ rights have been understood as 
the (individual) right to equality. In the Latin American context, cultural rights and 
ethnic distinctiveness are also linked to collective rights to land (Ng’weno 2007), which 
feature prominently in the international indigenous rights discourse.
The differences between these sets of rights are important under multiculturalism. The 
success of indigenous peoples in securing group-specific gains is due in large part to 
their clear cultural markers and traditional forms of leadership that help define their 
communities as ‘nations’. Afro-descendants have fewer cultural markers, weaker 
organisational platforms and less collective consciousness. Activists report some 
vestiges of traditional leadership in some communities, for example, in deference to 
‘elders’, but the structures are not pronounced. Afro-descendants, therefore, are not 
regarded as ethno-cultural nations. As Hooker (2005) summarises, “Latin American 
states and publics have been much more amenable to...calls for group rights posed in 
terms of cultural difference or ethnicity (Indian-ness) rather than race or racism 
(blackness)” (299).
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This perception is supported by evidence that Afro-descendants asserting an indigenous 
identity frame have been granted a specialised status based on their relationship to 
particular territories and/or cultural distinctiveness from the national population (and 
from other Afro-descendants). Individuals of mixed indigenous and Afro-descendant 
ancestry are termed zambos in Latin America and some settled as distinct communities. 
Groups like the Miskitu of Nicaragua and Honduras self-identify only as indigenous 
peoples, whilst others claim both an indigenous and an Afro-descendant identity. The 
Garifuna are exemplary of the latter and are the most prominent Afro-descendant group 
that is widely accepted to be an indigenous people. The Garifuna are descendants of 
escaped slaves and indigenous Carib populations, who generally still practice traditional 
livelihoods linked to their natural environment. They are present in Honduras (with the 
largest Garifuna population of around 250,000), Guatemala, Belize and Nicaragua, 
often living in remote coastal regions settled from the late 18th century (Thome 2004, 
21). As the Garifuna have increasingly come into conflict with governments interested 
to develop their coastal ancestral lands, they have responded by adopting an indigenous 
rights frame to challenge these encroachments (Thome 2004; Anderson 2007). 
Although they cannot be considered original inhabitants of the region, some states are 
willing to accept them as indigenous peoples in legal terms. In Guatemala, for example, 
The Agreement on Identity and Rights o f Indigenous People, signed in 1995, 
acknowledges that the Guatemalan indigenous peoples include the Maya, Garifuna and 
Xinca peoples. The Government of Honduras has recognised the Garifuna among the 
nine ‘ethnic groups’ of the multicultural state (Anderson 2007). The government 
reports that a “significant initiative in the matter of recognition of the rights of the 
country’s aboriginal and Black peoples has been Honduras’s ratification of ILO 
Convention No. 169”,237 implying that Garifuna are considered within the scope of the 
Convention in Honduras; Garifuna NGOs lobbied the government for these rights 
(Thome 2004, 24). Nicaragua also recognises a legal equivalence for the Garifuna and 
indigneous peoples (Hooker 2005, 286). Article 85 of Ecuador’s 1998 Constitution 
“recognizes and guarantees the rights of black peoples or Afro-Ecuadorians the rights 
determined in the previous article [on indigenous peoples], in all respects that are 
applicable”, suggesting that only those groups similar to indigenous peoples could 
exercise these rights in practice (Anderson 2007,406).
237 UN Doc. CCPR/C/HND/2005/1 (26 April 2005): para. 321.
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Collective land rights also have been conferred in cases where Afro-descendant 
communities can demonstrate an historical and continuous occupation of particular 
territories. In Colombia, the Afro-Colombians living in the Pacific Basin coastal region 
were afforded particular land rights under the 1991 Constitution, Provisional Article 55 
and finally Law 70 adopted in 1993 (Rapoport Center July 2007). The government 
reportedly recognises that ILO Convention 169 applies to Afro-descendants in 
Curbarado and Jiguamondo. Afro-descendants in other parts of the country have been 
unable to claim similar rights (Ng’weno 1997). In Brazil, the government since 1996 
has been processing land rights claims for some 700 quilombos under the direction of 
the Palmares Cultural Foundation, a statutory body (Davis 1999, 25; Rapoport Center 
September 2008). According to a government report to CERD, “Decree 4887 of 
November 2003 regulates the process of recognition of the quilombos, recognizing the 
principle of self-identification of the populations, who themselves determine whether 
they are part of a quilombo, in conformity with the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169)”.239 Ecuador has also granted Afro-Ecuadorians collective 
rights for ancestral lands.
The effect is that Afro-descendants that have an affinity with constructs of 
‘indigenousness’ in the region are able to make rights claims more or less identical with 
indigenous peoples’ rights, especially with regards to collective land title. Where Afro- 
descendants are more culturally integrated, living in mixed communities and 
territorially dispersed, they are considered assimilated with no ethnic identity basis for 
specialised rights. This creates a hierarchy of rights claimants both within the Afro- 
descendant community and between Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples and other 
ethno-cultural groups. This hierarchy has manifested as collective rights for indigenous 
peoples (and a select group of Afro-descendants), generalised non-discrimination 
policies, and in a few cases some targeted measures for Afro-descendants, such as 
affirmative action.
The success of indigenous peoples’ norm entrepreneurship has relied heavily on 
adjacency to decolonisation norms. They have framed themselves as historically
238 UN Doc. E/C. 19/2007/3/11 (7 March 2007): p 9.
239 UN Doc. CERD/C/43 l/Add.8 (16 October 2003): p 8.
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sovereign colonised peoples, antecedent on the territories of modem states, whose prior 
right to self-determination is the basis of contemporary rights claims. While Afro- 
descendants may be able to claim historical antecedence to the modem state, they 
cannot claim to have been present in Latin America prior to colonisation. More recently, 
Afro-descendants have been encroaching on this colonised peoples frame in innovative 
ways. The final WCAR documents represented Afro-descendants as the diaspora of 
colonised peoples in Africa, a potential challenge to the assumption that indigenous 
peoples are the only colonised groups in Latin America. Some Afro-descendants are 
successfully making land claims by using the historical antecedence criteria (see 
footnote 307). As Anderson (2007) states, this raises the prospect that, in Latin America 
at least, “‘indigenous’ does not always refer to the ethno-racial category Indian” (407). 
Furthermore, through the WCAR, Afro-descendants were able to advance another frame 
with moral obligations as weighty as decolonisation, by pushing states to recognise 
obligations to Afro-descendants arising from slavery and the slave trade, a process 
intimately linked to colonialism.
Indigenous rights activists understandably fear the collapse of their own specialised 
status because of competition with Afro-descendants. Afro-descendants and indigenous 
peoples are both poor communities, vying for the same limited resources and support 
from domestic and international actors. Bringing Afro-descendants to the table is 
perceived to leave less space for indigenous claims. This tension was in evidence in 
Colombia during the adoption of a new constitution in 1991 (Arocha 1998; Wade 1995, 
1997). The constitution was created under a multicultural frame, recognising the state’s 
responsibility to safeguard Colombia’s “ethnic and cultural diversity” (Article 7.2). 
Important concessions were made to indigenous peoples, including rights to land, 
autonomy and political participation. Afro-Colombians were granted a watered-down 
version of these rights, specified in Provisional Article 55 and realised under Law 70 
adopted in 1993. The process was important for shaping the discourse of the Afro- 
Colombian movement, from one focused on anti-discrimination measures to one 
claiming positive cultural rights that were “reminiscent of the indigenous movement’s 
ethnicity-based collective rights agenda” (Van Cott 2000, 47). The process was fraught 
with difficulties, not least because the public, indigenous peoples and many Afro- 
Colombians themselves were not convinced that Afro-descendants constituted a distinct 
ethno-cultural group (Van Cott 2000, 44 and 96). Many of the Afro-descendant elite
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asserted they “want to integrate and be treated as regular Colombians -  that is, they do 
not want to be singled out as an ‘ethnic minority’ at all” (Van Cott 2000, 96). 
Indigenous peoples’ representatives on the constitution’s negotiating committee, the 
National Constituent Assembly, reportedly emphasised “the greater scope of indigenous 
rights from that of ‘other ethnic groups;” (Van Cott 2000, 61). Afro-descendant 
organisations lobbied from the grassroots upwards, forging new forms of collective 
mobilisation at the national level in an attempt to compete with the indigenous lobby, 
which was long-organised, highly visible and supported by advice and financing from 
national and international actors (Arocha 1998, 72 and 82; Wade 1995, 346). In the 
end, the rights recognised for Afro-Colombians effectively split the population between 
those who were accepted as ‘ethno-cultural’ groups, i.e. more like indigenous peoples, 
and those who were not. Land rights are recognised only for a sub-set of Afro- 
Colombians, named in Provisional Article 55 as those in the Pacific Basin region and 
giving scope for the law to apply also to those in “similar conditions” (Wade 1995, 
348). Law 70 (Article 2.5) designated this as those Afro-descendants “that possess their 
own culture, share a history and have their own tradition and customs [...] that 
distinguishes them from other ethnic groups” (cited by Ng’weno 2007, 423). This 
recognition threatened indigenous communities -  who often live in the same territories 
as Afro-descendants - by effectively challenging their privileged position vis-a-vis land 
title. Afro-descendants’ gains overall have been less, however, despite constituting 
some 24 percent of the population against 2-3 percent for indigenous peoples (Ng’weno 
2007, 416). Two seats in Congress are designated for Afro-Colombian representatives, 
as well as special representation on a variety of government committees, tougher laws 
on non-discrimination have been adopted, inter-cultural education is being introduced 
and a development plan for Afro-Colombians for the period 1998-2002 was elaborated. 
The success on paper, however, belies the poor implementation in practice: for example, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism noted of the development plan that “since the 
necessary resources were not allocated, the plan remained largely unimplemented”.240 
Access to land rights provisions has been weak in the face of conflict and development 
encroachments; the introduction of Afro-descendant history and culture in schools has 
not been widely realised (Rapoport Center July 2007). The constitutional process 
initiated a dramatic increase in the profile of Afro-Colombian communities and put 
them firmly alongside indigenous peoples in the national discourse on multicultural
240 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/18/Add.3 (24 February 2004): p 6-7.
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accommodation. Translating this into tangible improvements in the lives of Afro- 
Colombians has proven more difficult.
Other states are adopting national institutions in which both indigenous peoples and 
Afro-descendants have representatives.241 In late 2001, the Government of Peru created 
the National Commission of Andean, Amazon and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA), 
subsequently re-established in April 2005 as the National Institute for the Development 
of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA), a body with ministerial 
status.242 Afro-descendant leaders had a hard fight to secure equal seats at the table, 
mobilising in protest against their exclusion from the early stages of forging the new 
body (Greene 2007, 447). Afro-descendants now have two representatives against four 
for the Andean and three for the Amazonian indigenous peoples. The indigenous 
representatives in the process complained that Afro-Peruvians were not a ‘people’ as 
such, but “mestizos from the coast like any other” who have only “come along for the 
ride” to multiculturalism (quoted by Greene 2007, 443). Despite these and other 
obstructions, Afro-Peruvians were aided in their efforts to secure representation by the 
fact that the body was established under a World Bank loan designated for indigenous 
peoples and Afro-Peruvians and by the momentum of the WCAR, which culminated in 
the same year as the body’s inception (Greene 2007,447).
Afro-descendants living in rural areas have had more success in working with their 
indigenous neighbours, united as campesinos, although conflicts over land in particular 
remain a challenge for inter-communal cooperation (Anderson 2007; Janet 2002; 
Ng'weno 2007; Wade 1995; Rapoport Center July 2007). Whereas poor rural 
communities would once have naturally gravitated towards cooperation (evidenced, for 
example, by NGOs such as the Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, 
Indigenas y Negras del Ecuador), indigenous leaders discovered that on the basis of 
their specialised status they had greater leverage and often abandoned cooperation in 
favour of unilateral negotiations (Anderson 2007; Ng’weno 2007). A case in point is 
Honduras, where the Garifuna and other Afro-descendant communities had long­
standing cooperation with indigenous organisations, including under a joint 
organisation, the Confederacion de Pueblos Autoctonos de Honduras, established in
241 See, for example, in Guatemala the Presidential Commission on Discrimination and Racism against 
Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala, which includes representation for the Garifuna.
242 CONAP AA was criticised widely for its ineffectiveness and mismanagement of funds.
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1992. By the end of the 1990s, there was a split, with several indigenous leaders 
seeking to create an indigenous-only confederation because, as they reasoned, “the 
black movement has a different trajectory” and “they are not the same because they 
were imported from Africa while we were here before the Spanish arrived” (quoted by 
Anderson 2007, 400). In 2002, the Consejo Nacional Indigena de Honduras was 
created, excluding Afro-descendant NGOs. Anderson (2007) finds that the split was 
linked not only to “perceived differences in race, culture, geography and history” but to 
“differences in political ideologies and tactics o f organisations” and “competition over 
funding and access to the state” (401).
At the international level, there does not appear to be any significant cooperation 
between indigenous and Afro-descendant NGOs and in general the two occupy distinct 
spaces (e.g. the WGEP and the WGM respectively). Attempts to forge an alliance 
between Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples in the regional WCAR preparatory 
process proved unsuccessful (Turner 2002, 32), although activists report that the 
processes did enable both groups to identify common problems stemming from racism. 
Afro-descendant leaders express solidarity with their “indigenous brothers” and 
recognise a shared endeavour in combating discrimination. They acknowledge that 
indigenous peoples have been far better organised at the international level and 
consequently have secured more gains; when asked if Afro-descendants have faired as 
well as indigenous peoples for support, one Afro-Peruvian activist replied, “No, la 
poblacion indigena ha podido desarrollar una serie de cosas gracias al apoyo 
intemacional. Si se ve la relation de apoyos otorgados a nuestros hermanos indigenas 
en los ultimos 10 anos es abismal”.243 Afro-descendant leaders have not been shy about 
capitalising on indigenous peoples’ success by borrowing from the indigenous 
repertoire to request that similar structures and standards be established for Afro- 
descendants. The parallels are striking: the concessions made in the WCAR outcome 
documents are virtually the same for both groups; there is now a UN Working Group of 
Experts on People of African Descent similar to the WGIP; calls have been made for the 
UN to proclaim “an international decade for people of African descent” and a 
“voluntary fund for people of African descent”; both of which exist already for
243 Electronic communication with Oswaldo Bilbao, CEDET, 30 October 2008. Author’s translation: “No, 
the indigenous population has been able to develop a series of things thanks to international support. If 
you look at the levels of support given to our indigenous brothers during the past ten years [the 
difference] is abysmal.”
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indigenous peoples;244 the OAS has created a Special Rapporteur for Afro-descendants, 
with a mandate not dissimilar to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Indigenous People; and the 2006 Santiago Mas Cinco outcome documents recommend 
“States consider the establishment of a Permanent Forum of Afro-descendants within 
the United Nations, using the same model as the existing Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Populations”.245
Whereas Afro-descendants used to have to squeeze into an ‘indigenous-like’ frame to 
make group-specific claims on the state, since the WCAR, they are better positioned to 
make claims as a distinct identity with their own set of standards. In the public sphere, 
Afro-descendant invisibility has largely been reversed and their inclusion as a specific 
community for policy action is more and more in evidence. The gap between attention 
to Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples nevertheless remains noticeable, not least 
because mobilisation of the former is still weaker. This is largely because Afro- 
descendants still struggle with identity issues. Not all Afro-descendant leaders are 
convinced that asserting a collective ethno-cultural identity is the most effective strategy 
for inclusion. The long-term prospects of the Afro-descendant qua Afro-descendant 
mobilisation project are uncertain. This challenge can be understood better with a brief 
examination of the nature of self-identification by Afro-descendants in Latin America.
Overcoming blanqueamiento:
The creation of a pan-Latin American Afro-descendant consciousness is hindered 
greatly by the nature of racial identity and self-identification in the region. Racial 
democracy has made racial distinctions publicly unpalatable and discrimination 
dissuades people from asserting an African identity. At the same time, multiculturalism 
has opened up opportunities for ethno-cultural groups. Afro-descendant leaders have 
been navigating between these two poles to forge a collective identity that is not 
exclusively race based but that capitalises on the ethno-cultural heritage of people of 
African descent and builds group esteem.
244 The Chincha Declaration, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/23 (27 February 2006): para 81.
245 UN Doc. A/HRC.4/111 (15 January 2007): p. 16.
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Racial identities in Latin America are expressed along a colour spectrum rather than in 
rigid categories. The majority of people of African descent would self-identify as mixed 
or moreno (meaning ‘a little bit black’). A smaller portion identify as black {negro, 
preto), more often because of their strongly ‘African’ physical features that prevent 
them from identifying otherwise, rather than because they seek to make a (political) 
statement asserting their African heritage (Burdick 1998, 140-141). The term ‘negro’ is 
also used as a derogatory slang. Given the implicit deference to blanqueamiento and the 
lack of targeted benefits for people of African decent, the effect, as Thome summarises, 
is “‘Black’ is not a robust category...There are few social, cultural, political or 
economic incentives to identify as black in Latin America” (Thome 2001, 4).
Many people of African descent do not perceive of their disadvantage in racialised 
terms, choosing class-based alliances instead. Moreover, the myth and reality of 
mestizaje has dissuaded the majority of Afro-descendants from asserting a racial 
identity. If individuals do not see themselves as Afro-descendants they have very little 
motivation to join any mobilisation of Afro-descendants. Despite the well-intentioned 
efforts of activists to encourage individuals to assert their Afro-descendant identity, the 
response from many, as Burdick’s study of Afro-Brazilian mobilisation revealed, is 
simply “The black movement is for blacks, and I am not a black” (Burdick 1998, 147). 
The impact on mobilisation has been profound. As one Afro-Colombian leader has 
summarised:
The communities of African descent in Latin America and the Caribbean, owing 
to the precariousness of their identity, poor organisation and continuous search 
for assimilation within the pigmentocratic system imposed by the dominant 
Eurocentric elite, are, in general, socially immobile and silent [...] with a very 
fragmented leadership both at the national and regional levels (Makanaky 2002,
5).
As a starting point for redressing this, Afro-descendant leaders in recent years have 
been focusing on census reform, with a view to reflecting more accurately the 
population of people of African descent and simultaneously creating a collective 
consciousness on that basis. They argue that the existing census and data collection 
practices inhibit people from selecting an identity that would denote them as being of 
African descent, both because of the categories of self-identification and the lack of 
awareness of these issues among those collecting the data. Many Latin American states
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in the past simply did not collect any data reflecting race. Of those that did, 
blanqueamiento and the emphasis on racial mixture meant that people would self- 
identify as mixed and as ‘white’ as possible. Moreover, individuals did not share a 
consciousness of the Afro-descendant identity frame and would express a variance of 
self-identification terms (such as Negro Caribbeano, Garifuna) that data collectors did 
not recognise as denoting African descent. In Brazil in the early 1990s, Afro-descendant 
NGOs worked in coalition to push the national statistics office to change the census 
categories to focus on race instead of colour, believing that in doing so a more accurate 
picture of the Afro-descendant population could be achieved. They were only partly 
successful: the 1991 census offered five categories from which to choose in response to 
the question, ‘What is your race or colour?’, i.e branco (white); preto (black); pardo 
(mixed or brown), amarelo (yellow) and Indigena (indigenous). But race appeared to 
refer to ‘indigenous’ and only 5 percent of the population chose preto, while some 42 
percent chose pardo. Afro-descendant advocates -although not entirely in agreement 
about the terminology -  had requested that ‘negro’ replace both preto and pardo, in part 
because “as one organiser explained, “preto” connotes only color, but negro connotes 
both culture and history” (Nobles 2000, 151). By emphasising ethno-cultural aspects of 
black identity rather than racial aspects, activists hoped that individuals would be more 
inclined to self-select as Afro-descendant regardless of their skin colour. Activists are 
also frustrated by the lack of sensitisation to these issues among those who collect the 
data. For example, census takers in Colombia do not recognise the variations of identity 
that could be denoted as Afro-descendant and consequently do not record individuals as 
such; the effect as reported by one activists is that “over 3 million Afro-descendants 
were assassinated with a pen!”246 There has been some important progress in census 
reform (discussed below) but colour categories still dominate and the pull factor for 
individuals to self-identify as ‘white’ or ‘mixed’ remains.
Instead of focusing on race, many Afro-descendant leaders historically have used 
culture and cultural pride as the stimulus for collective self-awareness. Identifying the 
cultural material on which to base a separate Afro ethno-cultural identity is not 
straightforward. This is not because those elements do not exist -  indeed, they do, 
including contemporary language, religion and traditions - but because for the most part 
they are not seen as exclusive to one subset of the national community, either by wider
246 Interview with Carlos Minott, May 2009.
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society or by Afro-descendants themselves. As Telles explains for the case of Brazil 
“many of the surviving and transformed Africanisms in Brazil have become part of the 
national culture, rather than an Afro-Brazilian ethnic culture” (Telles 1999, 83). For 
many Afro-descendants, their cultural identity and the national identity are 
synonymous. According to one survey in Brazil on descent and ethnic origin:
Afro-Brazilians and indios were those who most often indicated that they were 
of Brazilian origin -  to the dismay of those who had expected black Brazilians 
to indicate Africa as the region of descent. Only persons of Italian, Portuguese, 
German, Arabic or Japanese origin self-identified as being of foreign descent. 
(Sansone 2004, 30)
Sansone is among those who express a concern that Afro-descendant efforts to mobilise 
on an ethno-cultural basis, rather than fighting racial discrimination writ large, is 
dangerously divisive and ultimately doomed because of the realities of racial mixing in 
the region. He argues that “whatever definition we give o f black culture... [it] is a short 
blanket that cannot cover all groups within the black population”; moreover, he claims 
“the labelling of groups and practices as “black” carries the danger of essentializing 
difference” (Sansone 2003, 11-12). The recent experience of indigenous peoples under 
multicultural reform in Latin America, however, suggests that “essentializing 
difference” is the best means to access resources and opportunities, be it through new 
rights regimes or greater attention from national or international actors. Afro- 
descendant leaders would be remiss to ignore that it pays to stand out from the crowd 
under a multiculturalism regime. Their agenda is not separatist, however, especially 
when compared to the discourse of indigenous peoples. Afro-descendant leaders report 
an interest to secure recognition of the distinct Afro-descendant cultural identity and 
heritage at the same time as calling for efforts by the state to include Afro-descendants 
as a pillar of a wider national identity. They desire at once to be, for example, Afro and 
Costa Rican, and for those two identities to be integral (e.g. Minott 2005; Makanaky 
2002).
Sansone is correct that there are important differences between Afro-descendant groups, 
especially across borders. In many countries in Latin America the Afro-descendant 
community is far from homogenous, not only in terms of their rural/urban divide, 
regional identities, economic disparities, historical experiences but also firmly in their 
cultural identities. For example, in Panama there are three different groups of Afro-
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Panamanians: ‘Negros Coloniales’ (Spanish-speaking descendants of slaves); Afro- 
Antilleans (historically migrant labourers from the Caribbean, usually English- 
speaking); and Afro-Colombians living in the Darien border region (mostly refugees 
from the Colombian conflict) (Thome 2003, 321; Priestly 2004). Afro-Hispanic 
peoples refer to themselves as nativos and to the Antilliean migrants as antillos, the 
latter regarded as more ‘black’ and thus further down the social hierarchy than the 
‘moreno’ nativos (Davis 1995, 205). These distinctions have weakened domestic 
mobilisation of Afro-Panamanians and it was only in 2001 that they managed to unite 
under a common organisational platform (Priestley 2004, 322; Thome 2003).
Given this diversity among Afro-descendants, leaders have been challenged to establish 
an identity frame flexible enough to accommodate groups from throughout the region 
whilst still embedding them in a global African Diaspora. Indigenous peoples faced 
similar heterogeneity and solved the problem by forging their commonalities on the 
basis of experiences with states (and private development actors) and a basic set of 
shared rights claims. Afro-descendant leaders have tried to do the same, uniting 
individuals around common experiences of racial discrimination, 
economic/social/political marginalisation and the legacy of slavery. Also like 
indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant leaders have been better able to access certain 
rights where they could assert an ethno-cultural -  as opposed to racial -  identity. 
Leaders have tried to unite their constituents under various identity labels, from 
black/Black, to Afro-Latino, Afro-Brazilian/Afro-Colombian/Afro-Ecuadorian (etc), 
and most recently, Afro-descendant. The term Afro-descendant was widely accepted at 
the Santiago WCAR prepcom where it firmly entered the international lexicon. (Afro- 
Brazilian Sueli Cameiro, an academic and director of the NGO Geledes, reportedly 
introduced the term to the Afro-descendant discourse in 1996).247 ‘Afro-descendant’ 
denotes people descended from African populations that were victims of the trans- 
Atlantic slave trade (Minott 2005, 33). The shift from ‘black’ to ‘Afro’ represents a 
racial to ethno-cultural frame shift, the ‘Afro’ frame underscoring the cultural and 
historical link with Africa. It also unites disparate groups through the common descent 
from slavery and its contemporary impact. This has been a watershed for transnational 
mobilisation because it has created a common identity and solidarity despite the 
diversity of communities self-identifying as of African descent. The association of the
247 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI/INF. 9/08 (16 September 2008): p. 33.
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identity with the trans-Atlantic slave trade helps in norm entrepreneurship by tapping 
into the logic of appropriateness of moral obligations for redress; this mirrors the 
strategy behind the indigenous actors’ use of ‘peoples’ and its ties to decolonisation. 
The reference to slavery evokes the ‘bodily harm’ and ‘legal inequality’ frames that 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) consider most effective. Moreover, the focus on cultural 
identity is a symbolic rejection of the Western and colonial construct of race.
Afro-descendant leaders also have attempted to appropriate the ‘peoples’ frame into 
their discourse, whilst mostly rejecting the alternative ‘minorities’ frame. In the WCAR 
processes, activists used the term ‘Afro-descendant peoples'™  which was not adopted 
by states at Santiago or at Durban (only ‘people’ in the singular was accepted). At the 
post-WCAR La Ceiba regional seminar in 2002, convened under the auspices of the 
WGM, one Afro-descendant participant suggested, “to address the common difficulties 
and regional discrimination, all Afro-descendant people should consider themselves as 
“one people” and not as a “minority””.249 Indeed, the outcome document of the 
seminar called upon the WGM to “study and examine whether the concept of 
“minorities” is appropriately adapted to the resolution of the problems faced by Afro- 
descendants” 250 (the study never materialised).
There are various reasons why Afro-descendant leaders are attracted to the peoples 
frame and not the minorities frame. The socialisation of states to the two terms is 
important. Latin American states have historically rejected that the concept of 
minorities applies in their territory: as Thomberry uncovers from the travaux 
preparatoires for Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Brazilian delegate asserted “[a] minority 
resulted from conflict of some length between nations, or from the transfer of a territory 
from the jurisdiction of one State to that of another” (quoted by Thomberry 1990, 154). 
They perceived minorities as a European phenomenon, one that did not fit with the 
mestizaje and racial democracy models espoused within their own societies. Thanks to 
decades of indigenous peoples’ advocacy, Latin American governments are socialised 
to the ‘peoples’ frame and are more open to using this language in their interactions
248 See, for example, UN Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/5 (27 April 2001).
249 Comment attributed to Mr. Melvin Brown (Respuesta Afropanamena, Panama). Report o f the 
Regional Seminar on Afro-descendants in the Americas, UN. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/40, (10 June 
2002): para. 10.
250 Report o f the Regional Seminar on Afro-descendants in the Americas, UN. Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/40, (10 June 2002): Annex 1.
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with Afro-descendants. Indeed, some governments have accepted the peoples frame for 
Afro-descendants: for example, the Constitution of Ecuador adopted in 1988 (and 2008) 
makes specific reference to “los pueblos negros o affoecuatorianos”, recognising 
collective rights for them (Johnson 2007, 57-58). In the negotiations of the OAS draft 
convention against racial discrimination, this position continues to evolve. The original 
draft made no mention of minorities per se and it was only due to the advocacy of the
9^1MRG that draft provisions for minorities were inserted. The current draft names 
Afro-descendants specifically and as distinct from the category ‘minorities’.252 There 
are also tough negotiations continuing over whether to accord Afro-descendants 
collective rights the same as indigenous peoples (see footnote 300). Given Latin 
American state socialisation to ‘peoples’ and against ‘minorities’ there are clearly more 
gains in associating with the former than the later.
Afro-descendants’ own perception of the concept of ‘minority’ is also a factor. The use 
of the term to denote numerical smallness diminishes the fact that Afro-descendants are 
such a large population in the region. The term ‘minority’ is seen also as less 
empowering than ‘peoples’. A participant at the WGM La Ceiba meeting stated that 
Afro-descendants are “unhappy with the concept of “minorities” because classification 
as a minority seem[s] to weaken rather than empower”.253 The peoples frame clearly 
resonates for Afro-descendant leaders and represents the sense of transnational 
solidarity they feel (and seek to extend). The frame creates unity by emancipating local 
groups from minority status in their state and incorporating them into a wider coalition 
of identity. As one Afro-Peruvian activist summarised: “Mis 20 aiios de experiencia en 
el proceso organizativo del pueblo afroperuano me han permitido identificar que uno de 
nuestros grandes retos es lograr ser aceptados y reconocidos como pueblo” (Munoz 
Almenerio 2007,487).254
At Santiago, African Americans, African Caribbeans and Afro Latinos united under the 
common frame of Afro-descendant. This was a key step in the norm entrepreneurship 
process because it enabled groups to forge a shared normative agenda and an
251 Cynthia Morel, Legal Cases Officer, MRG. Communication with the author, March 2006.
252 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI-57/07 rev. 11 (18 February 2009): preamble.
253 Comment attributed to Mr. Dario Solano (Fundacion Afrocimarron, Dominican Republic). UN. Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/40, (10 June 2002): para.8.
254 “My twenty years of experience in the process of organising the Afro-Peruvian people has enabled me 
to identify that one of our biggest challenges is to be accepted and recognised as people” (author’s 
translation).
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organisational platform for advocacy. There is no accepted definition of Affo- 
descendant in international law, although there has been some interest to develop one 
for the purposes of better data collection. Activists have been working with Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to create a common 
platform on the use of ethnic variables in the 2010 census processes in the region. 
They want to establish a shared understanding of the Affo-descendant identity and its 
expression in various contexts so that population figures for Afro-descendants can be 
recorded more accurately. This is a challenging task, one that must be sensitive to 
localised self-identification practices with a view to uniting rather than homogenising 
Affo-descendant identities. Any definition might circumscribe the population: for 
example, in North America and Europe, voluntary migration ffom Africa accounts for a 
significant portion of the Afro population. This is less problematic for Latin 
Americans, where virtually all Afro-descendants have ancestry from slaves but limiting 
new norms only to those descended from slaves would divide the African diaspora, who 
share the common experience of discrimination but not the common legacy of slavery. 
Given that the norms have emerged in part from the “logic of appropriateness” of 
reparations for slavery, Afro-descendants could find their global mobilisation weakened 
by a context-dependant frame, much the same way indigenous peoples have been 
struggling to apply the ‘colonisation’ frame beyond the context of European settler 
states.
Afro-descendant leaders clearly see much to be gained from carving out a distinct 
identity for their communities in Latin America. Creating a strong social and political 
incentive to belong to the Afro-descendant ‘people’ continues to be a challenge for 
leaders. One means of overcoming this has been to seek a strong package of rights for 
individuals that self-identify as Afro-descendants.
255 This is a major initiative; the most recent meeting in Santiago, 19-21 November 2008, was attended by 
over 100 participants, including many of the key Afro-descendant leaders. The workshop was entitled, 
“Censos 2010 y la inclusion del enfoque etnico: Hacia una construction participativa con pueblos 
indigenas y afrodescendientes en America Latina”, and was led by the ECLAC Population Division in 
cooperation with several UN agencies.
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Linking identity to rights: an emerging Afro-descendant rights corpus
The struggle of Afro-descendants to forge a distinct transnational identity is linked also 
to their interests in claiming rights. Neither their identity nor their rights claims fit 
easily into any existing group rights regimes. Affo-descendant communities often have 
pursued different rights claims even within the same state. These claims can be divided 
broadly into those for collective land rights, for the preservation of cultural identity and 
for protection against racial discrimination* Overarching all of this has been a common 
interest in asserting basic economic, social, civil and political rights.
Each of these groups of rights is attached to different identity frames and rights regimes 
(albeit with some overlap). Land rights are addressed within the indigenous peoples 
rights regime; cultural rights within the indigenous peoples and minority rights regimes; 
racism within the non-discrimination regime; and socio-economic and political 
participation within the general human rights regime. The different rights regimes have 
in essence divided the Affo-descendant community because there is no single 
international rights regime -  and corresponding identity frame - that addresses the range 
of concerns they express. For example, land rights are not directly relevant to all Afro- 
descendant communities, at least not in the same way, with some communities making 
collective ancestral land claims linked to culture and others interested in (individual title 
to) land primarily to alleviate poverty. The emphasis on cultural rights has also been 
challenging, with some communities retaining vestiges of African culture and 
exercising distinct religious and linguistic identities, while others are assimilated into 
the national culture. There is a strong preference among some activists to emphasise 
race and ‘blackness’ rather than an identity frame that accepts anyone of African 
descent regardless of colour. Some Afro-descendants might happily self-identify as 
indigenous peoples, while others would reject any identity frame that distinguishes them 
from citizens at large.
Faced with this construction, Afro-descendant leaders have tried to shape a new Afro- 
descendant rights regime that incorporates collective, cultural and non-discrimination
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elements under a common Afro-descendant identity frame. The project prompted 
leaders to construct a corpus of rights that reunites all Afro-descendants under a 
contiguous set of norms rather than artificially dividing them according to, inter alia, 
their indigenous affinities, their physical appearance or their advocacy priorities.
This new patchwork of rights claims is constructed from the remnants of past advocacy, 
the indigenous rights lexicon, divergent community interests and the WCAR discourse. 
Many of the current rights claims strongly resemble those of indigenous peoples. One 
important distinction is the assertion of collective rights (especially to land) without 
asserting the unqualified right to self-determination per se, which is so central in the 
indigenous rights discourse. This is perhaps because Afro-descendant leaders have 
witnessed the objections this point has raised with states but also because claims for 
self-determination do not accurately capture their own sense of identity vis-a-vis the 
state or wider society. The indigenous peoples’ discourse is not the only source of 
inspiration. Some Afro-descendant leaders long ago adopted the rhetoric of 
‘peoplehood’, influenced by Pan-Africanism and the African decolonisation processes 
(see, for example, Nascimento 1990). The emphasis on the cultural distinctiveness of 
black communities has also featured since the early days of mobilisation. Presently, 
there is an important emphasis on policies for combating racial discrimination, such as 
affirmative action and census reform, which are either absent or less prominent in 
indigenous advocacy. Anti-racism measures have long featured in Afro-descendant 
advocacy but were further entrenched by the influence of the WCAR processes.
Some authors have expressed concern about the assertion by Afro-descendants of what 
they term ‘ethno-cultural rights’ in lieu of an agenda focused on combating racial 
discrimination. Juliet Hooker’s views are representative: she claims it is “not clear that 
collective rights based on a cultural difference can address race-based structural 
inequalities” (Hooker 2005, 308). On the flipside, efforts to combat racial 
discrimination face the difficult paradox summarised by Mala Htun, where “there is a 
tension between trying to get beyond race on the one hand and forming practical 
strategies to combat racism on the other” (Htun 2005, 25).
These are both legitimate concerns but they leave Afro-descendant leaders with a 
difficult dilemma. To begin, the realties of die domestic sphere cannot be ignored.
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They have witnessed the successes of indigenous peoples in mobilising collectively on 
the basis of constituting distinct ethno-cultural groups. Within the context of 
multicultural reforms in Latin America, both states and publics have responded better to 
this kind of mobilisation than mobilisation based on racial identity. Many Afro- 
descendants do not wish to identity along racial lines, so emphasising the cultural 
aspects of identity rather than racial categories has proved more appealing. The realities 
of the international sphere are also instructive. Therein, indigenous peoples in the 
region have gained important concessions in the form of specially designated rights, 
greater access to resources from international actors and have persuaded international 
actors also to put pressure on states to respect the rights of indigenous peoples 
domestically. Indigenous peoples have been able to make these gains by mobilising as 
a transnational community with a common advocacy agenda. These experiences suggest 
that at both the domestic and international levels, greater gains can be made if Afro- 
descendants are united, have a common advocacy agenda and base that agenda on the 
assertion of a shared ethno-cultural identity.
When the WCAR processes began, Afro-descendant leaders knew this was their chance 
to secure group-specific concessions; they would not make gains separately as Afro- 
Brazilians, Garifuna or Afro-Colombians but only as Afro-descendants, a united 
transnational group on par with indigenous peoples. The collective Afro-descendant 
identity has proved important for leverage and as a platform from which leaders can 
negotiate concessions from international actors and government officials alike. 
Contrary to Hooker’s concerns, Afro-descendant leaders have not had to trade ethno­
cultural rights for non-discrimination measures but have orchestrated a merger of the 
two regimes under a new Afro-descendant rights regime. Contrary to Htun’s paradox, 
Afro-descendants can combat racism without racialising their communities by using the 
ethno-cultural Afro-descendant identity frame as a substitute for one conceived solely as 
racial. When viewed from the perspective of international rights regimes and identity 
frames, Afro-descendants have not so much switched from “the legal rubric of race to 
one of ethnicity” (Ng’weno 2007, 415) as they have switched from the generic rubrics 
of both ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ to a group-specific rubric of Afro-descendant, as 
indigenous peoples in the region did so before them.
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Afro-descendant activists now have a set of shared rights goals clearly articulated in 
international documents. These goals include: an end to discrimination and racism, 
including through affirmative action, policy and institutional change; specially targeted 
social and economic development programmes; recognition of land rights; improved 
access to education; curriculum reform to reflect Afro-descendant history and culture; 
census reform; improved collection of disaggregated data; and public recognition of 
Afro-descendant history and cultural heritage. Most of these rights have a strong 
collective element. They are also linked to Afro-descendant claims of entitlement to 
reparations for the continuous negative effects of slavery and the slave trade. Rather 
than seek reparations on the basis of individual (monetary) compensation (as has been 
the case with other reparations precedents),256 Afro-descendants in Latin America have 
translated this entitlement into collective rights such as to affirmative action and equal 
development.
It is against this backdrop of identity formation that the mobilisation of Afro- 
descendants communities in Latin America has occurred. The next section will 
consider the historical roots of this mobilisation, before turning to an analysis of the 
contemporary transnational Afro-descendant movements.
Afro-descendant mobilisation: from global to local
Mobilisation by Afro-descendants in the Americas has a long history, starting from the 
first major slave rebellions in the 18th century, to the abolition struggles of the 19th 
century and more recently mobilisation around the WCAR in the 21st century. 
Transnational mobilisation has featured strongly throughout. The civil society of Afro- 
descendants has gradually strengthened in the transition to democracy but still struggles 
for lack of funds and ineffectual advocacy strategies. It is dominated in the 
international sphere by a small number of individuals and has limited connections with 
the grassroots level. The organisational platform is only loosely constituted and 
cooperation domestically and internationally has been undermined by suboptimal
256 Activists site examples such as reparations to Holocaust victims or for the internment of Japanese 
Americans and Canadians. Afro-descendant activists in the US and Canada more often frame reparations 
as individual financial reparations along these lines.
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mobilisation across actors. This section will explore some of these issues and highlight 
how transnational Afro-descendant mobilisation has changed over time.
Historical roots o f Afro-descendant mobilisation in Latin America:
The earliest example of Afro-descendant transnational mobilisation is the Pan- 
Africanism movement. It sought to unite Africans with the African Diaspora in a 
common endeavour for empowerment, self-determination and equality. Many of its 
early leaders came from the Americas, often of Caribbean origin, exuding a post­
emancipation disillusionment and desire for social justice. The movement was 
comprised of a handful of networks, including: Jamaican Marcus Garvey’s (1887-1940) 
Universal Negro Improvement Association/African Communities League; the National 
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), founded by Haitian- 
descendant W.E.B. Dubois (1868-1963) in the United States; and the nigritude 
movement co-founded by Aime Cesaire (b. 1913) of Martinique in the 1930s out of 
French colonies, including in the Caribbean. These different strands of Pan-Africanism 
did not always share a common agenda. Garvey and Dubois famously clashed, the 
former appealing more to the working class, the latter to the intelligentsia, although both 
shared a strongly political view of African identity and the necessity of decolonisation 
(Conniff and Davis 1994, 294-296). In contrast, the nigritude movement (negrismo in 
the Spanish-speaking Caribbean) focused less on confronting colonialism and more on 
celebrating the distinct literary and cultural identity of Africans globally.
Members of the Pan-African movements were engaged fully in the international sphere, 
principally through the series of four Pan-African Congresses held in various European 
cities and New York from 1919 to 1927, with a fifth organised in Manchester in 
1945.257 The meetings were attended by civil society and state actors; the first Congress 
held in Paris in 1919 included state delegates from the Caribbean, Africa, France, 
Belgium and Portugal (the US and Great Britain officially opposed the meeting) 
(Conniff and Davis 1994, 295). Very few South America participants attended these 
conferences, with their presence only made visible at the 1927 Congress in New York 
(Rodriguez 2000,21).
257 The first Pan-African Conference was held in 1900 in London, organised by Trinidadian Henry 
Sylvester Williams. Pan-African Congresses have also been held post-1945.
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The outcome recommendations of the 1919 Congress were aimed specifically at the 
Versailles Conference, with a view to representing the interests of colonised Africans 
and their calls for home rule. By 1945, the Congress featured many prominent leaders 
of the African independence movements, including Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame 
Nkrumah. Pan-Africanism therefore posed a serious challenge to state sovereignty, one 
that ultimately influenced the decolonisation process. The elite participants in this 
movement were focused on changing the map of the world. They drew inspiration from 
the early military victories of the Haitians and Ethiopians in overthrowing foreign 
domination. These actors were also important in securing space for civil society within 
the UN, where the NAACP figured prominently in the call for UN Charter recognition 
of the special UN relationship with non-governmental organisations (Article 71).
Pan-Africanism was supplanted after decolonisation by national struggles that were 
inward looking, including the US civil rights movement. This was in evidence in Latin 
America as well but the domestic dynamics differed. In contrast to those in the US or 
the newly independent states of Africa, Afro-descendants in Latin America had equal 
citizenship rights in relatively stable states. Afro-descendants were as likely to find 
common ground across class as race and many focused on participation in political 
parties and trade unionism, organisations usually dominated by whites (Conniff and 
Davis 1994, Ch. 14). Among the earliest examples of black social mobilisation was the 
Frente Negra Brasileira (FNB), founded in Brazil in 1931 as an organisation but which 
became a political party in 1936 (still the country’s only example of a black political 
party). The FNB had a civil rights agenda, seeking full integration and freedom from 
discrimination for Afro-Brazilians (Davis 1995, 255). Under President Vargas the FNB 
and other political organisations were banned from 1937 and it was not until after 
WWD that another organisation filled its place, the Teatro Experimental do Negro 
(TEN) founded in the late 1940s by Abdias do Nascimento. TEN used the projection of 
a distinct black cultural identity as a means to raise social consciousness and promote 
political and civil rights, an approach repeated by other organisations. TEN organised 
the First National Negro Congress in May 1949 but it remained a space of the 
intellectual elite and was widely criticised as being disconnected from the majority of 
Afro-descendants living in poverty (Barcelos 1999,159).
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An important deepening of Afro-descendant consciousness occurred in the 1970s as the 
black intelligentsia became better aware of the American civil rights struggle (Morrison 
2002, 17). A handful of new black organisations emerged in this period, including 
three organisations that continue to be influential today: the Moviemento Negro 
Unificado (MNU) created in 1978 in Brazil; CIMARRON (the National Movement for 
the Human Rights of the Afro-Colombian Communities in Colombia) formally 
consolidated in 1982 on the basis of earlier associations (Wade 1995, 342); and the 
Organization Fraternal Negra Hondurena (OFRANEH) established in 1977 in Honduras 
following a campaign to combat racial discrimination against the Garifuna Afro- 
descendant community (Anderson 2007, 392).
The mobilisation also became more transnational: a series of Congresses on Black 
Culture in the Americas were held from 1977 in Cali, Colombia;258 in Panama City, 
Panama (1980); in Sao Paulo, Brazil (1982); and in Quito, Ecuador (1984). Speaking at 
the first Congress, Abdias do Nascimento hailed the event as “the first time in four 
centuries the African descendants of the Americas have an opportunity to meet 
together” (Nascimento 1995, 233). The meetings were a regional resurrection of the 
Pan-African Congresses but focused primarily on problems of Afro-descendants in the 
diaspora. There was a distinct absence of grass roots actors but the programme was 
committed to dialogue on a broad range of issues from religion and art to politics, socio­
economic exclusion, identity and racism (Davis 1995, 363). The Congresses provided 
an important organisational platform for forging a regional agenda and a transnational 
Afro-descendant identity, at least among an informed elite. The attempts to make a 
more permanent structure out of the four Congresses failed due primarily to difficulties 
in funding (Johnson 2007, 65). Nevertheless, a transnational network was forged, 
incorporating intellectuals and activists from North and South America and the 
Caribbean, including across language divides (Davis 1995, 363; Johnson 2007, 65).
Social mobilisation in Latin America during this period was subject to the vagaries of 
authoritarianism. Unlike the stark racial divisions in the US, the notions of mestizaje 
and racial democracy continued to dominate in Latin America and black movements 
failed to generate a mass appeal among their target audience because many chose not to
258 The first Congress was organised by the Cultural Association of Black Peruvian Youths, the Afro- 
Colombian Studies Center, and the Colombian Foundation for Folklore Research. The Congress was 
attended by over 200 delegates (Rodriguez 2000, 22). \
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assert politically an African descent identity. Leaders also faced the challenge of 
mobilising a community where educational attainment, resources, access to information, 
and advocacy capacity were low, making collective organisation all the more difficult. 
Those participating in Afro-descendant mobilisation were primarily of the urban middle 
class and intelligentsia.
Some tensions within Afro-descendant civil society arose between those organisations 
with a more political and those with a more cultural interest. The MNU was firmly of 
the former type and Covin (1996) reports some of the MNU members were openly 
critical of the apolitical approach of many NGOs. At the same time, the MNU saw the 
mobilisation potential of cultural identity, both within Brazil and transnationally, 
asserting in their documentation “Black culture is...used as a means to promote 
linkages among Affo-Brazilians and even with people of African descent in other 
countries” (Covin 1996, 46). Pride in shared culture and the cultural contribution of 
Afro-descendants to Latin American identity was seen as a way of persuading people to 
assert their blackness publicly and politically.
Contemporary mobilisation o f Afro-descendants in Latin America:
In the 1980s and 1990s, the influence of the indigenous movement and state 
multicultural accommodation policies opened more space for individuals to (re-)claim 
their Afro identity (Wade 1997; Hooker 2005; Greene 2007). The effect has been a 
significant increase in Afro-descendant NGOs across the region, including the presence 
of at least one Afro-descendant NGO in each country (Morrison 2002, 19). According 
to one estimate, Brazil has over 2,000 African descendent organisations and Colombia 
has more than 60 (Morrison 2002, 19). Many are cultural organisations but a few have 
established mandates for advocacy. Among the most prominent national Afro- 
descendant focused NGOs with a presence also in the international sphere are the MNU 
(est. 1978), Geledes -  Black Women’s Institute (1988), Criola (1992) and Fala Preta 
(1997) in Brazil; National Movement for the Human Rights of the Afro-Colombian 
Communities - CIMARRON (1982), Proceso de Comunidades Negras de Colombia 
(1993), and Asociacion de Afrocolombianos Desplazados (AFRODES) (1999) in 
Colombia; Mundo Afro in Uruguay (1988); Asociacion Proyecto Caribe (1995) and 
Asociacion para el Desarrollo de la Mujer Negra Costarricense (1995) in Costa Rica; La
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Fundacion de Desarrollo Social y Cultural Afroecuatoriana “Azucar” (2000) in 
Ecuador; Organizacion de Desarrollo Etnico Comunitario (ODECO) (1992) and the 
Organizacion Fraternal Negra Hondurena (OFRANEH) (1977), in Honduras; 
Movimiento National Afroperuano Francisco Congo (1986), Asociacion Negra de 
Defensa y Promocion de los Derechos Humanos, (1991) and the Centro de Desarrollo 
Etnico (CEDET) (1999) all in Peru; and Asociacion de Desarrollo y Promocion 
Humana de la Costa Atlantica (ADEPHCA) (1987) and El Centro de Derechos 
Humanos, Ciudadanos y Autonomicos (CEDEHCA) (1994) in Nicaragua.
Some regional organisational platforms exist but most have struggled to create anything 
more than a loose alliance. The most institutionalised is ONECA, the Central American 
Black Organisation that was created in 1995 consisting of 21 organisations from 7 
different countries that meet annually; it has its headquarters in La Ceiba and the current 
President is Sidney Francis Martin. AffoAmerica XXI was founded by Michael 
Franklin in the US in 1995 with chapters in 13 countries; recent reports suggest it has 
splintered after financial difficulties but independent national chapters in Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela remain active.260 La Alianza Estrategica de Affo- 
Latinamericanos (La Alianza) was established in 2000 as a loose network of 
organisations across Latin America and the Caribbean but was never legally constituted 
(Telles 2004, 68). Networks of Afro-descendant youth and Afro-descendant women 
include the Red de Mujeres Affocaribenas, Affolatinoamericanas y de la Diaspora (est. 
1992) and the Afro-descendant Youth Network of Latin America.261 The Global Afro 
Latino and Caribbean Initiative (GALCI), created in October 2000, based in Hunter 
College, CUNY, is led by academics but has an advocacy agenda that has brought 
activists together across the region.262 There is no clear leading Afro-descendant NGO 
on the international stage, nor any umbrella coalition INGO (e.g. along the lines of the 
NCDHR in India), although members of La Alianza were the most prominent during the 
WCAR processes. At the core of the current transnational network of Afro-descendants 
in Latin America is a small cadre of Afro-descendant NGO actors. Among the most 
visible are Epsy Campbell Barr, Romero Rodriguez, Edna Santos Roland, Celeo
259 http://www.oneca.org (accessed 1 June 2009).
260 http://www.afroamerica21 .org/inicio.php (accessed 1 June 2009).
261 Some information on the activities of the youth network can be found at UN Doc. A/58/324 (27 
August 2003): para 65-66.
262 See http://www.hunter.cimy.edu/galci/about.htm (accessed 1 June 2009).
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Alvarez Casildo, Juan de Dios Mosquera and Jorge Ramirez Reyna. There is no 
defined leader among them.
Even before the WCR was on the agenda, some renewed transnational mobilisation was 
in evidence in the 1990s. One key meeting was organised under the direction of 
Rodriguez in December 1994 by Mundo Afro in Montevideo, entitled the First Seminar 
on Racism and Xenophobia. The meeting was convened two years after the 500th 
Anniversary of the Columbus arrival celebrations in the region, an event which had 
strongly mobilised indigenous peoples in protest and which also stimulated some 
renewed collective consciousness among Afro-descendants (Rodriguez 2000, 23). Some 
130 delegates representing more than 50 Afro-descendant organisations were present 
{Ibid, 23). Among the meeting’s many recommendations was the firm desire to build 
up a stronger regional network. Another key thread in the dialogue was the interest in 
increasing cooperation with international institutions. Some participants approached 
this with caution, in particular when speaking of international financial institutions, 
others understood that “partnerships with [international political and economic 
institutions] may provide valuable future contacts and access to funds as well as 
information, not to mention raising their own visibility internationally and thus 
nationally” (Davis 1995, 364). This awareness coincided with a change in the late- 
1990s when IOs in the region began to give greater attention to Afro-descendant issues. 
This was accelerated by the WCAR, especially its regional preparatory processes. As 
Afro-descendant representatives came together for regional meetings on social 
exclusion and the WCAR hosted by international organisations, a common agenda was 
crystallized further and a nascent TAN emerged. The Alianza was one of the most 
visible manifestations of this, formed at a 2000 regional meeting funded by Ford 
Foundation and co-convened by Global Rights and the Inter-American Institute of 
Human Rights. It aimed to help Afro-descendants feed into Durban; around 20 leaders 
present agreed on a loose network structure -  rather than an NGO structure -  that would
263 Epsy Campbell Barr, from Costa Rica, was coordinator of the Red de Mujeres Afrolatinoamericanas y 
Afrocaribenas from 1997-2001 and was a founder of the Black Parliament of the Americas. Romero 
Rodriguez is a director of Mundo Afro, Uruguay, is de facto leader of La Alianza, and has worked as 
consultant on Afro-descendant issues to UNESCO and the President of Uruguay. Edna Santos Roland 
founded Fala Preta, served as the Rapporteur of the WCAR and is a member of the Group of Eminent 
Experts established to support WCAR follow-up. Celeo Alvarez Casildo is President of ONECA. Juan de 
Dios Mosquera is the Director of the Afro-Colombian National Movement CIMARRON and member of 
several advocacy networks of Afro-descendants at the national, regional and international levels. Jorge 
Ramirez is a member of the statutory body INDEPA, Peru and was Director of the Asociacion Negra de 
Defensa y Promocion de los Derechos Humanos, Peru.
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enable them to retain their individual organisational identities but strengthen horizontal
264cooperation.
The Afro-descendant TAN is still loosely constituted with no formal organisational 
structure. In contrast to the Pan-African movement, much of the contemporary 
transnational mobilisation of Afro-descendants has been forged with the help of 
political opportunity structures created by IOs and INGOs. It is partly for this reason 
that fewer grassroots actors have engaged in the international sphere, which tends to be 
dominated by a select number of well-regarded activists. The development of the TAN 
has therefore been overly dependent on external political opportunities and funding, 
lending the impression that advocacy is more top-down than bottom-up.
Development of a strong organisational platform for Latin American Afro-descendants 
is difficult because the requisite components of a good TAN are scant. As discussed 
above, the mass mobilisation of Afro-descendants is difficult because of identity issues. 
This leaves NGOs to pick up the banner but the international advocacy capacity of most 
Afro-descendant focused NGOs is weak because of lack of funding and advocacy 
expertise. Often NGOs function on a voluntary basis with no full time employed staff, 
making it difficult to sustain activities. There is a dearth of specialized NGOs focusing, 
for example, only on litigation or on policy, and many conduct a range of activities to 
respond to community needs and available funding. Organisations with an overtly 
cultural focus are common and may be less inclined to cooperate with those working on 
advocacy. Afro-descendant activists are not politically homogenous, although 
nonpartisan links are being created through the Black Parliament of the Americas and 
national legislative caucuses of Afro-descendants as evidenced in Brazil and Colombia. 
There are at present no clear charismatic leaders of the type of DuBois or Garvey or any 
obvious intellectual radicals of the ilk of Nascimento. The epistemic community of 
Afro-descendants is growing; this is strongest in Brazil and Colombia but universities in 
the United States are also increasingly engaging in research on Latin American Afro- 
descendants. This is thanks to increased availability of funding to research and 
increased awareness and interest in Afro-descendant issues among academics and 
students. From this a valuable body of research is building but it still lags behind the 
information available on indigenous peoples in the region.
264 Interview with Ariel Dulitzky, April 2009.
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Demographics and sub-regional interests also play a role in weakening transnational 
action. The experiences and size of Afro-descendant populations across the region 
varies greatly, impinging on the perceived need and ability to forge common platforms. 
Affo-Caribbeans tend to be less directly involved in regional level mobilisation because 
of some language barriers but also because in many Caribbean states people of African 
descent form a majority and do not lack access to political representation. The 
magnitude of the Affo-Brazilian population means they have a higher number of NGOs 
and also greater leverage vis-a-vis their own government, making regional alliances less 
imperative. Nevertheless, Afro-Brazilians have been among the key leaders in the 
regional mobilisation process. Cooperation with Afro-descendants in North America 
has been mixed. African American and African Canadian advocacy organisations tend 
to focus on making gains through domestic political opportunity structures rather than 
through hemispheric advocacy networks or international organisations. There are Afro- 
Latino NGOs based in the US that have been established by the diaspora but they tend 
to have little advocacy cooperation with African American organisations (Turner 2002, 
34). Afro-descendants of Latin America are often frustrated with the lack of knowledge 
of their experiences among African Americans (Turner 2002, 33). Some alliances have 
been forged, including cooperation with Global Rights and GALCI, both of which have 
tried to foster a network between Latin American, Caribbean and American civil 
society. Cooperation with the Afro-descendant diaspora in Europe and other Northern 
states is even weaker. To some extent this was overcome during the WCAR processes 
where an African and African Descendants Caucus provided important space for 
development of inter-cultural understandings of Afro-descendant experiences globally 
(Lusane 2001; Turner 2002, 34). This was one of many exceptional achievements for 
Afro-descendants in the WCAR.
From Santiago to Durban: Afro-descendant mobilisation in the WCAR
The emergence in the international sphere of the Afro-descendant identity frame 
occurred more or less simultaneously with the elaboration of a rights regime for Afro- 
descendants in the WCAR processes. Before the WCAR there were no Afro- 
descendants per se nor any specific rights for them in any international standards. Afro-
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descendant leaders had to create a transnational identity frame, elaborate a shared set of 
normative goals and persuade states to adopt those norms into the international lexicon 
in the short time leading up to Durban. Their success in doing all three is a testament to 
their extraordinary norm entrepreneurship. No other group accomplished as much 
through the WCAR as Afro-descendants in Latin America. This success was not easy, 
however, challenged not least by the diversity of self-identification and interests among 
people of African descent globally. This section will document the norm emergence 
process during the WCAR and discuss the key factors that contributed to these 
achievements.
Afro-descendants secured sweeping commitments first at the Santiago regional prepcom 
(4-7 December 2000) and then in the DDPA. They were aided in their norm 
entrepreneurship both by an existing socialisation to indigenous peoples issues by Latin 
American states and the alignment of their concerns with those of African states. The 
WCAR pushed Latin American states to extend to Afro-descendants certain rights and 
other concessions previously made for indigenous peoples in the region. The grouping 
of African identities under the category ‘Africans and people of African descent’ in the 
WCAR and African states’ interest in reparations for the slave trade, forged a highly 
advantageous alliance for Afro-descendant activists.
The WCAR was an unprecedented political opportunity structure for Afro-descendants 
in Latin America for several reasons. State identities in Latin America were changing. 
Unlike the first two world conferences on racism, this third conference came at an 
important juncture when the region was firmly on a democratic path and the civil 
society of Afro-descendants was burgeoning. In the preliminary state discourse 
surrounding the WCAR, Latin American states were outward looking, blaming other 
countries for the practice of racism but refusing to acknowledge their own failings. 
Racial democracy and multiculturalism rhetoric were shielding the reality of inequality 
and discrimination. As late as 1 September 2000, Presidents in Latin America issued a 
declaration (the Brasilia Communique) in which they state concern over “the resurgence 
of racism and of discriminatory manifestations and expressions in other parts o f the 
world and affirm their commitment to shielding South America from the propagation of 
this phenomenon” (emphasis added).265 Afro-descendant organisations mobilised to
265 http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/70994.htm (accessed 10 May 2009).
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turn this position and with the leadership of Brazil they succeeded. The decision by the 
UN to create a hemispheric regional grouping for the WCAR (merging GRULAC with 
Canada and the US), also altered the dynamics so the insular ‘racial democracy’ rhetoric 
of Latin America could not be trumpeted so freely. Latin American states were forced 
to respond under the spotlight of the WCAR. They could no longer trade on the long­
standing image of tolerance when Afro-descendant civil society was vocal enough to 
expose this hypocrisy. To substantiate their democratic identity on the world stage, 
Latin American states had to recognise racism was a problem at home and respond with 
commitments to eradicate it.
The thematic focus of the WCAR also was a perfect match for Afro-descendant 
concerns. The high profile of the WCAR helped to begin to change the negative 
perceptions attached to the Afro-descendant identity frame for social mobilisation. Race 
and racism were part of the public discourse in an unprecedented way; it was no longer 
radical to be discussing the issues but necessitated and legitimated by the UN processes. 
National and regional dialogues on racism were convened in the run up to Durban, 
meetings that were unlikely events if not for the WCAR.
Donors such as the Ford Foundation and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) were 
prepared to allocate funds to Afro-descendant organisations for advocacy purposes. 
INGOs were also ready to step up their cooperation with Afro-descendant organisations 
for influencing the WCAR outcomes. Global Rights was particularly active in this way, 
training key civil society actors in the run up to Santiago and providing much needed 
strategic guidance and information for NGOs interested in the processes (Telles 2004, 
65-66).
With the external factors in their favour, Afro-descendants needed to organise 
themselves across borders. Some activists, like Edna Santos Roland, Sueli Cameiro and 
Epsy Campbell, had the recent experience of the Beijing World Conference on Women 
to draw from, enabling them to lead fellow activists in devising effective ‘world 
conference’ advocacy strategies. This was an important moment for Afro-descendant 
women, whose expertise in international advocacy earned them a prominent place in the 
WCAR processes. The preparatory meetings brought Afro-descendants together but 
their effective cooperation was complicated by their different identities, ideologies and
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rights claims. It was clear that more gains could be made if they had a united purpose 
and common advocacy goals. Not all differences were left behind, however, and the 
transnational mobilisation around the WCAR exposed capacity gaps, communication 
barriers and divergent priorities, including on the issue of reparations.
At the early WCAR Expert seminars, ‘Afro-descendant’ was not a current term. In die 
Bellagio consultation (March 2000), “Afro-Brazilians”, “Afro-Latins”, and “people of 
colour of the Americas” were used; at the Chile Expert seminar (October 2000), “Afro- 
Latin Americans” was used. At Santiago (December 2000), activists finally put their 
localized identity frames second and united as “people o f African descent”. The new 
identity frame was important instrumentally but also symbolically. As Afro-descendant 
leaders are often quoted, “we came to Santiago as blacks and we left as Afro- 
descendants”. This had the effect of highlighting the historical injustice of slavery as a 
factor in contemporary marginalization (by emphasizing their ancestral origins as 
slaves); it also denoted the African cultural element of their identities; and finally, 
Rodriguez says it “forced Afro-descendants of the Americas [...] to look at themselves 
in relation to the African Diaspora in the world” (Rodriguez 2004, 15). In the Santiago 
outcome document the key identity categories were expressed as “indigenous peoples, 
people of African descent, migrants and other ethnic, racial, cultural, religious and 
linguistic groups or minorities”. In one step, Afro-descendants distinguished themselves 
from other minorities and propelled themselves to sit discretely alongside indigenous 
peoples (notably still second in the list of groups!).
The elaboration of a normative agenda for Afro-descendants tried to accommodate a 
number of interests, first in the regional processes and then at the global level. The 
Afro-descendant WCAR caucus was split across several regions, principally Latin 
America, Central America and the Caribbean, North America and Europe, each with 
their own concerns. The common elements were the desire for states to recognise 
racism and to acknowledge the contemporary social, economic and political 
marginalisation of people of African descent as the manifestation of the historical 
injustices of slavery and colonialism. Beyond this there was a strong constituency of 
Afro-descendants, particularly from the United States and Europe, who wanted 
(financial) reparations for the descendants of slaves. Latin American Afro-descendants 
also sought reparations but rather than focusing on individual compensatory claims they
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aimed at securing commitments to policies like affirmative action and investment in 
social and economic development. Many in Latin American were influenced by the 
discourse of rights claims of indigenous peoples and sought similar commitments for 
their communities, including on the topic of land rights.
These differences impacted on the ability of the Afro-descendant caucus at Santiago to 
act collectively. They split into sub-regional caucuses and, according to one report, the 
“lack of cross-regional and collective consciousness resulted in an absence of 
uniformity and consensus, which had the effect of weakening their positions” 
(International Human Rights Law Group 2001b, 5). There were also clashes in 
approach, particularly between the AfroAmerica XXI contingent, led by Michael 
Franklin and the Alianza contingent. The caucus nevertheless managed to sketch a 
normative corpus for Afro-descendants in the Americas at events prior to Santiago. The 
regional WCAR Expert seminar was attended by several activists who gave their input 
into the final recommendations. The NGO Forum attached to Santiago enabled Afro- 
descendants to articulate the Chile Declaration. Both texts claim cultural and land 
rights for Afro-descendants, alongside measures to combat racial discrimination and its 
effects. The Chile Declaration also gives attention to reparations for slavery. There are 
close parallels between the rights claimed for indigenous peoples and those for Afro- 
descendants throughout the documents. For example, at the Expert seminar states are 
encouraged to “Adopt and apply legal measures regarding ownership of land by 
indigenous and Afro-Latin American peoples, including the cultural aspects of the 
forms of appropriation and the religious factors involved”;269 and the Chile Declaration 
recommends that “the Decade of African Peoples of African Descent be declared as 
from the year 2002”.
When it came to negotiating space in the Santiago outcome documents, not all of these 
proposals were secured but the major normative themes were adopted. Support for 
reparations appears in the text despite objections from the state delegations of Canada
266 According some activists, the imposition of Franklin’s views on the Afro-descendant caucus and his 
untransparent distribution of fimds to other NGOs, raised concerns that eventually precipitated his 
exclusion from the caucus.
267 UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/5 27 (April 2001).
268 See
http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06hrightsWictimGroups/AfricanDescendants/AfricanDescendants.htm 
(accessed 17 April 2007)
269 UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/5 27 (April 2001): pg 25, para 14 (a).
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and the United States. A distinct chapter on “People of African Descent” is included 
(only indigenous peoples and migrants also had distinct chapters). The rights 
recognised for Afro-descendants are parallel to those recognised for indigenous peoples 
in the text (with the exception of treaty rights). The Santiago Declaration states, inter 
alia, for Afro-descendants:
Recognition should therefore be given to their rights to culture and their own 
identity; to participate freely and on equal conditions in political, social, economic 
and cultural life; to development in the context of their own aspirations and 
customs; to keep, maintain and foster their own forms of organisation, their mode 
of life, culture, traditions and religious expressions; to maintain and use their own 
languages; to the protection of their traditional knowledge and their cultural and 
artistic heritage; to their ancestrally inhabited land; to the use, enjoyment and 
conservation of the natural renewable resources of their habitat and to active 
participation in the design, implementation and development of educational 
systems and programmes, including those of a specific and characteristic nature 
(para 27).270
The Santiago Programme o f Action also commits to an extensive array of policy 
commitments for Afro-descendants in the areas of health, education, employment, 
justice, media, land and culture (paras 103-119). No other regional prepcom documents 
mention Afro-descendants, save for one reference in the African regional prepcom 
acknowledging that the effects of slavery “are still present in the form of damage caused 
to the descendants of the victims by the perpetuation of prejudice against Africans in the
971continent and people of African descent in the Diaspora”.
Afro-descendants were a firm presence in the Geneva prepcoms. In the first draft of the 
DDPA “people of African descent” were mentioned only once; by the time of the third 
preparatory committee in July 2001, the draft included a distinct chapter on “Africans 
and People of African Descent”.272 The language is drawn primarily from the Santiago 
Declaration and Programme o f Action. With the exception of outstanding issues on 
reparations, the paragraphs on Afro-descendants were not openly contested and the final 
DDPA includes special chapters for ‘Africans and people of African descent’ (see 
Declaration paras 32-35; POA paras 4-14). There are only two notable differences 
from the paragraphs agreed at Santiago: the Durban documents are referent also to
270 Canada and the United States objected to the references to land rights for Afro-descendants. UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 189/PC.2/7 (24 April 2001): Annex IV, p. 52; Annex V, p.53.
271 UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/8 (27 March 2001): para 11.
272 See UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.3/8 (12 July 2001).
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“Africans” and therefore take on a broader remit; and land rights for Afro-descendants 
are recognised only “where applicable” (POA, para 34). The NGO Forum Declaration 
and Programme o f Action also elaborates distinct chapters for Afro-descendants.
The major disappointment of the Afro-descendant caucus on norms at Durban was on 
reparations for slavery. They sought both the recognition of the slave trade as a crime 
against humanity and reparations for this crime. The demands for (individual) 
reparations were driven primarily by the African Americans. When it became clear at 
Santiago that the US government would not support them, they turned to Latin 
American and Caribbean states for help, in particular the English-speaking states of 
Barbados and Jamaica. Several activists cite the important role played by the delegate 
from Barbados, David Comissiong, who served domestically as the Commissioner on 
Pan-African Affairs and was personally committed to the reparations issue. His 
delegation helped to secure a deal with the US and Canadian delegations so that the 
Santiago references to reparations were included. At Durban, the call for reparations for 
slavery appeared early on to dovetail with the interests of the Africa Group. It soon 
became evident, however, that African states and Afro-descendants had different goals. 
The African delegations were using the reparations discourse to seek resources for 
African states and had less concern for securing individual compensation for the 
descendants of slaves on other continents. Former slave-trading nations - including the 
UK, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal -  were firmly against the reparations, fearing 
that even an apology for the slave trade might open up opportunities for lawsuits. In the 
end, the WCAR text acknowledges “that slavery and the slave trade, including the 
transatlantic slave trade, were appalling tragedies in the history of humanity” and “a 
crime against humanity and should always have been so” (Declaration, para 13). It 
makes no apology per se, does not make slavery or the slave trade a crime ex post facto, 
and makes no mention of reparations for slavery. Afro-descendants lost out, achieving 
no compensation and left with impotent language for making future reparations claims.
The normative gains made at Durban through Afro-descendant advocacy are 
attributable both to Latin American states and to African states. The Afro-descendant 
caucus benefited from aligning itself with the cause of Africans writ large because this 
enlisted the influence of the African Group. States that opposed the draft paragraphs
273 See NGO Declaration paras 63-69 and POA paras 22-25; see also sections on ‘Slavery and the Slave 
Trade’ and on ‘Reparations’.
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relating to ‘Africans and people of African descent’ would have been challenging not a 
marginalised minority in Latin America but the population of Africa itself. This should 
not be understood, however, as a ‘kin state’ relationship stricto sensu; African states had 
no irredentist claims over Latin American territories; there are no contiguous borders; 
and the kin relationship is historical, not contemporary, and difficult to trace in any case 
to individual states. African states’ championing of the plight of Afro-descendants at the 
WCAR bolstered the ideational claims of Africans as disadvantaged in international 
society and corresponding rational state interests in using that perceived disadvantage as 
the basis of material demands for their region. Latin American states championed the 
inclusion of Afro-descendants at Durban because of their own identity interests, 
especially the desire to project internationally and domestically their legitimacy on 
human rights issues. Telles (2004) explains that the virtually all-white Brazilian 
Foreign Service made concerted efforts to bring Afro-Brazilian civil society on to their 
delegation and was genuinely open to their recommendations (67-71). The delegation 
nominated Afro-Brazilian NGO leader Edna Santos Roland as the official Rapporteur of 
the WCAR. The socialisation of states in the region to the indigenous rights discourse 
also played well for Afro-descendants who used “adjacency” to smooth the adoption of 
norms pertaining to their communities. The unhelpful engagement of the Western 
Group, in contrast, has undoubtedly undermined the potential impact of Durban, with 
many delegations shying away from the outcome commitments. This is significant for 
norm adherence given that many states in the Western Group, in particular the United 
States, have large populations of African descent and will be less likely to be socialised 
to the norms elaborated at Durban.
Afro-descendant activists and researchers agree that the WCAR impacted positively on 
the mobilisation of Afro-descendants in Latin America (e.g. Greene 2007, 331; Htun 
2004; Lebon 2007, 52; Safa 2005, 308; Turner 2002, 31). The WCAR gave a new 
generation of Afro-descendants a stronger global consciousness. They exchanged 
information on their experiences in caucus meetings and gained a better understanding 
of one another. The WCAR imbued the Afro-descendant identity with a renewed 
potency and pride, recruiting new individuals to the TAN. The spaces created for 
transnational dialogue were unprecedented and brought together a much wider range of 
actors than earlier transnational meetings, including governments and international
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organisations. Claire Nelson of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) sums up 
the dynamic well:
If the [Santiago] conference hadn’t happened, I don’t know if [Afro- 
descendants] would have crystallised themselves at that time in the way they 
have now. It was a pivotal mobilising force to give their voice legitimacy for 
people who have struggled in the dark for so many years, for the first time the 
governments said yes, they have a problem [with racism].274
The gains made from the WCAR, however, were not evenly distributed among the 
Afro-descendants caucus. The recognition of Afro-descendants and norms for their 
communities in the Santiago and Durban texts gave the most to Latin Americans; the 
weak provisions on reparations for slavery were a major defeat for Afro-descendants 
elsewhere. As J. Michael Turner recalls, “Afro-Latinos felt a certain pride about what 
was happening whereas the African Americans were absolutely despondent”.275 The 
WCAR expanded the transnational advocacy network but it could not consolidate it. 
The surge of funding to Afro-descendant civil society during the WCAR has waned and 
the organisational platform has not been institutionalized as a formal structure.
For Afro-descendants, Durban itself was just one phase of a much wider process of 
before and after activity that has significantly increased their profile and stimulated new 
forms of transnational social mobilisation. Their important efforts in the region 
translated to major gains for the global diaspora of Africans at Durban. The role of 
international actors -  specifically IOs and INGOs - in these processes has been crucial. 
The next section will consider these actors before turning to an assessment of post- 
Durban achievements in norm entrepreneurship.
The role of international actors in norm emergence:
Until recently Afro-descendants were absent from the working programmes of most IOs 
in the region. Government adherence to the racial democracy approach made racially 
targeted interventions by external actors unlikely. Individuals within these institutions 
were largely ignorant of Afro-descendants’ concerns, themselves drawn mostly from the 
ranks of the white elite. Thanks to the efforts of a small number of committed
274 Interview with Claire Nelson, April 2008.
275 Interview with J. Michael Turner, April 2008.
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individuals in IOs, Afro-descendants have been able to increase significantly their 
cooperation with these institutions. This cooperation has aided norm entrepreneurship 
in many ways, including by “certifying” Afro-descendants’ NGOs, offering funding 
support, providing space for transnational mobilisation and by enabling Afro- 
descendants to embed their claims in international institutions and socialise states to 
emerging norms. Three kinds of international actors have been most integral to norm 
entrepreneurship by Afro-descendants: those implementing international development 
cooperation; those promoting regional and international human rights standards; and 
those working in INGOs.
International development institutions:
The first multilateral development agency in Latin America to give specific attention to 
Afro-descendants in its work was the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). This 
came in 1996 with the publication of a review report on the situation of Afro- 
descendants (Cowater International Inc 1996). The work was initiated in 1992 by Claire 
Nelson, an Afro-descendant from Jamaica and IDB staff member, following her 
personal initiative to bring Afro-descendant leaders together in Washington D.C for a 
series of small awareness raising events. These leaders were Michael Franklin, Romero 
Rodriguez, Juan de Dios Mosquera and Jorge Ramirez. She also participated in the 1994 
Montevideo conference organised by Mundo Afro. She later managed to secure funding 
for a pilot research project on Afro-descendants and poverty: the resultant 1996 study 
gave the IDB an important baseline for its subsequent work. Michael Franklin 
cooperated with an external contractor in producing the report and it focuses heavily on 
AffoAmerica XXI partners. Nelson reports that she struggled to generate momentum 
after the report was published because “the issue was so much under the table nobody 
wanted to talk about it”. As a point in evidence, she was requested to remove the 
word ‘black’ from the title of the 1996 report and replace it with the more neutral term 
‘minorities’. She reports it was external Afro-descendant advocates like Michael 
Franklin, based in Washington D.C., and Romero Rodriguez, that put pressure on the 
IDB to respond more vigorously.
276 Interview with Claire Nelson, April 2008.
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In 1999, Nelson came into contact with Gay McDougall and became aware of the 
forthcoming WCAR. This coincided with the arrival at the IDB of a new Vice 
President, K. Burke Dillon. Dillon had been active in the American civil rights 
movement and was a highly sympathetic and influential figure in the IDB hierarchy. 
She began by asking questions about the IDB’s impact on Afro-descendants, breaking a 
wall of silence. Some important initiatives followed: the establishment of an internal 
‘diversity group’ in the IDB and the institutionalization of work on Afro-descendants 
under the Social Inclusion Division. The WCAR provided another external pressure to 
take up the issue, while the IDB’s programming commitment to poverty reduction and 
social inclusion provided an operational justification for the work. The Social Inclusion 
division set up the High-Level Steering Committee on Social Inclusion and the Inter- 
Departmental Technical Working Group on Combating Social Exclusion. The work 
was guided by Mayra Buvinic and implemented by Ruthanne Deutsch. The Technical 
Working Group met in January 2001 to produce an internal Action Plan fo r  Combating 
Social Exclusion due to Race or Ethnic Background (May 2001). In May 2001 another 
IDB report was published on Afro-descendants and social exclusion in Brazil, 
Colombia, Nicaragua and Peru (Oakley 2001).
In the run up to Durban, Dillon sought a major event to bring attention to the issues 
within the IDB. In June 2001, the IDB hosted “Towards a Shared Vision of 
Development: High Level Dialogue on Race, Ethnicity and Inclusion in Latin America 
and the Caribbean”. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, 
opened the event. At the WCAR itself, the IDB was an active presence, hosting several 
seminars with a delegation that included the IDB President Enrique Iglesias. After 
Durban, the IDB has brought together Afro-descendant leaders with decision-makers in 
the Bank and some national political actors through a series of events. A training on 
social development management for some 21 Afro-descendant leaders was held in July 
2002, including dialogue with the IDB President (Quesada 2002). In February 2003, the 
IDB established a Social Inclusion Trust Fund to support initiatives of local NGOs, with 
Afro-descendant NGOs constituting the largest beneficiaries; Norway is the principle
777donor to the fund. Internships for Afro-descendants have been introduced. Since
277 In 2003, 33 percent of the fund was dedicated to projects benefiting Afro-descendants, 13 percent to 
projects targeting indigenous peoples, 15 percent to disability projects and 39 percent to cross-cutting 
projects (IDB 2004, 6).
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2005, the IDB has added a ‘Work Program on Affirmative Action’ to its social 
inclusion activities.
The IDB also has focused heavily on the issue of census reform. This work began with a 
pilot study on household surveys for gathering ethnically disaggregated data 
commissioned in June 2000.278 Also in 2000 the World Bank began to cooperate with 
the IDB on this issue, co-hosting the “Todos Contamos” (“Everyone Counts”) 
conference in November 2000 in Colombia. A follow-up meeting was held in Peru in 
2002, attracting involvement from some 18 national statistics offices in the region. 
Importantly, both meetings also included representatives of Afro-descendants and 
indigenous peoples. Thome (2003) reports that “Between the first and second 
“Everyone Counts” conferences, Afro-descendents succeeded in honing their focus and 
message, and made more concrete suggestions about how to capture Afro-descendent 
identity” (318). The issue of census reform and the precise data to be collected and 
published can be political flash points for the banks. Afro-descendant leaders claim that 
population estimates for people of African descent are inaccurately low, giving a 
misleading picture of Afro-descendant presence and constituent influence. They have 
been keen to work with governments to alter census forms with a view to enabling more 
people to self-identity (in whole or in part) as Afro-descendants. The mostly white 
governing elite has had little incentive to ‘inflate’ the Afro-descendant population, nor 
to expose the wide inequalities faced by groups along racial lines. Few Latin America 
governments collected any data by ethnicity as of 2000. The involvement of the banks 
appears to have influenced a change: as of 2005, only Venezuela and Panama had yet to 
adopt practices for gathering ethnic and racial data (Ribando 2005, 7). Carlos Minott, an 
Afro-descendant leader in Costa Rica, reports that persuasive pressure from banks and 
agencies providing funding for census activities has socialised governments to NGO
970 •requests for reform. As further evidence in point, the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) is currently coordinating an initiative with 
governments, civil society and IOs to ensure that an ethnic data variable on Afro- 
descendants and indigenous peoples is included in the region-wide census round in
9RO2010. With more data available, the situation of Afro-descendants is exposed, one
278 http://www.iadb.org/proiects/Proiect.cfm?proiect=TC0006031&Language=English (accessed 29 
November 2007). Project title: “Costs o f Social Exclusion”.
279 Interview with Carlos Minott, November 2008.
280 See supra note 255.
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tool for enabling - and publicly justifying - more targeted responses from the 
government. Of equal importance, the inclusion of Afro-descendant identities on 
census forms and in public data has contributed to consciousness-raising amongst the 
Afro-descendant population. One of the strategies of the ECLAC work is to ensure 
variant local expressions of Afro-descendant identity are consolidated under the global 
rubric of African descent for the census data collection. The IDB and World Bank were 
making a political commitment by becoming engaged in and even leading reform in this 
area.
The World Bank (WB) has elaborated its own initiatives for Afro-descendants. Among 
the early internal influences was Shelton Davis, a senior advisor in the Social 
Development Department who also spearheaded the WB’s cooperation with indigenous 
peoples. Davis reports that WB officials first became aware of Afro-descendant issues 
through community development projects in Ecuador, Colombia and Peru funded in the 
early 1990s. As in the IDB, the momentum was helped by interest from a high-level 
official: in this case it was David de Ferranti, World Bank Vice President for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. De Ferranti was put into contact with Afro-descendant 
activists via the INGO GALCI in 1999. The Co-Director of GALCI, J. Michael Turner, 
formerly worked for the WB and used his connections to initiate a dialogue. When the 
activists met with de Ferranti in Washington, D.C., Turner says “Listening to [Afro- 
descendants] talk about their problems and issues it was like lights going on...Ferranti 
was amazed!”.281 With de Ferranti’s support, Davis was able to bring in Josefma 
Stubbs, an Afro-descendant from the Dominican, to coordinate WB work on Afro- 
descendants from January 2001. An internship programme for Afro-descendants was 
created in 2000. De Ferranti also pushed for WB involvement in a number of inter­
agency meetings on Afro-descendants, such as the “Todos Contamos” series. 
According to Davis, at these meetings:
We increased our contacts with a wide range of Afro-descendant organisations 
and became increasingly aware of their need for support to improve then- 
capacity to lobby their governments and to participate more actively in poverty 
reduction and other projects financed by the World Bank and other members of 
the donor community. As a result of these meetings we solicited resources from 
a Dutch Trust Fund, DFID, and a regional Institutional Development Fund (IDF) 
to provide a number of small grants to Afro-descendant organisations for
281 Interview with J. Michael Turner, April 2008.
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purposes of improving their capacity to lobby and negotiate with their 
governments in terms of poverty reduction and social inclusion policies and 
strategies, as well as to plan, implement and evaluate their self-managed 
community development (Davis 2003, 9).
These small grants have stimulated increased advocacy for Afro-descendants: for 
example, a WB grant enabled Afro-Venezuelan NGOs to organise a consultation with 
23 Afro-Venezuelan community-based organisations and to establish a common 
organisational platform (Garcia 2000, 34). The WB has injected funds into local 
development projects where Afro-descendants are key beneficiaries (usually alongside 
indigenous peoples), such as the PRODEPINE II project in Ecuador (allocated $34 
million in 2004) and Nuestras Raices programme in Honduras (allocated $15 million in 
2004).282 The WB has also commissioned further research on Afro-descendants, 
including a series of in-depth national reports between 2003 and 2005, focusing on 
Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru.283 The issue of land rights has 
featured strongly and the WB has worked closely with Affo-Colombians and Afro- 
Brazilians to demarcate lands. This cooperation has not always been positive, 
however, and at least one Afro-descendant NGO, OFRANEH, requested an 
investigation by the WB Inspection Panel, concerned that the land titling project was 
ignoring collective land title in favour of an individual rights model, contra the 
preference and rights of the affected Garffuna.285
Cooperation between the WB and the IDB on Afro-descendant issues was further 
solidified through the Inter-Agency Consultation on Race in the Americas (LAC). The 
LAC began as a meeting in June 2000, co-convened by the IDB, WB and the Inter- 
American Dialogue (a US policy institute). Jeanette Sutherland was the contact point at 
the WB for the meeting; she had worked previously with Michael Franklin of 
AffoAmerica XXI. The meeting brought together Afro-descendant leaders, 
development experts and government representatives to discuss the issue of race and 
poverty among Afro-descendants in Latin America (Inter-American Foundation 2000). 
It was a landmark meeting, the first in what would become a series of LAC annual
282 See World Bank Approves $34 Million For Indigenous And Afro-Descendent Peoples ’ Development In 
Ecuador, Press Release No: 2004/426/LAC, 17 June 2004; Honduras: World Bank Approves $15 Million 
Credit For Indigenous And Afro-Descendant Community Development Projects, Press Release No: 
2004/341/LAC, 4 May 2004.
283 See the publication series “Mas alia de los Promedios: Afrodescendientes en America Latina”.
284 Interview with Shelton Davis, April 2008.
285 The Panel ruled in favour of the requesters. World Bank Inspection Panel, Investigation Report -  
Honduras: Land Administration Project (IDA Credit 3858-HO), Report No. 39933-HN (12 June 2007).
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meetings (2000-2007) to try and forge regional cooperation on overcoming 
discrimination and exclusion faced by Afro-descendants. Among the other agencies 
actively involved were DFID, Ford Foundation, Inter-American Foundation (a US 
agency), the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Pan-American 
Health Organization. Although civil society participated in some of the LAC meetings, 
the space was principally for individuals within the respective agencies interested to 
advance the work on Afro-descendants. The IAC was, in essence, an information 
exchange and support group; individuals could use the leverage of the IAC to push 
similar agendas in their own institutions. The exchange of information also helped to 
ensure that, given the limited resources available for work on Afro-descendants, there 
would not be duplication between agencies. Participation in the IAC was initially at a 
very high level (including Dillon and de Ferranti among others) making it influential as 
a result, but when senior actors left the institutions they were replaced by technical staff 
who were less well placed to drive forward any major initiatives. Originally funded by 
DFID, the activities only lasted as long as they did because of the high exchange rate of 
the British pound which made the resources stretch further.286 Although there is interest 
among key members to resurrect the IAC, with no funding in sight and no high-level 
endorsement within the institutions, its future is uncertain.
Other international agencies with a development focus have engaged in some peripheral 
projects for Afro-descendants. UNESCO was one of the earliest IOs to focus on racial 
discrimination and was active not only in research on race in Latin America but also in 
directly supporting some Afro NGOs, such as the Center for the Investigation and 
Development of Black Culture in Colombia, where UNESCO financed a periodical 
called Presencia Negra (Wade 1995, 342). More recently, UNESCO used its focus on 
culture and education to launch a major project in 1994 on the history of the slave route
9R7that has them engaged with several Afro-descendant partners in Latin America. 
Several post-WCAR projects have been launched under UNESCO’s Integrated Strategy 
against Racism and Discrimination (from 2003). In Latin America, this has included 
co-hosting the First General Conference of the Coalition of Latin American and 
Caribbean Cities against Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia, convened in 
Montevideo in September 2007. The Afro-Umguayan NGO Mundo Afro was one of the 
steering members of the coalition. Mundo Afro has worked with UNICEF to prepare a
286 Interview with Judith Morrison, April 2008.
287 See www.unesco.org/culture/slaveroute/ (accessed 2 January 2008).
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major advocacy handbook for Afro-descendants, the Manual de los Afrodescendientes 
de las Americas y  el Caribe (2006). ECLAC has been a partner in some IDB and WB 
initiatives regarding ethnicity and development in the region; in April 2008, it hosted a 
regional seminar on Afro-descendants. Some bilateral development agencies such as 
DFID, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD) have been important donors to regional funds 
supporting Afro-descendant community development. DFID’s Regional Assistance 
Plan 2004-2007 for Latin America makes note of Afro-descendants alongside 
indigenous peoples, noting that discrimination is a cause of their poverty (DFID 2004, 
3). More recently the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development 
(AECID) has launched a major initiative aimed at Afro-descendants in Colombia, 
Ecuador and Panama (AECED 2007). This attention is not consistent across 
development agencies -  for example, the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) has not made a priority of targeting initiatives for Afro-descendants (Ribando 
Seelke 2008, 15-17); one notable exception is USAID engagement with Afro- 
Colombians, which has been limited to modest civil society funding under the Plan 
Colombia but has been increased in 2009 to some $15 million, including support to 
affirmative action, social development and human rights projects for Afro- 
Colombians.288
Human rights institutions:
OAS human rights institutions:
The Organization of American States (OAS) has two principle human rights 
institutions: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. Very little attention had been paid to the issue of racial 
discrimination within the OAS General Assembly prior to the WCAR preparations; in 
the 1990s only one resolution in 1994 was dedicated to the issue of “Nondiscrimination
9RQand Tolerance”. During this same period, the OAS was elaborating a draft American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (as yet to be adopted). From the late
288 Personal communication from Leonardo Reales, 22 April 2009.
289 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI-8/05 (4 October 2005): p. 2. The 1994 resolution on 
Nondiscrimination and Tolerance is AG/RES. 1271 (XXIV-O/94).
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1990s, these institutions have become increasingly engaged on Afro-descendant issues 
through, inter alia, the drafting of a new convention against racial discrimination, the 
establishment of a new Special Rapporteur, court decisions and attention to Afro- 
descendants in country visit reports. These processes are helping to socialise states to 
Afro-descendant concerns and to elaborate a set of regional normative provisions for 
their communities.
The Commission was slow to respond to the concerns of Afro-descendants for several 
reasons. Many inside the Commission did not consider Afro-descendant issues a 
priority and there was little pressure from Afro-descendant or human rights NGOs to 
engage on these issues.290 By the early 1990s, it was beginning to give attention to the 
rights of indigenous peoples but Afro-descendants remained invisible. For example, in a 
1993 country report on Colombia a separate chapter on indigenous peoples is included 
but no mention is made of Afro-descendants (some constitutional provisions for “ethnic 
groups” are noted briefly).291 By 1999, in a second country visit to Colombia, the report 
includes chapters on “the rights of indigenous peoples” and “the rights of black 
communities” 292 In a 1997 country report for Brazil, distinct chapters for “human 
rights of indigenous peoples in Brazil” and “racial discrimination” appear, the latter 
containing information on the situation of “black” Brazilians.293 In the same year a 
country report for Ecuador provides distinct chapters for “indigenous peoples” and 
“Afro-Ecuadorians”.294 Finally, in a 2000 country report for Peru, there is no mention 
of Afro-Peruvians but a distinct chapter on “the rights of indigenous communities”.295 
The Commission ceased to produce country report from 2003 but some thematic studies 
do mention Afro-descendants. There was little consistency on how the Commission 
approached these issues, ranging from complete omission, to examining them through a 
racial discrimination prism only, to acknowledging collective rights for Afro- 
descendant communities.
The 2001 WCAR helped to stimulate a change. Among the most promising work is the 
draft Inter-American Convention against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and
290 Interview with Ariel Dulitzky, April 2009.
291 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/n.84 Doc. 39 rev. (14 October 1993): Chapter XI: The Rights of 
Indigenous People in Colombia.
292 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/n. 102 Doc. 9 rev. 1 (26 February 1999).
293 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/n.97 Doc. 29 rev. 1 (29 September 1997).
294 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (24 April 1997).
295 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 106 Doc. 59 rev. (2 June 2000).
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Intolerance and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons of African Descent and 
Racial Discrimination, created in 2005. The proposal for the convention came from the 
Government of Brazil in 2000 and later that year the OAS adopted a resolution to begin 
its preparation.296 The same resolution urged states to support activities relating to the 
WCAR, suggesting that the convention proposal was part of the WCAR legacy. At the 
Santiago prepcom, the convention was endorsed in the outcome documents.
The draft convention is being negotiated by an inter-govemmental Working Group, 
with Brazil and Colombia as Chair and Vice-Chair respectively. The first acting Chair 
and person responsible for elaborating much of the initial draft is Silvio Albuquerque, 
one of the few Affo-Brazilians in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. Although his personal 
commitment to the work has been instrumental, he has been criticized for not making 
more effort to engage civil society (a common problem in OAS treaty negotiations). A 
handful of states have been active in the drafting process, including Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The United States has opposed a new convention, considering it duplication of existing 
instruments, such as ICERD;297 Canada remains engaged in the negotiations but has 
been vigorously trying to weaken the text since a new centre-right government came to 
power in early 2006. Many are concerned that the process has lost its focus, as civil 
society and states attempt to insert attention to too many forms of discrimination thus 
diluting the focus on racism.298
Afro-descendants from Latin America have been among the most active participants in 
the process but given limited time, resources and technical legal capacity they have 
relied heavily on the financial and advocacy support of INGOs like Global Rights. 
Attention to Afro-descendants figures prominently in the draft, where they are 
acknowledged as one of the victim groups of discrimination and religions “with African 
roots” are included among those in need of protection, both in the preamble.299 The 
most significant development has been a relatively late-inserted paragraph that affords 
Afro-descendants the same collective rights as indigenous peoples. It reads:
296 OAS Doc. OAS AG/RES. 1712 (XXX-O/00) (5 June 2000).
297 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CP/CAJP-2271/05 add. 1 (5 May 2005). It is not yet clear what the position of 
the Obama administration will be on the convention.
298 For example, the draft at February 2009 includes some 21 grounds for non-discrimination, including 
“stigmatized infectious-contagious condition, genetic trait, disability, [and] debilitating psychological 
distress”. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI-57/07 rev. 11 (18 February 2009): preamble.
299 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI-57/07 rev. 11 (18 February 2009): preamble.
225
The States Parties to this Convention recognize the collective rights of 
indigenous peoples and [CO: when pertinent,] of persons of African descent that 
are indispensable for their existence, well-being, and integral development as 
peoples, inter alia, the right to their collective action; to their social, political, 
and economic organisation; to their legal systems; to their own cultures; to 
profess and practice their spiritual beliefs; to use their languages; and to 
administer, make use of, and control their habitats and natural resources [CO: in 
accordance with the Constitutional provisions of the States Parties].300
Afro-descendants did not lobby for the inclusion of this paragraph -  it was proposed by 
the Brazilian delegation in their revised second draft. It was initially controversial not 
because it named Afro-descendants but because it introduced the language of collective 
rights in the convention.301 Several Afro-descendant activists have since embraced the 
paragraph but object to the ‘when pertinent’ language, perceiving it to be an 
unnecessary and discriminatory qualifier. It is true that not all of the rights would be 
equally relevant to all Afro-descendant communities, some retaining no distinct 
languages or traditional legal structures, for example. Alternate proposals omit explicit 
reference to Afro-descendants but not to indigenous peoples, suggesting that states are 
more socialised to the application of these rights to the latter.303 The paragraph risks 
being lost altogether because delegations argue that the paragraph prejudices ongoing 
negotiations on collective rights under the regional draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.
The inclusion of this ‘collective rights’ paragraph would be a significant development in 
norm emergence and close a large gap on group-specific rights between indigenous 
peoples and Afro-descendants. Even without this paragraph, however, the adoption of 
the convention against racial discrimination will mark the first time Afro-descendants 
are named in a legally binding treaty. This alone is a significant achievement for norm 
emergence and will set a baseline for future norm elaboration. As of May 2009, the 
draft was still under negotiation and by insider accounts there is a long way to go. At 
least one Afro-descendant activist is critical of the process, arguing that the exercise is
300 None of the text has been agreed; text in brackets has been proposed for deletion or insertion. OAS 
Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI-57/07 rev. 11(18 February 2009): article 4.
301 Personal communication with Ariel Dulitzky, 12 May 2009.
302 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI-61/08 (30 January 2008): p. 2,14, 19,45 and 49.
303 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CAJP/GT/RDI-112/09 rev.l (19 February 2009): p. 5.
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merely to delay further implementation of WCAR whilst giving the appearance of state 
action.304
The Inter-American Commission has also created a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Persons of African Descent and Racial Discrimination. The Special Rapporteur has a 
mandate to support OAS Member States to respect the rights of Afro-descendants, to 
analyse current challenges on Afro-descendant issues, to gather and disseminate best 
practice and formulate recommendations, and to provide technical advice as needed. 
The position has been held since its creation in 2005 by Clare Roberts, an Afro- 
descendant from Antigua and Barbuda and President of the Inter-American 
Commission. The mandate for a Special Rapporteur was secured through a 
transnational campaign led by Global Rights. In 2003, Global Rights cooperated with 
Afro-descendant organisations from Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay to push the 
Commission to host a thematic session on Afro-descendants. They hoped to make a 
case for a dedicated body in the Commission to consider Afro-descendants’ concerns. 
The Commission was sympathetic to the proposal but said there was no funding to 
support it. Global Rights lobbied the Government of Brazil, specifically SEPPIR, to 
provide start-up funding, arguing that the mandate would help socialise states to the 
draft convention against racial discrimination. After a second thematic session on Afro- 
descendants failed to secure a mandate, Global Rights met with the Brazilian mission 
and the Commission, where Brazil confirmed it would fund the mandate for its first 
year. Brazil also hosted the Special Rapporteur on his first country mission in 2005 
(albeit on the condition that no formal report would be issued). His first and only 
formal country mission was to Colombia in May 2007 (report pending). He has been 
engaged actively in the draft convention process as well as participating in several 
regional meetings pertaining to Afro-descendants.305 Several activists have been 
unenthused by his work to date, concerned that he lacks the political vigour needed to 
persuade states to implement their commitments to Afro-descendants. The fact that he 
is unable to speak either Spanish or Portuguese and is influenced by the distinct 
Caribbean Afro-descendant experience, undermines his capacity to reach out to Afro- 
descendants elsewhere. The mandate is nevertheless an important tool for norm 
emergence, with the potential both to elaborate norms and to socialise states to those
304 Interview with Gustavo Makanaky, October 2008.
305 For details on the work of the Special Rapporteur, see OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/WII.124 Doc. 5 (27 
February 2006): para 81-90; OEA/Ser.L/V/n. 127 Doc. 4 rev. 1 (3 March 2007): para 84-87.
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norms. The impact of support from a critical state like Brazil and an international actor 
like Global Rights is evident: without Brazilian commitment it is unlikely the mandate 
would have been adopted and without the strategic leadership of Global Rights and its 
close relationship with the Commission, it is less likely the campaign would have been 
effective.306
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been an important partner for norm 
elaboration for Afro-descendants, particularly in the areas of land rights, culture and 
non-discrimination. In the Moiwana Village v. Suriname case in 2005 the Inter- 
American Court ruled in favour of the Afro-descendant N’djuka maroon community 
forcibly expelled from their traditional lands around the Moiwana village and unable as 
a consequence to practice their culture. While it was accepted that the N ’djuka were not 
indigenous to the territory of Suriname, the important link between their cultural life 
and the use of lands traditionally inhabited by them since the 17th century was a central 
factor in the decision. The Court argued that Suriname had violated, inter alia, the 
collective land rights of the group and ordered that:
The State shall adopt such legislative, administrative, and other measures as are 
necessary to ensure the property rights of the members of the Moiwana 
community in relation to the traditional territories from which they were 
expelled, and provide for the members’ use and enjoyment of those territories.307
A similar decision was taken by the Court in 2007 in the case of the Saramaka People v. 
Suriname where another Afro-descendant maroon community was recognised to hold 
collective rights to land because of its status as a “tribal people” and its ancestral 
connection to the territory in question; again the Court reasoned that its jurisprudence 
with regard to indigenous peoples’ right to property was applicable to this 
community.308
The case of Lopez-Alvarez v. Honduras provided an innovative interpretation of cultural 
rights for Afro-descendants. Mr. Lopez-Alvarez was a community leader among the
306 A former Global Rights staff member, Ariel Dulitzky, worked in the Commission during the campaign 
and became the first assistant to the Special Rapporteur. Members of the Global Rights executive board 
are also drawn from the Commissioners.
307 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case o f Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgement o f 15 June 
2005, para 233.
308 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case o f the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement o f 28 
November 2007, para 86.
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Garifuna Afro-descendants. In his case he alleged that the state had created a false 
narcotics charge against him as a means of intimidating him and his community during 
their pursuit of a legal challenge to the state regarding land rights. The Afro-descendant 
NGO OFRANEH assisted the applicant in bringing his case. The decision was given in 
favour of Mr. Lopez-Alvarez, but of particular interest is the aspect of the case that dealt 
with the applicant’s right to speak his mother tongue whilst in prison, a right denied him 
by the prison authorities where he was held. The Court ruled this was a violation of the 
freedom of thought and expression and an act of discrimination against Mr. Lopez- 
Alvarez as a member of the Garifuna community, citing that “[l]anguage is one of the 
most important elements of identity of any people, precisely because it guarantees the 
expression, diffusion, and transmission of their culture”.309 Thus, the case was a double 
victory -  being both an effective use of an international institution to challenge the 
obstruction of the state when Afro-descendants tried to claim their rights and also an 
important source of jurisprudence for the protection of Afro-descendant identity.
The case of Simone Andre Diniz v. the Republic o f Brazil was reviewed by the Inter- 
American Commission. The case concerned racial discrimination against the applicant 
in applying for a job and the failure of the justice system to adequately investigate her 
complaint. The Commission found that the State of Brazil had violated the applicant’s 
right to equality before the law, the right to judicial protection and the right to a fair 
trial. The case exposed long-standing systematic failures in Brazil to implement its own 
stringent domestic laws against racial discrimination. In its recommendations, the 
Commission has urged the government, inter alia, to “Make the legislative and 
administrative changes needed so that the anti-racism law is effective” and to “Promote 
awareness campaigns against racial discrimination and racism”.310
These decisions provide a fertile basis for strengthening domestic law and practice and 
expanding the jurisprudence of the American Convention on Human Rights to protect 
members of distinct identity groups, including Afro-descendants. Together, the Court 
and Commission have taken a mixed approach to Afro-descendant rights, at once 
championing them as a distinct community with specific rights at the same time as
309 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case o f Lopez-Alvarez v. Honduras, Judgement o f 1 February 
2006. See especially Chapter IX, paras 157-174. The excerpt is from para 171.
310 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report N° 66/06, Case 12.001 Merits, Simone Andre 
Diniz v. Brazil (21 October 2006): para 146.
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placing Afro-descendants rights under a ‘racial discrimination’ rubric. They have 
capitalised on norm adjacency through state socialisation to indigenous peoples’ rights 
and used the goodwill of post-WCAR commitments to combat racism.
UN human rights institutions:
In terms of forging an organisational platform and norm elaboration UN institutions 
have been more supportive of Afro-descendant norm entrepreneurship than OAS 
institutions. The OHCHR, WGM and Special Rapporteur on racism have all made 
efforts to engage with Afro-descendants, driven both by the personal initiative of UN 
experts and the momentum of the WCAR. Given the distance, financial and language 
issues separating Latin America from the halls of the UN in Geneva, most cooperation 
has come from regional and country contact. Those UN bodies pertaining to the WCAR 
(e.g. WGPAD) will be considered in a separate section below.
The UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights has never issued a resolution on the 
situation of people of African descent. Gay McDougall, former Sub-Commission 
member, has reasoned this was partly the fault of Sub-Commission neglect of minority 
issues in Latin America and the dominance of apartheid when considering racial 
discrimination.311 The WGM has proved a stronger focal point for Afro-descendants, 
thanks in large part to the personal initiative of WGM Member Jose Bengoa from Chile. 
The WGM has hosted two regional seminars312 for Afro-descendants and from 2003 
included ‘Afro-descendants’ as a distinct cluster of discussion in the WGM annual 
sessions. The majority of Afro-descendant NGOs participating are from Latin America, 
in most cases funded by MRG to attend. Travel costs to Geneva are prohibitive for most 
NGOs and although translation is available, the working language of the WGM is 
English, not widely spoken by Afro-descendant leaders in Latin America. It is telling 
that only the Geneva-based NGO Espacio Afro-Americano consistently attended the 
WGM from its inception in 1995 until 2003 (thereafter switching to participation in the 
WGPAD). Some prominent Afro-descendant NGOs have engaged with the WGM in
311 Interview with Gay McDougall, April 2008.
312 A third seminar on Afro-descendants attended by the WGM Chair, Asbjom Eide, but was not 
organised by the OHCHR. This was the Conference on the Rights of Minorities o f African Descent in the 
Americas, Montreal, 27-30 September 2002. The list of attendees suggests the focus was particularly on 
Afro-descendants in Canada.
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Geneva, including Geledes from Brazil in 1996 and 2001, Asociacion Proyecto Caribe 
from Costa Rica in 1998 and 2001, CEDEHCA from Nicaragua in 1998-1999, and 
CIMARRON in 1999-2001 and 2005. Two important bubbles of increased participation 
occurred in 1999 and in 2001. In 1999, several North American reparations-focused 
NGOs were present and the WGM engaged in a brief dialogue on “the legacies of the 
slave trade for the black communities throughout the Americas”. These same NGOs 
made some interesting proposals, including that a “forum for African Americans be 
established at United Nations Headquarters and a new working group established in 
Geneva to study conditions throughout the Diaspora”.313 The second bubble in 2001 
saw some 15 Latin American Afro-descendant NGOs represented.314 Some were funded 
by OHCHR after Gay McDougall encouraged the WGM to hold an informal session on 
Afro-descendants that year, coinciding with a number of preparatory meetings for the 
WCAR running parallel in Geneva. At the 2001 WGM session NGOs raised issues 
regarding country situations, land rights and autonomy.315 The WGM gave space for 
advocacy and state socialisation: for example, in 2003 an exchange was made between 
Brazilian NGOs and the state and in 2004 between OFRANEH and the delegate from 
Honduras.316
The WGM has had a much stronger impact on norm emergence through its regional 
seminars pertaining to Afro-descendants. The first seminar was held 21-24 March 2002 
in La Ceiba, Honduras, an area with a predominantly Afro-Honduran population. The 
meeting was organised in cooperation with the local NGO ODECO. Some 47 Afro- 
descendant representatives from 19 countries participated in the seminar, alongside key 
INGOs such as Global Rights and the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights.317 
No government representatives participated. La Ceiba proved to be a space for building 
on the Durban outcomes, elaborating further a shared normative discourse and 
strengthening the organisational platform. Participants were exchanging views on how 
they perceived their collective identity (including the label of ‘minority’) and what their 
common priorities were post-WCAR.
313 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12 (28 June 1999): para. 60.
3,4 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/22 (22 June 2001): p. 4.
315 Ibid, paras 40 and 72.
316 See respectively, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/19 (10 July 2003): para 8; and UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/29 (8 June 2004): paras. 7 and 34.
3,7 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/40 (10 June 2002).
231
A second seminar was held in Chincha, Pern, 2-4 November 2005 to focus on poverty 
reduction for Afro-descendants. Chincha also has a high population of Afro- 
descendants, enabling the OHCHR once again to symbolically draw attention to the area 
and boost attendance by local Afro-descendant leaders. The meeting brought together 
key Afro-descendant leaders (many of which were represented also at La Ceiba), about 
seven months ahead of the Santiago Mas Cinco Durban follow-up meeting in Brasilia 
and they used this space also to strategise. In addition, several UN Experts (Special 
Rapporteur on Racism, Independent Expert on Minorities, Jose Bengoa, Joe Frans -  
member of the WGPAD), UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank), the IDB and a 
small number of government representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Guatemala and Peru (including the Minister of SEPPIR, Mathilde Ribeiro) participated. 
The meeting enabled an extended elaboration of norms and the possibility to embed 
them in an international institution with the endorsement of leading UN experts and 
agencies. Although the meeting was geared ostensibly towards development issues, it 
also played a role in further entrenching a distinct Afro-descendant collective identity, 
as evidenced in the Chincha Declaration, where participants:
Declare that the rediscovery in Chincha - a historic location in the story of slavery 
in the Americas - of a fundamental aspect of the identity of people of African 
descent has enabled us not only to formulate demands but also to understand the 
cultural, political and spiritual richness of peoples of African descent. In this 
sense, the workshop has made it possible to take great strides towards the creation 
of a new paradigm for the promotion and protection of human rights based on the 
Afro-descendant identity.31
Given the demise of the WGM it is not clear whether this programme of work will 
continue. The WGM was beginning to stmggle in defining its role against the WGPAD 
(although it should be noted that the WGM always welcomed, for example, indigenous 
peoples in spite of the WGIP, regarding itself as an ‘umbrella’ space for all ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities). The WGM served an important function in building 
up the Afro-descendant organisational platform and enabling them to elaborate and 
institutionalize their claims within a broader human rights frame through the La Ceiba 
and Chincha regional meetings.
Among the UN’s special procedures for human rights, the work of the Special
318 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/23 (27 February 2006): para. 19.
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Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance stands out. The Special Rapporteur has made nine visits to Latin 
American states as of mid-2008: Brazil (1995 and 2005); Colombia (1996 and 2003); 
Honduras (2004); Guatemala (2004); Nicaragua (2004); Trinidad (2003); Guyana 
(2003) and the Dominican Republic (2007).319 This is more country visits than to any 
other region, suggesting an interest among Latin American states to be seen as more 
progressive on the issue of racism. Most of the visits have come post-Durban; in Brazil 
and Colombia the first visits came at moments of national dialogue on democratization 
and multiculturalism. The Special Rapporteur’s reports provide an interesting insight 
into the changing views in Brazil and Colombia across the period of their first and 
second country visits, in particular regarding the erosion of the racial democracy 
precept. In the 1995 Brazil visit, the Special Rapporteur reports:
It is generally stated officially that there is no racism or racial discrimination in 
Brazil because the Constitution explicitly prohibits it and because miscegenation 
is a fundamental aspect of the Brazilian population and an essential component of 
the country’s multiracial democracy.. .The appearance of ethnic and racial 
cohesion in Brazil conceals substantial inequalities between Whites, Indians, 
people of mixed parentage and Blacks, which are a legacy of earlier times.320
In contrast, in the 2005 country visit report:
The Special Rapporteur.. .welcomes the recognition of the existence and depth of 
racism by the federal authorities at the highest level, and the adoption of a number 
of laws and institutions to combat racism.321
The differences suggest also the shift within the Brazilian government in terms of how 
it seeks to represent itself externally; in the 1996 report, the Special Rapporteur hints at 
the motivation of the government in inviting him, “Since Brazil is perceived by the 
international community as a positive example of ethnic and racial integration”.322 In 
2005, the Special Rapporteur:
[appreciated the President [Lula Da Silva]’ s frank recognition of the existence of 
racism and its influence on [...] Brazilian society and the strong expression of his 
political will to eradicate it. The President recognized that the law is not
319 See http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/rapporteur/visits.htm (accessed 21 September 2008).
320 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/72/Add. 1 (23 January 1995): paras. 25-26.
321 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3 (28 February 2006): p. 2.
322 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/72/Add.l (23 January 1995): para. 1.
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sufficient, assessed the resistance and obstacles to any meaningful change and 
pointed to the challenge of deeply transforming the current mentalities.
The Special Rapporteur’s visits bring greater attention to the plight of Afro- 
descendants, privilege their NGOs vis-a-vis government through “certification” in his 
meetings with them, and puts government officials at all levels into a direct dialogue 
with an external monitoring body on racism. His country reports are important both as 
accountability tools but also for socialisation and persuasion of states to Afro- 
descendants’ concerns. The shifting discourse of state actors with the Special 
Rapporteur is evidence of how perceptions of legitimacy, conformity and esteem have 
changed over time to affect normative beliefs: many senior level officials now appear 
more inclined to see it as appropriate to acknowledge racism than to deny it. This is not 
true of all states, however; in the mission to the Dominican Republic, where the Special 
Rapporteur and IEM found a “profound and entrenched problem of racism”, the 
government vehemently denied that any racism exists in the state.324 The country visits 
are useful also for norm elaboration because Afro-descendants have the opportunity to 
put their recommendations to the Special Rapporteur who typically includes them in his 
report. The IEM can serve a similar socialisation function, although she has only 
conducted two country visits in the region, to the Dominican Republic and to Guyana.
International NGOs:
A  handful of prominent international NGOs have played an important role in supporting 
the national and transnational mobilisation of Afro-descendants in Latin America. Some 
have played a primarily financial role, such as the Ford Foundation and the Inter- 
American Foundation, while others have assisted in documentation, advocacy support 
and norm elaboration, in particular Global Rights (formerly the International Human 
Rights Law Group) and Minority Rights Group International (MRG).
MRG’s work with Afro-descendants originated in a series of publications, namely The 
Position o f Blacks in Brazilian and Cuban Society (1971, 1979); an edited volume, No 
Longer Invisible: Afro-Latin Americans Today (1995); a second edited volume, Afro-
323 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3 (28 February 2006): para. 10.
324 See UN Docs. A/HRC/7/19/Add.5 (18 March 2008): p. 2; A/HRC/7/G/10 (18 March 2008): p. 22, 
respectively.
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Central Americans: Rediscovering the African Heritage (1996); and a country report, 
Afro-Brazilians: Time for Recognition (1999). Until the WCAR, MRG never had a 
specific programme on Afro-descendants, just a series of discrete publications that 
aimed to provide information on “one of the least studied of all the world’s larger 
minorities” (MRG 1995, viii). In the lead up to the WCAR, MRG received funding 
from DFID to conduct a project on Latin America as part of DFID funding to civil 
society under the WCAR. This enabled MRG to support local NGOs to participate in 
WCAR processes, to build capacity and to publish a regional report on economic 
exclusion of Afro-descendants in consultation with local NGOs (Afro-Descendants, 
Discrimination and Economic Exclusion in Latin America (2003)) and a national report 
on Afro-Paraguayans with Mundo Afro {The Afro-Paraguayan Community o f  
Cambacua (2000)). This cooperation built ties between MRG and several Afro- 
descendant NGOs across Latin America, which were subsequently supported to attend 
global events organised by MRG, including a workshop in Brussels in November 2002 
to interface with the EU -  marking the first time an Afro-descendant NGO had had such 
a dialogue with European Commission representatives. MRG also organised a 
regional training in 2006 in Central America for both Afro-descendant and indigenous 
peoples’ NGOs on the use of UN Treaty Body mechanisms.
Global Rights specialises in human rights advocacy and legal capacity-building. It has 
played an important role in Latin America where its work focuses on country projects in 
Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and Nicaragua, in addition to advocacy at the regional 
level. From 1994-2006, the Executive Director of Global Rights was Gay McDougall, 
an African-American lawyer. She is currently the EEM and formerly a member of 
CERD and alternative member on the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights. 
McDougall was deeply engaged in the WCAR processes and positioned Global Rights 
for a prominent place in the activities. They organised the Bellagio Consultation (an 
expert seminar for the WCAR) in January 2000; had extensive engagement in the
326Santiago prepcom; convened two roundtable seminars on race and poverty in the 
Americas in connection with the WCAR (International Human Rights Law Group n.d.); 
and hosted the Voices public testimony series in Durban (International Human Rights
325 Statement made by Romero Rodriguez, Mundo Afro, Uruguay; author present.
326 Global Rights prepared a Report on the Regional Preparatory Conferences o f the Americas, 
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/chileprepcomeng.pdf7docniH198 (accessed 20 December 
2007); and published an NGO guide to the WCAR (International Human Rights Law Group 2000).
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Law Group 2001). Global Rights has since been a driving force in the drafting of the 
OAS convention against racial discrimination. They also maintain a programme of work 
to train Afro-descendant activists on use of the UN and Inter-American human rights 
mechanisms. Global Rights has convened several hearings with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in an effort to increase engagement of the Commission 
on issues concerning Afro-descendants (Global Rights 2004, 12-13). Some targeted 
reports have been produced, including Brazil: Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
(Global Rights 2005), emerging out of an Affirmative Action Affinity Group convened 
by Global Rights in 2003, which brought together academics, lawyers and NGOs in the 
US, Brazil and Uruguay for a joint advocacy strategy supporting information 
exchanges, high-level policy dialogue and litigation on affirmative action. In 
Nicaragua, Global Rights worked with local Afro-descendant NGO CEJUDHCAN 
(Centro por la Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Costa Atlantica de Nicaragua) from 
1997-2003 on land rights claims. Global Rights has nurtured a cadre of individuals 
working on Afro-descendant issues with greater knowledge of regional and 
international human rights mechanisms and domestic legal policy and practice. This is 
helping nascent norms to solidify through holding more governments accountable to 
them in practice. Given its privileged access to IOs in Washington D.C., Global Rights 
has taken the lead in creating political opportunities for advocacy on Afro-descendant 
issues.
A similar role has been played by the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (HDH), 
a regional INGO based in Costa Rica, which has supported Afro-descendant advocacy 
and also normative work on the OAS convention against racial discrimination.327 For 
example, HDH helped divided Afro-Panamanian groups to come together in 2005 to 
form a national coalition, the Consejo de la Etnia Negra, through which they managed 
to successfully exert pressure on the government to adopt affirmative action 
initiatives.328 They have recently published a series of guides for Afro-descendant 
activists on identity and rights issues, funded by NORAD and SEDA.
Afro-descendant mobilisation has been aided significantly by funding organisations, in 
particular the Ford Foundation and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF). Both are 
American: Ford is funded privately and the IAF is an independent agency of the US
327 See http://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/Diversidades/ (accessed 21 December 2007).
328 Interview with Carlos Minott, October 2008.
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government. The Ford Foundation established offices in Latin America in 1962. It gave 
support to academics working on race relations from the late 1970s and subsequently to 
civil society organisations focusing on Afro-descendants. For example, the Brazil 
office included two African-American program officers in the 1980s, J. Michael Turner 
(co-founder of GALCI) and Patricia Sellers, who not only supported local research and 
community development through grants but also promoted an exchange of experiences 
and contacts between Afro-Brazilians and African Americans (Johnson 2007, 68). 
Turner says he was under pressure from both the white academic community and the 
Brazilian Foreign Ministry to stop “wasting the Foundation’s money with this Affo- 
Brazilian stuff I was doing”. 329 He solicited the support of (future President of Brazil) 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso to endorse his work and Cardoso reportedly replied, “We 
Brazilians don’t like to look at our dirty laundry. And our dirty laundry is race. You 
remember my thesis was looking at race in southern Brazil. [...] You must continue 
what you are doing”. From 1997 to 2000, Edward Telles, a sociologist with expertise 
on race relations in Brazil, was the human rights program officer for Ford in Brazil and 
under his influence grants to anti-racism related projects increased threefold, supporting 
among other things networks, affirmative action campaigns, research, and leadership 
training (Htun 2005, 23). Ford also gave specific grants for enabling Afro-descendants 
to participate in the WCAR processes, reaching into the millions of dollars (Htun 2004, 
77).
The profile of some recent funding recipients330 across the region demonstrates the Ford 
Foundation’s active role in enabling norm entrepreneurship. In Brazil, the Institute for 
Racial and Environmental Advocacy has funding for “For workshops, publications and 
strategic litigation to deepen the debate on racial relations in Brazil, combat 
discrimination and promote affirmative action as a remedy”. Elsewhere, Ford provided: 
$300,000 to the Center for Afro Study and Research in Uruguay, to support an “Afro 
Higher Studies Institute for next generation Afro-Latino leaders and to promote Afro- 
Latino rights throughout Latin America”; $100,000 to the National University of 
Colombia to study affirmative action policies for Afro-Colombians; $200,000 to the 
HDH to “To train attorneys in international human rights law in order to strengthen the 
human rights of the Afro-descendent population of Latin America”; $46,000 to the 
Rostros y Voces Foundation for Social Development in Mexico “To build
329 Interview with J. Michael Turner, April 2008.
330 See http://www.fordfound.ore/grants/database (accessed 21 December 2007).
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organisational capacity and intellectual capital and strengthen cultural identity in Afro- 
descendent Mexican communities”; and $124,000 to ODECO for a “Leadership 
Training in Human Rights among Afro-descendent populations of Honduras and 
Guatemala”. These examples give a picture of the kind of interventions Ford is willing 
to support, i.e. projects that build advocacy capacity of Afro-descendants and that 
address controversial public policy issues like affirmative action. Even in countries like 
Mexico where Afro-descendant mobilisation is weak, the community is on the radar of 
Ford, which is evidently willing to financially support projects that nurture Afro- 
descendant identities.
The IAF has been funding Afro-descendant initiatives in Latin America since the 1970s. 
Johnson (2007) reports a tumultuous early history of cooperation with Brazil, wherein 
the IAF was asked to the leave the country because of its decision to fund the Research 
Institute of Black Cultures (Instituto de Pesquisas das Culturas Negras -  IPCN) in 1977 
(67). The IAF did not rescind the grant but halted its engagement in Brazil from 1978- 
1983, whereupon it initially scaled back its support to Afro-descendants. The funding 
to the IPCN was important for building a solid foundation of activism in Brazil for 
Afro-descendants. At present, the IAF project support to Afro-descendant organisations 
in Latin America tends to focus on travel grants and community development projects, 
albeit often with an integrated networking/advocacy component:331 a typical example 
comes from Brazil, where Criola, an Affo-Brazilian women’s organisation, has been 
granted $171,000 for a project that will support artisans to increase their market access, 
production and managerial capacity. The IAF, like Ford, also has supported advocacy 
and cultural identity projects. In Colombia, for example, the IAF has granted $200,000 
to Corporation Asesorias para el Desarrollo in order to “train 100 leaders of 
communities of African descent in constitutional rights, natural resource management 
and self-governance and [to] provide legal assistance in 14 African-descendent 
territories”; in Ecuador, the Fundacion de Desarrollo Social y Cultural 
Afroecuatoriano—“Azucar” has been given $191,350 to “conduct activities that recover 
Afro-Ecuadorian history and culture and promote their value, encourage the interaction 
of African descendants with people of other ethnicities and improve well-being”. In 
2003, Mundo Afro was awarded $200,750 to develop a regional network among of 
Afro-descendants in Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. The IAF also supports
331 Details on IAF grants are taken from http://www.iaf.gov/grants/awards year en.asp (accessed 21 
December 2007).
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Mundo Afro’s Institute Superior de Formacion Afro (Institute for Afro-Latino 
Development) along with Ford. In 2001 it sponsored the first panel on Afro-descendants 
in Latin America at the Latin American Studies Association conference (Ribando 2005, 
15). In addition to funding, the IAF has played an active substantive role as well, 
important not least because it is an agency of the US Government. Judith Morrison is a 
key actor within the IAF driving this programme of work since joining in 1998, a 
commitment she gained during her previous activities with Afro-Brazilian and Afro- 
Colombian NGOs. The IAF was one of the founding members of the Inter-Agency 
Consultation on Race in the Americas (LAC). Morrison moved from the IAF to 
coordinate the LAC from the Inter-American Dialogue and recently returned to the IAF 
in Washington, D.C.. She provides an important link with norm entrepreneurs in the 
Afro-descendant community but recognizes that greater availability of funding for 
advocacy travel and too little funding for local activities is hindering important 
grassroots social development work by Afro-descendant NGOs.332 The IAF is limited 
by its own mandate and by the priorities of its funder, the US government. For 
example, US disinterest in the WCAR Durban Review Conference means LAF will not 
support Afro-descendant engagement in this process.
Assessing the impact o f international institutions:
The international actors profiled here have all been important for bringing attention to 
Afro-descendant concerns, for increasing their leverage with governments to raise these 
concerns and in supporting Afro-descendants to cooperate with each other. They have 
sometimes been conservative in their support of the normative discourse of Afro- 
descendants but their clear recognition of them as a distinct community in international 
society has been crucial to the norm emergence project.
The work of international development agencies on Afro-descendant issues has grown 
tremendously since the late 1990s. It has been advanced by the will of a small number 
of committed individuals within these institutions. They have been aided by the 
advocacy of Afro-descendant organisations and the catalyst of the WCAR preparatory 
events. In particular, the Santiago outcome documents have served as an authoritative
332 Interview with Judith Morrison, April 2008.
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guide, representing in David de Ferranti’s words “an important reference point for our 
work with borrower governments, with civil society organisations, and with partner 
development agencies” (de Ferranti 2001, 3). The WCAR provided an external pressure 
on the banks for a corporate response and raised awareness about racism in a manner 
that was less controversial given the impetus of the conference focus. A corpus of 
research on Afro-descendant exclusion in Latin America has been produced and 
regional meetings on these issues are more common. This has raised the profile of Afro- 
descendants considerably and enabled them to benefit from a modest increase in policy 
interventions. Among the most important policy changes has been on data collection, 
and the work of the banks and ECLAC on this point has tremendous potential to 
influence group-specific attention to Afro-descendants. The agencies also have helped 
indirectly to build the organisational platform of Afro-descendant by repeatedly 
providing spaces that bring them together for dialogue with international actors and 
each other. Small grants from sources like the IDB’s Social Inclusion Fund have 
provided much needed operational support to Afro-descendant NGOs.
These efforts are still tentative, however. Not all staff are convinced that a targeted 
approach is appropriate and attention to Afro-descendants is generally subsumed into 
wider social inclusion and poverty reduction programmes. This risks that they will be 
overlooked again, not least because there is weak capacity among staff on how racial 
discrimination impacts on development prospects. Funding for targeted activities on 
Afro-descendants is scarce; for example, the IDB Social Inclusion Fund reportedly 
receives three times as many applications as it can support. The handful of individuals 
with responsibility on Afro-descendant issues are not at senior enough levels to generate 
real institutional change. Dillon and de Ferranti have left the banks and no one at high 
level has taken up the baton. Agencies are also restricted by what governments ask for 
loans to do. Given the persistent denial of racial discrimination by some government 
officials, they are less likely to request bank loans to redress it. Actors within the banks 
acknowledge that without concerted external pressure from governments or NGOs, 
bank practice probably will not improve. The high-pressure shame tactics used by 
activists like Michael Franklin working from Washington D.C. in the late 1990s were 
aggravating but effective in getting the attention of the banks; the current leading 
figures have neither a US-base nor a strong advocacy strategy. They benefited 
enormously from the momentum of the WCAR but as this wanes they have to
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regenerate interest in other ways. Using the banks’ focus on poverty and inclusion as an 
entry point is a good alternative but requires pressure to ensure Afro-descendants are 
systematically considered. Agencies are still far more socialised to indigenous peoples’ 
concerns and they continue to gamer the greater share of attention in development 
spheres; for example, it is still more likely to find a dedicated webpage on indigenous 
peoples in international development agencies’ websites than on Afro-descendants, who 
- if mentioned -  appear under general social inclusion headings, albeit as a distinct 
group.
Human rights institutions have been important partners for norm elaboration and state 
socialisation. The OAS draft convention against racial discrimination will 
institutionalize Afro-descendants as a distinct group in international law. The Inter- 
American Court has used the American Convention on Human Rights to recognize 
rights to non-discrimination, culture and land for Afro-descendants in its judgments, 
expanding the corpus of their rights and borrowing from jurisprudence on indigenous 
peoples. The Special Rapporteur on Afro-descendants creates a specific space within 
the OAS for Afro-descendants and can be a useful socialisation tool. The UN 
institutions have made a contribution at a critical stage in the immediate post-WCAR 
period in reuniting Afro-descendant leaders at a global and regional level (under the 
WGM) and a national level (through the country visits of the Special Rapporteur on 
Racism). The authority of the UN has also been important for “certification” of Afro- 
descendant NGOs and for enabling them to embed their claims in international human 
rights institutions. These efforts, however, are fragmented across actors (two divisions 
in OHCHR, two UN experts, two Working Groups in addition to the official WCAR 
follow-up mechanisms) and have not produced consolidated pressure for norm 
adherence. UN agencies at the domestic level in some countries are reportedly having 
greater impact but tend to be restricted by the government lead.333 Given the greater 
political influence of the OAS human rights institutions than the UN human rights 
institutions in the region, their commitment to norm emergence for Afro-descendants 
needs to be strengthened. Activists from INGOs also report that mobilisation around the 
political institutions of the OAS, such as the Summit of the Americas, might yield better 
results but lament that Afro-descendant activists have not prioritized these fora, diverted 
by attention to regional WCAR follow-up.
333 For example, UNDP Ecuador and UNDP Brazil both have dedicated programmes of work on Afro- 
descendants.
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INGOs in both a capacity-building and funding role have been vital to building the 
organisational platform of Afro-descendant NGOs in the region. The seed funding for 
Afro-descendant NGO activities enabled them to make a strong presence in the WCAR 
processes where they forged and asserted their rights claims. The capacity-building has 
supported Afro-descendant leaders to engage with international human rights 
mechanisms and continue the process of norm elaboration at the international and 
domestic levels. INGOs have also been important in contributing to research and 
awareness on the identity and situation of Afro-descendants. INGOs can be criticized, 
however, for sometimes taking too much of a lead role in determining die direction of 
norm entrepreneurship through the campaigns they have spearheaded - such as the OAS 
convention against racial discrimination - or their decisions to fund certain projects and 
NGOs. There are still major capacity and funding gaps between INGOs and their Afro- 
descendant NGO partners. Afro-descendant NGOs face difficulties in maintaining a 
presence in international fora and their weak capacity in comparison with INGOs for 
international advocacy means they rely heavily on support from INGOs. The efforts of 
INGOs to invest in Afro-descendant capacity are limited also by their own resources 
and the extent of donor interest.
All of these international actors have provided high-level space for Afro-descendants to 
forge transnational cooperation well beyond the space afforded by the WCAR 
processes. This space has been ad hoc, however, and reliant on the drive of individuals 
rather than institutional commitment. This space also has not generated a permanent 
organisational structure and without something like an umbrella organisation for Afro- 
descendants with a presence in Washington, D.C. (where the banks, the IAF, Global 
Rights and the OAS are headquartered) activists will be challenged to generate 
sufficient pressure for change or to support operational capacity building within 
international institutions. Without this pressure and support, IOs will be slower to 
internalise the norms and unable to fulfill their potential role in socializing states for 
norm emergence and adherence.
Given these caveats for international actors, the next section will consider other post- 
Durban institutions and the evidence of norm cascade in state practice.
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After Durban: reviewing Afro-descendant mobilisation
The new wave of norm entrepreneurship that began with the WCAR has yielded some 
important results at the global and national levels. The change is most visible in the 
creation of new institutions to address Affo-descendents’ concerns specifically and 
racism more generally. The operation of these institutions has nevertheless fallen short 
of expectations. This section will review some key developments at the domestic level, 
in particular in the “critical state” of Brazil, to illustrate the ongoing challenges for norm 
emergence. The specific institution created for Afro-descendants by the WCAR, the UN 
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, will also be critiqued to 
determine what its role has been for norm emergence and how Afro-descendants have 
used it as a political opportunity structure and socialisation agent.
UN Working Group o f Experts on People o f African Descent:
The DDPA requests that the UN Commission on Human Rights consider establishing “a 
working group or other mechanism of the United Nations to study the problems of 
racial discrimination faced by people of African descent living in the African Diaspora 
and make proposals for the elimination of racial discrimination against people of 
African descent” (POA, para 7). The Commission created the Working Group of 
Experts on People of African Descent (WGPAD) in April 2002 with resolution 
2002/68. The WGPAD is comprised of five independent experts, meets for one 5-day 
session per year in Geneva and is authorised to conduct country visits upon invitation of 
governments.
There has been some debate regarding which people of African descent are to be 
covered by the WGPAD, i.e. only those in the African Diaspora, only those descended 
from slaves or also those in Africa. The Working Group has never agreed a precise 
definition nor has it actively engaged with Afro-descendant activists on this issue.
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Working Group Expert Ambassador Peter Kasanda prepared a working paper on the 
“Identification and Definition of ‘People of African Descent’ and How Racial 
Discrimination is Manifested Against Them in Various Regions”. He proposed the 
following definition:
People of African descent may be defined as descendants of the African victims 
of the Trans-Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea slave trade. The group includes 
those of the sub-Saharan slave trade. Descendants of the victims of the Trans- 
Atlantic trade live primarily in the Diaspora of North, Central and South 
America and the Caribbean. [...] However, for the definition to be completed, it 
must also include Africans and their descendants who, after their countries’ 
independence emigrated to or went to work in Europe, Canada and the Middle 
East where they also experienced racial discrimination suffered by those who 
live in Western European countries.334
The definition frames Afro-descendants as the African diaspora writ large and thus 
dilutes the moral claims that emanate from the experiences of slavery, claims that offer 
leverage in the norm entrepreneurship process. The definition also diminishes the 
authority of the WGPAD to focus on the issue of reparations. The paper was prepared 
prior to the Commission on Human Rights resolution in 2003 that expanded the 
mandate of the WGPAD to make proposals concerning racism and the DDPA for 
“Africans and people of African descent in all parts of the world” (emphasis added).335 
The change appears to have emanated from the Group of African states and they were 
keen to reiterate at the 2003 session of the WGPAD that the expanded mandate be 
followed.336
The WGPAD is still far from clear in its own mandate, however, both in terms of its 
substantive focus and the groups it seeks to address. It is pulled between state interests 
and the expectations of Afro-descendants. There is always a high presence of African 
states in the WGPAD sessions and they sometimes use the space to raise inter-state 
concerns. For example, when the Zambian delegate made a statement linking racial 
discrimination to international trade policy, one of the WGPAD Experts replied “the 
mandate of the Working Group was not poverty or injustice in general, but people of 
African descent, that is, those victims affected by slavery and the slave trade”.337 The
334 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/WG.20AVP.3 (28 January 2003): para 6.
335 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/30 (23 April 2003): para 24.
336 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/21 (19 December 2003): para 20.
337 Statement by Mr. Martins. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/21 (19 December 2003): para 36 and 37.
244
recommendations issued by the Working Group have been restricted to measures for 
people of African descent, and to date have never mentioned Africans per se. At the 
same time, the WGPAD has shied away from considering the issue of reparations for 
the slave trade, which many Afro-descendant activists believe is legitimately within its 
mandate. The discussion is made more difficult by the absence of key states: the United 
States and Canada have never attended, nor have key former slave-trading states like the 
United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal, all of which have significant populations of 
African descent. Notably, several Latin American states are usually present, including 
Brazil and Colombia consistently, an important measure of increased socialisation to 
Afro-descendant concerns. Only Belgium has had a country visit by the WGPAD, 
conducted in 2005; Ecuador announced its invitation for a country visit at the DRC.338 
The WGPAD has not yet fully realised its socialisation role largely because of the 
absence of states at the meetings and the overtly inter-state interests of many states 
present.
Another persistent weakness of the WGPAD has been the lack of engagement from the 
civil society of Afro-descendants. NGO attendance has been poor, ranging from a low 
of 11 NGOs at the 3rd session to a peak of 22 NGOs at the 4th session. Many leading 
Afro-descendant NGOs active in the WCAR have rarely if ever attended the 
WGPAD.339 From the first session the WGPAD has recommended that a Voluntary 
Fund be created to enable NGOs to participate in the meetings and although several 
states have endorsed the proposal, none has yet to make the necessary financial 
contributions. Some NGO activists have also expressed their concern that the expert 
members of the WGPAD lack the will or capacity to critically engage states and civil 
society in constructive examination of the issues. The WGPAD has conducted dialogue 
on a variety of points including housing, employment, empowerment of Afro- 
descendant women, the Millennium Development Goals and access to justice, which 
has contributed to some norm elaboration on these topics. The key issues that 
dominated the Afro-descendant normative agenda at Durban, however, have not been 
returned to. For example, in addition to reparations, concerns such as land rights have 
not been addressed. More promising was the 7th session of the WGPAD in 2008, where 
OHCHR facilitated the participation of a number of Afro-descendant experts globally as
338 E/CN.4/2006/19/Add. 1 (9 February 2006).
339 For example, Mundo Afro has attended only the 4th session and Edna Santos Roland (a member of the 
Group on Eminent Experts and Rapporteur of the WCAR) has attended twice as an invited expert.
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a preparatory consultation for the DRC in 2009. In the outcome document of the 
session, the WGPAD “strongly recommends that the issue of reparations for people of 
African descent be considered at the Durban Review Conference” (para 15).340 The 
WGPAD needs to be revived by the DRC, ideally through the establishment of a 
Voluntary Fund, if  Afro-descendants are to find a useful global space for norm 
entrepreneurship. So far it seems that political opportunity structures at the regional 
level are more effective, more attractive and/or more accessible to Afro-descendants 
than the Geneva-based Working Group.
WCAR follow-up meetings:
Afro-descendants have participated in several WCAR implementation and follow-up 
meetings. Among the most important was a regional workshop convened by the 
Government of Uruguay in cooperation with OHCHR in May 2003, in Montevideo, on 
the Adoption and Implementation o f Affirmative-Action Policies for People o f African 
Descent in Latin America and the Caribbean. The meeting was attended by 16 state 
delegations, Afro-descendant NGOs and key international organisations like the 1DB 
and World Bank.341 The meeting adopted sweeping recommendations on such topics as 
affirmative action, education and culture, religion and land ownership. The outcome 
suggests that at the rhetorical level norms for Afro-descendants are increasingly 
accepted by states in Latin America. For states to even acknowledge that affirmative 
action measures are needed represents an important break with the ‘racial democracy’ 
past.
Latin America is the only region to hold an official inter-governmental Durban+5 
review meeting (dubbed ‘Santiago M&s Cinco’), held in Brasilia, 26-28 July 2006;342 it 
was also the first region to hold a prepcom for the DRC, convened also in Brasilia, 17- 
19 June 2008.343 19 state delegations participated in 2006 and 25 in 2008. The outcome 
recommendations gave activists an important opportunity to sustain the gains made at 
Santiago and Durban and to build upon those strategically. Some innovative proposals 
were adopted, including the creation of a racial equality index, a UN Permanent Forum
340 UN Doc. A/HRC/7/36, (13 March 2008): p 19, para. 118.
341 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/17/Add.3 (8 January 2004): p. 26.
342 UN Doc. A/HRC/4/111(15 January 2007).
343 UN Doc. A/CONF.21 l/PC.3.3 (8 July 2008).
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on people of African descent, electoral reform to improve political participation, and 
recognition of collective land rights for Afro-descendants. Firm support is given for the 
OAS Special Rapporteur on Afro-descendants and the draft OAS convention against 
racial discrimination. The conferences reaffirmed the “multi-ethnic, multicultural” 
composition of the region. Interestingly, the Santiago Mas Cinco conference was 
opened with an “African-inspired indigenous spiritual ceremony”, a fascinating symbol 
of the shifting positions of Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples as representations 
of Latin American identity. The regional DRC prepcom for Africa gave significant 
attention to the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the outcome document and endorsed a 
voluntary fund for participation of, inter alia, people of African descent in DDPA 
follow-up mechanisms.344
Afro-descendants figured prominently at the DRC itself. The outcome document makes 
some references to people of African descent (one of the few groups to be named 
distinctly) and to slavery and the slave trade, although none to financial reparations per 
s e 345 An earlier version of the text called for the WGPAD to be “established as a United 
Nations permanent forum on people of African descent”.346 This was a proposal 
reiterated by several Afro-descendant NGOs. At a session sponsored by OHCHR, key 
international experts347 came together with at least 50 Afro-descendant activists to 
assess progress on the DDPA. The points raised included the need to revive 
transcontinental cooperation of Afro-descendants and the absence of strong national 
action plans for the DDPA focused on Afro-descendants’ inequality. The norms secured 
at the WCAR have been maintained in the follow-up and are more firmly 
institutionalised. The degree to which they have been adhered, however, varies in state 
practice.
344 UN Doc. A/CONF.211/PC.3/ (1 September 2008): preamble and paras 58, 60, 62.
345 The DRC outcome document does note at para 63 other forms of restitution for slavery, colonialism, 
apartheid and genocide, and calls on states “to find appropriate ways” for “restoring the dignity of the 
victims”.
346 DRC, Preparatory Committee, Second Substantive Session, Geneva 6-17 October 2008; Compilation 
ofparagraphs proposed by delegations; Section Two: Assessment o f the Effectiveness o f the existing 
Durban follow-up mechanisms (13 October 2008: para 41).
347 Among the experts present were: Joe Frans, Chair of the WGPAD; Edna Santos Roland; Githu 
Muigai, UN Special Rapporteur on racism; Gay McDougall; and Clare Roberts.
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Domestic reforms for Afro-descendants:
There have been some important changes in state policy vis-a-vis Afro-descendants 
since the WCAR in the domestic sphere. Four policy responses stand out: creation of 
new institutions focused on Afro-descendants; adoption of affirmative action policies; 
improved disaggregated data collection; and attention to land rights claims. While in 
some countries some of these policies were initiated prior to Durban under 
multiculturalism reforms, the WCAR commitments gave greater momentum and 
legitimacy to the process. The new international monitoring mechanisms established at 
Durban for follow-up and other human rights monitoring mechanisms (such as UN 
Treaty Bodies) have used the DDPA as a measuring stick to assess progress. Before 
turning to the evidence of a norm cascade, this section will examine the case of Brazil, 
which has served well as a critical state in the region for norm emergence.
The Durban conference reportedly marked the first time that the Government of Brazil 
admitted on the international stage that racism exists in Brazil.348 Domestically, the 
government began in the late 1980s to make reforms in favour of Afro-descendants, 
establishing the Palmares Cultural Foundation in 1988 and recognising collective land 
title for the quilombos under the 1988 Constitution. A handful of institutions for Afro- 
descendants had existed also at the sub-national level since the late 1980s, especially in 
regions with a high proportion of Afro-descendants such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao 
Paulo.349 Afro-descendant leaders had been successful in stimulating some public 
mobilisation around key symbolic events like the 1988 100th anniversary of the 
abolition of slavery in Brazil and in 1995 around the 300th anniversary of the death of 
Zumbi, the Afro-Brazilian Quilombo dos Palmares resistance leader (Htun 2004, 67). 
By the late 1990s, the WCAR provided a much-needed additional public spotlight on 
the calls by Afro-descendant leaders for reform.
Htun (2004) describes the cause of changes vis-a-vis Afro-descendants in Brazil as “[a] 
dialectic between social mobilisation and presidential initiative, framed within
348 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3 (28 February 2006): p. 11 and Turner (2002, 32). In its periodic 
report to CERD due in 1994, Brazil does acknowledge some racial inequalities and includes a specific 
section on indigenous peoples but not Afro-Brazilians; UN Doc. CERD/C/263/Add.lO (13 February
1996).
349 For example, in the state of Sao Paulo, a Council for Black Community Participation and 
Development was created in 1993 to enable Afro-descendant NGOs to advise the government on the 
development of public policy. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3. See also E/CN.4/1996/72/Add.l p. 21.
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unfolding international events” (2004, 62). The WCAR was the key international event. 
Brazil withdrew its initial offer to host the regional prepcom fearing that negative 
attention and domestic protests from the increasingly strong Affo-Brazilian movement 
would discredit their preferred international image as a ‘racial democracy’; Telles 
reports that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in effect the last government ministry to 
accept that this myth was no longer tenable (Telles 2004, 67). Persuasion by Affo- 
descendant activists - facilitated by an unprecedented level of dialogue with the 
Ministry - stimulated a reconsideration of the government’s international identity. In an 
about-face Brazil took up the baton for Affo-descendants. Global Rights reports “the 
Brazilian government was one of the most ardent proponents of having the [Santiago] 
Final Declaration and Plan of Action contain categorical language in reference to Affo- 
descendants” (IHRLG 2001, 11). According to Brazil’s Ambassador to the UN, Gelson 
Fonseca Jr.:
Durban was a positive experience for Brazil because it legitimized the debate on 
racism at the international level and recognized the need for remedial actions to 
benefit the victims of discrimination. But the most significant and immediate 
effect of Durban occurred at the domestic level, for it mobilised civil society and 
public opinion against racism, and strengthened the political will for policies to 
combat discrimination and led to the first experiences in affirmative action for 
Affo-descendants. (quoted by Htun 2004, 82-83).
The WCAR gave Affo-Brazilian advocates space to forge a common agenda where 
great divergence had existed among such actors (Burdick 1998, 137-138). A 
consultation process was held by the government in the year prior to Durban, including 
the first national conference on racism held in Rio in July 2001 (Htun 2005, 24). The 
WCAR also provided greater space in the media for attention to Affo-descendant issues, 
breaking a wall of silence that had existed previously (Telles 2004, 71). The Santiago 
and Durban commitments buttressed government justification for pursuing controversial 
and electorally unpopular affirmative action policies (Htun 2004, 62).
The WCAR processes occurred under the Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2002). Cardoso was a sociologist and well aware of the endemic racial 
inequalities in Brazil; he was the first Brazilian President to publicly acknowledge 
racism persisted in the country. He created in 1995 the “Interministerial Group for the
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Promotion of the Black Population”350 and under the auspices of a National Human 
Rights Plan in 1996, his government proposed the first ever targeted policies for racial 
groups in Brazil (Htun 2005, 21). The election of Lula Da Silva as President at the end 
of 2002 continued openness to reforms benefiting Afro-descendants. Da Silva 
appointed three Affo-descendants as Ministers of Culture, Environment and Social 
Welfare.351 In 2003, the Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality 
(SEPPIR) was created at the ministerial level. The first Minister for SEPPIR was 
Matilde Ribeiro, herself drawn from the ranks of Affo-descendant NGO activists (the 
current Minister is Edson Santos). Under Da Silva’s Worker’s Party more self- 
identifying Affo-descendants came into the Congress and in 2003 a Black Caucus was 
organised, providing increased pressure for initiatives to address discrimination and 
support Afro-descendants (Htun 2005,23).
Affirmative action policy was introduced by the government of President Cardoso but 
has expanded under President Da Silva. A study published in 2000 by the 
government Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) showed that 69 percent of 
those living in poverty were Affo-Brazilian, demonstrating the need to look beyond 
class-based analyses to overcome inequality.353 Htun reports that “by the end of 2001, 
14 different bills in Congress contemplated some form of racial quotas” and that at the 
start of 2002, Cardoso “issued a decree that created the National Affirmative Action 
Program” (Htun 2005, 22). In the 2003 state periodic report to CERD, the Government 
of Brazil cites a number of affirmative action initiatives adopted “as a result of the 
internal discussion about the racial issue and the principles enshrined in the Durban 
Programme of Action”.354 The Ministries of Agricultural Development, Foreign Affairs 
and Justice, and the State Secretariat for Human Rights all have hiring quotas for Afro- 
descendants. In 2001, the University of Bahia first adopted a quota system, reportedly
355following a proposal put forward by the Brazilian delegation at the WCAR. More 
than 15 public universities have quotas for Afro-descendants and another thirty private 
universities have voluntarily adopted quotas. Policies in the field of employment give
350 UN Doc. CERD/C/431 /Add.8 (16 October 2003): para 10.
351 These are, respectively, Gilberto Gil, Benedita da Silva and Marina Silva.
352 Afro-Brazilian parliamentarian and activist Abdias do Nascimento was the first to introduce bills in 
Brazil calling for affirmative action policies from 1983 (Da Silva Martins, Alberto Medeiros, and Larkin 
Nascimento 2004, 793-794).
353 UN Doc. CERD/C/43l/Add.8 (16 October 2003): para 11.
354 UN Doc. CERD/C/43 l/Add.8 (16 October 2003): para 19.
355 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3: p 13.
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support to business development by Afro-descendants and job training while 
predominantly Afro-descendant neighbourhoods are being targeted for extra social 
programmes (Htun 2005, 22). SEPPIR is cooperating with the Ministry of Education to 
train teachers on the teaching of African history in primary school, recently made a 
legal requirement. In March 2008, a bilateral agreement was signed with the United 
States for a Joint Action Plan to Promote Racial and Ethnic Equality, which aims for a 
two-way exchange of best practices, resources and information, emphasising education 
in particular.356
Further proposals are contained under the Statute on Racial Equality (PL 6264/2005) 
introduced by Afro-Brazilian Senator Paulo Paim; it was approved by the Senate in 
2005 and is still under review by a special commission of the House of Representatives. 
The Statute would mandate quotas in all public universities, in the civil service, in 
private sector companies of more than 20 individuals and in the broadcast media (Htun 
2005, 24). The adoption of affirmative action has not been supported universally. Some 
are concerned that the policy inappropriately pushes individuals to claim a racial 
identity, which would create inter-racial conflict where ostensibly there has been none. 
There has been firm mobilisation on both sides in response to the proposed law. 
According to one survey from July 2006, 65 percent of the Brazilian electorate is in 
favor and 25 percent are against the proposal to set aside 20 percent of places for 
‘Blacks’ in university. Among those self-identifying as Black, 69 percent were in favor 
of quotas, 22 percent were against. Among those self-identifying as White, 62 percent 
are for quotas and 31 percent against. According to the same survey, the vast majority 
of the population favours policies based on income rather than on race alone.357
The Da Silva government has been highly visible on the international stage in 
supporting the WCAR commitments. Brazil proposed the OAS convention against 
racial discrimination, financially supported the OAS Special Rapporteur on Afro- 
Descendants and co-convened and hosted the two Durban regional follow-ups. Brazil 
invited the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism for a country visit in late 2005 and the 
OAS Special Rapporteur on Afro-descendants in the same year. Brazil has also actively 
participated in the Durban-created mechanisms, including the WGPAD. The acceptance
356 See http://www.state.gOv/p/wha/rls/2008/l 11446.htm (accessed 20 November 2008).
357 Survey conducted by the Datafolha research institute. Source: 
http://www.levantamos.org/top storv.htm (accessed 2 January 2008).
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and promotion by Brazil of the Afro-descendant agenda has been a vital part of 
initiating a regional norm cascade vis-a-vis Afro-descendants and Brazil has served well 
as a ‘critical state’ in this regard.
There is evidence that other governments in the region have been taking greater steps to 
address the needs of Afro-descendants through policy commitments and institutional 
development. Some of the concessions occurred prior to the WCAR. This is true 
especially of land rights concessions for Afro-descendants. What Durban enabled was 
the embedding of norms on land rights for Afro-descendants into international 
standards, thus translating state practice in seven states in Latin America into a regional 
standard of achievement. For example, Ecuador has recognised new land rights for 
Afro-descendants since Durban.358 The impact on data collection has also been 
significant. The “Todos Contamos” World Bank sponsored meetings on disaggregated 
data collection (first convened in 2000) were tied to an increased consciousness of the 
issues brought about by the WCAR preparatory process. Afro-descendants now have 
more possibilities to work closely with national statistics offices in devising census 
identification criteria, not least because international development actors are aware of 
these issues and aim to integrate them into technical support and loans for data 
collection. Affirmative action policies have been less common and as the case of Brazil 
suggests, they are not easily adopted into national practice. All three of these policy 
responses are endorsed by the WCAR and give Afro-descendant advocates a soft law 
backing for their rights claims in the domestic sphere. Several states, including 
Colombia, Honduras and Peru, have revised or created new consultative or anti- 
discrimination institutions since Durban. These institutions serve as authoritative 
mechanisms to further embed norms domestically on Afro-descendant rights. Two 
regional conferences of representatives of these institutions, the Consultation o f Latin 
American and Caribbean Organizations Dedicated to Policies fo r  Racial Equality, were 
held in November 2004 and June 2006 (Inter-American Dialogue 2006, 2). Another 
helpful indicator of change in the region is that in the short years since Durban, five 
states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela) have made the declaration under 
Article 14 of ICERD to recognise the individual complaints mechanism, whereas prior
358 On 9 May 2006, the National Congress of Ecuador adopted the Law of Collective Rights for Afro- 
Ecuadorian Communities, which includes provisions for recognition of collective ancestral land rights for 
Afro-Ecuadorian communities.
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to 2001 only four states in the region had made the declaration over a 30-year period.359 
Symbolic efforts to recognise Afro-descendant identities are also in evidence: several 
states, including Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela, have designated national days for commemorating the culture and 
heritage of Afro-descendants. Finally, the OAS Summit of the Americas process 
(convened since 1994) reveals further textual evidence of change: although all of the 
Summit outcome documents have mentioned indigenous peoples, and some have 
mentioned “ethnic minorities”, it was only in the Summit in 2005 that Afro-descendants 
were named as a distinct group.360
Assessing norm entrepreneurship on Afro-descendant rights:
Afro-descendant leaders and external actors agree that state acceptance of norms on 
Afro-descendant rights has progressed rapidly in the past decade thanks in large part to 
the political opportunities created by the WCAR. The norms first emerged in selected 
states through efforts of Afro-descendant NGOs to secure a space for their communities 
in the multiculturalism reforms. With the oncoming of the WCAR processes, Afro- 
descendants were in a good position to further entrench the norms in international soft 
law standards. The regional Durban follow-up meetings have maintained the 
commitments to Afro-descendants made at Santiago and elaborated further measures. 
States see these norms as a legitimate part of their identity in international society. This 
has been aided by the dramatic increase in the number of socialisation agents on Afro- 
descendant norms, rivalling even those for indigenous peoples at the regional level. The 
international soft law of the WCAR outcome documents, the WGPAD, the Durban 
follow-up institutions, the OAS Special Rapporteur on People of African Descent, the 
draft OAS convention against racial discrimination, and the social development 
divisions of the IDB and World Bank are prominent in an even longer list of 
mechanisms that continue the process of socialising states.
Determination of whether a norm cascade has occurred in Latin America is complicated 
by the gap between international norm institutionalization and (national) norm
359 These are Uruguay (1972), Ecuador (1977), Peru (1984) and Chile (1994). 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/stat4.htm. Accurate as of 14 November 2008.
360 See Fourth Summit of the Americas, Declaration o f Mar del Plata, (5 November 2005): paras 30 and 
32.
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implementation. While some state officials at the senior level have accepted much of 
the normative discourse on Afro-descendants, this is a multi-level process, with many 
less senior officials and the public at large still skeptical. Afro-descendant activists 
continue to express their concern that implementation of promised measures has fallen 
short of expectations. The expression used by activists, “candil en la calle, oscuridad en 
la casa”,361 sums up the dynamic well -  states portray a flattering image of their practice 
on the international stage, while at home, obscure their failure to meet the commitments 
they have made. Financial support to operationalise institutional and policy reforms has 
generally been lacking; for example, SEPPIR is held as an extraordinary example of 
progress - the only Ministry on racism in Latin America - but it does not have the 
resources needed to fulfill its remit (Johnson 2007, 61). Political will is also tentative 
and can shift according to changes in government control. The progress in Brazil has 
relied heavily on President da Silva’s intervention but the National Congress may not 
pass the Statute on Racial Equality in Brazil into law. Afro-Colombian leaders feel that 
their new government (which came to power post-WCAR) is reverting to denials of 
racism and undermining census reform efforts that aim to more accurately reflect the 
size of the Afro-descendant population. Respect for Afro-descendant land rights are 
still shaky and a source of real conflict with some states (Anderson 2007; Ng’weno 
2007). The governments that have granted land rights to Afro-descendants appear to 
have been motivated in part by a desire to settle land claims in regions attractive for 
foreign investment, spurred on by the World Bank for one (Anderson 2007, 399). Afro- 
descendant leaders are not always satisfied with the national institutions created to help 
guarantee their rights, not least because the balance of power in decision-making in 
these institutions still remains in the hands of government (Greene 2007). The state 
retains the power to decide who is an Afro-descendant for affirmative action purposes 
and which Afro-descendants are entitled to special land rights. External pressure is often 
still needed to see a breakthrough in state commitments. For example, Afro-descendants 
in recent years have had some success in using the leverage of free trade and 
cooperation agreements being negotiated with the US, lobbying with members of the 
US Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) to put pressure on governments to respond to 
Afro-descendant concerns. The Plan Colombia counter-narcotics and development 
agreement has afforded to Afro-Colombians additional resources for civil society. The
361 “Candlelight in the street, darkness at home” (author’s translation).
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CBC is also using the free-trade agreement to help push for greater political 
representation of Affo-Colombians; this has influenced the appointment of the first 
Affo-Colombian as Minister (Paula Marcela Moreno, Minister for Culture), the creation 
of a Director of Affo-Colombian issues in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Justice 
and the creation of a Commission for the Progress of Affo-Colombian People.362 In 
Central America, the regional NGO ONECA fought to secure a seat on the civil society 
advisory group to the Central American Free Trade Agreement. These successes may 
have more symbolic than intrinsic value, however, particularly if those in power 
continue to ignore recommendations.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these conflicting outcomes for norm emergence, 
i.e. positive in the international sphere, poor in the domestic sphere. It is clear that 
Affo-descendants have been recognised as a distinct community. There is also evidence 
of change in the discursive position of states in favour of Affo-descendants, particularity 
in the international sphere. The material cost of implementing emerging norms 
domestically appears still too high. Although states have been able to lend the 
impression of action - most particularly to international audiences - with the creation of 
new institutions and participation in WCAR fora, inaction regarding norm adherence is 
common. The ideational acceptance of new norms for Affo-descendants is not 
universal and what is increasingly internalised by those at the most senior and 
diplomatic levels is not shared by all.
This raises two questions for assessing norm entrepreneurship: what accounts for the 
success of norm emergence at the international level?; and why have Affo-descendants 
been less effective at reproducing these results domestically? In answering the first 
question it is difficult to rely solely on rational explanations. Governments could have 
ignored Afro-descendants’ demands: in many states, they have weak leverage materially 
and electorally to influence government positions. Even in the “critical state” of Brazil, 
where roughly half the population are Afro-descendants, there was no popular sentiment 
in favour of race-based policies. In other states there may have been some material 
motivation to settle land claims made by Afro-descendants but this could have been 
resolved locally without the conversion of the claims into ‘universal’ norms. The same 
can be said for including Afro-descendants in multicultural reforms domestically: the
362 Interview with Leonardo Reales, April 2008.
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evidence suggests that in the main the concessions made specifically for Afro- 
descendants were rare and in most cases only for a subset of the Afro-descendant 
population.
The motivation of Latin American states in accepting group-specific norms for Afro- 
descendants may have more to do with the nature of the norms themselves and states’ 
corresponding identity concerns in international society. Two factors stand out in this 
case regarding the “issue characteristics”: “adjacency” and the intrinsic character of the 
norms. Afro-descendants have borrowed heavily from the indigenous peoples’ rights 
repertoire in establishing their own group-specific claims. States were disposed to the 
discourse of Afro-descendant rights because of its parallels with the discourse advanced 
by indigenous peoples in the region. Moreover, the claims made by Afro-descendants 
are in general less demanding of state reform than claims made by indigenous peoples 
(which have in many cases challenged basic sovereignty principles). The WCAR also 
gave Afro-descendants the opportunity to link their contemporary claims to the 
historical crime of slavery. The prohibition of slavery is already considered part of jus 
cogens in international law. An important stream of debate at the WCAR sought also to 
establish the transatlantic slave trade as a crime against humanity, one that warranted 
reparations. While much of this debate had inter-state material implications, there was 
also a strong ideational side to the discussion. In the context of the WCAR, state actors 
from Latin America acknowledged the moral obligations owed to the descendants of 
slaves, who continued to be among the poorest people in the region. Their response to 
Afro-descendants’ demands can therefore been seen to emerge from a “logic of 
appropriateness”. In other words, states recognised the historic wrong to Afro- 
descendants and attempted to make amends by accepting normative standards that 
benefited Afro-descendants explicitly. The moral and normative weight of slavery was 
compounded by the moral and normative weight of anti-racism, another key stream of 
Afro-descendants’ advocacy at the WCAR. State actors were faced with an 
overwhelming “logic of appropriateness” forged by two of the most widely accepted 
norms in international society. States in the region had followed a similar logic of 
appropriateness in accepting indigenous peoples’ claims, i.e. that states had moral 
obligations flowing from the wrongful colonisation of indigenous peoples. In effect, the 
WCAR made racial discrimination and slavery adjacent to colonialism in the public 
discourse; state actors would have been remiss to acknowledge the latter but not the
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former at Santiago.
Concurrently, the strong mobilisation of Afro-descendants around the WCAR meant 
that states could not portray their identity as a ‘racial democracy’ with so many vocal 
advocates to contradict them. To maintain credibility in their international identity, they 
had to concede that racism was a problem and demonstrate their legal and moral 
commitment to its eradication. Affo-descendants have been aided greatly by the 
persuasion and socialisation of IOs and by TAN cooperation with INGOs. Their 
support to Afro-descendant claims ‘certified’ the discourse vis-a-vis states. They have 
supported the transnational mobilisation of Afro-descendants, helped them to elaborate 
new norms, provided political opportunity structures and offered critiques of state 
failures to accept emerging norms.
Afro-descendants have faced greater challenges domestically in norm emergence. The 
WCAR pushed states to agree concessions for Afro-descendants in a very short time 
frame. The dialogue on what these concessions should be took place between a small 
cadre of Afro-descendant NGOs and government representatives, principally those 
working in ministries of foreign affairs. The difficulty post-WCAR is gaining wider 
public support and deeper governmental commitment for the agreements made at 
Durban and Santiago. The challenge is not just material (although this no doubt plays a 
role). Many state actors continue to believe that adopting measures that target people on 
the basis of race are in fact racist; the normative prohibition of racism is strongly felt 
but the logic of its manifestation and how to respond diverges significantly from the 
normative logic guiding state actors in the international sphere. Moreover, many of the 
target beneficiaries of new standards do not identify themselves as Afro-descendants, 
although activists report that the WCAR has increased consciousness of a collective 
identity. Afro-descendant activists have tried to use top-down approaches like census 
reform to generate cohesion but class allegiances and a belief in racial democracy still 
impact strongly on identity formation. The public have been reluctant to countenance 
Afro-descendants as a distinct ethno-cultural community on par with indigenous 
peoples. Indigenous peoples’ representatives do not always readily accept that Afro- 
descendants should have an equal seat at the table. As an exception, a few Afro- 
descendant communities with an indigenous affinity have been able to secure some 
tangible gains from states, further evidence that norms on indigenous peoples rights are
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more firmly embedded. The content of the WCAR outcome documents are an unknown 
to many in the public and in the government. New institutions have been created to 
implement the norms but they are restricted by the lack of norm internalisation. Afro- 
descendant activists and a small number of international actors therefore find 
themselves in a vanguard position, trying to persuade others of the need to implement 
domestically commitments made. The resources made available to do this during the 
WCAR have become increasingly difficult to access since then.
Afro-descendants are at a critical juncture in their norm entrepreneurship. The future of 
the Durban review mechanisms is uncertain but they will remain spatially distant in any 
case. If the norms are to take root in the long term, Afro-descendant leaders and their 
partners will need to adopt a bottom-up strategy to reinforce the largely top-down 
approach taken to date. They must build a wider constituency of norm adherent actors. 
Some critical states in the region like Brazil and Colombia have taken positive steps but 
changes in government can quickly halt gains because the norms are not sufficiently 
internalised. There is a need to build stronger national platforms to push for norm 
adherence, a goal that is undermined by limited funding and insufficient advocacy 
expertise at the local level. Many of the opportunities opened up by successful norm 
entrepreneurship have not been translated well to the domestic sphere: for example, the 
wide acceptance of Article 14 under ICERD has not yet witnessed any individual 
communication submissions from Afro-descendants. Afro-descendants will also need to 
build stronger transnational cooperation links to facilitate socialisation, particularly in 
states with smaller and less well-mobilised Afro-descendant organisations. The WCAR 
provided an invaluable boost to their advocacy but with the future of Durban follow-up 
processes uncertain, Afro-descendants will have to work hard to keep their issues on the 
agenda. The DRC reaffirmed the commitments of the WCAR and Afro-descendants 
were a strong presence in Geneva. The same week, at the Summit of the Americas, the 
outcome document made no mention of Afro-descendants despite some presence of 
Afro-descendant NGOs. Activists report that the national media was focused on the 
Summit, not the DRC. These divergent outcomes suggest that Afro-descendants need a 
critical review of their norm entrepreneurship strategies. The repeated calls at the DRC 
for a UN Permanent Forum on Afro-descendants could help to further consolidate the 
global organisational platform of Afro-descendants that has dissipated somewhat since 
Durban, providing a permanent space for socialisation, review and continued norm
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elaboration. Whether such a space can tackle the obstacles to norm adherence 
domestically is unlikely, as the experience of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues suggests. More possibilities rest with the ECLAC 2010 census reform, through 
which advocates are working to devise a region-wide strategy for gathering the hard 
evidence needed to get past denials of racial inequality and lay bare the identity, status 
and size of Afro-descendants in Latin America.
Conclusions:
Extending the view beyond the WCAR processes reveals that contemporary 
mobilisation of Affo-descendants has been enabled by several factors. Territorial 
autonomy of palenques, slave rebellions, Pan-Africanism and civil rights movements 
are among the important historical inspirations. Under the authoritarian regimes that 
dominated the region for much of the 20th century, political mobilisation was difficult 
but continued to be nurtured through national and transnational cultural links between 
Afro-descendants. The political opportunity structures created by the national dialogues 
on multiculturalism opened an important space for Afro-descendant leaders. During the 
same period, government action encroaching on Afro-descendant land and symbolic 
events like the 100th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1998, helped to 
stir consciousness and collective action. External financial support to nascent Afro- 
descendant focused NGOs and advocacy support of INGOs has been vital to building 
NGO capacity. Regional meetings organised by international actors, including 
development agencies, human rights actors, parliamentarians and INGOs have given 
Afro-descendant leaders opportunities for building an organisational platform and 
elaborating a common normative agenda. Against this backdrop, the WCAR emerged 
and became a driving force for intensified mobilisation and greater focus on racial 
discrimination by state and international actors alike. The focus of the WCAR on racism 
meant that official adherence to the racial democracy precepts was no longer such a 
constraint and policies against racial discrimination could be discussed more openly. 
Afro-descendant activists had a new platform for dialogue with governments and IOs 
and these actors were more disposed to respond under the spotlight of a world 
conference.
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Afro-descendants qua Afro-descendants now exist as an entity in the international 
sphere. The identity frame is institutionalised and their issues are on the agenda. This 
acts as a counter-balance to the forces of ‘racial democracy’ and mestizaje in the 
domestic sphere that continue to impede Afro-descendant mobilisation. Afro- 
descendant leaders have not let themselves be restricted by existing identity frames -  
such as indigenous peoples, minorities or race -  but have set on a completely new path, 
designating a corpus of rights that is particular to Afro-descendants.
This set of normative standards has a variety of roots. The collective experience of 
economic, social and political marginalisation of Afro-descendants, forged by the forces 
of racism and poverty, have been the starting point of rights claims. State recognition of 
the contemporary legacies of slavery has been the moral leverage. The language of 
these claims has been imbued with the discourses of indigenous peoples rights and 
multiculturalism. Historically, the experiences of Pan-Africanism that emphasised the 
‘peoplehood’ and distinct culture of Afro-descendants and the civil rights movement in 
the US focused on anti-racism measures have also impacted. These norms for Afro- 
descendants are part of international soft law and may in future be incorporated into 
legally binding standards. The first step is evidenced by the draft OAS convention 
against racial discrimination.
International institutions have responded, creating group-specific mechanisms much as 
was done previously for indigenous peoples. Afro-descendants are now routinely 
mentioned as distinct groups in government reports and policy documents of many 
international agencies. All of these initiatives, however, depend upon the will of states 
and a select number of internal actors to keep them in place. The WGPAD may have a 
chance of long-term survival but not because it necessarily meets the needs of Afro- 
descendants as much as it meets the interests of states. The major role played by 
international development agencies in favour of Afro-descendants is time-bound as 
development assistance in the region decreases and their influence declines. On a more 
positive note, there are possibilities to embed the international norms on Afro- 
descendants into state practice at the local level, evidenced by the increase in national 
Afro-descendant government institutions and municipal initiatives like the UNESCO 
cities against racism programme. Statistical evidence of inequalities faced by Afro- 
descendants is more widely available than ever before and data collection can stimulate
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further self-identification. Afro-descendant NGOs are taking proactive steps to work 
with IOs directly and have been adept at using regional trade agreements and alliances 
with US political actors to put pressure on their governments for change.
Afro-descendant activists need a long-term strategy for norm internalisation. Focusing 
more intensely on political opportunities at the regional level may reap greater benefits: 
first, because UN mechanisms have lower political resonance than those of the OAS; 
and second, because at the global level, Afro-descendants have divergent discourses on 
reparations and/or different identity frames than African migrants not descended from 
slaves. Their organisational platform has not been institutionalised and NGOs struggle 
to secure funds making sustained advocacy on the international and national levels 
difficult. Despite some important changes to the international discursive position of 
states, many government officials continue to profess that racial discrimination does not 
exist in Latin America. It is vital for norm internalisation that activists focus on 
socialisation of this wider constituency of state actors. The transnational identity frame 
current among an elite cadre of actors is slowly trickling down but the mass of Afro- 
descendants intended to benefit from new standards are not engaged in the process of 
mobilisation and advocacy. Many Afro-descendants are reluctant to embrace self- 
identification or mobilisation on this basis of Afro identity; the prospective gains of 
blanqueamiento are still stronger than those offered by the few nascent programmes 
targeted for Afro-descendants. As national policies vis-a-vis Afro-descendants become 
more prominent this can stimulate greater collective awareness. Afro-descendant 
leaders, however, need to be sensitive to not pursue a top-down homogenising strategy. 
Afro-descendants even within the same state may have divergent or competing interests 
depending on, inter alia, cultural identity, land entitlement and socio-economic status. 
Unity during the WCAR process was vital to give a solid platform and justification for 
global norms but the reality of Afro-descendant life is much more heterogeneous and 
space should be maintained for a diversity of voices. The project of norm 
entrepreneurship by Afro-descendants has had great success over the past decade and 
although the foundations are reasonably strong, the future of norm implementation and 
adherence is far from certain.
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C h a pt e r  IV. Co n c lu sio n : A ssessing  g r o u p-specific  n o r m
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Introduction:
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) hypothesise that in the later part of the 20th century, “the 
speed of normative change has accelerated substantially” (909). The case studies here 
support this idea and show the remarkable reshaping that has occurred to the 
international protection regime for minorities over the past 10-15 years. Norm 
entrepreneurship by Affo-descendants and Dalits has followed a path very similar to 
that forged by indigenous peoples and Roma before them. They have sought to build a 
group-specific set of norms that would recognise their group, fulfil their claims and 
increase their leverage. Their efforts have been supported by a wide variety of 
international actors and a select number of critical states. The 2001 WCAR was a 
pivotal juncture in many ways and its legacy continues to affect the major groups that 
participated. This concluding chapter aims to tie together the evidence and assessment 
across the Afro-descendant and Dalit cases and to contrast them also with the Roma and 
indigenous peoples, in order to offer an overview of trends and consequences of norm 
entrepreneurship by minority groups. One of the important contributions of this thesis 
is that is offers the possibility to look beyond individual groups, to make comparisons 
and to provide insight into macro-level changes to minority protection. Several 
questions will guide the concluding analysis. What evidence is there that norm 
emergence has occurred? What factors have influenced the success or failure of norm 
emergence? What commonalities in norm entrepreneurship can be identified across the 
cases? How has norm emergence impacted on the groups, other minority communities 
and on international society? What might be the future trends of group-specific norm 
entrepreneurship?
The answers to these questions can help us to understand better minority-state relations 
in international society and the influence that even the most marginalised groups can 
wield when using the mechanisms of transnational social mobilisation. Unlike many
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other analyses of minority groups, this thesis has not sought to take an exclusively 
statist perspective nor to view minority rights through a security frame. The aim was to 
consider the agency of minority groups directly and their own construction of new 
norms. The research adds something to the literature on norm entrepreneurship by 
considering a unique kind of transnational non-state actor, one that possesses the latent 
capacity for statehood. It also problematises the role of international actors in aiding this 
norm entrepreneurship and considers their limitations, interests and ideational 
commitments. On a normative level, the findings give a glimpse of how emerging 
norms for transnational minority groups could alter conventions of representation in 
international society, displacing the state as the sole voice for sub-state groups and 
creating post-Westphalian forms of political community. On a policy level, the findings 
can inform approaches to multiculturalism, inclusion and ‘upstream’ conflict prevention 
policies in the national and international spheres.
The conclusion will elaborate some policy proposals based on an assessment of the case 
studies, taking an explicitly normative interest in facilitating adherence to emerging 
norms, space for future norms to emerge, and mechanisms to strengthen existing norms 
of minority protection. It is hoped that the learning from these cases can be instructive 
for the establishment of a more effective international protection regime for minorities 
that is emancipatory for groups, empowers ‘voices of moderation’, and transforms long­
standing structures of inequality.
Evidence of norm emergence:
This thesis has focused on several identifiers of norm emergence, including agenda- 
setting, issue recognition, changes in discursive positions of states, norm elaboration 
and institutionalisation and the creation of new bodies to review norm adherence. Based 
on these measurement criteria, the case studies show that new norms have emerged for 
Dalits and Afro-descendants since the late 1990s and particularly just prior and 
subsequent to the 2001 WCAR. These norms are constituted by more than just group- 
specific rights and standards and are evidenced also by recognition and mechanisms for 
each group at the international level.
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The emergence of norms on caste-based discrimination is evident primarily in UN 
human rights institutions. The CERD General Recommendation XXIX on ‘Descent’ 
(2002) detailing the particular elements of discrimination on the basis of caste and 
analogous systems is the strongest example. There also exist reports by several UN 
Sub-Commissioners and the two specially appointed UN Special Rapporteurs providing 
detailed assessments of how work and descent-based discrimination is prohibited in 
international law. The “Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Effective Elimination of 
Caste Based Discrimination” elaborated by the Special Rapporteurs provide further 
prescriptions for state behaviour to combat this form of discrimination. These texts are 
firm evidence of institutionalisation within the UN system. The Special Rapporteurs are 
mechanisms created specifically to review (if not monitor) the norms while CERD, 
although not a new caste-focused mechanism per se, has a role in advising on the 
General Recommendation on ‘Descent’. There are several other weaker examples of 
institutionalisation. For example, the decision by the European Commission to name 
caste-affected groups as specific recipients of funds under its EEDHR funding line; the 
resolutions by the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE condemning caste-based 
discrimination; and the US Congressional criticisms of India’s treatment of Dalits. In 
addition to this institutional acceptance of the norms, the caste TAN has elaborated a 
common platform of rights claims that have been embedded in international 
declarations of their own creation, such as the Kathmandu Declaration (2004) and the 
Delhi Declaration (2001). Although the discursive position of the critical state of India 
has not altered, several states, including Nepal and Pakistan, have more recently 
accepted discussion of caste within international fora on racial discrimination such as 
the DRC. The European Parliament, Denmark, the UK and the US are among the actors 
that mention caste in their bilateral statements on India.
Norms for Affo-descendants have emerged most visibly in connection with the WCAR. 
There are dedicated chapters on ‘people of African descent’ in the WCAR Durban 
Declaration and Programme o f Action and the Santiago prepcom outcome documents. 
The two regional follow-up conferences, Santiago Mas Cinco and the regional prepcom 
for the DRC, maintain these new norms, providing strong evidence of state socialisation 
and change to discursive positions. Brazil in particular as a critical state has shown its 
willingness to press for norms on Affo-descendants in international fora. The draft OAS 
convention against racial discrimination (endorsed at the Santiago prepcom) names
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Afro-descendants as a distinct group. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
made judgements that confirm juridically some of the new norms contained in the 
WCAR, particularly in the area of land rights and cultural identity. The UN Working 
Group of Experts on People of African Descent (WGPAD) is a new global mechanism 
for addressing Afro-descendant concerns and the OAS has created a regional 
monitoring mechanism, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons of African 
Descent and Racial Discrimination. The statements and programmes of several IOs in 
the region further embed these norms, particularly in international development 
institutions like the World Bank, the IDB, and other UN agencies. With the support of 
the WGM, Afro-descendants have elaborated more detailed provisions on their 
normative claims at regional seminars in Chincha (2005) and La Ceiba (2002) under the 
auspices of the UN.
What is the content of these new group-specific norms? With regard to the norms that 
have been accepted to date, the content is not new. In other words, states have not 
adopted nor IOs institutionalised, sui generis rights for Dalits or Afro-descendants. The 
same can be said for Roma and indigenous peoples. The innovation has been in the 
repackaging of a set of existing rights gathered from various quarters and presenting 
them as rights of a particular group. Group-specific rights for Afro-descendants have 
emphasised rights to non-discrimination, to protection of cultural identity, to land rights 
and to economic and social rights. They draw from the rights regimes of racial 
discrimination, minority protection, indigenous peoples and general human rights. 
Group-specific rights for Dalits emphasise the rights to non-discrimination on the basis 
of descent, with a particular focus on measures that prevent segregation, and general 
human rights protection on an equal basis. Group-specific rights for Roma include 
especially the rights to non-discrimination, to protection of cultural identity, and general 
human rights protection on an equal basis. Group-specific rights for indigenous peoples 
might appear prima facie  to include some sui generis provisions, in particular the right 
to free, prior and informed consent, and to ownership of land in accordance with 
traditional land tenure systems, but these can also be viewed as an elaboration of 
common article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR on the right to self-determination.
The fact that the content of adopted rights is not new should not been seen as a failure; 
on the contrary, groups have been adept at using adjacency strategies to access rights
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from various regimes and make them their own. This is evident, for example, in the 
case of non-discrimination. Each set of group-specific norms has non-discrimination at 
the core but each group argues that discrimination against them is of a unique type. 
Affo-descendants in the WCAR NGO Forum outcome document asserted that anti- 
Black racism was particular (WCAR NGO Forum POA, para 25). Dalits also argue that 
caste-based discrimination is a “distinct form of discrimination” (Delhi Declaration 
2001, preamble 2) with particular elements such as ‘untouchability’. Even Roma claim 
that anti-Gypsyism (or anti-Tziganism) is a distinct kind of discrimination (WCAR 
NGO Forum Declaration, para 175). Thus, although recycling existing norms, the 
groups have put their own mark on them to underscore the importance of packaging 
these rights as group-specific.
How do these group-specific norms compare with the existing pillars of minority rights? 
The cases provide some interesting insights into how the norms are interpreted and 
applied by different groups. On the right to exist, the cases show that existence is about 
much more than bodily integrity of the group, it is about a desire for a collective identity 
to be recognised. These groups want to exist as entities in multicultural states and as 
groups within international society. This desire has been instrumental to advocacy but 
it is also the foundation of a new form of political community, as exemplified by 
projects like the Afro-descendant Black Parliament of the Americas (and its predecessor 
the Pan-African Congresses), the supra-state representation aspired to by some Roma 
and the PFII. The right to exist is also affirmed in their claims to disaggregated data, a 
point stressed particularly by Afro-descendants.
On the right to non-discrimination, each of the groups has asserted this as a positive 
right, i.e. one that requires positive measures on the part of the state to be fulfilled. 
Affirmative action is one manifestation of this and although controversial in many states 
it features prominently in the groups’ demands. As noted above, the groups also assert 
that there are group-specific manifestations of discrimination. This is clearest in the 
case of Dalits with practices like ‘untouchability’; for others, the particularities are 
harder to pinpoint but nevertheless are felt by victims and raised by activists. CERD’s 
General Recommendations (on descent and Roma and possibly in future on Afro- 
descendants) suggest that the committee recognises these particularities.
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On the right to protection of identity, each of the groups have included ethno-cultural 
identity markers in their identity framing, although only Affo-descendants, Roma and 
indigenous peoples have incorporated cultural rights into their group-specific claims. 
For Dalits, cultural identity seems to be more instrumental than substantive, a tool for 
identity construction but not a right under threat or in need of exercising. The 
recognition of history and injustice has been an important part of all their rights claims. 
Affo-descendants, Roma and indigenous peoples have had aspects of their cultural 
identity spliced off and integrated into national identities without a corresponding social 
and political inclusion. Aspects of their culture are celebrated at the same time that they 
as groups are discriminated against. Thus, assertion of their rights to protection of 
cultural identity have been integral to public participation rights, an attempt to ‘ regraft’ 
the culture onto the collective people and to ensure more than just their cultural 
inclusion in national identity. Protection of identity means also recognition of their 
contribution to society -  economic, social, cultural, political -  and their equal 
membership in that society.
On the right to participation, each of the groups has faced deep, egregious forms of 
political exclusion, evidenced by practices of slavery, segregation, forced assimilation 
and caste. The journey to full political participation has been very long and their 
advocacy has stressed that the journey is far ffom complete. Unlike indigenous peoples 
and some Roma, Dalit and Afro-descendant leaders typically have not used the 
discourse of self-determination to assert their participation claims. In this sense, their 
claims usually have been in line with minority rights standards on the right to 
participate in decision-making that affects them or the regions in which they live (see 
UNDM Article 2.3). Some Afro-descendant groups have sought forms of autonomy 
over traditional territories, which has been accepted in WCAR provisions, some 
national constitutions and decisions of the Inter-American Court. Colombia is the only 
state in Latin America that reserves seats in Congress for Afro-descendants. India and 
Nepal have reserved seats for Dalits at various levels of government. Several states in 
Eastern Europe, including Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Kosova, Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic, have reserved seats for Roma in local and/or national government bodies. 
Political participation remains disproportionately low for all groups, however, and 
attention to facilitating full political participation therefore has been a key component of 
their advocacy. Also significant are the supra-state forms of political participation
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sought. The PFII stands as an attractive model for others. Afro-descendants are 
persisting with their requests for a UN Permanent Forum on Afro-descendants, 
receiving some state support in the WCAR follow-up outcome documents. Roma have 
sought seats of representation at IOs -  achieving some success with the ERTF-CoE 
relationship. Only indigenous peoples have achieved collective rights recognition to 
date, although the proposed paragraph in the OAS draft convention against racism could 
mark a diffusion of this right to Afro-descendants. States have not adopted for non- 
indigenous groups the language of peoples or nations that the leaders often assert, using 
instead the ‘persons’ formulation common in minority rights standards.
It is worth noting some important aspects of economic and social rights that are 
departures from the mainstream minority rights framework. The normative basis of 
their claims to economic and social rights has included the discourse of reparations. 
This is most obvious in the case of Afro-descendants but was also reflected in some 
calls by Roma, Dalits and indigenous peoples at the WCAR.363 In the case of Afro- 
descendants in Latin America, states have responded not with reparations but by 
recognising rights to affirmative action measures. Affirmative action also is a long­
standing policy for Scheduled Castes in India. Land rights have featured strongly in the 
requests of Afro-descendants and Dalits; Afro-descendants are the only non-indigenous 
group yet to secure state recognition of these rights in international fora. The latter’s 
gains may help similar bids for national minorities to territorial rights in future, 
although it is important to recall that only those Afro-descendant groups with affinity to 
indigenous peoples have secured these land rights in practice.
In each case it must also be noted that the aspirations of activists have not yet been met 
by the outputs of norm emergence. They seek specific international treaties pertaining to 
their groups and additional monitoring mechanisms. Some Dalit activists believe that an 
International Convention in the Elimination of Caste-Based Discrimination is needed 
and persist in their recommendations for a Special Rapporteur on caste-based 
discrimination. Afro-descendants have requested the creation of a UN Permanent 
Forum for Afro-descendants, a UN Decade on People of African Descent and a UN 
Voluntary Fund for the WGPAD. In the OAS draft convention against racial 
discrimination, Afro-descendants are making a bid for collective rights on par with
363 NGO Forum Declaration, para 75 and POA, paras 30, 68 and 142.
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indigenous peoples. Similarly, some Romani leaders have sought a European Roma 
Rights Charter and many would like to see an EU Directive and Commissioner 
specifically for Roma. The transformation of the DRIPS into a legally binding 
document is in the sights of indigenous leaders. These are all ambitious goals, ones not 
universally shared by activists nor consensually prioritised by them. Many prefer to 
focus attention on policy and funding commitments already targeted at their groups 
rather than investing time and resources in demanding legally-binding standards and/or 
new monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, there does not appear to be active state 
support for any of these proposals.
The norm emergence achievements of Dalits and Afro-descendants have not matched 
those of indigenous peoples and Roma. The most obvious shortfall concerns the 
agreement of a group-specific state negotiated international standard. In this regard, the 
adoption of the DRIPS in 2007 was a major victory for indigenous activists, one that 
privileged them above other ethno-cultural groups in the global sphere. The UN PFII is 
the strongest global institution for ethno-cultural groups and the UN Special 
Rapporteur, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (replacing the 
WGEP), UN Voluntary Fund plus the regional mechanisms for indigenous peoples in 
the Americas and Africa still trump any success at the global level of the other groups 
considered. Institutional mechanisms and resources targeted for Roma at the regional 
level are considerable and growing and in some ways overtake those of indigenous 
peoples (e.g. in terms of targeted funding).
The relative success of indigenous peoples and Roma prompts questions when 
evaluating the achievements of Dalits and Afro-descendants. What factors account for 
the difference in success between groups? How has framing, norm adjacency, 
organisational platforms, political opportunities and the support of IOs and states 
differed? What has prevented the groups from achieving their more ambitious goals of 
group-specific legal standards and permanent mechanisms? These points will be 
considered further in the next section where the processes, actors and strategies that 
have made this norm emergence possible will be examined.
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Assessing the norm entrepreneurship processes for group-specific rights:
Dalits and Afro-descendants have followed similar pathways to norm emergence for 
new group-specific standards and have been challenged by similar obstacles. The 
process and strategies for norm emergence they have pursued are consistent with the 
analytical framework offered by the literature on norm entrepreneurship. Their 
experiences give insight into the impact of issue and actor characteristics on norm 
emergence by showing the particular difficulties in constructing transnational social 
mobilisation and new norms for marginalised groups facing racial/ethnic discrimination. 
The case studies also have identified many of ‘the  material and ideological limits to 
such [transnational identity] construction in particular historical and political settings” 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998, 214-215) by looking at group experiences in a long view 
across distinct geographical regions. The role of international actors in norm 
entrepreneurship is also uncovered further by these cases. Together, the findings help to 
understand how weak non-state actors can forge alliances with actors across borders and 
in the international sphere to pursue normative change where group diversity is high and 
the rational motivations for state support are low.
The analysis will consider what factors made norm emergence possible and what factors 
hindered norm emergence. The issues of framing, norm adjacency, organisational 
platforms, political opportunity structures and 10 and state support will be reviewed. To 
summarise, the key factors contributing to norm emergence have been successful 
transnational identity and norm framing by the groups; support of international actors to 
their normative claims, including material, advocacy and ideational support; the 
availability and accessibility of political opportunity structures, particularly as space for 
persuasion and socialisation of states to emerging norms; and support from critical 
states. Some of these factors, particularly state acceptance, have been sufficient but not 
necessary for norm emergence. The key obstacles to norm emergence have been a low 
level of awareness of and commitment to minority rights issues among policy-makers; 
low capacity of and space for groups to engage in sustained mobilisation strategies 
domestically and transnationally; the marginalisation and low level of self-identification 
of the group members domestically; and the influence of state rational and ideational 
interests that create low motivations for state acceptance of emerging norms.
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Framing:
Each of the groups has undergone a process of re-framing their identities to create a new 
transnational identity frame that is empowering, uniting and instrumental for accessing 
existing norms and political opportunity structures. All have faced challenges in doing 
so. Among these are: the wide diversity in national/local identities; different historical 
contexts; different languages; domestic constraints that limit the acceptance of certain 
identity frames; competition among groups to privilege their identity; and the impact of 
discrimination in impeding the willingness of individuals to self-identify with the group.
Group diversity is a challenge for any transnational mobilisation; mass-based 
transnational social movements are difficult to create and sustain because of differences 
between national contexts (Tarrow 2005). In all of the cases, the groups considered are 
marginalised and discriminated against and have broadly similar experiences 
historically of subjugation and exclusion. Within each group, however, the context 
across countries varies significantly on issues such as population size, language, and 
relations with the state, that undermine the forging of common platforms. Afro- 
descendants, for example, range from a small numerical minority in most states to a 
majority in others, and have three predominant languages (Spanish, Portuguese, 
English) alongside numerous ancestral languages. While sharing a legacy of slavery, 
they have varied levels of economic status and political representation, particularly 
across the four dominant regions of North America, the Caribbean and Central and 
South America. Although the majority of caste-affected groups are Hindu (or of Hindu- 
descent), the incorporation of Buraku people from Japan and African caste-analogous 
communities has challenged the advocates to delineate common structures and 
experiences that are relevant across groups. Similarly, Roma are historically settled 
minorities in some countries, migrating communities in others and newly arrived 
immigrants in still others, while indigenous peoples exhibit tremendous diversity among 
communities who identify as such.
Groups within the broader transnational frame have sought often to assert their 
particular identity or ideological approach. Afro-descendants have been able to 
overcome many cultural differences to forge a shared identity linked to the experience 
of slavery. Even during the height of collective action during the WCAR, however,
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there were divisions over advocacy approaches and the policy implications of the 
reparations discourse, the latter particularly marked between divergent views of North 
and South Americans. It is perhaps telling that only the sub-region of Central America 
has been able to forge a lasting organisational platform of Afro-descendants (i.e. 
ONECA). The caste-affected groups have vastly differing cultures, embedded in distinct 
cultural and religious structures across continents, but have managed to create a 
common objective in the international sphere with framing. The solution has been found 
in forging a shared understanding of caste-based discrimination beyond the experience 
of Dalits and the Hindu caste system and embedding the Dalit experience in a more 
global phenomenon of discrimination based on work and descent. This frame has been 
an important enabler of the norm institutionalization process. It is noteworthy, however, 
that both the Buraku people and the Osu wanted to be named distinctly in the Durban 
NGO Forum outcome documents. Similarly, at the national level, Dalits have struggled 
to create unity across religious, regional, ideological and political lines. They have yet 
to solidify a domestic coalition for sustained mass mobilisation. These kinds of 
divisions have manifest among Roma and indigenous peoples as well. This has been 
striking in the case of Roma: the Romani identity frame has been rejected by Sinti and 
Travellers and a host of other groups at the same time that ‘ethnic Roma’ have sought to 
exclude groups that did not share their Romani culture. For the Roma, the competition 
among sub-groups for attention and participation opportunities has made the identity 
frame consensus fragile, with the effect that disputes over in and out groups and 
privileged identities within the Romani frame has distracted attention from collective 
advocacy. The ‘communicative interaction’ process (Passy (1999) citing Habermas 
(1987)) to achieve the Romani frame has created divisions within the transnational 
alliance. The indigenous peoples frame has witnessed divisions, particularly between 
those in so-called ‘European settler states’ like in the Americas or New Zealand and 
Australia and those in Asia and Africa who typically take a less rigid approach to the 
‘peoples’ frame and concepts such a ‘colonisation’.
These differences have prompted leaders to focus more on common experiences of 
discrimination and marginalisation and the effects thereof to unite constituents. Each of 
the groups share experiences of discrimination that are deeply entrenched historically 
and structurally. They are travelling gypsies, outcastes, natives and slaves for centuries 
and even millennia past. These identities have translated into social hierarchies that
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remain strong today, hierarchies that place indigenous, Romani, Dalit and Afro- 
descendant identities at the bottom. Where leaders seek to use the common experience 
of discrimination to unite individuals, it is conversely discrimination that impinges the 
prospects for mass mobilisation. Individuals are embedded in these social hierarchies 
and find it difficult to emancipate themselves from the core myths that perpetuate the 
inequality. The social, political and economic advantages of being indigenous, Romani, 
Dalit or Afro-descendant are low and the incentive to either climb the social ladder or 
accept the status quo is high. Roma commonly deny their status as ‘gypsies’ and try to 
meld into the society at large; Afro-descendants typically claim to be ‘mixed’ rather 
than African descent; most Dalits either disassociate themselves from Dalit 
communities by improving their economic status or changing their religion, or defer to 
religious doctrine and accept their identity without seeking to radicalise it for 
mobilisation purposes. Indigenous peoples have had more success in transforming 
negative perceptions of their identity into positive ones but still struggle in the face of 
many societies that see indigenous customs as backward.
There appears to be a common strategy across all four groups for countering this effect 
of discrimination by using culture to build esteem for the identity and to reinforce the 
logic of group-specific claims. Culture has been instrumental to challenging 
discrimination both by helping to constitute a more attractive identity frame and by 
setting the groups apart as distinct communities. Each group has attempted to imbue 
their identity with a newfound pride using culture as the medium to this end. Indigenous 
peoples have had fewer challenges in this regard given their individually rich ethno­
cultural identities, which have been united loosely under similar practices of land use 
and spirituality. In the other groups, leaders have forged “imagined communities” 
across borders utilising many of the symbols of nationalism. According to one 
predominant theory by Anthony Smith (2000), modem nations are derived from ethnies, 
defined by him as “a named human population with common myths of ancestry, shared 
historical memories, one or more elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland, 
and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (65). Ethnie ingredients are 
featured in the identity frames of each group considered here. Afro-descendants have 
both the mythical homelands of their African ancestors and the composite cimarron 
identities; they have cimarron territories defended against European intrusion by heroes 
like Zumbi of Brazil; traditional religions; music, dance and food co-opted into
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contemporary national identities; and the legacies of the slave trade. Transnational 
mobilisation has concentrated on these unifying cultural and historical elements, evident 
in the earliest efforts of the Pan-African Congress and nigritude movements, in the 
Congresses on Black Culture in the Americas and in the contemporary mobilisation 
around the WCAR. Dalits (of India) have resurrected their pre-Arayan invasion ethnies 
and territories; venerated the founding father Ambedkar and his precursors; and forged 
a Dalit cultural movement that has established Dalit literature and created Dalit heroes. 
Ambedkar was keen to construct Dalits as a common people, asserting that their 
subjugation was not divined but the product of invader oppression o f indigenous 
communities. The Roma have their great transcontinental migration; the ‘Gadjos’; their 
impact on music; a mythical homeland; a Romanes language, a flag and a national day. 
Many Romani leaders have used the language of nationalism in defence of their 
communities. Leaders in each of the groups have created an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ in their 
myths of origin to construct a collective identity at the same time as trying to seek 
integration of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in contemporary society, including in their demands a 
greater recognition of the groups’ historical and contemporary cultural identity.
The names chosen by leaders are evidence in point. Each name has created for the 
groups a collective identity akin to a self-determining nation or people. The term Dalit 
means ‘broken people’, denoting their status as a community rather than an aggregate of 
individuals. ‘Afro-descendants’ implies a common ancestry and place of origin and 
leaders often use the label in conjunction with ‘people’. This is the strategy pursued by 
indigenous peoples before them with a clear eye on claiming the right of all people to 
self-determination. Similarly, the term Roma holds stronger ethno-cultural connotations 
than ‘Gypsy’, helping to buttress the claim that Roma are a stateless nation in Europe. 
As a mobilisation unit, being a ‘people’ or ‘nation’ of any kind confers a high status in 
international society, serving as the baseline for statehood. ‘People’ and ‘nation’ are 
also indefinite terms, making them malleable for entrepreneurial framers.
The inclusion of ethnie markers can be understood principally as a project of esteem- 
building rather than a nationalism project per se (although the latter is more in evidence 
for some Romani and indigenous leaders). Studies in psychology show the importance 
of group esteem in helping to insulate group members from the impact of discrimination 
and the correlation between perceived public racial discrimination and low self-esteem
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(e.g. Garcia and Sanchez 2009; Porter and Washington 1993; Kimura 2007).364 By 
transforming the social value of identities conventionally downgraded by 
discrimination, leaders can improve the self-esteem of group members and decrease the 
impact of racial discrimination by altering public perceptions of the group identity. If 
individuals feel that their group identity is valuable, then discriminatory treatment by 
external actors will have a weaker impact on their self-esteem. The stronger the group 
self-esteem, the less potent is discrimination against them. The efforts at forging strong 
group-identity frames thus provide an important boost to efforts to prevent 
discrimination by law.
There are many who would regard these efforts to construct group-specific claims as 
‘essentialising difference’ and consider the outcome as negative; when viewed through 
the prism of esteem-building, however, the framing of identities around cultural -  and 
not just non-discrimination -  markers, is a vital component of the norm 
entrepreneurship process, which can have a positive impact on eliminating 
discrimination. It transforms power relations by making the identity once subject to 
denigration and discrimination into one that is a source of pride and strength. This 
increases the likelihood of self-identification with the identity (because it can improve 
self-esteem) and can contribute to stronger forms of social mobilisation. If leaders only 
used non-discrimination frames, they would be relying inordinately on external actors to 
change their behaviour (i.e. discrimination) without empowering their own members to 
alter the impact of that behaviour on themselves (i.e. through building esteem). This 
helps also to bypass the paradox of using identities discriminated against as weapons to 
fight discrimination; the identities are not reified as is, they are transformed and then 
reified in a more positive ‘ethno-cultural’ frame.
By forging distinct communities, the groups have set the foundations for distinct group 
claims. The cultural strand to their identity frame has buttressed their claims to specific 
rights beyond the general provisions of non-discrimination, by underscoring their 
unique experiences and collective identity. The construction of the identity frame is
364 Some research finds variations of these points according to class and education: for example, those in 
low educational attainment categories have been found to exhibit a lower positive correlation between 
strong racial identity and high self-esteem than those with higher educational attainment (e.g. Kimura 
2007 ,18).
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integral to the rights claims made and the interest to establish new normative categories 
for their groups.
Adjacency:
The strategy of adjacency in norm emergence is identified by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998): in order to increase the likelihood of acceptance, “activists work hard to frame 
their issues in ways that make persuasive connections between existing norms and 
emergent norms” (908) and the “standards of appropriateness defined by prior norms” 
(897). This approach is visible in the case studies. Dalits have based their claims on 
‘descent’ in ICERD to elaborate a prohibition of caste-based discrimination in 
international law. Through framing, they did not have to create a new norm in 
international law but had rather to expand the understanding of an existing norm. Afro- 
descendant activists have taken a slightly different tack. They have expressed their 
claims in terms similar to those accepted previously by states for indigenous peoples. 
The emphasis on descent from slaves has situated their claims in the arena of norms and 
obligations stemming from the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. Romani leaders 
have used the framing of the Roma as a (stateless) ethno-cultural nation to seek existing 
rights granted to national minorities in international and domestic law. In a similar 
manner to Dalits, they did not create a new norm but instead have extended that norm 
beyond dominant (state) interpretations to include non-territorial ethno-cultural groups. 
Indigenous peoples also have extended dominant interpretations of the right of peoples 
to self-determination. Effective framing has made Dalit claims adjacent to norms 
against racism, Afro-descendant claims adjacent to norms for (indigenous) peoples and 
against slavery, Romani claims adjacent to norms for nations and national minorities 
and indigenous claims adjacent to norms of decolonisation. The norms they have made 
adjacent to their claims are among the most deeply embedded in international society.
Adjacency for norm emergence was challenged by the accepted “logic of 
appropriateness” held by states and exhibited in dominant discourses vis-a-vis existing 
norms. Afro-descendants had to contend with ‘racial democracy’ and its blanket 
assumptions about racial miscegenation and inter-communal harmony. They benefited 
from efforts by indigenous peoples to break this myth and emphasise diversity but
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because indigenous peoples took the lead they also framed the discourse around ethno­
cultural identity rather than race, leaving less space for Afro-descendants’ claims. This 
made framing their identities purely along racial lines more difficult amidst an emerging 
discourse on mvlticulturalism. This can account in part for the interest of activists to 
extend their claims beyond non-discrimination and to highlight also the cultural aspects 
of their identity. Dalits faced the dominance of post-colonial ideas of racism and its 
structure in international society. India continues to reject the framing of Dalit claims 
within ‘descent’ under ICERD because it cannot accept that racism is tolerated or 
practiced by a decolonised state. The logic of appropriateness proposed by Dalits is 
contra India’s self-perception as a leader of anti-racism on the international stage. 
Roma have challenged the “logic of appropriateness” on the rights o f nations and 
national minorities by ‘deterritorialising’ the norm and constructing a transnational 
nation that -  in its most ambitious form - seeks specialised status in international fora. 
Indigenous peoples have deconstructed conventional ideas of colonialism and 
manifestations of the right to self-determination, brokering a new understanding of 
internal measures of self-determination that would be less threatening to territorial 
integrity of states. The way that each of these norms emerged previously in international 
society was under different conditions and advanced according to different state 
interests, namely decolonisation, nation-building and threats of irredentism. Activists 
have therefore had to challenge and transform accepted logics of appropriateness 
(specifically, logics that have underpinned state legitimacy) in order to secure norm 
emergence. The difficulties they have faced in the norm entrepreneurship process 
suggest that these logics have not been altered fully at all levels of governance.
This is partly because opportunities to socialise states to a reformed ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ have been few. Indigenous peoples were aided in their efforts at 
socialising states particularly by the UN Working Group on the draft declaration on the 
rights of indigenous peoples. Over 17 years (1995-2007) this process took place, 
culminating in the adoption of the Declaration; as noted in Chapter 1, this was not 
without states setting firm limitations to the scope of self-determination, evidence that 
the ‘logic’ put forth by indigenous activists is still not resolutely accepted (see footnote 
53). Nevertheless, this direct interaction over questions of normative interpretation has 
proven valuable to shifting the logic of appropriateness on indigenous rights. Roma 
have had various international fora -  in the OSCE, CoE and EU institutions -  to
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socialise states but their discourse has been more on issues of policy than on norms. 
Afro-descendants primarily have used the WCAR fora and outcome documents to 
socialise states and negotiate new normative innovations. This process is still evolving 
at the OAS draft convention against racial discrimination negotiations but Afro- 
descendants are not the sole focus, unlike the DRIPS negotiation, thus limiting the 
intensity for socialisation. Dalits have had the least such opportunities for socialisation, 
lacking also any regional mechanisms, which can account in part for the slow changes 
in the recalcitrant position of India and in other affected states.
Keck and Sikkink (1998) find that claims framed as issues of legal inequality of 
opportunity (as opposed to outcome) or bodily harm against a vulnerable 
individual/group will be more effective for transnational advocacy than other 
approaches. They add that success is increased where “causes can be assigned to the 
deliberate (intentional) actions of identifiable individuals...[rather than] problems 
whose causes are irredeemably structural” (27). The evidence from these cases both 
support and challenge their conclusions. Suggestions of vulnerability and bodily harm 
have featured in the representation of the groups’ concerns: for example, experiences of 
extreme poverty, cultural erosion and/or violent attacks have been current in the 
advocacy work of the groups. Two critical distinctions from Keck and Sikkink’s 
claims, however, are needed. First, there is no legal inequality of opportunity at play in 
the cases, only de facto inequality. This is because the right to non-discrimination is 
embedded in virtually every domestic legal system. Examples of legal inequality of 
opportunity are difficult to find these days, with legal discrimination tending to be 
restricted to laws that limit the rights of non-citizens, sexual minorities and, in some 
cases, women. The activists have had to rely more on “accountability politics” (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, 24), i.e. demonstrating the gap between legal obligations and state 
practice. Alongside this they have extrapolated from Keck and Sikkink’s criteria to use 
frames that demonstrate how contemporary experiences are resultant from historical 
legal inequality. They have tapped into the obligations erga omnes of states on issues 
like genocide, apartheid and slavery, and made their claims emergent from these 
obligations. For example, advocates have used the phrase “hidden apartheid” to 
describe the situation of Dalits in India and argue that the Vedic-sanctioned caste- 
structure of inequality persists. In Latin America, advocates emphasise that 
contemporary experiences of marginalisation and discrimination are the direct result of
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historical experiences of slavery. Roma invoke their persecution during the Holocaust 
and the practices of Romani slavery that persisted late into the 19th century (Barany 
2002, 109; Mamshiakova and Popov 2001, 41-45). Indigenous peoples have focused 
primarily on colonialism as a form of legal inequality of peoples. Secondly, the 
advocacy of each group has focused on structural causes of marginalisation, rather than 
on “the actions of identifiable individuals”. They have made society writ large and 
governments responsible for structures of social (or ‘racial’) inequality. In line with 
Keck and Sikkink’s argument, addressing structural causes has proved challenging for 
these norm entrepreneurs. Discussion of contemporary forms of discrimination, 
however, has been difficult also because of threats to the esteem of individual (state) 
actors. Individuals are responsible for acts of discrimination, even as they are 
embedded in structures of inequality that perpetuate this discrimination. To address this, 
activists often are framing the sources of contemporary injustice in the roots of past 
events, enabling current actors to accept responsibility for correcting the manifestations 
of injustice (including discrimination) without incurring as much individual shame for 
these actions. This is tricky, however, and each of the groups has faced challenges in 
confronting structural inequalities that largely are socially accepted even though racism 
per se is individually and socially repudiated.
Neither Dalits nor Afro-descendants have been keen to frame their identities as 
minorities or to make their claims adjacent to norms for minorities. They have rejected, 
in whole or in part, the terminology of ‘minority’ for self-identification or mobilisation. 
They nevertheless have used international mechanisms for the protection of minorities 
in their advocacy at some point. The reasons cited by activists for not utilising the 
minority frame are both instrumental and normative. Dalits have been unable to claim 
minority status in the domestic sphere where, in India for example, the term applies 
only to religious minorities. The concept of minority is not widely used in Latin 
American states where it has been viewed as a European construction ill-fitted to the 
Latin American experience. Some or all of the sub-groups within each transnational 
identity could claim prima facie to be ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in 
accordance with the international understanding of these terms. When advocating in the 
international sphere some leaders will tacitly accept these frames to access relevant fora 
and partners; this has been strongly in evidence in the case of the WGM, which has not 
only been attended by members of both groups but which also has supported regional or
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national dialogues, most actively for Afro-descendants in Latin America. There is an 
obvious trend in splintering away from these general minority-focused institutions, 
however, to group-specific mechanisms: the UN has created a specific Working Group 
on People of African Descent; Dalits have created a series of distinct Special 
Rapporteurs focusing on ‘work and descent-based discrimination’; the OSCE Contact 
Point on Roma and Sinti has largely taken over from the HCNM for work on Roma; and 
indigenous peoples have helped create several group-specific institutions at the global 
and regional levels. Like Afro-descendants and Dalits, Romani and indigenous peoples’ 
leaders have also moved away from the ‘minority’ identity. For some Roma, the 
minority frame is attractive and state-accepted but for others, the frame has proved less 
accessible because the groups are not considered as national minorities or to hold 
distinct ethno-cultural identities. Moreover, for some leaders, accepting anything less 
than recognition as a transnational nation is defeatist. Indigenous activists have proven 
to be much more rigorous in their disassociation from the minorities frame: many 
indigenous rights activists from the Americas, Nordic states, Australia and New Zealand 
in particular would not attend the WGM believing their presence in such a forum would 
undermine their identity claims. Given the plethora of mechanisms established for their 
advocacy, indigenous activists have had sufficient political opportunity structures to 
afford to be choosy, a freedom that other groups have not enjoyed until recently. Like 
indigenous peoples, however, many of the activists interviewed for this thesis said the 
frame of ‘minority’ was disempowering and that it did not fit with their perception of 
their group. They preferred terms like ‘people’ or ‘nation’.
States appear mostly to avoid the minority label for these groups. This may be due to 
the domestic constraints noted above regarding the social construction of the term or 
because of state interests to dissuade collective identity mobilisation and/or rights 
claims that come from minority status in international society. In contrast, actors 
external to the groups based in IOs or INGOs appear to be more inclined to categorise 
them de facto as minorities. Compared to the state position, this recognition seems 
progressive but it could also be argued that the caution of IOs and NGOs to accept 
frames like ‘people’ or ‘nation’ and to work instead under the frame of minority is 
restricting norm entrepreneurship of these groups in a way that maintains the state- 
centric status quo. In other words, IOs and many INGOs are conservative in their 
acceptance of the more ‘radical’ identity frames that some norm entrepreneurs are
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utilising, opting instead to stick within the confines of the minority protection regime 
and its largely state-friendly boundaries. In some respects, the acceptance of group- 
specific frames and norms is a way out of this conundrum for states and external actors: 
if the groups are considered as sui generis rather than as types of peoples, nations or 
minorities, this enables specific and restricted boundaries to be set around their 
normative entitlements, as opposed to the fuzzier boundaries of rights for peoples or 
nations.
Organisational platforms:
Transnational mobilisation is aided greatly by the creation of organisational platforms. 
These platforms provide an institutional focal point for information exchange, 
strategising, capacity-building and discourse elaboration.
There is strong evidence of forms of social mobilisation by Dalits and Afro-descendants 
in the domestic sphere dating back to the early 20th century but increasing significantly 
in the 1990s. Despite the presence of several NGOs, there have been few national 
platform NGOs established. Although the number of NGOs active in the international 
sphere has been limited, each group has created INGOs and/or networks to function as 
transnational organisational platforms. Caste-affected groups have the IDSN and the 
ADRM and Afro-descendants have network structures (rather than INGOs) including 
the Alianza, Afro-America XXI and the Red de Mujeres (Women’s Network). In the 
case of Afro-descendants, these networks are preceded by the Pan-Affican Congress 
and the Congresses on Black Culture in the Americas; at present, the Black Parliament 
of the Americas appears to be gaining strength. There are also some sub-regional 
networks, such as ONECA, comprising the states of Central America. National Dalit 
organisations have transnational ties with several Dalit Solidarity Networks. Roma and 
indigenous peoples similarly have a long history of transnational links that were 
consolidated in the early 1970s with the creation of the IRU and the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples; since then, the Roma have established, for example, the RNC and 
ERTF and indigenous peoples have numerous other INGOs (see Table 1.2). None of the 
groups has formed a permanent caucus along the lines of that created by indigenous 
peoples on the global stage, which has proven useful for negotiating common platforms.
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The only examples of caucuses for Dalits, Roma and Afro-descendants were those 
created during the WCAR processes, which have not been maintained. Each of the 
transnational organisational platforms is headed by a member of the group; the IDSN is 
managed by a council that includes Dalit organisations. The degree of 
institutionalisation varies widely: the indigenous INGOs, the ERTF and IDSN are the 
most institutionalised in terms of permanent staff, funding, regular outputs and a 
physical base. The other INGOs/networks have a nominal website or no website, no 
permanent physical base nor any full time designated staff. The consolidation of these 
organisational platforms - both domestically and internationally - has been hindered by 
several factors.
The first is lack of sustained funding to enable part-time activists to become full-time 
professional advocates with a reliable institutional base. Funding has waxed and waned 
for minority NGOs. At an NGO conference in Europe in late 2008 pertaining to the 
FCNM, the outcome NGO Declaration notes that “involvement of civil society and 
minority rights organisations in the promotion of the [FCNM]... is in practice curtailed 
by the lack of funding available for this type of work. Particularly within the European 
Union area, it is virtually impossible to secure funding for minority rights advocacy”.365 
Low technical capacity for completing increasingly complex funding applications for 
donors has been an issue, along with the structures of funding provision that tend to 
privilege larger, permanent NGOs over smaller looser organisations. More critical in 
this case is that the substantive focus of minority advocacy is a subject that many 
donors omit from their funding priorities. This is to be distinguished from funding to 
social development projects that directly or indirectly benefit minorities (although the 
latter is more common). Bilateral and multilateral donors often regard the rights of 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities as politically sensitive issues and are cautious 
about being seen to fund organisations (or target projects to communities) that states 
might perceive to be politically destabilising. Minority organisational platforms (like 
the IRU) with aspirations to represent groups at the supra-state level will be challenged 
to get funding for work that is perhaps seen as too similar to that of a political party or 
that produces no tangible social development outcome. These organisational platforms
365 Assessing the Impact 10 years on: NGO declaration on the Framework Convention for the Protection 
o f National Minorities; On the occasion o f the Conference Enhancing the Impact o f the Framework 
Convention: Past Experience, Present Achievements and Future Challenges, Strasbourg, 9-10 October 
2008: para. 34. The Declaration was signed by 86 NGOs.
282
are not in a strong position to canvas money from the individuals they seek to represent 
because of the self-identification and mobilisation issues noted above and also the fact 
that those they represent are among the poorest. It may not be a coincidence that much 
of the funding to the organisational platforms for Dalits, Afro-descendants and Roma, 
has come from private foundations like Ford, OSI and faith-based charities. Funding 
has also been channelled via IOs, exemplified by Norway’s funding to the IDB’s Social 
Inclusion Fund or the European Commission’s funding streams focused on minorities, 
caste issues and discrimination. Where bilateral donors have provided resources to 
minorities it has often come under less conspicuous banners, such as ‘social inclusion’ 
exemplified by DFID funding to combat caste-based discrimination in Nepal, although 
recent initiatives like that of AECID in Latin America for Afro-descendants are more 
overtly targeted.
Indigenous peoples have not faced the same degree of funding problems for their 
international advocacy work. The UN Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations has 
had some US$ 4.1 million in voluntary contributions from states and other actors over 
the period 1992-2007.367 More striking are the figures of funding allocated under the 
European Commission’s EIDHR funding line: over the period 2000-2006, nearly three 
times as much funding was allocated under the theme of ‘rights of indigenous peoples’ 
as was allocated under the theme ‘rights of persons belonging to minorities and ethnic 
groups’ (see Table 1.3). Notably, funding to Dalits and Afro-descendant advocacy was 
allocated predominantly under the ‘Fight Against Racism, Xenophobia and 
Discrimination’ theme. A cursory look at the funding allocated for ‘minorities and 
ethnic groups’ reveals that of the 48 projects at least eight are for groups that self- 
identify also as indigenous peoples (e.g. Batwa, pastoralists). Only 13 of the projects in 
this theme are designed to benefit one specific group (others benefit more than two 
groups or, more commonly, are regionally focused); of these, eight are targeted at 
Roma, two at Afro-descendants, two for minority groups in Turkey and one for the 
Uigurs in China. The latter projects in Turkey and China focus on promoting minority 
culture and education respectively. Further research on these trends is needed but these 
initial findings suggest that the EU is less likely to fund organisations that represent the 
interests of particular minority groups, more likely to fund organisations that represent
366 On the European Commission, see the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) Strategy Paper 2007-2010, p. 8-11.
367 See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/about/funds/indigenous/ (accessed 6 March 2009).
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indigenous peoples and in the case of national minorities, restricts its funding to culture 
and education rather than advocacy work. Overall, this makes building organisational 
platforms for norm entrepreneurship on group-specific rights more difficult.
Table 1.3 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Funding by 
Theme, 2000-2006368
Theme Funding in Euros Number of EIDHR 
Projects
Rights of Persons Belonging to 
Minorities and Ethnic Groups
8.7 million 48
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 24.2 million 74
Fight Against Racism, 
Xenophobia and Discrimination
28.6 million 95
The organisational platforms also have been weakened by lack of consensus on goals 
and frames between key leaders. The absence of a strong central leadership figure(s) to 
unify has made the elaboration of common advocacy plans difficult in the face of 
competing personalities and priorities. For example, the Alianza managed effective 
cooperation during the WCAR but its ties have been much looser since then. Dalit or 
caste-NGOs are strong in India, Nepal and Japan but report very little horizontal 
cooperation outside the collaborations facilitated by the IDSN and more recently in the 
ADRM.
Along with the obstacles to mobilisation of discrimination and self-identification, the 
groups also lack firm mobilising structures to draw from in building organisational 
platforms. Dalits sometimes cooperate through trade union ties or faith groups, for 
example, but this only encompasses a portion of the population and is more fragmenting 
than unifying. Afro-descendant mobilisation historically has emerged through an urban 
intelligentsia limited in reach. With the exception of selected Romani and Afro- 
descendant communities, none of the groups have traditional decision-making structures 
that are still a feature of many indigenous communities. Although these structures have 
given more legitimacy to the claims of indigenous peoples’ sovereignty, they are mostly 
localised and have not been directly useful for building transnational mobilisation. This 
absence of mobilisation structures to engage a more mass-based interest has contributed
368 For figures, see EIDHR 2000-2006 Compendium of Funding by Theme and EIDHR Statistics 2000- 
2006, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/eidhr/index en.htm (accessed 6 March 2009).
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to the fact that international advocacy is elite-driven in all four cases and poorly linked 
to the grassroots level.
The lack of sustained political opportunity structures and limited funding for 
international advocacy also have inhibited organisational platform development. Afro- 
descendants have found some space in regional IOs and with the support of the WGM 
but this has been sporadic, unpredictable and highly dependant on external funding. 
Dalits have no designated space in international fora beyond that which they have 
created for themselves in the form of international conferences. There is no permanent 
institutional space on the scale of the ERTF or PFII as yet for Dalits and Afro- 
descendants, although calls for a Permanent Forum on Afro-descendants demonstrate an 
interest in this direction.
The participation of non-minority organisations in these group-specific transnational 
advocacy networks (TANs) is another important feature of transnational mobilisation. 
In each group there are a set of INGOs helping to shape the international advocacy 
strategy. For Dalits, the role of HRW, IMADR and the Lutheran World Federation 
stand out; for Afro-descendants, Global Rights, the Ford Foundation and the Inter- 
American Foundation are most significant; for Roma, organisations like the ERRC and 
OSI are important; and for indigenous peoples, INGOs like IWGIA, Cultural Survival 
and Survival are long-time supporters. Across these groups, Anti-Slavery International 
and MRG have been useful partners. These organisations have made contributions to 
the consolidation of the TAN through certification of the issues and individual 
advocates, provision of funding to attend international fora, publicising concerns of the 
groups, sharing information, creating advocacy strategies, and organising space in the 
international sphere for dialogue between the groups, states and IOs. INGO support has 
been crucial for norm emergence, not least in the way these actors have helped to shape 
the normative discourse by embedding it firmly in the international human rights 
regime. The support of INGOs can change, however, according to internal 
organisational priorities: for example, the impact of HRW engagement depended largely 
on the initiative of Smita Narula and HRW action on Dalits has declined since her 
departure from the organisation.
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Political Opportunity Structures:
Like indigenous peoples and Roma before them, Dalits and Afro-descendants have 
witnessed an increase in the political opportunity structures accessible by them and 
targeted for them. These opportunities have given the groups space for norm 
entrepreneurship, enabling TANs to consolidate, rights claims to be elaborated and 
states to be socialised to emerging norms. The international political opportunity 
structures that have proved most amenable to advocacy by these groups are those 
focused on human rights and, to a lesser extent, those focused on development. The 
agency of Dalits, Roma and Afro-descendants in creating these political opportunities 
has varied. Most have been established by states or by IOs and although often fashioned 
in the name of the groups they have not necessarily been formulated (solely or 
principally) to advance their interests. The groups have had to transform political 
opportunities to meet their own goals. In each case, the successful use of these 
structures has depended on cooperation with sympathetic insiders that have assisted 
norm entrepreneurship. A key opportunity structure, the 2001 WCAR, will be 
considered separately.
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) theory of transnational social mobilisation argues that the 
international sphere is used when domestic political opportunities are blocked or in 
“insider-outside coalitions” (Sikkink 2004) where international political opportunities 
complement those available domestically. The domestic blockage can result from poor 
state-civil society relations, state objections to the norm emergence and inability to 
secure domestic political allies. In the case of minority groups, the openness of political 
opportunities needs to be evaluated on social, political and structural levels. 
Structurally, the groups constitute a numerical minority and so can lack the critical mass 
to use political mechanisms without alliances with other groups. Forging alliances in 
the international sphere can be easier than creating domestic political alliances because 
there are fewer actors in TANs with whom to negotiate plans and the groups do not 
need to rely on mass mobilisation to have a political impact in the halls of international 
institutions. Socially, discrimination and marginalisation impedes the ability of groups 
to gain sympathy for their cause from the wider population and even from within the 
community itself where self-identification may be low. Remedies for discrimination are
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difficult to secure without external pressure for transformation because societies are 
bound by internalised caste and race-prejudices that are difficult to transcend.
Political channels have not been entirely closed for these groups, as evidenced by some 
representation in government, but they have not been effective. In the case of Dalits, 
the failure of political leaders to implement more forcefully the laws protecting Dalits 
has prompted activists to enlist pressure from outside. Dalits have been unable to create 
effective political alliances domestically to advance their own interests, either within 
parties or across party lines. With so many regional, ideological and hierarchical 
divisions, they have not been able to coalesce to generate greater leverage and 
accountability from parties. At best they constitute only 16 percent of the population in 
India, for example, which is enough to be courted politically but not enough to be 
decisive. For Afro-descendants, political freedoms in general were blocked until the 
1990s. They have witnessed small increases in political representation in recent years. 
Engaging in domestic politics is difficult for any group lacking financial resources and 
political capital, something that marginalised minorities have even less of than others. 
Because their mobilisation has tended to be elite and not mass-based, they have lacked 
the ‘human’ leverage to trade political allegiance for changes in domestic policy, at 
least not beyond the rhetorical level.
Whereas in the domestic sphere, actors from these groups faced discrimination, 
marginalisation and elite disregard for their concerns, political opportunities in the 
international sphere have had open doors and conferred upon activists a new level of 
respect and authority. The structures of inequality in national politics are replaced by a 
more level playing field internationally, where activists can engage with high-level 
government and 10 officials with ease not characteristic of their domestic experiences.
The cases show that political opportunity structures can be effective for norm 
emergence even in the face of state opposition; many structures, like CERD, the Sub- 
Commission, the Special Rapporteurs, and the regional human rights courts are outside 
the bounds of strict state control and have conferred tangible support. Other structures 
do depend on state support, evidenced, for example, by India’s ability to block the 
adoption of the recommendations of the Special Rapporteurs on work and descent. The 
initiative of individual actors within IOs has been important to transforming institutions
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into political opportunities; this is clear in the IDB and World Bank examples. The 
groups also have created their own political opportunity structures, such as the Black 
Parliament of the Americas or the Dalit Kathmandu conference in 2004.
The UN is the only political opportunity structure that is common across all four 
groups, particularly the UN human rights institutions. These institutions are relatively 
open to civil society and by framing their concerns broadly as human rights issues, 
activists found a receptive audience. The UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights was 
the first place that Romani and Dalit activists engaged with the UN, from the late 1970s 
and early 1980s respectively. Individual Sub-Commissioners took an active interest in 
their issues and supported the drafting of group-specific resolutions or reports, 
particularly in the case of Dalits. Afro-descendants had less interaction with the Sub- 
Commission directly but did make some good use of the WGM, especially through the 
political opportunities created by the WGM at the regional level with seminars targeted 
for Afro-descendants. The keen interest of WGM member Jose Bengoa was 
instrumental in this regard. The WGM has not served Dalits and Roma as well as Afro- 
descendants, constituting a space for delivery of interventions but not useful for norm 
emergence. In contrast to the WGIP, the WGM lacked a Voluntary Fund so attendance 
could not be sustained; its efforts to focus more on Romani issues were always trumped 
by better funded regional initiatives in Europe; and work on Dalit issues was taken up 
by WGM Chair Asbjom Eide in the context of the Sub-Commission instead. The 
WGIP has served faithfully indigenous norm entrepreneurs since 1982 and the Special 
Rapporteur also has undertaken innovative country and thematic discussions.
CERD has been a significant political opportunity structure in each case as well. The 
decisions to convene thematic sessions by CERD on Roma and on ‘descent’ were major 
victories in the norm emergence process; these were preceded by a General 
Recommendation on the rights of indigenous peoples in 1997. There is now interest 
from new CERD member Pastor Elias Murillo Martinez, an Affo-Colombian lawyer 
and activist, to hold a similar thematic session focused on Afro-descendants. CERD 
has been able to support norm emergence with little interference from states, albeit 
striving for state endorsement of its recommendations. CERD review of periodic state
369 Interview with Carlos Quesada, April 2008. Mr. Murillo Martinez has also issued a proposal for a UN 
Decade on Afro-descendants from January 2010 (personal communication with Patrick Thomberry, June 
2009).
288
reports also has proved a useful political opportunity for activists, particularly Roma 
and Dalits, who have submitted alternative reports for consideration. CERD also has 
been proactive in socialising states to emerging norms in its Concluding Observations 
thus helping to forge domestic political opportunities for groups.
The Special Rapporteur on racism deserves mention as a third useful political 
opportunity structure. Country visits have provided space for actors to mobilise in the 
domestic sphere. The main holder of the Rapporteurship over the period examined here 
is Doudou Diene. He has proved amenable to wide interpretations of his mandate by 
taking up Dalit and caste issues, been rigorous in his exploration of Afro-descendant 
issues during his many country visits to Latin America, and Roma have been a constant 
feature of his reports from European states (and Colombia370).
Smith (2004a) finds that INGOs are increasingly working with regional IOs; this is 
reflected also for those groups where regional institutions with a human rights focus 
exist. The Dalits had limited regional opportunities, not least because SAARC does not 
have institutions focused on human rights. Caste-affected groups created their own 
regional political opportunities, organising international meetings, for example, in New 
Delhi (2001), Vancouver (2002) and Kathmandu (2004), where civil society and IOs 
could come together. The absence of states from the region at these meetings, however, 
weakened the utility of the structures for state socialisation. The outputs of these 
meetings have contributed to norm emergence, particularly because they are elaborated 
principally by the communities affected, but they lack the certification that embedding 
the declarations in an IO would confer. Dalits have also used political opportunities in 
other regions with the support of Dalit Solidarity Networks. Three targets stand out: the 
US and UK bilateral relations with India and the interface between the EU and India. 
They did have some success in securing congressional and parliamentary moral 
criticisms of India in a classic ‘boomerang’ model of advocacy but none of these actors 
has used material leverage against India.
Afro-descendants have had more opportunities through regional human rights 
institutions and IOs but these have come mostly just prior to or since the WCAR. The 
OAS has created a new Special Rapporteur on People of African Descent and has an
370 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/18/Add.3 (24 February 2004): see paras 6, 38, 39.
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inter-state Working Group to negotiate the draft convention against racial 
discrimination. The support of Global Rights was critical to securing both of these 
opportunities, not only for the resources they brought for sustained advocacy but also 
the contacts and advocacy expertise. The Inter-American Court has served as a political 
opportunity structure for national NGOs by making some decisions that interpret the 
American Convention on Human Rights in innovative ways to support Afro- 
descendants’ normative claims to land rights and protection of their cultural identity. 
Also of importance to Afro-descendants have been the political opportunities afforded 
by international development agencies. The efforts by concerned individuals within the 
World Bank and IDB to give attention to Afro-descendants marked a significant change 
in the profile of Afro-descendants among all regional IOs. This opening was hard 
fought, an effort led by internal actors and accelerated by the WCAR. Once the space 
was created for regional dialogues on the issues, Afro-descendant activists were better 
able to strengthen their organisational platforms. Their cooperation with important IOs 
helped to certify their norm entrepreneurship, not least because state actors were often 
present in the political opportunities created by IOs.
Roma and indigenous peoples have had several political opportunity structures both at 
the regional and global level. From the CoE, to the OSCE, EU, CERD and initiatives 
like the Decade of Roma Inclusion, Roma have been privileged by layers of institutional 
engagement. Attention to indigenous peoples began in global opportunity structures 
and has expanded to regional mechanisms in the OAS, African Union and Arctic 
Council. As political opportunity structures, many of these are institutionally weak 
mechanisms and have not necessarily met the aspirations of activists. For example, the 
PFII reports only to ECOSOC and has a limited mandate of engagement with the UN 
system. The ERTF has a much lower status than the desired permanent membership in 
the CoE. The more recent efforts of key Romani leaders to secure an EU Directive or 
Strategy on Roma have so far been unsuccessful, not least because the material 
implications for states and the European Commission are high. Many of the political 
opportunity structures that exist in IOs specifically for these groups are constructed by 
states and therefore do not meet fully the needs and interests of the groups they profess 
to benefit. In spite of these limitations, groups manage to utilise the space offered to 
advance their norm entrepreneurship goals.
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World Conference Against Racism:
This thesis has given particular attention to the impact of the WCAR as a political 
opportunity structure. Activists anticipated the WCAR would be a political opportunity 
structure on par with the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women, offering to the 
‘victims’ of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related Intolerance an 
increased policy and programme response similar to that made for women. The fraught 
negotiations leading up to and at Durban, combined with the dramatic turn of world 
events just after the WCAR conclusion, meant the conference fell short of expectations. 
The controversies of the WCAR have obscured the positive impact that the processes 
had on norm entrepreneurship for some groups. The parallel fora to the WCAR gave 
space for elaborating common normative platforms; in lobbying for inclusion into the 
WCAR outcome documents the groups were socialising states to the new norms, even if 
not all were accepted universally. Three key outcomes will be discussed here, namely 
new transnational mobilisation, new recognition, and new norms and mechanisms.
Transnational social mobilisation: The processes surrounding Durban provided ready 
political opportunities for establishing transnational social mobilisation. All groups 
benefited from the increased availability of financing to civil society earmarked for 
WCAR related activities, which facilitated travel, consultations and communication. 
The myriad of parallel process at the national, regional and global level offered an 
unprecedented number of political opportunities structures in which to formulate and 
advance their claims. Their cooperation was institutionalised in new networks and the 
thematic caucuses created for the WCAR process. In the case of Dalits and caste- 
affected groups, the WCAR helped accelerate a horizontal and vertical expansion of 
advocacy networks. What had previously been primarily domestic advocacy with 
limited cooperation with INGOs (such as HRW and EMADR) became a firmly 
entrenched TAN with a strong organisational platform. Dalits of South Asia 
strategically aligned with other caste-affected groups and the Dalit diaspora located 
primarily in the Western states to increase their leverage for advocacy. A new global 
identity frame was created through this transnational mobilisation. The WCAR offered 
Latin American Afro-descendants the chance to emerge as a dynamic component of 
transnational Afro-descendant mobilisation. Meetings in preparation for Santiago
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stimulated the Alianza. The WCAR also gave space for Afro-descendants from the 
Americas to work with those in Europe and to have new contact with African actors. 
The Roma population in Latin America had been isolated and virtually invisible on the 
international stage prior to the WCAR regional prepcom. They created a new regional 
platform of NGOs out of this process and brought to the mainly European Roma caucus 
a new and challenging perspective. Their presence in the Roma caucus underscored the 
transcontinental reach of the identity and justified Romani bids for representation at the 
global -  rather than European -  level.
The WCAR also gave space for mobilisation across groups in an unprecedented way. 
The political opportunities offered by the previous two world conferences against 
racism were far less, not least because NGOs from affected groups were fewer in that 
period. The thematic caucuses representing Afro-descendants, Dalits/caste-affected 
groups and Roma worked alongside each other in the NGO Forum, sometimes 
participating in joint events.
Recognition: Each of the groups sought recognition of a particular identity frame by the 
WCAR. Neither caste-affected groups nor Afro-descendants were explicitly recognised 
within the lexicon of international human rights standards before the WCAR processes. 
‘Afro-descendant’ and ‘caste-based discrimination’ became institutionalised frames 
under which individuals and sub-communities could unite. This distinct recognition 
was a symbolic validation of their collective identities and a ‘certification’ of the 
identity as a basis for mobilisation within international fora. Although only Afro- 
descendants were successful in securing formal recognition within the DDPA, caste- 
affected groups secured recognition in all but the outcome documents, their identity 
incorporated, for example, into the NGO Forum documents, as one of the largest caucus 
groups and within the media reports on the conference. Roma were named specifically 
in the WCAR outcome documents, thus asserting their identity on the global level, 
although the desired ‘stateless nation’ recognition was not achieved. In Latin America, 
states recognized Roma and Sinti as a distinct community for the first time in the 
Santiago outcome document. Indigenous peoples wanted states to use the peoples 
formulation in the DDPA but fell short of the unqualified recognition due to states’ 
normative concerns.
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Expanding norms and mechanisms: All four groups included among their WCAR 
objectives the expansion of a normative framework on rights for their group. Each 
elaborated group-specific ‘declarations’ outlining their own perspective on rights claims 
to be endorsed by states at Durban. The WCAR processes gave the groups a sufficient 
time frame and high level of interaction through which to socialise states to their 
proposals.
Afro-descendants were the most successful in using the WCAR for norm emergence. 
The Santiago prepcom (and Durban) outcome documents remain central to Afro- 
descendant advocacy. In addition to recognition, the key innovation was to accept 
certain rights for Afro-descendants that had previously only been associated with 
indigenous peoples in international law. These included rights to “protection of their 
traditional knowledge”; to “the use, enjoyment and conservation of the natural 
renewable resources of their habitat”; and “where applicable to their ancestrally 
inhabited land” {Durban Declaration, para 34). The creation of a Working Group of 
Experts on People of African Descent provided a more permanent political opportunity 
structure in which to elaborate on these and other norms for Afro-descendants. The 
OAS draft convention on racial discrimination, endorsed in Santiago, could be the first 
international treaty to recognise rights specifically for Afro-descendants.
Norms for caste-affected groups were not recognised in the WCAR outcome documents 
despite the strident efforts of the Dalits and Caste caucus. Nevertheless, the space 
provided by the WCAR for negotiating the draft text brought firm attention to the issue 
and highlighted India’s obstinacy. New states were socialised to the case, including 
those without caste-affected populations, and the media took a keen interest in the 
controversy and the advocacy of Dalits. The parallel non-governmental events provided 
a space to create solidarity for their concerns, to elaborate their demands and to embed 
their recommendations in the NGO Forum outcome documents. The exclusion of caste- 
based discrimination in the WCAR had some impact on the creation of subsequent 
political opportunities for norm emergence, like the CERD thematic session on 
‘descent’ and the Sub-Commission Special Rapporteurs.
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Roma were not as successful in convincing states of their ‘nation’ status but they did 
maintain the normative gains made elsewhere, including distinct recognition in the text, 
and elevated them to a global institution. They also strengthened their claims for 
representation within the UN by demonstrating their presence outside of Europe. The 
influence of the indigenous peoples’ discourse on the Roma of Latin America was 
particularly striking and had the immediate effect at Durban of imbuing the normative 
claims of Roma with stronger language on collective rights, which appeared in the NGO 
Forum outcome documents. Indigenous peoples had hoped the DDPA would buttress 
their claims as peoples and more firmly entrench their right to self-determination. This 
was not the outcome but the DDPA reiterated many of the norms already recognised for 
indigenous peoples, albeit inserting weaker formulations on land rights issues.
As a political opportunity structure, the WCAR altered the power of states vis-a-vis the 
marginalised groups. It was important for opening up space domestically to discuss 
issues that are usually ignored in public discourse. The change was especially profound 
in the case of Afro-descendants and Dalits: the WCAR gave civil society the leverage 
they needed to push states into a dialogue. For Roma in Latin America it also gave 
them a chance to seek their distinct recognition. The WCAR shows that even where 
state interests are firmly entrenched, they are no longer able to silence their opponents 
thanks to the political opportunities and allies available to marginalised groups within 
the international sphere. Within the narrow confines of negotiating a text at Durban, 
India could make trade-offs to meets its objectives; outside the conference centre, they 
were unable to avoid their critics. Caste-based discrimination accrued a dramatic 
increase in international attention because of the WCAR. Similarly, Brazil and other 
Latina American states had hoped to avoid scrutiny of their policies on ‘racial 
democracy’ but with the strong spotlight of Durban, they were pushed to acknowledge 
their failings.
Post-Durban: the norm entrepreneurship continues
The extraordinary nature of the WCAR as a political opportunity structure can be 
appreciated better when contrasted with the weak opportunities offered by the global 
WCAR follow-up mechanisms. The utility of these mechanisms has depended 
principally on state support, funding for civil society and the agency of the experts that
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sit in the mechanisms. The dramatic turn of world events on 11 September 2001 just 
after the conclusion of the WCAR and the negative feeling that was generated by some 
of the conference outcomes, has pulled international attention away from combating 
racism towards combating the ‘war on terror’.
State support has been poor, particularly from Northern states that had a rough ride 
through Durban and have avoided re-opening any debates shakily concluded there. 
Indeed, this latter point was a precondition for Northern states to even participate in the 
2009 Durban Review Conference (DRC). Political capital on racism issues in the 
international sphere has been redirected to attacking or defending Western state policies 
vis-a-vis Muslim minorities and immigrant groups.
The global WCAR follow-up mechanisms have not been well funded by states and no 
voluntary fund has been created to support civil society participation. Key organisations 
like the Ford Foundation and the Inter-American Foundation that invested heavily in 
civil society participation in the WCAR have withdrawn funding to support the WCAR 
follow-up mechanisms after the controversies that ensued at Durban. The experts or 
states sitting in the three global mechanisms, namely the Inter-Governmental Working 
Group, the Group of Independent Eminent Experts and the WGPAD, have not been as 
ambitious as civil society would have liked. With the exception o f Edna Santos Roland 
in the Group of Experts, who has been actively pursuing a proposed Racial Equality 
Index, the discussions within the mechanisms have generated little interest from 
affected groups and NGO engagement has been low.
Dalits have concentrated their resources in other human rights institutions given that 
‘work and descent’ was never agreed at Durban and consequently is not given 
recognition in the follow-up mechanisms. Indigenous peoples have been lukewarm on 
the DDPA and Durban follow-up; the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002 were much stronger in contrast. Efforts are focused on group- 
specific mechanisms instead. Roma also have stronger relevant mechanisms at the 
regional level in Europe and with the exception of the ERRC have not participated in 
any of the WCAR follow-up mechanisms. In contrast, Roma in Latin America have 
benefited from the many regional Durban follow-up initiatives. Latin American states, 
under the lead of Brazil, have been the most proactive in creating such initiatives: this
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was the only region to host a Durban + 5 meeting and the first to hold a regional 
prepcom for the DRC. In both events, Roma maintained their presence and recognition 
in the outcome documents, as have indigenous peoples of the region. Afro-descendants 
have benefited from these and other regional level meetings that have stemmed from the 
WCAR. They have given less attention to the global WCAR mechanisms, including the 
WGPAD. Lack of funding for travel, poor outreach by the WGPAD and the apparent 
cautiousness of the experts in these mechanisms are key points that have discouraged 
participation.
The DRC in April 2009 was a good measure of how important the WCAR was to each 
group as a political opportunity structure. Afro-descendants and Dalits were a strong 
presence and Roma and indigenous peoples were virtually absent. The difference 
suggests that the WCAR offered much more to groups that lacked other political 
opportunity structures before Durban and that it remains a symbolically valuable 
mobilisation space for them. The outcomes of the DRC show some evidence of the 
impact of state socialisation to Dalit and Afro-descendant norms since 2001. Although 
India remained obstinate, several other states referred to caste-based discrimination in 
their interventions, including Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mauritius and Slovenia. 
During the prepcoms, the interventions of the EU Member States referenced the CERD 
General Recommendation XXIX to support discussion of caste in the DRC and the 
accreditation of caste-focused NGOs. The DRC text makes some references to people of 
African descent (one of the few groups named) and an earlier version of the text called 
for the WGPAD to be “established as a United Nations permanent forum on people of 
African descent”.371
Overall, the long-term value of the WCAR for norm entrepreneurship has been 
strongest in the case of Afro-descendants, where the leadership of Brazil as a critical 
state has kept political interest in the fora high and where Afro-descendant activists 
continue to use the Santiago outcome documents as a tool for advocacy and policy 
development. This top-down and bottom-up pressure, combined with investment of 
resources from regional IOs and INGOs, has kept the WCAR current in the region. 
Afro-descendant activists have been able to capitalise on the renewed government
371 DRC, Preparatory Committee, Second Substantive Session, Geneva 6-17 October 2008; Compilation 
ofparagraphs proposed by delegations; Section Two: Assessment o f the Effectiveness o f the existing 
Durban follow-up mechanisms (13 October 2008: para 41).
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interest post-DRC to stimulate new discussion on national action plans against
372racism.
Support o f international actors:
International actors have played a vital role in norm emergence. IOs have served as 
political opportunity structures for securing issue recognition, agenda-setting and 
socialisation of states. They have institutionalised emerging norms and housed new 
mechanisms to monitor these norms. INGOs have participated in TANs and built 
capacity for norm entrepreneurship. Both IOs and INGOs have ‘certified’ the norm 
entrepreneurs and norm emergence process to help increase leverage against states. 
Agents within these organisations have assisted with norm elaboration. Perceptions of 
their expertise, moral influence and political legitimacy have buttressed minority TANs 
that sometimes can be regarded as weaker on these points.
In Latin America, the engagement of regional organisations, like the OAS and the IDB 
and regional events, like the seminars of the OHCHR, has further coalesced the regional 
transnational mobilisation of Afro-descendants. For caste-affected groups, the UN has 
proved a useful focal point for the construction of global cooperation. This is also the 
case for indigenous peoples, although regional 10 fora like the Arctic Council and 
African Union have also emerged as useful spaces. Romani activists have benefited 
greatly from the myriad of European institutions that have created opportunities for 
their mobilisation, evidenced most strongly by the CoE’s role in establishing the ERTF.
There are a handful of international actors whose agency has proven important to norm 
entrepreneurship of two or more of the groups. Gay McDougall, the current IEM, has 
been instrumental in her roles on the UN Sub-Commission, CERD, as Executive 
Director of Global Rights, as a key actor during the WCAR and currently as IEM. Her 
impact has been particularly strong in the case of Afro-descendants but she has been 
supportive of Dalit rights by choosing to highlight this issue at the WCAR Bellagio 
Consultation, and was a member of CERD during the Roma thematic session. Minority 
Rights Group International was possibly the first INGO to take up the issue of caste in
372 Personal communication from Carlos Minott, May 2009.
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the early 1980s, also serving as an active member of the IDSN; it has been a leader in 
documenting the experiences of Afro-descendants in Latin America since its first 
related publication in 1971; and has long been active with Romani organisations in CEE 
and indigenous groups in Africa and Asia, on publications, advocacy and training. The 
Ford Foundation has offered its funds to further strategic aims that support emerging 
advocacy: Ford seed funding to HRW in India supported the creation of a national 
platform for advocacy on Dalit rights; and Ford officers in Brazil targeted their 
resources to nurture Affo-Brazilian activists and intelligentsia. Ford funded advocacy 
activities for all four groups during the WCAR, including providing a major grant to 
ERRC that enabled some 40 Romani advocates to attend Durban.
Like Ford, other donors have crossed the line of passive donor to become active 
promoters of normative change. The Inter-American Foundation sponsored a major 
programme of work on Afro-descendant issues that helped to build the transnational 
network and continues to direct its funds toward projects that build Afro-descendant 
capacity for advocacy. DanChurchAid and Cordaid are among the donors that have 
offered resources for international advocacy and the work of the IDSN. Similarly, the 
OSI has spearheaded major initiatives in support of Roma, like the Decade of Roma 
Inclusion and the Roma Education Fund, at the same time as providing scholarships for 
Romani professionals, grants to smaller NGOs and resources to support monitoring of 
EU accession criteria relevant to Roma.
Tarrow (2005) identifies the role of IOs in ‘certification’ of non-state actors (194). This 
helps to legitimise actors’ claims and increases access to further political opportunities. 
IOs often have been more open to dialogue with the groups studied here than states have 
been. IOs, however, have to proceed with some caution in deciding with which 
organisations to engage. Afro-descendants, Dalits, Roma and indigenous peoples have 
tended not to use violence in their advocacy and have used very little direct action; none 
of the groups has threatened directly the territorial integrity of states. IOs nevertheless 
appear open to engagement with minority activists whose approaches are more 
aggressive than conciliatory and do not shy away from inviting such actors to 
participate in events. This could be part of a strategy by sympathetic insiders to 
generate external pressure that motivates internal attention to the issues. They need 
some sparks to get less sympathetic colleagues to take notice and action. At the same
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time, IOs need the ‘certification’ of minority groups for programme initiatives and there 
is clearly a need for activists that can communicate useful policy proposals to IOs, 
taking a constructive rather than only critical approach. This is evidenced in the 
Romani case, where ERIO reportedly is gaining the trust of EU institutions by 
providing the strategic policy advice that other bodies, like the ERTF, has been unable 
to offer. Without sustained pressure from a group-TAN, however, it is easier for IOs to 
cherry-pick individual actors as consultants rather than undertaking a broader shift 
towards sustained cooperation with a group; for example, Romero Rodriguez of Mundo 
Afro has been advisor to UNICEF and UNESCO in Latin America on some projects, an 
approach that is precipitated in part by the absence of a strong, institutionalised 
organisational platform of Afro-descendants.
The evidence from the case studies suggests that 10 support for norm emergence has 
depended more on individual agency than on institutional commitment. Institutional 
commitment has been difficult to secure and engagement by IOs has fluctuated 
according to interest by internal actors, particularly those at a high-level. IOs also have 
struggled to concretise efforts at inter-agency coordination on issues, evidenced in the 
Affo-descendant case by the moribund Inter-Agency Consultation on Race in the 
Americas. In contrast, inter-agency cooperation on indigenous peoples issues has been 
more successful, demonstrated by a vigorous Inter-Agency Support Group on 
Indigenous Peoples Issues (IASG) (comprised of 31 10 members)373 and the interface 
between agencies facilitated by the PFII. Roma, Dalits and Afro-descendants are still a 
relatively low priority for many IOs actors, who would prefer to mainstream these 
concerns into overall programmes of cooperation on poverty reduction and social 
inclusion. This is the trend visible in the IDB for Afro-descendants, and in the 
European Commission’s hesitation on the proposed European Framework Strategy on 
Roma Inclusion. The processes of 10 cooperation differ slightly with indigenous 
peoples. Indigenous peoples’ norm entrepreneurship emerged out of conflict with IOs, 
particularly those engaged on development, and included campaigning efforts that 
sought to highlight the harm caused by agencies like the World Bank. Thus, IOs were 
trying to defend their actions and in the process, adopting policies and programmes 
targeted for indigenous peoples in an effort to assuage activists. Afro-descendants, 
Dalits and Roma have not targeted IOs in the same manner; their claims for special
373 http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/iasg.html (accessed 9 March 2009).
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attention come at a time when agencies are saturated by requirements to target special 
groups -  such as women, children, the aged, persons with disabilities and persons with 
HIV/AIDS. Indigenous peoples were first in line but the political will for targeted 
approaches possibly has been weakened for subsequent groups.
IOs and INGOs have different motivations but similar constraints in supporting norm 
entrepreneurship by minorities. Both have to consider state interests in deciding whether 
to cooperate with minorities: IOs because they are created by states and INGOs because 
they are usually funded by states. Cooperating only with organisations that use non­
violence and have no secessionist aspirations are relevant also for INGOs. INGOs gain 
much in cooperating with minority groups in TANs, such as access to donor funds, 
access to information at the local level, greater legitimacy for country-level work and 
the use of minority NGOs as implementing partners for local-level projects. Just as 
INGOs help to certify minority claims, working with minority groups certifies the 
legitimacy of INGOs and helps them to realise their objectives.
The cooperation with INGOs has not been without controversy, however. The INGOs 
have been seen as outsiders either by minority leaders within the TAN or by external 
critics. Dalits have faced criticism for working with ‘Western’ or ‘Christian’ 
organisations; Afro-descendants have not always welcomed the influence o f American 
NGOs in Latin American affairs; Romani leaders have regarded many INGOs as 
‘Gadjo’ institutions; and many indigenous leaders have long rejected anything other 
than self-representation. NGOs from the North and South have differed in their 
ideological views as well, with Southern actors more likely to be focused on anti­
globalisation and leftist views and Northern actors pursuing liberal agendas concerning 
legal rights. The structures of funding have meant that Northern INGOs often filter the 
distribution of funds to smaller, Southern-based minority NGOs. The lower level of 
funds minority NGOs receive makes it more difficult for them to consolidate 
institutionally. By controlling funding allocations, Northern INGOs can (unduly) 
influence the predominance of certain actors, their project activities and the voice and 
advocacy approach they bring.
So far the benefits of transnational cooperation with INGOs have outweighed the 
negatives. INGOs understand the modus operandi of IOs and diplomacy in
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international society and have helped to broker the norm emergence process. They have 
provided much needed seed funding, advocacy support and information. As the 
organisational platforms of Dalits and Afro-descendants strengthen, the relationship 
with INGOs can change. This is evident in the indigenous case, where strong 
indigenous INGOs have relied far less on other INGOs to support their international 
advocacy. INGOs tend now to support more nascent mobilisation by smaller and 
institutionally weaker indigenous actors. Strong indigenous INGOs have altered the 
interface with states, making direct negotiations instead of via INGOs and positioning 
themselves as quasi-political representatives rather than just activists.
Donors may need to reconsider their relationship with burgeoning minority INGOs, 
offering longer-term financial support to institutions that demonstrably represent 
minority-group interests without shying away because these are more ‘political’. IOs 
that seek policy input from minority groups have to be prepared to invest in institutional 
development, operational costs and policy-capacity building as well as responding in 
good faith to the policy recommendations minority NGOs offer. It will always be 
challenging to establish adequate accountability and representation of groups via INGO 
structures. There are two examples of promising practice: ERIO and IDSN. ERIO aims 
for a staff that is majority Roma, is institutionally an INGO (unlike the ERTF, which is 
more a political structure) and has a close relationship with the Commission that 
appears to be mutually beneficial. It serves as a conduit for information exchange 
between Romani organisations and the EU institutions. ERIO is dominated, however, 
by a single figure, Ivan Ivanov, who could have undue policy influence with less 
accountability. The IDSN is possibly a better model in this regard: its structure consists 
of a council of core national Dalit platform NGOs or solidarity networks, with INGOs 
as associate members, and its decision-making is led by the council directly.
Support o f states:
The support of a small number of states has influenced strongly the norm emergence 
process in the two case studies. Afro-descendants have gained visible state support for 
group-specific norms; in contrast, Dalits and caste-affected groups have gained 
sympathy for their cause but few states have been willing to expend their political 
capital in support of norm entrepreneurship. This difference helps to uncover some of
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the factors that help or hinder socialisation of states to emerging norms. State 
motivation for endorsing norm emergence can be understood from both ideational and 
rational perspectives. The studies also suggest that state support varies at different 
levels of analysis, not least because the costs and benefits of norm endorsement inside 
and outside the state differ. This analysis is based on perceptions of state interests by 
actors in IOs and minority TANs and by the discourse of states in international fora, and 
to a lesser extent, by their actions domestically. The present thesis has not been 
conducted with interviews of state actors, thus limiting any firm conclusions, but some 
points are offered here that could be tested with future process-tracing research.
The most important state for advancing group-specific norms on Afro-descendants has 
been Brazil. Brazil is a quintessential ‘critical state’, a regional hegemon and the state 
with numerically the largest population of Afro-descendants. Brazil was a firm 
supporter of Afro-descendants’ claims during the WCAR, in regional follow-ups, in 
politically and financially supporting the creation of the OAS Special Rapporteur on 
Afro-descendants and in taking a lead position in the elaboration of the draft OAS 
convention against racial discrimination. No other state in Latin America has 
challenged Brazil’s direction or efforts for norm emergence. India similarly has been a 
quintessential ‘critical state’, positioned as a regional hegemon with the largest 
numerical population of Dalits. Unlike Brazil, India has been obstructive towards norm 
emergence in the international sphere, blocking any state support for provisions in the 
WCAR on caste-based discrimination and undermining efforts by UN experts to review 
the situation of caste-affected groups. Until very recently, other states with caste- 
affected populations had not contradicted India’s stance in international fora (even 
whilst taking more open approaches at the domestic level, as evidenced by Nepal). 
Some change was witnessed at the DRC, where Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh noted 
in their high-level interventions the need to consider caste-based discrimination in 
international fora.
There is very little evidence of states from outside each region trying to socialise states 
to the emerging norms. Guatemala, Switzerland and Barbados gave some support to the 
Dalits and Caste Caucus during the WCAR, and both the US and UK have made some 
declarations condemning India’s obstinacy on caste but these efforts have not been 
sustained nor accompanied by material sanctions. The US has not pressurised Latin
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American states to adhere to emerging norms for Afro-descendants save through the 
unilateral actions of the US Congressional Black Caucus in some individual states like 
Colombia. Support to norm emergence on Dalit and Affo-descendant rights has not 
been a foreign policy priority but more attributable to the agency of individual state 
actors, either in delegations to UN fora or in legislative branches domestically. Latin 
American states like Brazil and Colombia that have been open to Romani rights have 
not intervened in European regional affairs to push for better norm adherence. Groups 
of states conventionally strong on human rights socialisation in international society 
each have their own internal problems of racial discrimination, making them ill-placed 
to put pressure for normative change on racism in other states. To do so risks reciprocal 
pressure that can harm their own identity and legitimacy interests. Post-colonial states 
have more readily used accusations of racism against the North in the (false) belief that 
their own societies were not internally racist. The groups studied here have questioned 
the validity of these claims. In addition, both Brazil and India are regional hegemons 
and criticising their actions offers little material or strategic gain for states outside the 
respective regions. African states have championed the WCAR and DRC processes and 
reparations for the transatlantic slave trade but their efforts seem focused more on their 
own benefit than that of the African diaspora. One exception has been efforts of 
bilateral donors like DFID, NORAD, and AECID to fund targeted initiatives for Afro- 
descendants and Dalits through development programming.
Material interests of affected states have been a factor in Dalit and Affo-descendant 
cases. Four material interests are most relevant: security, territorial integrity, voting 
power and economic gains/losses. For Brazil, supporting norms for ‘Africans and 
people of African descent’ in the WCAR Brazil strengthened its South-South relations 
with African states and created good will that can be useful for promoting its economic 
and strategic interests in the region. Domestically, greater attention to Affo-descendant 
concerns increased the legitimacy of both outgoing and incoming governments by 
generating support from Afro-Brazilian voters. India’s Dalits are 16 percent of the 
population and while the Dalit vote is courted by most political parties, it has 
conventionally been splintered and therefore not decisive as a whole. Positions of 
political and economic power in India are dominated by high-caste groups; it is not in 
their material interests to redistribute wealth to tackle low-caste poverty or to dismantle 
the de facto privileges they accme from the caste hierarchy. Notably, the conventional
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material concerns pertaining to minority groups, i.e. security and territorial integrity, 
have not been consistent factors in these norm emergence processes. Afro-descendants 
have posed no security threat in the contemporary period but some land claims have 
threatened state authority over certain territories valuable for resources or tourism. 
Security has been a factor for Dalits because Naxalite/Maoist militants in India and 
Nepal have a high number of Dalit members. The effects have differed: in Nepal, this 
has presented more openings for caste-focused advocates in post-conflict democratic 
reforms but activists in India report it has had little direct impact on their advocacy.
Rational motivations alone cannot explain fully the actions of states in these cases. The 
fact remains that Afro-descendants and Dalits mostly are poor and marginalised groups 
with weak political and economic power. They constitute less than 20 percent of the 
population in most states and often have been co-opted by political parties that have 
failed to fulfil their promises. None of the groups has a kin state that might prompt 
government concessions as a means of preventing irredentism. This same holds true for 
indigenous peoples and Roma. To understand the success and failure in norm 
emergence it is necessary to consider also ideational motivations for state actions.
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) identify legitimacy, conformity and esteem as three key 
ideational factors influencing the propensity of states to be socialised to emerging 
norms. Legitimacy and conformity appear to be strong factors in these cases, although 
they cannot be divorced completely from material interests. In Latin America, the 
treatment of Afro-descendants helps portray state commitment to norms on 
multiculturalism and democratic governance that have characterised the post­
authoritarian regimes. The Santiago about-face by Brazil in endorsing group-specific 
norms for Afro-descendants (and Roma) signalled a new criterion for legitimacy of 
states in the region and many have been quick to conform to the Brazilian model. The 
fact that Affo-descendant civil society is weaker in most states, however, means they 
have not gone as far as Brazil to implement the norms. The material costs of doing so 
domestically are high. India has rejected norm emergence on caste-based discrimination 
for fear that its projected international image as a modem, egalitarian and democratic 
state will be compromised by its failures to secure equality for Dalits. Other states with 
Dalits have often conformed to India’s narrative that caste is not race. India maintains 
that its standards for the elimination of caste-based discrimination are extremely high,
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thus asserting the government’s legitimacy domestically and internationally. It is also 
important to note that the position of the state in international society affects 
socialisation possibilities. Brazil and India as regional hegemons can socialise other 
states to emerging norms of legitimacy.
Manipulating the esteem of state actors is more challenging in these cases. 
Domestically, the status of Dalits and Afro-descendants is still very low and their 
marginalisation is not regarded by the majority of the population as a failure of the 
government nor a threat to its legitimacy. Each state has perpetuated (or not 
contradicted) myths that safeguard the esteem of state actors in considering these 
groups, such as racial democracy and the constitutional outlawing of ‘untouchability’. 
For this reason, the groups have to rely heavily on norms in international society to 
influence state behaviour. The challenge is made more complicated because state 
identities are threatened by emerging group-specific norms. The idealised status of 
Afro-descendants and Dalits is integral to the founding principles and self-perception of 
many states: Afro-descendants challenge the myth of racial harmony that Latin 
American leaders have long portrayed as a unique achievement of the region; Dalits 
challenge India’s post-colonial aspirations for a just, non-hierarchical democracy of 
citizens.
Advocates have been able to manipulate esteem by emphasising their positions of 
extreme marginalisation. They are among the poorest of the poor and state actors seek 
to address poverty as a result of (ideational) international development commitments 
and (material) interests in domestic growth. Furthermore, the groups are fortunate 
(ironically) that they suffer from violations of some of the most firmly embedded norms 
in international society (e.g. genocide, slavery, apartheid, racial discrimination). Groups 
can use these norms to influence state perceptions of esteem, legitimacy and 
conformity. The “logic of appropriateness” in adhering to these norms is not questioned 
by states. What advocates have been challenged to do is to persuade state actors to 
admit to their failure to adhere to these norms. This has been difficult because many 
state actors might believe they compromise state legitimacy in the international sphere 
by so doing as well as damage their own esteem by accepting culpability for these 
crimes.
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Of particular interest is the norm against racial discrimination. The controversies that 
ensued at each of the world conferences against racism show that states have been slow 
to reconceptualise the purpose of this norm in international society. Those in post­
colonial states have long argued that racism is a construct of colonialism, implying that 
racism does not exist in decolonised countries. Similarly, post-communist states see 
racism as anathema to communism and thus not a legacy they perpetuate. Post-colonial 
and post-communist states therefore have struggled to accept that racism is an internal 
problem for them. Groups that seek state support to eradicate discrimination have faced 
blanket denials that racism exists. Two things have helped groups to challenge these 
assumptions: the WCAR and transnational mobilisation. The 2001 WCAR created a 
political opportunity structure in which dialogue on ‘contemporary forms’ of racism 
could take place, pushing many states to make ideational concessions over the course of 
the preparatory processes. Groups had space, time and resources for socialisation and 
persuasion similar to that long-held by indigenous peoples in the international sphere. 
Transnational mobilisation has helped to diffuse attention from individual states, 
attention that might frame individual states as pariahs in international society. By 
supporting norm emergence for a transnational group, no single state is isolated in its 
responsibility for racial (or caste) discrimination. This helps to decrease the threats to 
esteem, identity and legitimacy in international fora.
State support, however, must be disaggregated according to levels of analysis. The 
material costs of accepting norm emergence in the international sphere often are less 
than the costs of doing so at the national level. States can make rhetorical commitments 
to emerging norms without having to provide immediately the resources and legal 
reforms needed to enact the new norms domestically. For example, states have adopted 
international soft law commitments for Afro-descendants and Roma but where they 
have faced proposals for legally-binding obligations, they have been less forthcoming. 
India’s objections to the ‘work and descent’ standards are linked partly to the fact that 
accepting ‘descent’ as a relevant norm means accepting that ICERD applies. This trend 
is evidenced also in the case of Roma, where not all states accept application of the 
FCNM to Roma, and for indigenous peoples by the low number of ratifications of ILO 
Convention 169 and state reservations to the DRIPS. Another interesting example of the 
differential costs by level is Nepal: although domestic adherence to emerging norms for 
Dalits is most likely motivated by a post-conflict inclusion project reflecting Maoist
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demands, championing these same norms at the international level would harm relations 
with India.
The ideational motivations also seem to differ: the case studies reveal a major gap 
between the discourse on group-specific rights at the international level and that used by 
local government actors. While those in the Foreign Ministry are conveying 
commitments to the eradication of discrimination, those at home are less likely to accept 
that discrimination is a problem. It may be that esteem is assessed differently in the 
domestic and international spheres, such that locally, actors incur higher costs to their 
esteem in acknowledging racial discrimination than do actors in international society.
The case studies show that state support is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for 
norm emergence. International actors have assisted norm emergence even with the 
opposition of states, particularly with respect to issue recognition, agenda-setting, norm 
elaboration and institutionalisation and even in creating norm monitoring bodies. What 
is clear is that socialisation of states to emerging norms can be impacted greatly by 
states, particularly by critical states. At the norm adherence stage, this socialisation 
becomes of central importance. The enthusiasm of IOs for norm emergence, therefore, 
gives a false impression of how far states have really been socialised to these new 
norms. The relative ease with which norm entrepreneurs have been able to secure norm 
emergence without the active help of states belies the much greater challenges ahead of 
securing those norms in practice.
Rational factors shape state interests in norm emergence for group-specific norms but 
state perceptions of legitimacy, conformity and esteem are also relevant. To be 
successful, groups have had to challenge the accepted “logic of appropriateness” on 
deeply embedded norms. The engagement by some states from outside each region 
shows that even though there were few material interests in supporting norm emergence 
for these groups, ideational motivations stimulated action by some state actors. An 
important point for the future of norm adherence is that state socialisation varies 
according to the level of analysis. None of the groups discussed here have achieved full 
norm adherence domestically. The material costs of norm adherence domestically are 
high and knowledge of local state actors of emerging norms on group-specific rights 
seems to be very low. There is a need to work with local actors to socialise them to
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norms and to create accountability mechanisms so the norms are enforced and 
implemented. Checkel’s (2005) work suggests that different strategies of persuasion 
can be more or less effective; in the case of discrimination, for example, persuasion ‘in 
camera’ might be more successful if costs to individual esteem are reduced. 
Discrimination -  or denials thereof - is not easily overcome but institutions can make 
actors more legally, socially, and politically accountable for perpetuating discrimination 
and in the long-term, transform their “logic of appropriateness” in norm recognition.
The impact of norm emergence for group-specific rights:
The new group-specific norms emerging for indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, 
Roma and Dalits have increased the complexity of the international protection regime 
for minorities with both positive and negative effects. The once singular global regime 
incorporating all ethnic, national, religious and linguistic minority groups under 
provisions like Article 27 of the ICCPR has now fragmented into several distinct 
branches, each delineated by a set of group-specific norms and mechanisms. While few 
would dispute that overcoming centuries of marginalisation, discrimination and cultural 
erosion is a just cause, it is possible that the proliferation of group-specific standards 
may not be the best means to this end. These trends could harm the interests of other 
(minority) groups, essentialise differences and alter the order of international society.
Norm emergence has had three key impacts: first, it has empowered the groups in 
question; second, it has altered the landscape of international society; and third, it might 
prompt other communities to seek additional group-specific norms. These points have 
normative and practical implications both for the composition of international society 
and for policy vis-a-vis minority groups. Specifically, the emerging norms: might 
necessitate further support to groups and states for the purpose of norm adherence; will 
require further consideration of accountability of activists to group members locally; 
and finally, could necessitate the elaboration of criteria for assessing whether additional 
group-specific norms are needed and/or legitimate.
308
Empowering minority groups:
The fragmentation of the minority protection regime has transformed in several ways 
the power structures in which minority communities are embedded. The opportunity to 
elaborate group-specific norms has been emancipatory for the communities subject to 
these new norms. The process has increased their participation, liberated them from the 
power constraints of the ‘minority’ term, and deconstmcted the Eurocentric conventions 
of minority protection.
Unlike earlier minority protection regimes, the norms emerging for Dalits, Roma, Afro- 
descendants and indigenous peoples have been shaped in large part by members of the 
groups themselves rather than principally by the interests of states. The elaboration of 
these group-specific norms has been an exercise in self-determination. The norms have 
not been driven by kin state interests or by conventional security concerns but rather by 
a dialectic between these groups, states and international actors. From this dialectic, a 
discourse on new group-specific norms has emerged. The level of participation by 
these groups in the discourse has been unprecedented, facilitated by, inter alia, TANs, 
political opportunity structures and the certification of their demands by international 
actors. Groups that have been invisible and marginalised domestically are now the 
focus of international attention and their recognition offers valuable symbolic gains and 
leverage for altering their status at the national level. Within the international sphere, 
pursuit of norm emergence has increased interest in the concerns of these groups, 
increased their participation in decision-making that affects them, and increased 
resources allocated to their communities. These gains at the international level have not 
translated directly into domestic change, however: for example, new institutions created 
domestically to address group-specific concerns have lacked adequate funds and groups 
still struggle to secure better political participation domestically.
The groups no longer have to call themselves minorities. With the exception of some 
Roma in Europe, for who the label minority is instrumentally useful, the other groups 
are not constrained by the minority label, which they have found to be disempowering, 
inappropriate or logically inconsistent with their self-perception. They can make rights 
claims without having to use the minority frame. This alters the inter-subjective 
understanding of the place of these groups in domestic and international society; far
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from being nameless minorities within states, they are asserting their specific identities, 
their ‘people-ness’ and their transnational community.
The model of minority rights that emerged from the UN system was tied too closely to 
European historical experiences and assumptions of state-minority relations. The UN 
minority protection regime was effectively a European ethic that was extended to serve 
as a universal ethic. As Kymlicka (2007) argues, the regime has had the potential to 
cause harm in other regions and for other groups because it assumes that the 
preconditions that have helped minority protection to function in Europe exist elsewhere 
when they might not. The new group-specific regimes are better adapted to regional 
experiences, other identities and the unique state-minority relations that these groups 
have endured. Prejudice by states in other regions against ‘Western’ minority rights 
(Kymlicka 2007, 258) is decreased by the indigenisation of the group-specific norms, 
making them more useful for local advocacy. For example, Latin American states do 
not have a tradition of using the ‘minority’ concept but Afro-descendants have benefited 
from aligning their claims adjacent to indigenous peoples’ rights to which states in the 
region have been socialised. Dalits and other caste-affected groups in Asia and Africa 
are shaping norms for combating a phenomenon that is not paralleled historically in 
Europe.
Activists will need more support, however, if they are to be empowered to achieve norm 
adherence. This is a key paradox of norm entrepreneurship evident across the cases: 
norm entrepreneurs often are stronger in the international sphere to achieve norm 
emergence then they are in the domestic sphere to secure norm adherence. This is 
because state ideational and rational motivations differ at these two levels and because 
the ability of groups to mobilise transnationally with the assistance of international 
actors has been more successful than their ability to mobilise domestically where 10 
activity is less, interests of group members diverge and the impact of discrimination and 
exclusion is more constraining.
Norm adherence at the domestic level requires strong advocacy skills on the part of 
groups and understanding of the emerging norms on the part of state actors. This means 
investing in long-term sustainable capacity building of all relevant actors. Civil society 
for each group requires funding to build and maintain organisational platforms and
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targeted support on advocacy skills training. Projects that build group esteem, both 
internally and externally, will have multiple benefits. States, particularly at the local 
level, need training on standards, policy support from IOs and NGOs and opportunities 
to work directly with the groups in question. From this dialectic, actors can take steps 
toward norm internalisation.
The international sphere will likely remain important for “insider-outsider coalitions” 
and so the preservation of space in the international sphere for socialisation and 
persuasion to continue is vital. This space provides political opportunities for the 
‘voices of moderation’ within groups. It is important to emphasise that group 
empowerment came from normative change rather than violent conflict. All of the 
groups considered here have had brushes with violence in the past -  both against them 
and by them; there is no reason to assume that they might not take up arms in future, 
particularly where evidence suggests that international interest in their affairs can be 
increased dramatically as a result (Kymlicka 2008, 20). The utility of political 
opportunity structures and support to peaceful organisational platforms is particularly 
striking when compared to the transnational mobilisation of radical Islamists and its 
devastating effects. International society needs to consider carefully how it can 
strengthen space for norm entrepreneurship that uses peaceful methods to generate norm 
adherence.
Changing the landscape o f international society:
The creation of group-specific regimes has increased pluralism in international society 
and challenged the hegemony of the state as the legitimate and unitary representative 
institution of peoples therein. This challenge falls somewhere between the 
communitarian and cosmopolitan assumptions about the locus of the right to self- 
determination, the former believing this rests with the community, the latter with the 
individual. The groups are questioning communitarian assertions that the state is the 
realisation of self-determination of the people by claiming (implicitly or explicitly) that 
the right to self-determination of their group members has been denied by the state. At 
the same time, cosmopolitan assumptions are unhelpful because these groups feel that 
collective identity has meaning and purpose for them, including across borders; they 
proclaim a transnational identity but one that is exclusive and not universal. The right to
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self-determination that these groups assert is located in a different unit of analysis than 
the state or the individual.
Their efforts show how new forms of political community are active in the international 
sphere. General minority rights have served as a caveat to constitutive norms in 
international society, like national self-determination and sovereignty, by 
acknowledging sub-state diversity and imposing limits on state behaviour towards these 
groups. These rights were always contained in the domestic sphere, however, and by 
most accounts were elaborated more for the purpose of protecting state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity than nurturing cultural diversity. The new transnational group- 
specific norms do something different: they make a post-Westphalian challenge to the 
idea of community in international society and the notion that the state is the basic unit 
of analysis and basic right-holding entity. As transnational right-holding groups, they 
have the potential to represent their communities in the international sphere 
independently of any one state, transcending regions and even continents. Unlike other 
groups with group-specific rights, e.g. women, children and persons with disabilities, 
these groups possess the basic building blocs of political community, such as shared 
ethnicity, religion and language, that have constituted our understanding of nations in 
international society. The strategies of building group esteem through incorporation of 
ethnie markers in their identity frames further underscore this. Moreover, they all have 
some interest in land: indigenous peoples have traditional territories, as do several Affo- 
descendant groups; Romani groups are either historically settled with weak land rights 
or nomadic with culturally -specific land rights; and Dalits, also with small and weak 
land holdings, have made some overtures regarding historical treaties regarding land. 
The latent capacity for statehood, however tenuous, makes these groups a very different 
kind of non-state actor in international society.
Privileging states in international society as representatives (and defenders) of 
communities may be conventional and orderly but there is no agreement among 
political theorists as to whether this is the most just system of representation. Even 
communitarians accept a ‘thin’ universal ethic that trumps state sovereignty in cases 
where egregious harms are being made against (usually minority) sub-state groups 
(Linklater 1998, 60). Andrew Linklater (1998) explores some of these possibilities in 
The Transformation o f Political Community where he posits, inter alia, the arguments
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for new forms of political community that are more inclusive than states. He believes 
there is:
a strong argument for granting the members of minority groups the right of 
appeal beyond sovereign states to global legal institutions which give expression 
to the normative ideal of an international society of peoples. Far from being 
antithetical, communitarianism and cosmopolitanism provide complementary 
insights into the possibility of new forms of community and citizenship in the 
post-Westphalian era. They reveal that more complex associations of 
universality and difference can be developed by breaking the nexus between 
sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship and by promoting wider 
communities of discourse. (60)
In many ways, the groups considered here are fulfilling Linklater’s possibilities. Dalits, 
Roma, Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples are not tied to each other by 
citizenship, nationality, territoriality or sovereignty; they are united by a shared 
experience of exclusion by the state. They may feel more affinity with members of 
their group than with the state and their fellow citizens who ignore, degrade, 
discriminate or patronise. The state has not been emancipatory for them, contra 
communitarian assumptions, and individual human rights have not sufficiently served 
their interests. They bring us one step closer to the “normative ideal of an international 
society of peoples” by seeking new forms of representation at the international level and 
have opened up “wider communities of discourse” on minority rights.
These prospects of supra-state representation demand further scrutiny, however. While 
this representation can offer opportunities for a dialectic between excluded and included 
groups (Linklater 1998, 10), it also raises questions of accountability for the discourse 
that results. The presence of minorities in the international sphere, in particular when in 
community with other members of their transnational group, gives more opportunity for 
shaping a new discourse with states than was possible in the domestic sphere where 
such discourse was blocked or insincere. The case studies show clearly that political 
opportunity structures at the international level have opened up new forms of interaction 
with states. How this discourse might be institutionalised over time remains a 
fascinating question. The permanent seat sought by Roma in the UN and CoE opens up 
possibilities of supra-state elected institutions for transnational minority groups. The 
PFII was a step in this direction but has fallen short of expectations, realised as an 
interface with UN agencies rather than a distinct UN representation for indigenous
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peoples on par with states. Afro-descendants have not yet clarified how they see the 
proposed UN Permanent Forum on Afro-descendants functioning. The PFII and ERTF 
have demonstrated that despite the obvious logistical challenges, it is possible to have a 
quasi-electoral system of supra-state representation. What is less clear is the 
accountability of these actors to the constituent groups they portend to represent and to 
the wider societies on which their discourse and decisions might impact. Some critics 
of minority rights already are concerned that the standards give IOs and other states too 
much authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of the state. State freedom is reduced 
by group-specific norms in key areas like national building, equality of opportunity, and 
territorial control. Group-specific supra-state institutions could impose conditions on 
state practice that affect non-minority groups, with limited avenues for appeal. 
Transnational ties of groups and loyalty to supra-state institutions may weaken loyalty 
to the state. Even the members of the beneficiary group might question some of the 
policy proposals emerging from the obscure international sphere.
For the time being, most group members and activists do not seek radical changes to the 
construction of international society. Their priority is to invest in the state to make it 
more equitable and representative, seeking to be valued citizens, for their diversity to be 
respected and for hierarchies to be abolished. They want their right to self- 
determination to be embedded in the state provided it is done so on the basis of equality 
and the acceptance of diversity. Their pursuit of group-specific norms in international 
society is in many ways a mirror of emerging multiculturalism domestically and may 
support it. As the pluralism of minority groups and their distinct representation 
becomes more accepted in international society, this can socialise states to ideas, rights 
and institutions of pluralism domestically. The most likely future scenario is that IOs 
and states will continue to support group-specific supra-state institutions for advisory 
purposes. They will be valuable symbolically and for socialisation but have no power 
to coerce state action, much as is the case for domestic statutory ‘minority councils’. 
Whether they become a temporary ‘special measure’ or permanent structures of 
international society is uncertain. If groups come to rely too heavily on these supra- 
state institutions to promote their interests the risk is that incentives to engage in politics 
domestically will remain low. This could lead to further disenfranchisement of already 
marginalised groups. A constructive policy approach would strive to increase the 
accountability of supra-state advisory groups at the same time as creating support and
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incentives for minorities to engage in politics locally. The supra-state institutions would 
then serve as useful tools for “insider-outsider coalitions”. This bottom-up, top-down 
pressure can in turn makes states more accountable to norm adherence.
Stimulating more group-specific norms:
The directional trend towards group-specific norms raises two essential questions: how 
do we determine which claims for group-specific norms are reasonable?; and what 
impact do these group-specific norms have on other minority groups not able or 
interested to follow this path?
The fragmentation of the minority protection regime reflects a general trend of 
horizontal fragmentation of rights by group. Vertical fragmentation of rights has long 
been a feature of human society, with special privileges accorded by hierarchical status. 
The modem period literally turned this idea on its side, creating differentiation of rights 
for different groups but basing this on a principle of horizontal equality. There are now 
group-specific rights for, inter alia, women, children, persons with disabilities, migrant 
workers and emerging rights for LGBTs. These rights are not seen to privilege these 
groups above others but rather as rights that respond to the particular needs of these 
groups, their legitimate entitlements and the barriers they face to equality.
Any concerns that might be raised about fragmentation of the minority protection 
regime must first acknowledge the weaknesses of the regime, among them that it fails to 
deal adequately with differences across groups. This was a major focus of Will 
Kymlicka’s recent book, Multicultural Odysseys (2007), where he focuses on the 
difficulties presented by the global spread of liberal multiculturalism. Among his 
concerns is the distortion that has resulted from the separation of the indigenous peoples 
rights regime from general minority rights protection. He does not question the 
legitimacy of indigenous rights per se but rather the negative impact of this 
fragmentation on the rights of national minorities. He believes that national ‘homeland’ 
minorities (i.e. historically settled minorities with a distinct territorial concentration) 
have lost out in the minority/indigenous rights split. Norms for indigenous peoples 
have emerged that by his analysis should be afforded equally to national minorities, in 
particular rights to autonomy and self-determination. It is a good example of how
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group-specific norm emergence can unintentionally harm the legitimate interests of 
other minority groups.
In response, he posits the need for a “framework of multi-targeted minority rights” 
(Ibid, 301) but argues that “to date, targeted norms have emerged in an ad hoc 
fashion.. .[that] is unlikely to be stable” (Ibid, 301). He points out:
we need to think more systematically about the role of targeted minority 
rights...there is no established procedure or criteria for evaluating proposals to 
establish new targeted categories, and no general theory of how and when 
targeted categories are needed to supplement generic minority rights (Ibid, 300).
With the increasing complexity of rights regimes, Kymlicka’s interest to establish a 
“procedure or criteria” for determining the justness of new group-specific rights is 
pressing. Most commentators accept that having a distinct indigenous peoples rights 
regime is just but their assessment has been based on the particular case of indigenous 
peoples without proposing universal criteria. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
consider what these normative criteria should be. The case studies suggest, however, 
that the success of norm emergence has depended heavily on instrumental factors such 
as transnational mobilisation and identifying a critical mass of affected states. All of the 
groups considered here exist across continents, not just borders. They also are 
concentrated regionally, whereby most states within the region have populations of the 
groups in question. The population sizes are also large: Roma are Europe’s largest 
minority at roughly 9-11 million; Afro-descendants in Latin America number some 150 
million; Dalits are 240 million, in addition to another 10 million of caste-affected 
groups globally; and the UN estimates that indigenous people number over 370 million. 
In order to allocate the time and resources to group-specific norms and mechanisms, 
there is an evident cost-retum calculation. Neither IOs nor states are likely to 
countenance investing in norm emergence for groups that exist in one or two states. 
Moreover, group-specific norms are institutionalised in regional or global structures in 
which agreement for new norms must be sought across a majority, if not all, states. 
This is difficult to secure and smaller groups seeking protection might achieve stronger 
norms and mechanisms by negotiating domestically where there are fewer actors to 
persuade.
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The problem for these non-transnational minority groups is that to achieve norm 
emergence domestically they may still need the leverage provided by international 
actors and “insider-outsider coalitions”. For this reason, maintaining the generalised 
minority rights protection regime with its standards and monitoring mechanisms is 
valuable for sub-state groups. The proliferation of group-specific norms, however, may 
be weakening these core institutions. The mechanisms specifically targeted for Roma, 
caste-groups, Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples have grown significantly. 
These mechanisms have required new resources. At the same time, there is evidence 
that the general minority protection mechanisms are receding: repeated calls to create a 
Voluntary Fund for minorities have been ignored and the 5-day WGM has been 
replaced with a 3-day Forum on Minorities that has no permanent experts (save for the 
attendant IEM) and can only consider one theme per year. Whereas minorities 
previously could raise grievances within the WGM and the WGM could explore a range 
of thematic issues, the new structure severely curtails both these options. Meanwhile, 
Roma can access a myriad of political opportunities at the regional level; Afro- 
descendants have their own WGPAD and a regional Special Rapporteur; indigenous 
peoples have, among other things, the PFII, Expert Mechanism and Special Rapporteur; 
and Dalits, although lagging behind the others, did have two Special Rapporteurs until 
recently and the ongoing support of CERD.
With decreasing space for generalised minority issues some groups have tried to 
reframe their identities to access the rights and political opportunities of the group- 
specific regimes. This has been most evident in groups claiming to be indigenous 
peoples (Kymlicka 2007; Lennox 2006) and the efforts of immigrant minorities seeking 
protection under the FCNM.374 The effect is that the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ 
and ‘national minorities’ is distorted and the rights regime weakened by application of 
the norms to communities that do not fit into the category legitimately. As these other 
group-specific regimes grow, a similar distortion may occur. Already there is evidence 
that this is creating tension: for example, the attempts by Travellers to claim access to 
norms and institutions for Roma have inflamed relations between the groups in some 
cases.
374 Personal communication with Alan Phillips (Chair of the FCNM Advisory Committee), June 2009. 
Phillips reports that the Advisory Committee will sometimes consider article 6 of the FCNM vis-a-vis 
recent immigrant groups and where states accept the application of the FCNM to such groups.
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Tension also can arise between groups at the international, and particularly, domestic 
level. As Dalits, Roma, Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples gain attention, 
resources, standards, mechanisms, and policy interventions targeted only for them, other 
groups within a region or state may perceive the support to be disproportionate and 
exclusionary. Marginalised ethnic, religious and linguistic groups that do not fall into 
these broad group-specific categories may be increasingly ignored and see their 
inequality grow as resources are diverted to these transnational groups. This can create 
inter-communal tension and possibly conflict. With few outlets within international 
organisations to raise their concerns, marginalised minorities may have to resort to more 
antagonistic means to make their objections heard.
It is important to recall that the failures of the protection regime fall to states, not 
minority groups. If we focus too much on the harm caused by the fragmentation of the 
minority protection regime we risk blaming the victims and not the violators. Groups 
that have sought their own regimes have done so because their positions of extreme 
marginalisation and inequality have not been addressed by the state. Group-specific 
norm entrepreneurship is partly a response to poor implementation of existing norms. 
To suggest that group-specific standards should be limited necessitates first a call for 
states to adhere to existing norms of protection. Rights are always a means to an end; 
new rights are not necessarily die most efficient means to the end but without strong 
material power domestically, transnational social mobilisation and norm 
entrepreneurship has provided one means for groups to press for change. So long as 
states continue not to meet their obligations to minority groups, we might expect 
minorities to continue their norm entrepreneurship projects.
The future of minority group-specific norm entrepreneurship:
Given that indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, Dalits and Roma have been 
successful at group-specific norm emergence, it is worth considering how their 
achievements to date might evolve in the future, and how their experience might 
stimulate other norm entrepreneurs. There are also several ways in which their efforts 
could be understood better with further research.
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The case studies show that the groups have been more successful at securing soft law 
standards and monitoring mechanisms than they have been at achieving legally binding 
provisions. Only indigenous peoples have a legally binding treaty in the form of ILO 
Convention 169 and this has been ratified by only 20 states. The desire of Dalit leaders 
for a convention on caste-based discrimination, the Roma for a European Roma Rights 
Charter and Afro-descendants for articles specifically for them in the OAS convention 
on racism, may be a long way to fulfilment. Strategically, the groups might be better 
off using existing soft law and monitoring mechanisms to socialise states to the 
emerging norms towards a gradual norm cascade, at which point the adoption and 
ratification of a legally binding treaty could be much easier to secure. In this effort they 
can rely on the continued support of international actors like CERD and the Special 
Rapporteurs.
Beyond the experiences of the four groups considered here, we might see increased 
interest from other groups to follow a similar path towards group-specific norm 
entrepreneurship. Pastoralists, for example, have been tentatively mobilising across 
borders and regions.375 At present, they make their claims primarily under indigenous 
peoples’ standards but the particular needs of nomadic, animal-husbandry communities 
might be served better by group-specific standards that can address, for example, 
transborder route issues and economic development interests. Other minority groups 
could potentially constmct frames that unite transnationally otherwise disparate 
identities. National ‘homeland’ minorities or linguistic minorities might be able to find 
common ground and embark on norm entrepreneurship. The fact that we have not 
witnessed this kind of transnational social mobilisation at the global level to date 
suggests that either the will or capacity to pursue it is low. At the more radical end of 
the spectrum, the possibility of an international alliance of all marginalised minority 
groups stands. The idea is not new: Dalit activists have uncovered evidence of 
correspondence from Ambedkar to W.E.B. Dubois discussing the similarities between 
“Untouchables in India and of the position of the Blacks in America” and their shared 
interest in petitioning the new UN to take better account of their concerns in drafting the 
UDHR (Thorat and Umakant 2004, xxix). The efforts by the NAACP and the 
American Jewish League to secure representation of NGOs in the UN could be 
interpreted as an attempt to create space for such an international alliance to build.
375 See the first Global Pastoralist Gathering held in Ethiopia in 2005. Some 120 pastoralist leaders from 
23 countries attended the meeting, along with governmental and IO actors (Scott-Villiers 2005).
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Since the WCAR, some minority groups have used opportunity structures like the 
World Social Forum to build transnational and trans-group solidarity; for example, 
Dalits arranged during the first World Social Forum to visit to landless Afro-
*inf.
Brazilians. The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, founded in 1991, 
comes closest institutionally to this idea but despite some interesting initiatives, such as 
a conference on ‘Opening the World Order to De facto States’ in May 2008, it has failed
^77to make much impact. In general, the challenges of transnational mobilisation and 
group-specific norm entrepreneurship are great, resources to do it are scarce and 
political opportunities are not widespread, decreasing the likelihood that many more 
groups will follow this path.
Alternatively, states may find it is in their interests to create more group-specific norms. 
This possibility is increasingly evident in the case of Muslim minorities, who are being 
championed by the OIC (for example, in the context of the DRC ((Lennox 2009)). It is 
also evident in Europe, where states with large immigrant minorities are resisting efforts 
to extend the FCNM’s provisions to such groups (e.g. Turks in Germany). It is in state 
interests to restrict the definition of national minorities as narrowly as possible to avoid
%7 q
rights claims of ‘aspirant’ immigrant minorities. This restriction has the adverse 
effect of leaving many groups without minority rights protection. Any new conventions 
can only be ratified voluntarily by states; the states with the highest population of the 
affected group may conversely have the lowest incentive to ratify a legally-binding 
convention that would restrict state practice. The OIC, for example, is behind a 
proposed optional protocol to ICERD that would focus on religious defamation (Lennox 
2009); while they may succeed in adopting an optional protocol, non-Muslim states 
could have weak incentive to become party to it. Kymlicka (2007) notes that an attempt 
by Liechtenstein to table a Draft Convention on Self-Determination through Self- 
Administration in 1994 (in effect, a global, stronger FCNM) failed (208).
The trend towards and consolidation of group-specific norms seems more likely to 
occur at the regional level. The example of the Roma illustrates this well -  European 
Roma have had tremendous success with European institutions and Roma in Latin 
America did best at the Santiago prepcom. Transnational mobilisation is more easily
376 Interview with Umakant, November 2008.
377 For information on the UNPO activities see www.unpo.org (accessed 14 March 2009).
378 1 am grateful to Anna-Maria Biro for this point.
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constructed across similar cultural and political space. It requires fewer resources to 
socialise a smaller number of states to emerging norms. States with a shared history and 
similar identities can ease the complications of trying to achieve global consensus over 
commitments. The case studies suggest that success can be achieved even by a small 
number of elite activists where they have good support from INGOs and IOs, 
particularly IOs that can institutionalise emerging norms. Much will depend upon the 
political opportunity structures available to groups at the regional level and whether 
they are able to establish organisational platforms that can sustain advocacy efforts. On 
the former point, the political opportunities generated by the WCAR and UN human 
rights institutions, which have been vital to group-specific norm entrepreneurship, will 
not be matched easily at the regional level. On the latter point, evidence shows that 
donors are reluctant to fund group-specific advocacy so the prospects of building or 
strengthening organisational platforms are limited.
The most significant barriers to future norm entrepreneurship, however, are at the 
domestic level. The paradox of minority norm entrepreneurship is that groups often are 
stronger in the international sphere to negotiate norm emergence than they are in the 
domestic sphere to secure norm adherence. Norm emergence costs are usually lower for 
states than norm adherence. Forms of discrimination and social hierarchies prevalent 
domestically are less potent in the international sphere, increasing groups’ power. The 
mechanisms for transnational social mobilisation have been easier for groups to use 
than the mechanisms of social mobilisation domestically. The international sphere has 
fewer players to reach consensus on strategies. IOs often have made it easy for groups 
to input into policy recommendations. This has created less propitious conditions for 
norm adherence because norm emergence has accelerated beyond the rate of norm 
socialisation, aided in large part by forward-thinking 10 interventions. At the domestic 
level, Affo-descendant, Dalit, indigenous and Romani leaders have struggled to make 
their respective identity frames more empowering for group members at the grassroots 
level. Discrimination still results in social disadvantage for many individuals who self- 
identify as members of these groups. Without state intervention to integrate fully these 
identities into a pluralist, multi-cultural construction of the nation, civil society leaders 
will find an uphill struggle to mobilise people regardless of the machinations in the 
international sphere. The implementation of the emerging norms falls primarily to 
states. At present, there is very little pressure on states to fulfill these responsibilities:
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domestic mobilisation of Afro-descendants, Dalits, Roma and (with some exceptions) 
indigenous peoples is still relatively weak; the possibility for country-level monitoring 
of group-specific and general minority mechanisms is low; and IOs have not exhibited 
institution-wide commitment to emerging norms, limiting the likelihood they will push 
for these norms across their engagement with states. Stakeholders will need to shift 
their attention to establishing the domestic conditions for norm adherence rather than 
sticking to the slightly easier path of norm emergence processes.
There are several areas of future research that could illuminate this norm adherence 
path. Further study is needed on the conditions that have helped or hindered norm 
adherence domestically. A comparison of each group across several states in a single 
region would uncover some of the variables that have influenced this adherence. In this 
research, it is necessary to consider what are the potential risks of non-compliance for 
states. Ostensibly, the risks at present are low but research might uncover some 
variables that would show the high costs of non-compliance and benefits of adherence, 
which in turn could be useful for developing better advocacy strategies. Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) contend that domestic factors of mobilisation matter less as norms are 
more embedded in international society (902); whether this is equally the case for 
group-specific norms for ethno-cultural groups -  i.e. groups that have a particular 
relationship with the state -  would be useful to uncover. Any research on norm 
adherence must be disaggregated by level of analysis. The preliminary evidence from 
the case studies suggests that barriers to norm compliance vary at international, national 
and local levels of governance. This needs to be examined in order to create more 
effective policy responses that can overcome the factors, particularly at the local level, 
that will impede norm internalisation. The analysis here has tentatively explored some 
of the reasons why norm adherence will be challenging, including the nature of non­
discrimination as a norm, lack of awareness of emerging norms by local/national actors 
and weak capacity of local NGOs to advocate for norm adherence. Consideration of the 
impact of norms on other groups should feature in any of this research. Concerns that 
the proliferation of group-specific norms unnecessarily divides societies could be 
critically assessed with, inter alia, survey research and data on the changes in the 
distribution of resource and policy provisions across groups.
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The role of IOs could also be examined in greater detail. There is very little analysis of
<570
the influence on state behaviour of 10 support to emerging minority norms. Different 
IOs have differing capacity to create threats and opportunities for state compliance. 
There is also very little transparency on how IOs are supporting norm adherence 
through their myriad of programme and project interventions. Some IOs can pinpoint 
how much funding they have earmarked for some groups, particularly indigenous 
peoples and Roma, but funding alone is not a measure of impact on normative 
behaviour. Individual project evaluations are insufficient to assess the (compounded) 
influence of different forms of intervention, be they sector-specific, group-specific, 
quiet diplomacy, civil society grants or budgetary support.
There has also been weak analysis of the implementation of the Durban Declaration 
and Programme o f Action specifically. State reports submitted to the OHCHR as part 
of the DRC process have mostly been thin on detail. The WGPAD has invited a 
handful of papers to review some progress on the provisions for Afro-descendants but 
these have not been well-funded research projects and have failed to look in-depth at 
processes at the national level. Many activists cite the value of the WCAR for their 
norm entrepreneurship. This thesis has tried to examine those perceptions and to 
determine how the WCAR - among other factors -  has been a tool for norm emergence. 
More effort is needed to determine what impact the WCAR has had outside the 
international sphere, in the daily lives of Dalits and Afro-descendants at home.
Durban was a singular moment, a hopeful event despite its controversies, and a high 
note in a series of world conferences that have given little to the victims of racism. It 
has not had the same normative impact of world conferences in Vienna, Rio or Beijing 
but its achievements, as demonstrated here, are not insignificant, particularly for those 
groups who have used it to mobilise and to strengthen a longer-term project of norm 
entrepreneurship. Afro-descendants wanted their governments to address the 
contemporary impact of the historical injustice of slavery and to acknowledge the value 
of Affo-descendant heritage. Dalits wanted their governments to implement domestic 
standards created to overcome the injustices of the caste-based discrimination. Roma 
wanted their governments to respect the cultural heritage of Roma, to combat anti-
379 Some exceptions include studies on the impact of the World Bank policies on indigenous peoples and 
on EU accession policies on minorities.
380 See UN Doc. A/HRC/7/36, (13 March 2008).
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Gypsism and to protect them as a distinct type of non-territorial nation. Indigenous 
peoples wanted to be accepted equally and fully as peoples. After the WCAR, Roma 
and indigenous peoples no longer stand out as the lone groups that have been able to 
establish group-specific norms and mechanisms in international society. Durban marked 
the consolidation of the caste-based transnational mobilisation frame and gave Latin 
American Afro-descendants a chance to forge a strong regional identity and normative 
base. These groups also stood out from other victim groups at Durban, managing 
through sustained advocacy, international cooperation and strategic alliances to secure 
extensive provisions in the outcome documents of the regional prepcoms, NGO Forum 
and the WCAR itself. Through these actions and their norm entrepreneurship since, 
they are injecting a new pluralism into normative understandings of inter-communal 
relations, helping to transform conventional dichotomies like state/nation and 
majority/minority. They have created “wider communities of discourse”, which are 
shaping new ideational assumptions about group identities, state obligations, and the 
role of IOs vis-a-vis sub-state communities.
The very fact that so many of the world’s most marginalised people could travel so far 
to Durban, make their voice heard so wide and compel states to admit so many of their 
failures shows how far we have come in the protection of minorities but is a reminder 
that there is still a long way to go to achieve equality and justice for all.
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